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Abstract 
Most LDC regimes, especially those with a colonial past, suffer from a deficit in 
legitimacy. Basing their rule on the personality and achievements of one person, 
these regimes have failed to pass on their legitimacy to their successors, or 
sometimes even secure legitimacy for the state. They have drawn up a social 
contract with their populations that entailed obligations to achieve objectives such 
as industrialisation, national and economic independence, and welfare of their 
societies. In return, their populations were expected to support their regimes, and 
surrender their political rights and liberties. 
In this research, we focus on the social contract in Egypt, as an example of an LDC 
state where the regime has suffered from a lack of legitimacy since the country 
gained its independence in 1952. Over the last five decades, Egyptian regimes have 
forged a social contract with their populations in order to legitimise their rule. The 
social contract encompassed achieving objectives adopted by the regime on the 
domestic and international level according to their visions. The formula of the 
social contract has been modified by the regime in response to changes in domestic 
and international factors. 
One of the main obligations that the regime has committed itself to since 1952 has 
been welfare provision by the state. The commitment of the regime to provide 
welfare for the population has been an effective tool to generate legitimacy. Thus, 
the maintenance of a 'welfare state' has constituted a central component of the 
social contract since 1952. However, a social contract based on welfare provision 
has not been durable; this type of contract has secured the regime legitimacy only as 
long as it has been able to deliver welfare products. As industrialisation failed to 
take off, Egyptian regimes found it difficult to sustain the welfare state. Their 
attempts to withdraw from welfare provision, without compromising their 
legitimacy, have been unsuccessful. This is because the regime has marketed 
welfare provision by the state as a right of the public based on citizenship; the 
populace has proved resilient in defending this right. Hence, the regime had to rely 
upon aid and or external borrowing to postpone the crisis; and modify the social 
contract by introducing some measures of politicalliberalisation. 
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Introduction 
Introduction 
Western democratic states have been characterised by stability, symbolised in the 
absence of coup d'etats or revolutions since World War II. 1 One can argue that this 
has been due to the presence of a social contract between the state and society that is 
founded upon respect of liberties, property, and maintenance of social cohesion. This 
has been facilitated by the existence of strong democratic institutions that guarantee 
the rotation of power peacefully through an election process. This system allows the 
formation of 'corporations', representing the different interest groups in society, and 
enables them to influence policy formulation. 
In contrast, many regimes in less developed countries (LDCs), which lack legitimacy, 
have failed to create democratic institutions that can legitimise their rule and bring 
about the desired stability. Thus, a major challenge for these LDC regimes has been 
how to maintain stability in the absence of legitimacy. 
1 Huntington, S., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991 ), pp. 16-18. 
1 
Many regimes in post-independent LDCs have come to power through military 
coups. Once they reached power, these regimes found it difficult to preserve their 
rule, due to their lack of legitimacy, and in some cases of the state as well. 
Therefore, stability has been a major preoccupation of these regimes. To these 
regimes, stability means the preservation of their rule. 
Lacking sound democratic institutions that can guarantee stability, these regimes 
have tried to legitimise their rule and achieve stability through another form of social 
contract with their populations. According to this contract, the regime pledges to 
meet certain obligations dictated by its vision, in return for the support of the 
population. These obligations included ambitious objectives, such as industrialisation 
and modernisation, and pursuing national and economic independence. Additionally, 
many of them have extended welfare policies, which in some cases, such as in India, 
have been installed by former colonial powers. 2 And when they have been unable to 
control their opponents, they usually resorted to repression. 
Industrialisation 
Many LDCs gained their national independence throughout the 1950s and 1960s. 
National independence was then believed to be tied to economic independence. The 
newly independent nations aspired to achieve economic growth, self-reliance, and 
social justice, and soon become like the European countries that managed to build 
2 Midgley, J., ''Theoretical Implications of Third World Social Policy Research", inS. MacPherson, 
and J. Midgley (eds.), Comparative Social Policy and the Third World, (Sussex: Wheatsheaf, 
1987), pp. 119-121. 
2 
their economies after their entire destruction in the aftermath of World War II with 
the aid of the Marshall Plan.3 
Structural development theorists, such as Prebisch, Seers and Myrdal, argued that 
the structure of the world economy worked against the development of LDCs. LDC 
economies were characterised by the dominance of primary commodity exports in 
their international trade.4 They traded primary commodities for manufactured goods 
from industrialised economies. The declining terms of trade for primary commodities 
versus manufactured products favoured industrialised advanced economies at the 
expense of LDCs. So if these countries wished to become independent economically, 
they should industrialise their economies, through import-substitution (IS) policies, 
and protect their domestic infant industries from competition of foreign products. 5 
By the late 1960s, most of these economies, which had adopted IS industrialisation 
policies, came to realise the limitations of these policies once they finished the easy 
first stage of IS, of producing labour-intensive consumer goods. They were trapped 
into the second more complex stage that entailed the production of intermediate 
capital-intensive goods.6 Other LDCs, mainly African countries, have based their 
3 Abdel-Waheed, M., "Aid and Debt Issues in Egypt: Past Trends and Future Prospects", L'Egypte 
Contemporaine, no. 446, April1997, pp. 70. 
4 For figures of export structure of some LDC see Cypher, J., and J. Dietz, The Process of 
Economic Development, (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 274-275. 
5 Hunt, D., Economic Theories of Development: An Analysis of Competing Paradigms, (New York: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989), pp. 47-59. 
6 Cypher, J., and J. Dietz, The Process of Economic Development, (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 
300-302. 
3 
industrialisation on manufactured capital-intensive goods in an attempt to move 
away from dependence on agriculture and export of primary products. 7 In both 
cases, these economies became more dependent on the developed economies for 
technology; and the desired objectives of sovereignty once again faltered. 
Since the late 1970s, advocacy of a free market economy gained prominence, as IS 
policies had failed to achieve economic development. The public sector in most 
LDCs failed to play an effective role in producing economic growth; it expanded and 
became inefficient, acting more as a drain on the modest resources of these countries 
than an 'engine of growth'. Thus, neo-liberal economists were vindicated and they 
called for the confmement of the government to providing national defence and 
maintaining domestic security. 8 
Neo-liberal economists opined that many LDC economies experienced difficulties 
due to their inward-oriented policies. This was exacerbated by the oil shocks of the 
1970s and the recession that followed, as the US and Britain adopted tight monetary 
policies in order to control domestic inflation. In response to escalating economic 
difficulties, most of LDC countries attempted to protect their industries, while 
maintaining their consumption levels. They were able to sustain both requirements 
7 Cammack, P., D. Pool, and W. Tordoff, Third World Politics: A Comparative Introduction, 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1988), pp. 55-56. 
8 Bauer, P., "Remembrance of Studies Past", in G. Meier, and D. Seers (eds.), Pioneers in 
Development, (New York: Oxford University Press, Published for the World Bank, 1984), pp. 30-
31. 
4 
through external aid and borrowing. 9 Most LDCs borrowed from international banks 
short-term loans at excessively high interest rates. Consequently, their debts started 
to accumulate at an unprecedented rate rising from US$92 billion in 1972 to US$760 
billion in 1982.10 
Due to the global recession, LDCs immersed in debt found it difficult to service their 
debt. Subsequently, Mexico declared moratorium on its debt in 1982. Concerned 
about the possibility of other countries following suit, the IMF and the US interfered 
to overcome the debt crisis and save the international fmancial system from 
collapsing. They assisted 'potentially defaulting countries', through debt reschedule, 
debt-for-equity and debt-for-nature swaps. These countries were also pressured to 
adopt structural adjustment programmes by tying aid and extension of funds to 
. rfi .h 11 econotruc pe ormance m t ose programmes. 
Welfare Policies 
Since their independence, most LDC regimes have adopted welfare policies, 
represented in food subsidies, free health care and education, and guaranteed 
employment. These regimes have purported that welfare policies have been 
9 Cypher, J., and J. Dietz, The Process of Economic Development, (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 
533-546. 
10 World Debt Tables: External Debt of Developing Countries, (Washington, D.C.: The World 
Bank, 1989, 1991). 
11 Cypher, J., and J. Dietz, The Process of Economic Development, (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 
547-550. 
5 
implemented to enhance development and social justice. However, in most cases 
these policies have been manipulated by the ruling regimes to gain the support of 
their populations at the grass-root levels, while keeping them away from political 
participation. 
Most of these states were newly created after independence; and even the ones that 
enjoyed a long tradition of statehood were not institutionalised in a way to promote 
political participation and democracy. Most leaders of LDC states have sought to 
accumulate power vis-a-vis society in order to secure their regimes. They have done 
this by blocking most avenues to political participation, and suppressing the 
development of a dynamic civil society in order to prevent the emergence of any 
group that could challenge their authority. 
Thus, they have taken away from their populations the right to participate m 
exchange for some economic benefits. In effect, these regimes have tried to forge a 
social contract with the middle and lower income groups of their populations, who 
have been bypassed in the process of economic growth through industrialisation. 
According to this contract, regimes provide their populations with goods and 
services and the latter offer their support. 
However, the durability of this type of contract is highly questionable because of the 
limited resources of these states. LDC states cannot afford to sustain welfare 
provision indefinitely, with modest economic growth rate, taking into consideration 
population growth. Financing current consumption can come from government 
revenues, borrowing or aid. Devoting government revenues to finance welfare 
6 
policies and current consumption undermines economic growth. This is because state 
resources can be employed alternatively to fmance industrial projects or 
infrastructure that can contribute to investment and economic growth. Borrowing is 
not a favourable option as it ties future earnings of the country, through interest rate 
payments, and it means that current consumption is materialised at the expense of 
future consumption. Finally, aid compromises the sovereignty of the state, as the 
economy becomes dependent on external aid, which is usually conditional. 
Consequently, once these resources dry up, the state is burdened by debt and it 
experiences a 'fiscal crisis'. Then the regime is under pressure to adopt retrenchment 
policies, which involve diminishing its welfare programmes. However, as the social 
contract is based upon exchange of goods and services for political support, the 
legitimacy of the regime is compromised. Hence, the beneficiaries of welfare policies 
have the right to resist the authority of the regime; and the fragility of legitimacy of 
the regime is exposed. 
Hypothesis of the Study 
This study examines the crisis of legitimacy in LDCs. The author argues that many 
LDC regimes in their desperate quest for legitimacy have manipulated social policy 
to gain the support of segments of middle and lower income groups, who have not 
been incorporated into the system through patronage. The research focuses upon the 
social contract based on welfare provision as an instrument for generating 
legitimacy. 
7 
Legitimacy, the author argues, is a dynamic concept; in other words, regimes may 
enjoy legitimacy at certain points in their rule more than at others. Moreover, 
legitimacy exists along a continuum so that the population may be acquiescent to its 
regime not only because of its belief in the right of the regime to rule and the 
soundness of the regime's policies, but also because of a conditional consent. The 
relationship between the public and the regime can be based upon exchange, 
whereby the former gains from material benefits in exchange for the support it offers 
the regime. This type of relationship forms the essence of the social contract in many 
LDC states. 
In this research, the author examines the durability of this formula of social contract 
between the regimes and citizens in the developing world. The researcher opines that 
welfare policies have been manipulated in LDCs, by the regimes, in order to generate 
the legitimacy that they lacked upon assuming power after independence. 
This approach has ensured the survival of the regime and served the interests of the 
ruling elite by allowing them to make considerable profits from the prevalent political 
and economic system, with minimum resistance from the disadvantaged groups 
within society. Thus, the welfare state serves more as an apparatus of legitimation 
than a device to enhance the welfare of citizens or to promote the rise of a welfare 
society. The regime tries to balance the conflicting interests of the ruling elite and 
lower income groups, whilst maintaining conditions that serve the interests of the 
ruling elite and/or the state. 
8 
Focus of the Research 
In order to examine the social contract between LDC regimes and society, this 
research focuses upon: 
• the state; 
• the civil society. 
The state is central to the analysis of the social contract between the regime and 
society. This is because the formulation and implementation of a social contract 
based upon the surrender of the right to participation by the populace, in return for 
welfare gains, is determined by the strength and autonomy of the state to apply this 
formula. Therefore, a discussion of the strength, autonomy and legitimacy of the 
state is vital for the scrutiny of the social contract. In particular, we need to 
investigate what determines the strength of the state and the autonomy a state enjoys 
from different interest groups within society. Then we need to explore the relevance 
of the social contract to the legitimacy of political authority. 
Social contract theory attempts to explain the emergence of civil government and the 
legitimacy of political authority. Social contract theorists, basically, argue that civil 
government originated to protect the life, property, and liberties of individuals. The 
ruler, therefore, has an obligation to promote the liberties of citizens, who should 
submit to his/her authority so long he/she carries out his/her obligations. Once the 
ruler fails to meet his/her obligations, citizens have a right to resist his/her authority. 
Thus, the social contract legitimises the authority of the ruler. 
9 
When the regime commits itself to provide welfare to legitimise its rule, the 
acceptance of the authority of the regime is tied to its ability to meet its welfare 
obligations. The ability to deliver welfare is dependent upon the resources of the 
state. This implies that once these resources are exhausted, the regime faces a 
difficulty in meeting its obligation, and the risk of the population turning against the 
regime rises. At this point, the regime is compelled to modify the terms of the 
contract, and in the absence of resources, it has to allow the civil society more 
autonomy to play a larger role in meeting the needs and wants of the public. 
The civil society, which compnses voluntary associations, acts as a mediator 
between the state and the individual (or the household); it represents and advances 
the interests of citizens. A strong civil society is more efficient than the state in 
meeting the needs and wants of citizens because it springs from voluntary activity, 
and is, therefore, more sensitive to these needs. However, it poses a threat to the 
ruling regime, if its legitimacy is weak, as it highlights the failure of the regime to 
provide welfare for society, and, therefore, could act as a viable vehicle for 
democratisation, especially as the contract based on welfare provision collapses. 
Organisation of the Research 
Since the focus of the research is state-society relations in LDCs, we need to 
examine the state, and civil society. The first two chapters will form the theoretical 
foundation of the study. In chapter one, we will present a definition of the state; then 
we will explore the concepts of strength and autonomy of the state in making 
10 
decisions and formulating policies. A key concept for the purpose of the research 
that will be examined at length is the legitimacy of the regime, particularly in LDCs. 
Then we will look at the other component of the study, the civil society, identifying 
its main characteristics and its significance for the study of the social contract in 
LDCs. 
In chapter two, we will look at the welfare state, exploring its philosophy, origins in 
the West, and the explanations behind its rise, expansion, and retrenchment. We will 
propose a definition of the welfare state that suits the purpose of this study. We will 
examine the different models of the welfare state, and universal vs. selective schemes 
of welfare provision. Finally, we will discuss the applicability of the welfare state to 
LDC states in order to comprehend how welfare provision has been utilised as the 
basis of the social contract to generate legitimacy. 
Having laid the theoretical foundation of the research, we will apply it to the case 
study, Egypt. 
Case Study: Egypt 
In this research, we are particularly interested in the relevance of welfare provision, 
as one of the main declared obligations of the regime towards the population, to the 
social contract in many LDCs. The author uses Egypt as a case study to consider this 
form of social contract in LDCs. 
11 
In chapter three, we will highlight state-society relations in Egypt during the period 
1952-2000. We will analyse the social contract formulated by Egyptian regimes since 
the 1952 revolution. The author argues that Egyptian regimes since 1952 have aimed 
to generate legitimacy by operating at two levels, domestic and international. 
Domestically, they have employed a corporatist model to co-opt key groups in 
society into the system. The regime has manipulated welfare policies to gain the 
support of middle and lower income groups. As Egyptian regimes have been 
reluctant to share power, they have continually suppressed civil society. At the 
international level, Egyptian regimes have tried to capitalise on their victories in 
foreign policy to acquire the support of their population. Furthermore, they have 
used the rent from Egypt's geo-strategic location to secure foreign assistance that 
has been employed to finance industrialisation and/or welfare provision. 
In other words, the welfare state has been crucial to the social contract in Egypt. The 
regime has pledged to provide the population with welfare products, such as 
subsidised basic foodstuffs, and free education, in return for its acquiescence. 12 
The study of the Egyptian case will allow us to test the durability of a social contract 
founded upon this type of exchange between the state and society. The hypothesis of 
the author is that a social contract founded upon welfare provision, is not durable 
because it is conditioned by the ability of the regime or the state to secure the 
required resources to finance the welfare state. This hypothesis is validated by 
12 Hinnebusch, R., ''The Formation of the Contemporary Egyptian State from Nasser and Sadat to 
Mubarak", in I. M. Oweiss (ed.), The Political Economy of Contemporary Egypt, (Washington, 
D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1990), pp. 189. 
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tracing the rise, expansion and decline of the welfare state under the three successive 
regimes that have ruled Egypt since the revolution. The case study shows that 
legitimacy engendered through welfare provision is not stable, as it is conditioned by 
the availability of resources. 
In chapter four, we will investigate the existence of a welfare state in Egypt. 
Applying the definition proposed in chapter two, the author characterises Egypt, 
within the time frame of the study, as a welfare state. The development of the 
welfare state in Egypt could be divided into three phases: rise, expansion, and 
retrenchment of welfare provision. We will examine how Nasir's regime employed 
welfare policies to generate the needed legitimacy once he was in power, through 
food subsidies, free education, and public health care. Then we will analyse the 
reasons behind his successor's, Sadat, expansion in welfare provision. Finally, we 
will discuss the phase of retrenchment under Mubarak. 
In order to present an analysis of the social contract based on welfare provision, we 
need to examine the perceptions of the beneficiaries of welfare state of public 
welfare products, especially those at the lower end of social strata, who tend to be 
politically and socially excluded. Therefore, a fieldwork measuring the perceptions of 
these groups of the welfare products provided by the state proved essential. 
Fieldwork 
In chapter five, we present the findings and conclusion of a fieldwork conducted by 
the researcher during the period December 1998 - October 1999. The fieldwork 
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assesses the accessibility of lower income households, in a low-income district in 
Cairo, to welfare products offered by the state in the fields of food subsidies, 
education, and health care. The fieldwork also highlights voluntary efforts of 
religious organisations that serve as alternative providers in many cases for these 
households. The author suggests that the success of these organisations is double-
edged. On the one hand, it relieves the state by sharing the heavy burden of 
providing for society, given the limited resources of the state. On the other hand, it 
leads to the alienation of these groups from the regime, and widens of the gap 
between the state and its disappointed population that gave up its right to 
participation for welfare but was not gratified by the poor performance of the state. 
Results from the fieldwork have been used by the researcher as an indicator of the 
perceptions of these households of the ability and commitment of the state to meet 
their needs in the aforementioned areas. The researcher used a non-probability 
sample of 160 households from a low-income district in Cairo. Due to the sensitivity 
of the study, the researcher had to depend on a network of friends in approaching 
interviewees, whose identities were kept anonymous. 
The sample comprised the two major religious elements of Egyptian society, Muslim 
and Christian, to be able to investigate the role of religious institutions in providing 
an alternative channel of assistance to the poor. 
The purpose of the questionnaire is to assess: 
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o The accessibility of goods/services in areas of food subsidies, education, and 
health-care provided by the state. 
• The degree to which lower income households use these products. 
• How lower income households rate these products. 
• The services provided by religious organisations as an alternative to those offered 
by the state; and how they are rated by the users from lower income households. 
As lower income groups lack resources to influence policy formulation, their 
interests have usually been overlooked. Nevertheless, these groups have managed to 
benefit marginally from welfare products extended to the whole population, as part 
of the social contract between the state and the population. The author avers that the 
regime, due to financial constraints, has failed to fulfil a major obligation of the 
social contract. The implication of this failure is that society is looking for alternative 
means to satisfy its needs. Thus, the regime has to redetine the contract by allowing 
the civil society to operate more autonomously to help serve those unmet needs in 
order to ensure stability and continuity. So far, the regime has shown resilience in 
meeting societal demands for a more liberal environment conducive to the operation 
of an active civil society because of its lack of legitimacy. This is because of its 
concern that its legitimacy will be further diminished by the success of a dynamic 
civil society that serves the needs of its local constituencies. 
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Chapter One 
The State and Civil Society 
Introduction 
Many regimes in LDCs suffer from a deficit in legitimacy. To consolidate their rule, 
these regimes have tried to acquire legitimacy by drawing up a social contract with 
society that served their interests. They have tried to appeal to their populations 
through various means, such as nationalism, economic development, and welfare 
provision. In return, they expected their populations to provide them with support 
and allow the regime to steer the nation according to the vision of the regime. 
This research focuses upon the social contract and its durability in LDCs, using 
Egypt as a case study. In order to examine the social contract, we need to look at the 
parties involved in the contract, namely, the state and society, and analyse the 
relationship between them. The social contract governs the relationship between the 
state and society by setting out the terms of exchange of the contract that defme the 
relationship between the two parties. 
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Many regimes in LDCs have tried to expand their autonomy at the expense of 
society. In return, they have pledged to achieve national and international 
objectives. By claiming to promote the common interest, they have also tried to 
suppress civil society in order to prevent it from posing a challenge to their rule and 
acting as a vehicle for democratisation. However, usually regimes have been unable 
to keep their part of the social contract; and they have redetined the formula of the 
social contract. This has afforded civil society an opportunity to reassert itself vis-a-
vis the state and assume a larger role in the new formula. 
In this chapter, we will lay down the theoretical foundation to understanding the 
relationship between state and society by focusing on the following: 
• state; 
• civil society; 
In the first part of this chapter, we will examine existing definitions of the state; 
additionally, we will analyse the factors that affect the ability of the state to 
formulate and implement decisions and policies, namely, strength, autonomy, and 
legitimacy. After that, we will consider the role played by civil society in the 
political, economic and social arenas. In chapter two, we will investigate the rise 
and decline of the welfare state as an arm of paternal governance. This will enable 
us to understand how social policy has been manipulated by many LDC regimes in 
order to acquire legitimacy. 
17 
The State 
The state regulates society and relationships among different actors within society. 
For the purpose of this research, which is to examine the durability of the social 
contract in Egypt based on welfare provision, we need to understand the 
relationship between the state and society, especially in terms of state obligations. 
In order to ascertain this, it is critical to arrive at a suitable working definition of the 
state. 
When we examine the state, from this perspective, we need to focus upon three 
particular concerns: 
• state strength; 
• state autonomy; 
• state legitimacy. 
These concerns are central to the understanding of the interaction between state and 
society. They constitute a state-centred approach to the study of the state. This 
approach, which has been mainly employed by political scientists, however, has lost 
some of its appeal since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the 
maturation of many of post-independent states. This approach stands in contrast to 
the sociological approach, which focuses on the configuration of interest groups 
within society. The debate over the state has generated a wealth of literature. Below 
is a summary of that debate: 
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1. Society-centred approach: This approach was popular in the United States and 
Britain in the 1950s and until the rnid-1960s. The society-centred approach 
claims that the state represents the differing interests of society. Policies are 
formulated by public officials to serve the interests of powerful groups, who 
control resources in society. 1 
2. State-centred approach: By the late 1960s, the state has been perceived in 
Western literature as an actor whose policies are effective in shaping the 
institutional structures of society. According to this approach, the state is 
autonomous, in the sense that it acts according to its own preferences regardless 
of the interests and preferences of the contending groups within society. 2 
The author believes that neither of the two approaches is sufficient for the 
understanding of the state. In this study, therefore, we will combine the two 
approaches. Nordlinger observed that '[t]aking the state seriously entails bringing 
together state- and society-centred analyses in a meaningful manner, in ways that 
parallel the coexistence and interrelationships between the state and society'. 3 
Before proceeding any further, however, we need to propose a suitable definition of 
the state. 
1 Nordlinger, E., "Taking the State Seriously'', in M. Weiner, S. Huntington, et al. (eds.), 
Understanding Political Development, (Glenview: ScotForesman, 1987), pp. 354-355. 
2 Nordlinger, E., "Taking the State Seriously'', in M. Weiner, S. Huntington, et al. (eds.), 
Understanding Political Development, (Glenview: ScotForesman, 1987), pp. 355. 
3 Nordlinger, E., "Taking the State Seriously'', in M. Weiner, S. Huntington, et al. (eds.), 
Understanding Political Development, (Glenview: ScotForesman, 1987), pp. 361. 
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Defining the State 
According to the pluralist perspective, 'the state is perceived as an arena in which 
conflicting interests compete for scarce resources. It is a means of managing 
competition, so that the state is recognised as a legitimate way to settle such 
disputes'. 4 The interests of competing groups within society are balanced, as the 
state is neutral towards all the groups. 5 Meanwhile, no group has an interest to push 
its demands more than the other groups due to 'cross-loyalties'. Individuals may 
belong to more than one group simultaneously; for example, individuals of one 
profession belong to different social classes. This ensures that they will not push the 
interests of their profession at the expense of their social class. In other words, 'co-
operation' is the way to protect the interests ofthe different groups in society.6 
Nordlinger defmes the state as follows: 
The state refers to all those individuals who occupy offices that authorize them, and 
them alone, to make and apply decisions that are binding upon any and all parts of a 
territorially circumscribed population. The state is made up of, and limited to, those 
individuals who are endowed with societywide decision-making powers.7 
4 Smith, B., Understanding Third World Politics: Theories of Political Change and Development, 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 172. 
5 Williamson, P., Corporatism in Perspective: An Introductory Guide to Corporatist Theory, 
(London: Sage, 1989), pp. 55. 
6 Smith, B., Understanding Third World Politics: Theories of Political Change and Development, 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 173. 
7 Nordlinger, E., "Taking the State Seriously", in M. Weiner, S. Huntington, et al. (eds.), 
Understanding Political Development, (Glenview: ScotForesman, 1987), pp. 362. Note that 
Nordlinger prefers this definition to the one put forward by Weber, which defines the state in terms 
of institutions because only individuals can take actions. In addition, as not all states are 
institutionalised, Weber's definition cannot be applied universally to all states. 
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This definition is a plausible one, in the opinion of this author, as it does not confme 
its conception of the state to authority. Rather, the state is viewed as a 
multidimensional complex comprising government (or decision-makers and the 
executive), territory, and nation. Jessop has made a valuable contribution to this 
defmition by pointing out that policies and decisions formulated by the state are 
'made in the name of [the] common interest' of citizens or their 'general will' .8 This 
amendment is particularly crucial to the question of legitimacy of the state and the 
social contract, which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
When one attempts to arrive at a defmition of the state, one encounters a problem of 
making the distinction between the state and government. Although the two terms 
are sometimes used interchangeably, they do not refer to the same thing. The state is 
a more 'inclusive' concept than government, as it includes institutions and all 
members of society, as well as those in office, whereas the government refers to 
those in power, the legislative and the executive. Thus, the government is a subset 
of the state. Moreover, whereas the incumbent government, which is temporary, 
represents the interests and ideas of a certain party, the state, which is permanent, 
'in theory', represents the public interest.9 
Alfred Stepan was not content with identifying the state with the 'government'. He 
thought that the state was characterised by structuring and institutionalising 
relationships within civil society and not only between the government and society. 
8 Jessop, B., State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in Its Place, (Cambridge: Polity Press), pp. 
341. 
9 Heywood, A., Key Concepts in Politics, (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 40-41. 
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He was more interested in the institutional dimension of the state, and the 
organisation of actors operating within the state. He observed that 
[t]he state must be considered as more than the "government". It is the continuous 
administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive systems that attempt not only to 
structure relationships between civil society and public authority in a polity but also to 
structure many civil relationships within civil society as weli. 10 
According to this approach, the state regulates relations among different actors 
operating within its jurisdiction. Different actors have competing interests; yet, they 
still co-operate in decision-making and producing goods and services. Production 
acts as a unifying or common factor among these groups in society whilst 
distribution works as a divisive factor. Not only does competition arise amongst the 
political, military and economic institutions, but also amongst different interest 
groups. For example, in a capitalist system of production, the private sector seeks 
profit maximisation, and the criteria for measuring success is efficiency. On the 
other hand, a social democratic state seeks equal political and economic 
participation of all citizens, and its criteria for success is equity. Therefore, a 
contradiction arises between a social democratic state and capitalism, as capitalism 
breeds inequalities. 11 
Thus, alliances are formed between state institutions and elements of civil society 
producing competition over objectives. This is particularly true of political parties, 
which represent different classes and adopt different objectives. They define 
10 Stepan, A., The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1978), pp. xii. 
11 Mishra, R., The Welfare State in Capitalist Society: Policies of Retrenchment and Maintenance in 
Europe, North America and Australia, (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), pp. 9-11. 
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problems of society differently, and, hence, formulate different strategies to attain 
their objectives. 12 In order for the state to design and implement its strategies and 
policies, which may sometimes be inimical to the interests of some groups in 
society, it has to be strong. 
Strength is, therefore, critical for the state to enforce its formula of social contract 
upon society. In the case of many LDCs, for example, regimes have denied their 
populations the right to political participation in exchange for welfare provision. 
This has meant that resources have had to be dedicated to welfare provision, 
sometimes at the expense of investment in infrastructure or industrialisation, which 
is inimical to the interests of the private sector. Moreover, as these states became 
burdened with fmancing welfare policies, they tried to retreat from welfare 
provision; the beneficiaries of welfare policies resisted and more often than not 
regimes have had to rescind their decision of eliminating welfare policies. This 
leads us to the first concern in the study of the state, namely, the strength of the 
state. In other words, what determines the ability of a state to implement its 
policies? 
Determining the Strength of the State 
Traditionally, strong states have been considered to be ones that are capable of 
implementing unpopular policies. Thus, the strength of the state was determined by 
its ability to carry out its policies without being restrained by interest groups within 
12 Mishra, R., The Welfare State in Capitalist Society: Policies of Retrenchment and Maintenance in 
Europe, North America and Australia, (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), pp. 15-16. 
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society. Myrdal differentiates between two types of states, strong states, and weak 
states. 13 
Strong States vs. Weak States 
According to Myrdal, strong states have the power and autonomy to implement 
policies that influence growth and distribution of income. Weak states, on the other 
hand, have neither the power nor autonomy to conduct such policies. They serve the 
interests of the centres of power due to widespread corruption. Myrdal identifies the 
following features of weak states: 14 
• Deficiencies in legislation and enforcement of law. 
• Public resistance to controls and discipline. 
• Opportunity for gain from corruption at all levels of society. 
• Collusion between officials and powerful interest groups. 
Myrdal emphasises the need to change institutions that secure the power of the elite 
and dismantle corruption to rid the society of its ailments. Although strong states 
are usually associated with developed countries and weak ones with LDCs, this is 
not always the case. For example, the US, according to the aforementioned criteria, 
fits more into the second type. Myrdal, therefore, concludes that an authoritarian 
state is not necessarily a strong state, as it might still exhibit symptoms of a weak 
13 Myrdal, G., The Challenge of World Poverty, (New York: Pantheon, 1970), pp. 208-209. 
14 Myrdal, G., The Challenge of World Poverty, (New York: Pantheon, 1970), pp. 208-209. 
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state, where the state is unable to implement its policies due to widespread 
corruption. 15 
The strength of the state was, therefore, conceived as the 'ability of states to assert 
control over political outcomes'. Ikenberry argues that classifying the state in this 
way is 'crude and misleading'. When the state intervenes, for instance, private 
actors may benefit from this action. Consequently, in the balance of power, the state 
may lose its popularity whilst certain interest groups build socio-political capital. In 
this case, intervention cannot be considered strength. To the contrary, minimal state 
intervention may be counted as strength. This is where the irony of the state lies, 
concludes lkenberry. 16 We should, therefore, modify the definition of the strength 
of the state to allow for its ability to 'intervene, withdraw, reform or abstain'. 
It is important to make this modification because if we think of a strong state as one 
that is able to design and employ unpopular policies in spite of resistance, 
totalitarian regimes become the most capable ones. However, capable states are the 
ones that are able to maximise their options 'at subsequent moments of decision' .17 
States are able to do this by contributing to the infrastructure, by investing in human 
development, and promoting co-operation among different groups in society rather 
than engaging directly in ownership or production.18 
15 Myrdal, G., The Challenge of World Poverty, (New York: Pantheon, 1970), pp. 209. 
16 Ikenberry, J., ''The Irony of State Strength: Comparative Responses to the Oil Shocks in the 
1970s", International Organization, val. 40, no. 1, winter 1986, pp. 133-137. 
17 Hall, J., and J. Ikenberry, The State, (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1989), pp. 95-97. 
18 Hall, J., and J. Ikenberry, The State, (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1989), pp. 80-82. 
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Krasner has refmed the 'strength' debate by alluding to the state's ability to 
implement policies, fundamentally re-orientate the 'behavioural' tendencies of 
interest groups, and restructure the domestic environment. Krasner has opined that 
the strength of the state is determined by its relations with society. These relations 
are not static and fluctuate along a continuum; the state can exhibit signs of strength 
in certain areas and with certain interest groups and weakness in other areas with 
other groups. To Krasner, a strong state not only overcomes pressures of dominant 
groups, but also can effect change in the behaviour of private actors, and social and 
economic structures. Accordingly, there are three types of relations between the 
d . 19 state an society: 
• The state may be able to implement its policies in spite of resistance of society, 
but it cannot change the behaviour of private actors; 
• The state is able to implement policies and convince private actors to 'follow' 
these policies, but it is still unable to change the structure of its 'domestic 
environment'; 
• The state is able to implement unpopular policies, and convince private actors to 
change their behaviour and in the process change the structure itself. 
The state's strength to implement unpopular policies and restructure the domestic 
environment is constrained by a number of significant factors. Skocpol has noted 
five of these, which amount to the following:20 
19 Krasner cited in Ikenberry, J., "The Irony of State Strength: Comparative Responses to the Oil 
Shocks in the 1970s", International Organization, vol. 40, no. 1, winter 1986, pp. 134. 
20 Skocpol, T., "Bringing the State Back In: Current Research", in P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and 
T. Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 
16-20. 
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1. Administrative ability: For a state to formulate and implement effective 
policies, it needs a capable administrative body with skilled, well-educated, and 
loyal officials suited for this purpose. 
2. Financial resources: The state needs resources to carry out its policies. The state 
considers the available means for raising the required funds, either domestically, 
through tax collection, or internationally, through aid or borrowing. 
3. .Deployment of resources: Once the state has managed to acquire those funds, 
its capacity in policy implementation is limited by whether it is able to utilise 
these resources freely or they are tied to certain commitments, such as defence, 
or they are disbursed according to decisions dictated by the preferences of 
influential groups in society. For example, the state may find it easier to invest in 
infrastructure than in health or education, because the wealthy benefit from well-
maintained roads. 
4. Policy instruments: Policy instruments enable a state to deal with problems or 
crises, and/or to effect change. These instruments include, legislation, fiscal and 
monetary polices. The state may have more instruments at hand to carry out its 
policies in certain areas but not in others. For example, the state may fmd it 
easier to remove protection from one sector, but not from another. 
5. Support of key interest groups: A crucial factor for the success of state policies 
is the support of the concerned societal groups. A state may have the instruments 
to implement its policies but without the support of 'key' groups in society, the 
policies are prone to failure. 
If the state is able to implement its policies in spite of resistance of key influential 
groups in society, then the state is said to be autonomous. Nordlinger presents the 
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following typology of the state in terms of autonomy and support to characterise a 
state as strong, independent, responsive, or weak:21 
• Strong state: it enjoys both high autonomy and high support. Its policies reflect 
its preferences supported by society. 
• Independent state: it enjoys high autonomy but low support. It implements its 
policies regardless of the preferences of society. 
o Responsive state: it has low autonomy and high support, in the sense that it 
carries out policies that translate the preferences of society. 
• Weak state: it scores low on both autonomy and support. It tries to act 
autonomously but fails to do so due to the contending preferences within society. 
States are not static in terms of the autonomy and support they enjoy. They usually 
t1uctuate between the four typologies. 
The strength of the state vis-a-vis society is, therefore, determined by autonomy and 
support (legitimacy). In order to be able to understand the relationship between state 
and society, we must examine the autonomy of the state from interest groups in 
society, and the legitimacy of the state. This is because if the state is dominated by 
particular interest groups in society, it will serve their interests at the expense of 
21 Nordlinger, E., "Taking the State Seriously'', in M. Weiner, S. Huntington, et al. (eds.), 
Understanding Political Development, (Glenview: ScotForesman, 1987), pp. 369-370. 
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other interest groups, such as lower income groups, which might compromise its 
legitimacy. 22 Therefore, the next section will be devoted to exploring the concept of 
the autonomy of the state; then we will examine the legitimacy of the state. 
Autonomy of the State 
A state is said to be autonomous if it seeks to attain its own objectives, rather than 
the objectives of any interest group within society.23 To Weber, states are 
autonomous, as they have control over the means of coercion and administration. 
They may, therefore, implement policies adopting objectives that are at odds with 
dominant interest groups in society. 24 
On the other hand, Marxists assert that states are not autonomous. They are a 
configuration of the struggle among classes, where the state represents the interests 
of the dominant class, which is, in Marx's analysis of the industrial state, the 
bourgeois class. Marx observed: 
the bourgeoisie has at last, since the establishment of Modern Industry and of the 
world market, conquered for itself, in the modern representative State, exclusive 
political sway. The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the 
common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie. 25 
22 Higazi", 1., al-Faqr fi misr [Poverty in Egypt], (Cairo: The National Centre for Social and Criminal 
Research, 1996}, pp. 115-116. 
23 Lal, D., and H. Myint, The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth: A Comparative 
Study, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 260. 
24 Weber, M., The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, translated by A Henderson, and T. 
Parsons, edited with an introduction by T. Parsons, (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 154. 
25 Marx, K., and F. Engles, The Communist Manifesto, (London: Penguin, 1965), pp. 82. 
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In accordance with Marxist analysis, where the capitalist mode of production 
exploits the proletariat, the state is regarded as a parasite, and its function is to 
extract resources from society for the benefit of the ruling elite, the bourgeoisie. 26 
Neo-Marxists argue that states are machines that ensure the perpetuation of the 
prevalent modes of production and accumulation of capital. They claim that a state 
can be described as relatively autonomous if it manages to circumvent resistance of 
the dominant capitalist class. 27 Skocpol has broadened the detinition of 'dominant 
class' to encompass any group in society whether economic or political. According 
to Skocpol, 'States conceived as organizations claiming control over territories and 
people may formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the 
demands or interests of social groups, classes or society'. 28 
A modified version of this perspective asserts that the state acts as a factor of 
cohesion, trying to balance the interests of contlicting classes, meanwhile 
preserving those of the dominant one. The state secures its autonomy as it resides 
above society, though it protects the 'long-term' interests of the dominant class. 
This leads to a situation where the state and its responsibilities in society expand to 
encompass all aspects of economic life. In other words, the state is responsible for 
providing an infrastructure, and where the private sector is incapacitated, it takes 
26 Smith, B., Understanding Third World Politics: Theories of Political Change and Development, 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 175. 
27 George, V., and P. Wilding, Ideology and Social Welfare, (London: Routledge, 1989}, pp. 135. 
18 Skocpol, T., "Bringing the State Back In: Current Research", in P. Evans, D. Ruescbemeyer, and 
T. Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 
9-11. 
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over the role of enterprise and state capitalism emerges. The state carries out 
marketing activities, employs people, designs pricing policies, and allocates 
international aid to different projects. 29 
Gramsci conceives the state as 'the entire complex of political and theoretical 
activity by which the ruling classes not only justify and maintain their domination 
but also succeed in obtaining the active consent of the governed. ' 30 In other words, 
ruling classes rule not only through domination, but also, and more importantly, by 
securing the support of the governed. 
According to Gramsci, the state is an apparatus whose role is to maintain 
equilibrium in society by generating conditions that allow the interests of the 
dominant class to be served, by making them representative of universal interests. 
In this sense, the role of the state is dynamic as it acts to preserve equilibrium, 
which is not necessarily stable, and, hence, requires the state to play an active role. 31 
Skocpol observes that autonomy of the state is a dynamic rather than a static 
concept. This is because states undergo transformations that affect their 
organisation and coercion, which are reflected in their relation to society. 32 A state 
29 Smith, B., Understanding Third World Politics: Theories of Political Change and Development, 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 176-177. 
30 Gramsci quoted in Femia, J., Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the 
Revolution, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 28. 
31 Sassoon, A., Gramsci's Politics, (London: Croom Helm, 1980), pp. 118-119. 
32 Skocpol, T., "Bringing the State Back In: Current Research", in P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and 
T. Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 
14. 
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is offered a chance to achieve some autonomy if cleavages arise among dominant 
groups in society, or in case of the uprising of subordinate classes. The outcome of 
the second scenario is recognised by Rueschemeyer and Evans to be uncertain 
depending on the 'relative strength of the state apparatus and outside forces, and on 
the specifically political patterns and processes mediating between the state and the 
interest structure of society.' 33 In its attempt to repress the uprising of subordinate 
groups, the state may gain some autonomy and take actions against the preferences 
of the elite. 34 This stands in sharp contrast to the Bonapartist state, which enjoys 
autonomy in balancing the differing interests of the contesting groups within 
society. 35 
Rueschemeyer and Evans argue that relative autonomy of the state is crucial if the 
state aims to be 'effective' in its policies. This is because it needs to achieve a level 
of autonomy from all groups in society, especially when it comes to socio-economic 
issues where it needs to implement policies that are inimical to the interests of 
capitalists but will benefit the poor. An example of this case, cited by 
Rueschemeyer and Evans, is collective goods that would not otherwise be provided 
if left to capitalists or private actors. 36 
33 Rueschemeyer, D., and P. Evans, "The State and Economic Transformation: Toward an analysis 
of the Conditions Underlying Effective Intervention", in P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol 
(eds.), Bringing the State Back In, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 64. 
34 Rueschemeyer, D., and P. Evans, "The State and Economic Transformation: Toward an Analysis 
of the Conditions Underlying Effective Intervention", in P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol 
(eds.), Bringing the State Back In, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 63. 
35 Marx, K., The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, (New York: International Publishers, 
1963). 
36 Rueschemeyer, D., and P. Evans, "The State and Economic Transformation: Toward an analysis 
of the Conditions Underlying Effective Intervention", in P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol 
(eds.), Bringing the State Back In, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 60-61. 
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Rueschemeyer and Evans warn that 'considerable' autonomy is not advisable in a 
pre-capitalist society where the state is characterised as 'predatorial'. In this phase, 
the state may adopt policies that suit its interests, such as expanding the bureaucracy 
for its own sake. In this case, it is better if the elite control the state. Rueschemeyer 
and Evans recognise the fact that being autonomous does not guarantee that the 
decisions made by the state will be successful, as wrong decisions may still be made 
due to lack of information. 37 
Nordlinger criticises Skocpol's view of autonomy because of the limitation of its 
definition of autonomy only to situations of conflicting preferences of interest 
groups and the state. He contends that if those preferences are congruent, this does 
not detract from the autonomy of the state. 38 He argues that a state that preserves the 
status quo in spite of high social and economic inequality is as strong as one that 
manages to successfully effect change in the structure of society. 39 Hence, 
Nordlinger concludes that 'a state is autonomous to the extent that it translates its 
own preferences into authoritative actions' .40 
The autonomy of the state is, therefore, not only tied to the configuration of interest 
groups in society, but more ultimately to the notion of domestic legitimacy. At this 
37 Rueschemeyer, D., and P. Evans, "The State and Economic Transformation: Toward an analysis 
of the Conditions Underlying Effective Intervention", in P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol 
(eds.), Bringing the State Back In, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 61-62. 
38 Nordlinger, E., "Taking the State Seriously'', in M. Weiner, S. Huntington, et al. (eds.), 
Understanding Political Development, (Glenview: ScotForesman, 1987), pp. 365. 
39 Nordlinger, E., "Taking the State Seriously'', in M. Weiner, S. Huntington, et al. (eds.), 
Understanding Political Development, (Glenview: ScotForesman, 1987), pp. 366. 
40 Nordlinger, E., "Taking the State Seriously'', in M. Weiner, S. Huntington, et al. (eds.), 
Understanding Political Development, (Glenview: ScotForesman, 1987), pp. 361. 
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point, we should address the third concern in our analysis of the state, namely 
legitimacy. 
Legitimacy 
Weber has argued that, in general, those in power need to 'justify' themselves in 
order to maintain their domination over other parties within a certain relationship.41 
Once subordinates cease to believe in the basis of power of the more powerful in 
the relationship, the latter lose their legitimacy, and their position is jeopardised. 
Thus, legitimacy is defined as 'the extent to which social and political norms in a 
given society are accepted, especially those applying to the exercise of power or the 
domination of some individuals or groups of individuals by others' .42 If this concept 
of legitimacy is applied to the relationship between the 'modem state', which can 
find its roots in the French Revolution of 1789, and its citizens, it translates into the 
state's ability to show its citizens that 'its powers are derived from them' .43 
Weber identified three sources of legitimacy: 44 
41 Weber cited in Habermas, J., Legitmation Crisis, T. McCarthy (trans.), (London: Heinemann, 
1976), pp. 97. 
42 Rush, M., Politics and Society: An Introduction to Political Sociology, (New York: Prentice Hall, 
1992), pp. 53. 
43 According to Finer, the 'modern state' comprises two elements: a nation identifying the 'right to 
independent existence' ruled by its native citizens according to laws that apply to their territory; and 
'popular sovereignty'. See Finer, S., Comparative Government: An Introduction to the Study of 
Politics, (London: Penguin, 1970), pp. 99. 
44 Weber, M., The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, translated by A.M. Henderson, and 
T. Parsons, edited with an introduction by T. Parsons, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), 
pp. 238. 
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1. Traditional: traditional legitimacy is rooted in an established belief in the 
sanctity of specific traditions that confer legitimacy upon those exercising 
authority (traditional authority); 
2. Charismatic: charismatic legitimacy rests upon devotion to the specific and 
exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, 
and of the normative patterns or order revealed by him (charismatic authority). 
3. Rational: rational legitimacy is grounded in a belief in the legality of patterns of 
normative rules and the right of those in positions of authority, under such rules, 
to issue commands (legal authority); 
Rational legitimacy is the most dominant mode of legitimacy in 'modern states'. In 
contrast to other sources of legitimacy, under rational legitimacy 
authority becomes legitimate independently of who is the incumbent in political office 
or what the intentions of the incumbents are. The only thing that decides the 
legitimacy of political authority is whether or not it has been achieved in accordance 
with general formal principles, for example, election rules.45 
In other words, the determinant of rational legitimacy is that the leader conforms to 
the rules of society in the acquisition and exercise of power regardless of his/her 
adopted policies. Once in office, the leader has to abide by the rules of the 
constitution, and if an alternative party wins elections, the leader has to step down.46 
45 Offe, C., Contradictions of the Welfare State, (London: Hutchinson, 1984), pp. 134-135. 
46 Offe, C., Contradictions of the Welfare State, (London: Hutchinson, 1984), pp. 134-135. 
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Habermas criticises the conceptualisation of rational legitimacy, defmed as belief in 
legality. He asserts that 'technical legal form alone, pure legality, will not be able to 
guarantee recognition in the long run if the system of authority cannot be 
legitimized independently of the legal form of exercising authority' .47 Habermas 
argues that as authorities are the ones that issue laws, they cannot depend on these 
very laws as a source of their legitimacy. Instead, he asserts that legitimacy stems 
from the consensus on a belief in a certain 'ideology', which forms the basis of the 
laws and norms adopted by society. Habermas acknowledges the fact that these 
norms can be questioned at any time, and, consequently, altered according to a new 
consensus among participants.48 In other words, if a divergence arises between the 
'ideology' and norms of society and the legal system, there is a crack in legitimacy 
based on this ideology, and a new consensus has to be found; otherwise, the regime 
experiences a crisis of legitimation. 
A crisis of legitimation does not necessarily mean the collapse of the state or 
regimes. This is because although legitimacy is recognised to be an essential factor 
in accepting authority, it is not the only one. Sometimes citizens do not question the 
legitimacy of their rulers, and they accept their authority due to other factors. One 
can characterise these as 'negative' or 'positive' acceptance of authority.49 
47 Habermas, J., Legitmation Crisis, T. McCarthy (trans.), (London: Heinemann, 1976), pp. 100. 
48 Habermas, J., Legitmation Crisis, T. McCartby(trans.), (London: Heinemann, 1976), pp. 101-105. 
49 Rush, M., Politics and Society: An Introduction to Political Sociology, (New York: Prentice Hall, 
1992), pp. 21. 
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Negative Acceptance of Authority 
Negative acceptance is 'grudging acquiescence', where individuals submit to 
authority because they do not accept the 'consequences' of breaking laws and 
norms. These 'consequences' extend from a fear of physical threat, such as 
imprisonment, torture, or death, to material threats that may affect their welfare, 
such as a loss of job, deterioration in standards of living, or some form of 
discrimination. Other negative reasons for acquiescence might be apathy - 'a lack 
of interest' - or cynicism - 'a feeling that resistance is useless or not worth the 
effort'. 
Positive Acceptance of Authority 
On the other hand, a positive acceptance of authority may entail benefits that 
individuals accrue from the state because of the organisation of the system, so that 
advantages appear to exceed the disadvantages. An example of positive acceptance 
is networks of patronage that the state develops with different actors in society, 
whereby these actors are co-opted into the system, and they exchange their 
. ti ' . d rial d • 50 acqmescence or percetve mate a vantages . 
50 Rush, M., Politics and Society: An Introduction to Political Sociology, (New York: Prentice Hall, 
1992), pp. 21. 
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Thus, the acquiescence of individuals does not necessarily stem from the rational 
legitimacy of leaders. Furthermore, acquiescence exists along a 'continuum', which 
Held denotes as follows: 51 
1. Following orders or coercion: individuals obey because they fear the 
consequences (sanctions) of opposition. 
2. Tradition: individuals have never thought about the values disseminated by the 
regime; they follow the rules out of habit rather than because these values are 
endeared to them. 
3. Apathy: individuals do not care about the situation. 
4. Pragmatic acquiescence: individuals do not like the situation - it is neither 
satisfactory nor 'ideal' - things cannot be imagined to be really different and so 
they 'shrug [their] shoulders' and develop a fatalistic view of their situation. 
5. Instrumental acceptance or conditional agreement/consent: individuals are 
dissatisfied with the current affairs, but they go along with them in order to 
secure an end. They recognise a long run advantage in their acquiescence to the 
system. This type of acquiescence is grounded in exchange. Individuals are 
offering their acquiescence in exchange for some material benefit, prestige, or 
status, etc. 
6. Normative agreement: in the current circumstances, and with the available 
information to them, individuals conclude that it is 'right', 'correct', or 'proper' 
for them as individuals or members of a 'collectivity' to go with things as they 
are. They believe it is what they should or ought to do. 
51 Held, D., Models of Democracy, 2nd ed., (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), pp. 195-196. 
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7. Ideal normative agreement: it is what in 'ideal circumstances', given all the 
possible knowledge of opportunities and requirements of others, individuals 
would have agreed to do. 
If one accepts this continuum, one can conclude that except for the last two phases, 
compliance is grudgingly given to the regime. On the above scale, the last two types 
of acquiescence represent the ultimate conditions where it can be said that the 
regime and/or state enjoy legitimacy. The first four types depict a state where 
despite of acquiescence of the public, the political system may not be legitimate. 
This is because acquiescence does not generate legitimacy. The fifth type represents 
an ambiguous point, where acquiescence of the public can indicate a weak form of 
legitimacy, but the system is not totally legitimate. 52 
Thus, it follows that acquiescence, which can take a passive form, no resistance, or 
an active form, such as voting in a plebiscite, or swearing an oath of allegiance, is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition of legitimacy. In other words, the public may 
be acquiescent for negative or positive reasons, but the regime/state is not 
legitimate. The other two conditions that must be satisfied to describe the authority 
of a regime/state to be legitimate, according to Beetham, are that the way power is 
acquired and exercised should 'conform to established rules' in society; and these 
rules are justifiable according to the social and political norms shared by the both 
the rulers and the governed of the society in question, especially the latter. 53 
52 Held, D., Models of Democracy, 2nd ed., (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), pp. 250. 
53 Beetbam, D., The Legitimation of Power, (London: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 12-20. 
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It should be noted that most of LDC states extract acquiescence from societies 
through the first five modes. In particular, instrumental acceptance or conditional 
agreement (which is the most important element of legitimacy for this study) is the 
most prevalent form of acquiescence in LDCs, where regimes court key groups in 
society seeking their support in return for generating an environment conducive to 
their interests (through patronage and/or welfare provision). 54 In this way a contract 
is formed between the rulers and the governed. In this type of relationship, one 
party's behaviour is conditioned by the other's fulfilling his/her obligations 
according to the terms of the social contract. 
The Social Contract 
Social contract theories, which attempt to explain the origins and/or the legitimacy 
of political authority/the state, maintain 'that all of our basic political rights and 
duties are derived from some kind of explicit or implicit contract among a 
collection of individuals'. Contract theories presume 'the existence of some form of 
community' that seeks to preserve its rights through the institution of a civil state. 55 
In this section, we will examine the main arguments of social contract theorists, and 
the criticisms raised against using consent to explain the origin of the state. 
Social contract theorists, such as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, have used the 
'social contract' to refer to an express or tacit agreement between citizens and the 
54 Held, D., Models of Democracy, 2nd ed., (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), pp. 251-252. 
55 Medina, V ., Social Contract Theories: Political Obligation or Anarchy?, (Savage: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1990), pp. 5-6. 
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state that forms the basis of political authority in society. In the absence of such a 
contract, individuals are threatened by a 'state of war', according to Hobbes, where 
human life is endangered by solitude, poverty, and brutality due to the inexistence 
of a powerful agency that is capable of regulating life among individuals. 56 
Locke argues that individuals in a 'state of nature', where they are free to 'dispose 
of their property and possessions' as they please independent of the will of any 
other individual, are governed by the 'law of nature', according to which they 
should not transgress on the life, liberty or property of others. However, as not all 
individuals abide by this law, the need arises for the 'institution' of a civil 
government to enforce law and prevent the 'state of war', which can arise from their 
attempt to carry out punishment themselves in case of the violation of the 'law of 
nature'.57 
Individuals, therefore, come to an agreement to establish a civil government to 
ensure the prevalence of security and liberty in society. According to this social 
contract, individuals agree to give up some of their power, freedom and property in 
order to preserve their liberty and security, which are provided for by the state. 58 In 
Rousseau's words: 
... in the social contract, ... the position in which [individuals] find themselves as a 
result of the contract is really preferable to that in which they were before. Instead of a 
56 Rachels, J., The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 3'd ed., (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1999), pp. 144. 
57 Locke, J., Two Treatises of Government, edited with an introduction and notes by Peter Lasleu, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 269-282. 
58 Gough, J., The Social Contract: A Critical Study of Its Development, 2"d ed., (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1957), pp. 136. 
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renunciation, they have made an advantageous exchange: instead of an uncertain and 
precarious way of living they have got one that is better and more secure; instead of 
natural independence they have got liberty, instead of power to harm others security 
for themselves, and instead of their strength, which others might overcome, a right 
which social union makes invincible. Their very life, which they have devoted to the 
State, is by it constantly protected; and when they risk it in the State's defence, what 
more are they doing than giving back what they have received from it?59 
Rousseau asserts that individuals engage in this contract because they perceive 
some benefit in doing so. Individuals, by giving up their 'natural independence', are 
empowered and enjoy the protection of the state through the application of laws. 
The state is able to enforce law upon its citizens by virtue of being the central 
authority in society, which exercises absolute power over all its citizens. The state 
promotes the common interest of society through the embodiment of the 'general 
will' of citizens, which forms the basis of rights, duties, and responsibilities of the 
state.60 
Rousseau differentiates between two types of wills, the 'particular will' and the 
'general will'. The 'particular will' is the selfish will of each individual to pursue 
his own private interest. The 'general will', on the other hand, is the will to seek the 
common good for all individuals in society. It is different from the 'will of all', 
which amounts to the 'sum of particular wills' in society. Rousseau argues that in a 
'moral state', individuals should seek the common good rather than their own 
private interests. This is because individuals can only promote their particular wills 
at the expense of other members of society. This usually means that powerful 
groups pursue their own interests to the detriment of disadvantaged groups in 
59 Rousseau, J., The Social Contract, (London: J.M. Dent, 1938}, pp. 29. 
60 Rousseau, J., The Social Contract, (London: J.M. Dent, 1938}, pp. 26-30. 
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society.61 Based on Rousseau's identification of the general will, he concludes that a 
legitimate state is one where the interests and the wills of the rulers and the 
governed are united. They all work for the common good of all citizens; the 
differences among them will be on means to achieve this common good.62 
Kant argues that this contract should not be motivated by any interest. When 
individuals surrender their freedom, only to get it back 'immediately', they do so 
not do so for a 'particular purpose', such as protecting one's property. To Kant the 
state is a categorical imperative, grounded in reason, rather than a hypothetical one 
dependent upon the satisfaction of another condition or a means to an end. Kant 
explains: 
The act by means of which the people constitute themselves a state is the original 
contract. More properly, it is the Idea of that act that alone enables us to conceive of 
the legitimacy of state. According to the original contract all the people give up their 
external freedom in order to take it back again immediately as members of a 
commonwealth, that is, the people regarded as the state. Accordingly, we cannot say 
that a man has particular purpose; rather, we must say that he has completely 
abandoned his wild, lawless freedom in order to find his whole freedom again 
undiminished in a lawful dependency, that is, in a juridical state of society, since this 
dependency comes from his own legislative Will.63 
After Kant, contract theory declined until it was revived in the twentieth century by 
Rawls. In his study entitled A Theory of Justice, Rawls endeavours to formulate a 
theory of a just society. He utilises the concept of social contract not to explain the 
origin of society or government, but to work out 'a theory of justice'. Rawls 
61 Steinberg, J., Locke, Rousseau, and the Idea of Consent: An Inquiry into the Liberal-democratic 
Theory of Political Obligation, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 83-85. 
62 Steinberg, J., Locke, Rousseau, and the Idea of Consent: An Inquiry into the Liberal-democratic 
Theory of Political Obligation, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 96. 
63 Kant, 1., The Metaphysical Elements of Justice: Pan I of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated 
with an introduction by J. Ladd, (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1965), pp. 80-81. 
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attempts to formulate 'principles of justice' according to which the society is 
organised. According to Rawls, individuals are rational; in other words, they are 
motivated by their self-interests. As they recognise benefits from interaction, they 
identify, in the 'original position' 'principles of justice', which form the basis of 
social co-operation in society. The 'principles of justice' determine the rights and 
duties, and the terms of 'distribution of benefits and burdens of social co-operation' 
• . 64 
among citizens. 
Rawls' theory is based on the assumption that individuals in the 'original position' 
are free, equal, rational, and impartial. They choose these principles in the 'original 
position', behind, what Rawls calls, a 'veil of ignorance'. The 'veil of ignorance' 
means that parties to the agreement 'do not know their conceptions of the good', 
preferences or resources. They are equal in the sense that they 'all have the same 
rights in the procedure for choosing principles'. Their ignorance of their conditions 
ensure that the outcome will be a 'fair', as it will not enhance the conditions of one 
group. Rawls argues that the parties are bound by a 'hypothetical contract' to 
organise society according to the chosen 'principles of justice'. The significance of 
the concept of social contract to Rawls' theory of justice is that it guarantees that 
the chosen principles are acceptable to all parties.65 
The two 'principles of justice' that Rawls believes 'would be chosen in the original 
position' are equality in basic liberties; and acceptance of social and economic 
64 Rawls, J., A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1971), pp. 17-22. 
65 Rawls, J., A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1971), pp. 3-22. 
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inequalities provided that they are 'reasonably expected to be to everyone's 
advantage' and that all individuals have equal opportunity to access 'positions of 
authority and offices of command'. Although Rawls acknowledges that inequalities 
in wealth and income are acceptable, he emphasises that this is only justifiable as 
long as they are to 'everyone's advantage'. Rawls, however, warns against an 
exchange of political right for economic gains. To him, basic liberties, such as 
political rights '(the right to vote and to be eligible for public office), together with 
freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience of freedom of thought; 
freedom of the person along with the right to hold (personal) property; and freedom 
from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defmed by the concept of the rule of law' take 
precedence over economic benefits. 66 
Within the social contract tradition, the notion of contractarianism, has, therefore, 
been used, especially by Locke, to refer to two types of agreements in society. One 
type of contract is among a multitude of individuals, who consent to establish a 
political society, or 'commonwealth', to ensure that everybody conforms to the law 
of nature and hence reduce violence in society. This type of contract explains the 
emergence of political society. The other form of contract is one between the state 
and society. This one pre-supposes the existence of some form of society, as 
individuals agree to give up some of their power and liberty to the sovereign, 
central authority, in order to protect their life and property and promote their 
liberties. 67 Citizens entrust their government with political authority, and whenever 
66 Rawls, J., A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1971}, pp. 60-63. 
67 Medina, V., Social Contract Theories: Political Obligation or Anarchy?, (Savage: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1990), pp. 38-41. 
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the government betrays their trust, by not meeting the obligations it was trusted to 
deliver, it ceases to be legitimate and they have a right to change it.68 
This leads us to the second aspect that contract theory aims to explain, namely, the 
legitimacy of political authority. In other words, once the state has been instituted, 
from where does it derive its legitimacy? And do citizens have a right to rebel 
against the state if they perceive it as illegitimate? 
Legitimacy of Political Authority 
According to contract theorists, such as Locke and Rawls, a government is 
described as legitimate as long as it delivers what it promised according to the terms 
of an actual or 'hypothetical' contract, by promoting certain values and ends. These 
values, according to Locke, are the protection of 'life, liberty, and property'. Once a 
government fails to fulfil its obligations and abuses or misuses its authority, it 
ceases to be legitimate and citizens are 'absolved from any further obedience'. This, 
however, does not mean that they will actually exercise their right to resist their 
illegitimate government.69 This implies that the absence of resistance does not mean 
that citizens tacitly consent to their rulers. 
Critics of contract theory argue that if the contract is 'hypothetical', in the sense that 
it is neither historic nor is based on actual consent, then it follows that the contract 
68 Steinberg, J., Locke, Rousseau, and the Idea of Consent: An Inquiry into the Liberal-democratic 
Theory of Political Obligation, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 69-70. 
69 Steinberg, J., Locke, Rousseau, and the Idea of Consent: An Inquiry into the Liberal-democratic 
Theory of Political Obligation, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 44-46. 
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is not binding for the parties involved. Yet contractual political thinkers claim that 
citizens are committed to the obligations of the contract for different reasons.70 
Hobbes, for example, who identifies men as self-interest seeking beings, argues that 
individuals abide by the contract because it serves their interest in preserving their 
life and property. Hobbes conceives that the government commands obedience so 
long it protects citizens, as the alternative to submission to political authority is 
anarchy that endangers their lives. He concludes that individuals have no right to 
rebel once the government has been instituted, even if the ruler is tyrannical. 71 
Rousseau, on the other hand, opines that individuals 'gain their civil liberty and 
property' in obliging with the contract. Rousseau argues that rebellion is 
unperceivable because sovereignty resides with citizens, who propagate the general 
will rather than the particular wills of some individuals even if they constitute the 
majority, as this will lead to the oppression of disadvantaged or less influential 
groups in society. No one can promote his/her particular will at the expense of the 
general will, as he/she will be constrained by the community, and hence, Rousseau 
argues, he/she will be forced to be free. Freedom in this sense amounts to obliging 
with the 'general will'. Therefore, the existence and perpetuation of the social 
contract depends on the agreement of all citizens, who rule directly rather than 
through representatives as no one can represent the will of the individual other than 
him/herself. 72 
70 Medina, V., Social Contract Theories: Political Obligation or Anarchy?, (Savage: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1990), pp. 76-78. 
71 Hobbes, T., Leviathan, R. Tuck (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 153. 
72 Germino, D., Modem Western Political Thought: Machiavelli to Marx, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 
1972), pp. 186-190. 
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Finally, Kant agrees with Hobbes in his rejection of resistance, not to mention 
rebellion. Once individuals have agreed to 'alienate' their sovereignty, they cannot 
reclaim it. Thereupon, they have a moral obligation to obey the law even if the ruler 
is a tyrant. 73 Moreover, Kant reasons that the state is the 'ultimate authority in 
society'; accordingly, no one can challenge it, otherwise the authority of the state as 
the supreme authority is undermined. Citizens should obey the state 
unconditionally, regardless of whether the ruler is despotic or not. They are obliged 
to obey the law, and if they do not, then they are defying the moral order. Kant 
argues that change in a 'defective constitution of a state', concerning the executive, 
can only be brought about through reform undertaken by the legislative authority 
and not through a revolution of citizens. 74 
After we have briefly outlined the main arguments of contract theory, we will 
present some of the major criticisms against contract theory. 
Criticisms of Contract Theory 
Criticisms against contract theory, as an explanation of the origins and the 
legitimacy of the state, can be summarised in the following three points. First, the 
conclusion of a contract has not been proven historically. There is little evidence 
that government came into existence through the express agreement of citizens to 
institute a civil government. Second, even if citizens have explicitly agreed to obey 
73 Medina, V., Social Contract Theories: Political Obligation or Anarchy?, (Savage: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1990), pp. 80-82. 
74 Kant, I., The Metaphysical Elements of Justice: Part I of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated 
with an introduction by J. Ladd, (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1965), pp. 84-88. 
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the state in the past, this does not imply that they will want to do so in the future. 
Locke argues that individuals by living within the territories of a certain state, and 
by enjoying the benefits of its protection, have tacitly agreed to the contract. 
However, individuals do not always have the choice to leave the state where they 
have been born, even if they do not want to abide by the original agreement, which 
in this case cannot be described as tacit consent.75 Finally, contract theory fails to 
explain why individuals should obey the state on the basis of a contract.76 Critics of 
contract theory, such as Hume, argue that individuals obey political authority 
because it is in their interest to submit to the rule of the state, and this does not 
require a contract; it is simply based on utility. Once the government becomes 
tyrannical or does not act in the interest of the governed, the latter have a right to 
rise against the government, again because it is in their interest to resist an 
. 77 
oppressive government. 
In answer to this Gauthier replies that self-interest is not sufficient for 'compliance' 
with the agreement between individuals and the sovereign. Rather a contract is 
indispensable to guarantee peace and security in society. He argues that a contract is 
different from a self-interest agreement in that it adds 'supplementary incentives 
and/or sanctions' in the absence of which one of (or all) the parties to the agreement 
might not comply. The presence of these incentives and/or sanctions, therefore, 
75 Castiglione, D., "History, Reason and Experience: Hume's Arguments against Contract Theories", 
The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls, in D. Boucher, and P. Kelly (eds.}, (London: Routledge, 
1994}, pp. 105-106. 
76 Medina, V., Social Contract Theories: Political Obligation or Anarchy?, (Savage: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1990), pp. 111-131. 
77 Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature in Two Volumes: Volume Two, A. Lindsay (intro.}, 
(London: Dent, 1966), pp. 240-252. 
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ensures reciprocity of citizens in abiding by law, based on their self-interest in 
preserving their property and social peace. These incentives and/or sanctions ensure 
the obedience of citizens to the sovereign, even in situations where compliance with 
authority may be inimical to their self-interest. Gauthier rightly opines that if self-
interest were enough to ensure compliance of all citizens to agreed-upon 'conditions 
of peace', then there would be no need for a civil government.78 
For the purpose of this research, we will use the Lockean interpretation of the social 
contract with reference to the second type between the rulers and the governed 
because it explains legitimacy of political authority, which is the subject of this 
study. According to Locke, rulers enter into a fiduciary relationship79 with the 
governed who entrust the former to advance the common interest of society by 
promoting certain moral ends, which include protecting liberties. The governed on 
their part, owe their rulers/regimes allegiance as long as the latter abide by their 
obligations according to the terms of the social contract. The social contract, 
therefore, explains the moral obligation behind the obedience of the governed to 
legitimate authority. Accordingly, the social contract is the generator of legitimacy. 
In most LDCs, regimes have engaged in a different type of social contract with their 
populations, where leaders have offered the governed goods and services in return 
for their acquiescence and surrendering their right to political participation. This has 
78 Gauthier, D., "Hobbes's Social Contract", in C. Morris (ed.), The Social Contract Theorists: 
Critical Essays on Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), pp. 61-
68. See also: Charvet, J., "Rousseau, the Problem of Sovereignty and the Limits of Political 
Obligation", in C. Morris (ed.), The Social Contract Theorists: Critical Essays on Hobbes, Locke, 
and Rousseau, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), pp. 209-210. 
79 Medina, V., Social Contract Theories: Political Obligation or Anarchy?, (Savage: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1990), pp. 41. 
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often led to the development of a patrimonial system, where neither party can 
survive without the other. The regime needs the population to preserve its rule, and 
the population needs the regime for distributing patronage and welfare products. 
Thus, a social contract based on distribution of welfare is the foundation of 
legitimacy for these regimes. 
This type of contract is legitimate because a social contract, Habermas argues, is 
legitimate if both parties have entered into the contract voluntarily, and they have 
enough motivation to do so. This contract, therefore, ceases to be binding once one 
of the (or both) parties fails to fulfil its (their) part of the contract or if its (their) 
motives change, as the 'original constellation of interests' changes.80 
Nevertheless, the perpetuation of this system of legitimacy depends on the resources 
of the state, which the ruler distributes to the population to maintain its support. 
Once these resources run dry, in other words the regime fails to fulfil its part of the 
contract, or some activists - who are not satisfied with the formula of this contract 
anymore - demand political participation, the contract ceases to be binding. 81 
Hence, the fragility of the social contract, and accordingly the legitimacy of the 
regime based upon welfare provision, is exposed and the regime has to seek an 
alternative formula of the social contract to maintain its legitimacy and remain in 
power. The social contract in LDCs is, therefore, not static; its ingredients change as 
80 Habermas, J., Legitmation Crisis, T. McCarthy (trans.), (London: Heinemann, 1976), pp. 103-104. 
81 Leca, J., "Democratization in the Arab World: Uncertainty, Vulnerability and Legitimacy. A 
Tentative Conceptualitzation and Some Hypothesis", in G. Salame (ed.), Democracy without 
Deomocrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World, (London: LB. Tauris, 1996), pp. 70-74. 
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a result of change in resources available to the state, the motives of the population, 
or the configuration of interest groups in society. 
Gramsci argues that society is convened through two ways, externally and 
internally. The first way is externally through dominance of force by the monopoly 
that the state, and, in particular, the ruling elite that dominate the state, enjoys over 
means of coercion. The second way is internally through 'intellectual and moral 
leadership', 'by moulding personal convictions into a replica of prevailing norms'. 
Thus, the ruling elite do not rule by force or economic incentives only; instead, and 
more importantly, they elicit consent from the governed via 'cultural institutions', 
mainly corporations, trade associations, and educational institutions that propagate 
the regime's 'modes ofthought'. 
Gramsci describes the situation where the ruling elite succeed in portraying their 
interests as the interests of society as 'hegemony'. If the ruling class is successful in 
securing 'voluntary consent' of subordinate groups, then it can be characterised as 
legitimate. 82 This form of acquiescence tends to be more stable and less likely to 
produce opposition, as the population adopts the values and ideas of the ruling elite, 
and, hence, conforms without a need for coercion. Only 'weak states' resort to 
repression to control society, whereas 'strong' ones rely, primarily, upon hegemony 
and educational institutions. 83 Gramsci notes that 
82 Femia, J., Gramsci's Political Tlwught: Hegenwny, Consciousness, and the Revolution, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 24-40. 
83 Adamson, W., Hegenwny and Revolution: A Study of Antonio Gramsci's Political and Cultural 
Theory, (Berkerley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 170. 
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the supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as 'domination' and as 
'intellectual and moral leadership'. A social group dominates antagonistic groups, 
which it tends to 'liquidate', or to subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it leads 
kindred and allied groups. A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise 
'leadership' before winning governmental power (this indeed is one of the principal 
conditions for the winning of such power); it subsequently becomes dominant when it 
exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to 'lead' as 
well. 84 
The relationship between the ruling elite and the governed in this case is one of 
'organic cohesion', where the values and ideas of the dominant class become 
representative of the whole society. 85 These ideas and values are propagated in 
society by intellectuals. It should be noted that Gramsci de tines 'intellectuals' not in 
the traditional sense, meaning thinkers, but rather in an 'organisational function' in 
whatever area they operate, such as production, culture, and political administration. 
In this broad sense, intellectuals can include NGO personnel as well as officers in 
the army. 86 
This view of dominant ideas of the ruling elite emanates from the Marxist tradition, 
which argues that the dominant class not only controls the 'material' production of 
society, but also 'intellectual' production.87 
Jessop elaborates that hegemony 'involves political, intellectual and moral 
leadership rather than the forcible imposition of the interests of the dominant class 
on dominated classes'. The hegemonic ruling elite embrace a 'national-popular 
84 Gramsci quoted in Sassoon, A., Gramsci's Politics, (London: Croom Helm, 1980), pp. 111. 
85 Sassoon, A., Gramsci's Politics, (London: Croom Helm, 1980), pp. 124. 
86 Sassoon, A., Gramsci's Politics, (London: Croom Helm, 1980), pp. 134-135. 
87 Femia, J., Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolution, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 32. 
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project' that identifies certain objectives with the national interest. Although the 
project mainly serves the interests of the ruling elite, it considers the interests of 
different societal groups, including 'subordinate groups'. To enhance their 
hegemony, the ruling elite sponsor the national project via two means. They 
mobilise support for the project by promoting political and moral values of the elite 
through education, and by offering concessions to 'subordinate groups'. Second, 
opponents of the system who can form an alternative hegemonic constellation for 
the current ruling elite are neutralised, wherever possible; the ruling elite use force 
against radical opposition groups that cannot be co-opted into the system. 88 
Utilising the argument of hegemony, one can explain the adoption of welfare 
policies by the ruling elite as a means for generating legitimacy for the capitalist 
economic system. Marxists, such as Offe and Habermas, argue that the state, in 
Western capitalist societies, has manipulated welfare policies in order to secure 
legitimacy. Its main aim from adopting these policies has been to contribute to the 
accumulation of capital. This has helped perpetuate the capitalist system by 
facilitating a process of exchange between capital and labour through offering 
labour opportunities of education, training, and health care. As organised labour has 
gained from these policies, in terms of health, education, and other benefits, it has 
been acquiescent. Nevertheless, the welfare state soon experienced fmancial 
difficulties, or what came to be known as the fiscal crisis of the state, 89 and 
subsequently has been unable to keep its promises. 
88 Jessop, B., State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in Its Place, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 
pp. 181. 
89 See O'Conner, J., The Fiscal Crisis of the State, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973). 
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Marxists attribute this failure to the inherent 'contradiction' within the capitalist 
mode of production, where the system is based on profitability. Such profitability is 
maintained through exploitation of labour by suppressing wages. To maintain itself, 
the capitalist system needs a welfare state, where the latter provides the required 
infrastructure, creates an environment conducive to technological change, preserves 
social peace, and helps prevent an eruption of 'conflict and anarchy' .90 However, 
the state eventually becomes burdened with financial obligations of welfare 
provision, and faces a fiscal crisis as the demand for welfare increases. The state 
then undergoes retrenchment, at a time when it should have expanded its welfare 
provision due to rising demands from beneficiaries.91 
Most regimes in LDCs have followed the path of expansion in welfare provision 
and eventually faced a fiscal crisis. These states, however, differ from Western 
states, as most of them have been newly created, and their leaders do not enjoy 
legitimacy like their Western counterparts. It should be noted that the existing 
theory of the state applies essentially where state formation has taken place over a 
long period of time, and institutions are firmly established. These institutions are the 
basis of the legitimacy of the state and its leaders. When one studies political 
societies in LDCs, one is confronted with a set of problems that emanate from the 
weakness of state institutions. 
This analysis of the state, therefore, does not hold such relevance when applied to 
newly established/independent states or states in transition. Most regimes in LDCs 
90 Offe, C., Contradictions of the Welfare State, (London: Hutchinson, 1984), pp. 147-154. 
91 Habermas, J., Legitmation Crisis, T. McCarthy (trans.), (London: Heinemann, 1976), pp. 68-69. 
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have been marked by the rule of one man and a dominant ruling group. In these 
societies, the study of the state needs to take into consideration legitimacy of the 
ruling regime. Thus, we need to elaborate on legitimacy of regimes in LDCs. 
Legitimacy in WCs 
Although countries belonging to this category exhibit different characteristics in 
terms of resources, population, history, political regimes, and cultures, they share 
common features, mainly their economic peripherality, and the environment where 
policies are formulated. 92 
States in many LDCs were newly created after a long history of colonialism. Their 
boundaries were drawn haphazardly as a result of 'diplomatic bargaining' between 
colonial powers, or for 'ease of administration' .93 However, not all states in LDCs 
are artificial creations of colonialism, some states enjoyed a long history of 
'statehood', such as Egypt.94 
In most LDCs, the heroes who emerged from the struggle for national independence 
set upon national projects of 'modernising' their states and attaining economic 
independence. They aspired to make their states wealthy and internationally 
92 Clapham, C., Third World Politics: An Introduction, (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp. 1-3. 
93 Finer, S., Comparative Government: An Introduction to the Study of Politics, (London: Penguin, 
1970), pp. 109. 
94 Finer, S., Comparative Government: An Introduction to the Study of Politics, (London: Penguin, 
1970), pp. 97. 
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powerful. 95 One means to achieving this end was identified as industrialisation. 
Thus, these leaders needed the support of their populations to achieve these 
ambitious objectives and to remain in power.96 Hence, legitimacy became an 
immediate issue for new leaders of LDCs. 
Regime legitimacy in most LDCs is still in transition, being based upon a mixture 
of tradition and personal qualities of the leader, and sometimes on constitutional 
methods. Leaders in this phase rely, in their rule, upon the bureaucracy and their 
personality. The bureaucracy, including the army, provides some degree of 
continuity, and, therefore, stability.97 In order to 'maintain' control, leaders depend 
on different proportions of persuasion and coercion. If leaders resort more to 
repression, they can secure their rule in the short run, but this can, as well, lead to 
instability in the long run. On the other hand, if they seek the genuine support of 
their populations to ensure stability, they will be under pressure to liberalise the 
system even more, thus undermining their own rule, as other actors in society will 
k h . 98 see power-s anng. 
The personality of one man, who has usually emerged as the hero in the pro-longed 
struggle against colonialism for attaining independence is essential to legitimacy in 
95 Finer, S., Comparative Government: An Introduction to the Study of Politics, (London: Penguin, 
1970), pp. 104. 
96 Dekmejian, A., Egypt under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics, (London: UniversityofLondon 
Press, 1972), pp. 2. 
97 Heikal, M., The Autumn of Fury: The Assassination of Sadat, (London: Andre Deutsch, 1983), pp. 
55. 
98 Finer, S., Comparative Government: An Introduction to the Study of Politics, (London: Penguin, 
1970), pp. 110-111. 
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most LDCs. The problem with this 'one' man, as identified by Heikal, is that 
'however respected or even idolized, [the leader] cannot rest on his laurels'. 
Moreover, this leader cannot confer his legitimacy upon his successor. Lacking 
enduring legitimacy of institutions to back leaders, their achievements remain a 
main ingredient of their legitimacy. Hence, in contrast to the West, where usually a 
leader's legitimacy springs from legal institutions of the state, in LDCs it is 
dependant upon the achievements of the leader, particularly in the fields of welfare, 
development or foreign affairs. 99 
Welfare 
Most leaders of LDCs have promoted welfare policies, at some point in their rule, in 
order to expand their base of support. 100 These welfare policies range from 
subsidising food items to extending free health care and education to those who 
cannot afford them. After an initial redistribution of resources, and with modest 
growth, the resources of these states were exhausted. In the absence of foreign aid, 
many LDC states tried to retreat from the area of welfare provision, and the role of 
the state in economic life, in general, was reduced. Nevertheless, they encountered 
resistance, from beneficiaries of the system, when they tried to withdraw. 101 
99 Heikal, M., The Autumn of Fury: The Assassination of Sadat, (London: Andre Deutsch, 1983), pp. 
55. 
100 Midgley, J., "Theoretical Implications of Third World Social Policy Research", in S. 
MacPherson, and J. Midgley (eds.), Comparative Social Policy and the Third World, (Sussex: 
Wheatsheaf, 1987), pp. 120-121. 
101 Leca, J., "Democratization in the Arab World: Uncertainty, Vulnerability and Legitimacy. A 
Tentative Conceptualitzation and Some Hypothesis", in G. Salame (ed.), Democracy without 
Deomocrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), pp. 56. 
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Development 
Meanwhile, many leaders of LDCs have adopted slogans of development, ignoring 
the fact that development is a broad process that involves more than establishing 
factories, and an infrastructure. According to Heikal, development is a process that 
should embrace the whole society in the cultural, economic, as well as political 
spheres, and progress on all these fronts should be carried out simultaneously. As 
Heikal puts it '[t]here can be no true development unless the institutions exist in 
which it can be contained and flourish, and no effective institutions unless they 
retlect the reality of the society they are supposed to represent' .102 
Problems have arisen when leaders have tried to implement welfare and 
development policies simultaneously, particularly in states with limited resources. 
As economic and financial resources have been depleted, the fragility of these 
regimes has been exposed. They have realised that it is difficult to pursue both goals 
(welfare and development) simultaneously. This usually happens when the first 
'relatively easy' stage of IS industrialisation and the expansion of infrastructure is 
reached; the state is then forced to compromise on one of its two props of 
legitimacy, 'welfarism or developmentalism' .103 
102 Heikal, M., The Autumn of Fury: The Assassination of Sadat, (London: Andre Deutsch, 1983), 
pp. 55-56. 
103 Ayubi, N., "Political Correlates of Privatization Programs in the Middle East", Arab Studies 
Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 2 & 3, spring/summer 1992, pp. 40. 
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Foreign Affairs 
On the other hand, failing to address their domestic constituency, a feature not 
exclusive to LDCs, leaders turn to foreign affairs, where they try to achieve some 
victories that only buy them time and secure short-term stability and support. When 
leaders face insurmountable domestic problems, the quick and easy solution is to 
turn to the external world to try to gather domestic leverage. There is ample 
evidence in history to support this proposition. For example, when President Sadat 
was challenged at home in 1977, he became desperate to secure a peace treaty with 
Israel. 
Arab leadership provides a good illustration of the manipulation of the leader's 
achievements in order to secure their regimes in the absence of strong state 
institutions. 
Legitimacy of Arab Leaders 
When most of the Arab leaders have assumed office, they have pledged that their 
rule would be based on their commitment to attain 'rapid development, social 
justice, Arab unification, liberation of Palestine, cultural renaissance, sound 
democracy, and the like'. Since all these objectives could not be achieved 
simultaneously, the public had to compromise, always on democracy and political 
reform. 104 However, as Arab populaces have become frustrated with their rulers. 
104 Ibrahim, S., "Introduction", in S. al-Gbabra, Al-Kuwait: dirasahfi allyat al-dawlah al-qutriyah 
wa al-sultah wa al-mugtama' [Kuwait: A Study in the Mechanisms of the Regional State, Authority 
and Society], [Cairo: Ibn Kbaldun Center, 1995), pp. 19-20. 
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who have failed to achieve any of the declared objectives, they have started to 
express their discontent, demanding more political freedom and participation. 
Nevertheless, Arab rulers have been resilient to popular demands of political 
liberalisation. So far, they have only been removed from power by one of three 
methods: 'death, assassination, and coup d'etat' .105 
During their rule, many Arab leaders have relied upon different strategies to obtain 
the support of their populations: 106 
• Ideologies, such as anti-imperialism, nationalism, Arabism, and socialism; 
• External powers mainly for securing economic aid, and to serve the interests of 
comprador elite; 
• Relying on the burgeoning bureaucracy to try to expand their constituencies by 
extending the network of beneficiaries. 
In addition, when all of the above failed, Arab regimes have resorted to repression. 
Although, for a long time, Arab societies have been characterised by their passivity, 
they are 'becoming too complex and volatile to be completely controlled'. They 
seek political freedom and the attainment of human rights. The problem is 
compounded by the failure of their respective regimes to deal with domestic 
economic difficulties and regional threats, namely Israel. 107 
105 Ibrahim, S., "The Future of Human Rights in the Arab World", in H. Sharabi (ed.), The Next Arab 
Decade: Alternative Futures, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 41-42. 
106 Murphy, E., "Legitimacy and Economic Reform in the Arab World", The Journal of North 
African Studies, vol. 3, no. 3, autumn 1998, pp. 73-77. 
107 Hudson, M., "State, Society, and Legitimacy: An Essay on Arab Political Prospects in the 1990s", 
in H. Sharabi (ed.), The Next Arab Decade: Alternative Futures, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 
pp. 23-25, 33. 
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Thus, as leaders of LDCs have failed to build credible legal institutions that would 
give them legitimacy in the eyes of their populations, they have ultimately failed to 
secure rational legitimacy grounded in the institutions of the state. 
Institutionalisation of the state makes the system more adaptable, complex, 
autonomous, and coherent and generates long-term legitimacy in the eyes of the 
populations. In other words, institutionalisation leads to the generation of an 
'independent belief in validity of the structure and norms', which is in turn 
supported by the public leading to the enhancement of legitimacy. 108 
The institutionalisation of the state involves establishing a system that allows 
citizens to participate in the political process. This enhances the legitimacy of the 
state and the regime, as citizens know they can influence the decision-making 
process. Hence, political participation is crucial for the legitimacy of the state and 
the regime, and, accordingly, to the stability of any political system. In the next 
section, we will examine political participation and democracy in more detail due to 
their significance for the concept of legitimacy, which is a main reason behind the 
institution of the social contract. 
Political Participation and Democracy 
Political participation is defmed by Rush as 'the involvement of the individual at 
various levels of activity in the political system, ranging from non-involvement to 
108 Hudson, M., Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1977), pp. 23. 
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the holding of political office' .109 Political participation is a major feature of 
democracy. One cannot speak of a democratic system that does not entail public 
participation in the political process. Democracy involves 'popular consent and 
control on the part of the governed which may fmd expression in various political 
practices and forms of government' .110 
It is important to distinguish between political liberalisation and democracy. 
Political liberalisation refers to freedom of expression, and providing more outlets 
and allowing political association. On the other hand, democracy is about political 
participation, free elections, and peaceful transfer of power from one government to 
another. 111 
As defined by Schumpeter, 'the democratic method is that institutional arrangement 
for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide 
by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote.' 112 The central 
determinant as to whether a system is democratic or not, according to the above 
definition, is that leaders are selected by the governed through 'competitive 
109 Rush, M., Politics and Society: An Introduction to Political Sociology, (New York: Prentice Hall, 
1992), pp. 110. 
110 Rush, M., Politics and Society: An Introduction to Political Sociology, (New York: Prentice Hall, 
1992), pp. 80. 
111 Norton, A., "The Future of Civil Society in the Middle East", The Middle East Journal, vol. 47, 
no. 2, spring 1993, pp. 207. 
112 Schumpeter, J., Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1959), pp. 
269. 
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elections' rather than 'birth, lot, wealth, violence, cooptation, learning, appointment, 
or examination' .113 
Looking at democracy from this perspective, it involves two essential elements: 
contestation and participation. The criteria for assessing how democratic a system is 
are freedom of speech, expression, assembly, organisation, which are crucial for 
'political debate', and conducting 'electoral campaigns' .114 Another important 
feature of democracy is the continuous 'responsiveness' of the government to 
citizens' preferences. Citizens should be able in a democratic system to 'formulate' 
and express their preferences, and the government should be accountable to citizens 
and removed from power if it fails to carry out their wi11. 115 
It should be noted that democracy exists along a continuum. A system can be 
more/less democratic than another system; and it can be more/less democratic at a 
certain point in time compared to another time. In other words, democracy is a 
dynamic form of government. 116 Although democratic systems can be put in place, 
they may not endure if they are not institutionalised. Institutionalisation is, 
therefore, a means of ensuring the stability of the system. 117 
113 Huntington, S., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 6. 
114 Huntington, S., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 7. 
115 Dahl, R., Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 
pp. 1-3. 
116 Huntington, S., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 11-12. 
117 Huntington, S., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 11. 
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It does not matter whether the government is irresponsible, incompetent, or corrupt; 
this does not make it undemocratic. A democratic government can be incompetent, 
and a non-democratic one can be efficient. The two concepts are not related. The 
essence of democracy, in any state, is ultimately tested in the process of elections, 
whereby parliamentarians and deputies can compete in a fair system irrespective of 
class, ethnicity, religion or gender. 118 A government selected by the people will 
probably have more interest to involve the public in its operations to secure support 
in subsequent elections. 
A democratic system does not mean, however, that people will participate in the 
political process. There are two types of explanations of political participation: 
instrumental and developmental theories. Instrumental theories view participation 
'as a means to an end, that is for the defence or advancement of an individual or 
group of individuals and as a bulwark against tyranny and despotism'. As 
individuals can best judge their own interests, governments should involve the 
governed to be more effective and to fulfil their wishes. For instrumental theorists, 
then, participation is the main font of legitimacy of the government. Developmental 
theories, on the other hand, believe that 'ideal' citizens should participate out of 
'societal' responsibility. Thus, citizens, being aware of not only their rights but also 
their duties, should participate. In this sense participation is regarded as a duty of 
citizens. 
118 Huntington, S., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, (Norman: 
UniversityofOklahomaPress, 1991), pp. 9-10. 
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However, citizens do not always participate in the political process, even if they 
have the option. Social scientists have been interested in explaining the 
phenomenon of non-participation. Schumpeter, for example, argued that people, in 
general, tend to exhibit a lack of interest and concern in economic and foreign 
policy issues and policies that do not have an immediate impact on their everyday 
lifi 119 e. 
Furthermore, if the populace do not believe that participation can be effective in 
bringing about change, and that their participation is influential in decision-making 
in general, they will abstain from participation. 120 This has been corroborated by the 
strong statistical correlation between participation and 'political efficacy', which 
refers to the sense of the possibility of influencing policies. 121 
Clapham observes that states that have low level of participation have 'few if any 
generally accepted moral principles which would distinguish "legitimate" from 
"illegitimate" government, what matters is simply that it is the government'. In 
these states even if the regime in question has come to power via 'free and fair 
procedure', once it is there, it is entrenched and clings to power with no chance of 
being replaced. Realising this, the populace show low interest in the political 
process; hence, they do not participate. 122 
119 Schumpeter, J., Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1959), pp. 
261-264. 
120 Held, D., Models of Democracy, 2nd ed., (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), pp. 268. 
121 Rush, M., Politics and Society: An Introduction to Political Sociology, (New York: Prentice Hall, 
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Most LDCs have low levels of participation because regimes control the decision-
making process through two means. First, regimes draw a tacit social contract with 
their populations, whereby the public surrenders its right to participation and 
receives welfare and patronage in return. Second, regimes try to block the channels 
of participation through regulations and laws that constrain political freedom. The 
populations on their part buy into the social contract. But when regimes fail to 
deliver their part of the contract, populations seek more political participation and 
question the right of the regime to rule because of its failure to carry out, what they 
perceive as, its obligation as a welfare provider. 
Populations, therefore, look for alternative solutions to their problems rather than 
rely on an inefficient state that has already failed them. The solution lies in the civil 
society. 
Civil Society 
Before the seventeenth century, political philosophers did not make a distinction 
between state and civil society. Society was conceived a"' a community of citizens 
who were subject to the rule of common laws and a civil government.123 Since the 
rise of the liberal school in the seventeenth century, political philosophers have 
tended to differentiate between the state and society. This differentiation was 
particularly outlined by Hegel in the nineteenth century. Hegel's contribution to the 
study of civil society is that he highlighted the distinction between the state and 
123 Faulks, K., Political Sociology: A Critical Introduction, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1999), pp. 18-19. 
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civil society, or the public and the private. Hegel identifies the private as an area of 
voluntary organisation among individuals as opposed to the public which is 
organised by the state. He associates the state with the means of coercion. Society, 
on the other hand, is grounded in freedom and voluntary organisation between 
individuals not based on familial relationships. To Hegel, the public takes 
precedence over the private. In other words, the 'interests [of civil society] are 
subordinate to ... and dependent' upon the state.124 
Therefore, civil society can be defined as 
. . . all those social relationships which involve the voluntary assoctation and 
participation of individuals acting in their private capacities . . . civil society can be 
said to equal the milieu of private contractual relationships ... It involves all those 
relationships which go beyond the purely familial and yet are not of the state. 125 
This definition stresses the voluntary aspect of civil society. Individuals choose 
voluntarily to become members of organisations that are designed to represent 
differing interest groups in society. It includes, social classes, political parties, 
welfare associations, and corporations. Thus, in a civil society, citizens hold their 
'ultimate loyalty' to their sovereign state; yet, they have sub-loyalties to interest 
groups, classes, and professions with which they are associated. Sub-loyalties 
change with vertical (moving to a different class) or horizontal (change of 
profession or membership of an association) mobility. 126 
124 Hegel, G., Hegel's Philosophy of Right, T. Knox (trans.), (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1942), pp. 
161. 
125 Tester, K., Civil Society, (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 8. 
126 Ibrahim, S. (ed.), "Civil Society and Prospect of Democratization in the Arab World", in Egypt, 
Islam, and Democracy: Twelve Critical Essays, (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 
1996), pp. 245-246. 
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Civil society is formed of corporations. Corporations are bodies that incorporate 
members with common interest with the aim of pursuing certain purposes. 
According to Durkheim, 'corporations' protect the individual from the possible 
'excesses' of the state; and they stop the state from relapsing into 'conservatism', 
which hinders innovation in the political, social and economic spheres. Civil society 
acts as a check on the state and protects the individual against its possible 
tyranny.127 Civil society, therefore, refers to economic and social voluntary 
organisations that advance and protect the interests of their members. Thus, it acts 
as a link between the individual or family and the state, or between universal and 
particular demands, where universal demands represent the common good of 
society and particular demands are demands of individuals. 128 
The state, which to Hegel represents the 'highest form of human community', 
regulates society through the means of coercion over which it has monopoly. It 
protects the individual by controlling activities that might be harmful to universal 
interests (the common good). Civil society, on the other hand, aims at confining the 
role of the state to 'maintaining order' whilst protecting the individual from the 
arbitrary use of coercion by the state. In other words, society guards the right of the 
individual to 'life, liberty, and property' .129 
127 Giddens, A., Durkheim, (London: Fontana Press, 1986), pp. 60-61. 
128 Hegel, G., Hegel's Philosophy of Right, T. Knox (trans.), (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1942), pp. 
122. 
129 Steinberg, J ., Locke, Rousseau, and the Idea of Consent: An Inquiry into the Liberal-democratic 
Theory of Political Obligation, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 24-29. 
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Thus, the relationship between the state and civil society is one of continuous 
interaction and 'tension', where each party tries to control the other. 130 The state 
tries to exercise control over civil society by regulating relationships among 
different organisations. Civil society, on the other hand, tries to curb the power of 
the state through the pressure exerted by influential interest groups aiming to make 
the state more accountable and responsive to their demands and needs. 131 Though 
the strength of civil society in advancing the interests of its members differs from 
one country to another, common characteristics can be identified. 
Characteristics of Civil Society 
In general, civil society is characterised by three main features: 132 
1. Pluralism: Civil society comprises many self-organised associations, 133 which 
represent the interests of specific groups. These associations are organised along 
political, economic or social interests. There are two levels of pluralism. 
Associations operate pluralistically in the political, economic and social spheres. 
Then the associations functioning within each sphere co-operate and conflict 
13
° Keane, J., Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), pp. 6. 
131 Janoski, T., Citizenship and Civil Society: A Framework of Rights & Obligations in Liberal, 
Traditional, and Social Denwcratic Regimes, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 
12-17. 
132 Sbils, E., ''The Virtue of Civil Society'', Government and Opposition, vol. 26, no. 1, winter 1991, 
pp. 3-16. 
133 Kamrava, M., and F. Mora, "Civil Society and Democratisation in Comparative Perspective: 
Latin America and the Middle East", Third World Quanerly, vol. 19, no. 5, December 1998, pp. 
895. 
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with each other. The lines between these spheres are not clearly demarcated. For 
example, a political party functions in the political arena, yet it embraces an 
economic framework, which forms one of the pillars of its programme. Pluralism 
is attached to liberties; civil society accepts diversity of opinion and interests. 
Thus, it respects freedom, which is an essential condition for its flourishing. 
Freedom includes freedom of thought, belief, religion, worship, expression, 
assembly, representation, and association. The concept of 'citizenship' is central 
to civil society, as it decrees that all individuals have equal rights, obligations, 
and dignities. Hence, this ensures the respect for those of different opinion and 
creed. 
2. Autonomy: Civil society is 'distinctly' different from the state; its institutions 
enjoy autonomy and their decisions and actions are not directed by the state, but 
are made according to agreement among participants of these institutions. Yet, it 
has a complex relationship with the state to safeguard this separation. The state 
stipulates laws that set the boundaries of civil society; on the other hand, civil 
society limits the actions of the state. The law binds both the state and citizens; it 
protects the latter from the power of the wealthy, political authorities, 
bureaucrats, the military, and the police. Abiding by law, in this case, emanates 
not from force but from a belief in the 'legitimacy of laws, regulations and 
institutions of society'. Civil society is characterised by civil manners; and 
thereby it 'regulates the conduct of individuals towards the state and society as 
well as towards other individuals'. 
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3. Respect for private property: Another important feature of civil society is its 
respect for private property. This feature has been crucial for the rise of market 
economy. According to Smith and Hegel, civil society comprises commercial 
associations and institutions, which are not a part of the family or the state, that 
facilitate functioning of the market. 
In a state with a dynamic civil society, the state is powerful enough to enforce the 
law, which protects pluralism, liberties, and private property. It is essential to note 
that although market institutions constitute a major ingredient of civil society, they 
are not the only ones. Civil society must be able to protect its autonomy; therefore, 
it must have political parties that compete through elections. Based on these 
elections, an independent legislature is formed, which protects the interests of civil 
society, as well as an independent judiciary. It should also enjoy a free media to 
monitor the decisions and actions of the government and be able to criticise them 
freely. 134 
'Members' of a civil society compete for power and control of the state. In some 
cases, one group may become dominant and form the ruling elite in society. 
According to Mosca, one of the founders of elite theory, societies can be divided 
into two classes, 'ruling' and 'ruled'. The ruling elite constitute a minority that 
exercises control over the state whether directly or indirectly. 
134 Shils, E., "The Virtue of Civil Society'', Government and Opposition, vol. 26, no. 1, winter 1991, 
pp. 9-10. 
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Using a Marxist framework, the ruling elite is the dominant class, the bourgeoisie, 
which manipulates the state to serve its own interest. However, elite theorists differ 
from Marxists in that whereas Marxists believe that once socialism is achieved, the 
society becomes classless, and hence the state 'withers away', elite theory regards 
elite ruling, as a form of government, as inevitable, though circulation of power is 
possible. This implies that the ruling elite can be challenged by a counter-elite that 
can then seize power; exploitation is a permanent feature of societies. 135 
Pluralism offers a different version of elite theory. Pluralists opine that society 
comprises many 'heterogeneous social groups' with differing conflicting interests. 
These interest groups act as a constraint on the state in so far as they are organised, 
and are able to exert pressure on the state, and affect the decision-making process. 
A variation of pluralism is corporatism, which assumes that there is a limited 
number of self-administered non-competitive associations, often created by the 
state, such as syndicates and labour unions. These associations co-operate with the 
state, and, therefore, they benefit from their links with the state. Their dependence 
on the state acts as a check on their 'behaviour', as they cannot compete openly 
with the state. They function more as regulatory agencies, 'on behalf of the state', 
over their members, who do not usually have alternative channels to represent their 
interests. They operate along hierarchical structures, and, therefore, resemble state 
bureaucracies. 136 However, leaders of corporatist associations face a continuous 
135 Dunleavy, P., and B. O'Leary, Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy, 
(London: Macmillan Education, 1987), pp.l36-139. 
136 Williamson, P., Corporatism in Perspective: An Introductory Guide to Corporatist Theory, 
(London: Sage, 1989),pp.60-69. 
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'dilemma'. Being dependent on links with the state, they are usually obliged to 
compromise the interests of their members, in situations where these interests are in 
conflict with those of the state or regime. This, in turn, undermines their credibility 
in the eyes of their constituencies. 137 
A corporatist system is marked by a 'symbiotic' relationship between the state and 
certain key interest groups in society. The state controls these groups, and they 
'manipulate' the state to serve their own interests. Usually there is a permeability in 
the system between the state and these interest groups. In other words, the same 
people who control the state are associated with these interest groups. For example, 
incumbent politicians or bureaucrats (or their relatives) may be involved in running 
private businesses. 138 
As the state can manipulate civil society to serve its own ends, through promoting a 
corporatist system, the latter can also bring about a change in the system, mainly 
more political liberalisation. Many political scientists have argued that civil society 
can be a vehicle for democratisation. This is because civil society is based upon 
voluntary activity and respect for personal freedoms and private property. 
Voluntary associations, such as trade unions and professional syndicates, defend 
and promote the interests of their members and constituencies, meanwhile shaping 
their 'organizational and civic socialization'. They play a significant role in 
advocating, pressuring, and monitoring political decisions affecting their members 
137 Jessop, B., State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in Its Place, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1990), pp. 163-164. 
138 Clapham, C., Third World Politics: An Introduction, (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp. 105. 
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or the society at large. Therefore, they contribute to the 'vitality of the political 
process', and, hence, to democratisation. 139 
Civil Society and Democratisation 
It is predicated that a prosperous civil society can eventually lead to the evolution of 
a democratic system in LDCs, especially after the failure of the state to meet its 
obligations of the contract towards the population, as the latter will abrogate the 
contract by rebelling against their regimes and states. However, Kamrava and Mora 
argue that civil society organisations can only become powerful agents of political 
liberalisation if the following conditions are satisfied: 140 
1. Weakening of the state: As the state fails to fulfil many of its functions, the 
civil society gains more leverage over the state. Such functions include, 
provision of infrastructure, and services such as health and education, and 
improving or maintaining the standard of living of citizens. Civil society 
organisations 'tend' to rise as the state fails to carry out its functions effectively. 
They first emerge as a local solution to meet the immediate needs of the 
community. 'By serving as alternative sources of information and 
139 Ibrahim, S., "The Socio-economic Requisites of Democracy", in A. Dessouki (ed.), Democracy in 
Egypt, (Cairo: The American University of Cairo, Cairo Papers in Social Science, vol. 1, monograph 
2, 1978), pp. 60-61. 
14
° Kamrava, M., and F. Mora, "Civil Society and Democratisation in Comparative Perspective: 
Latin America and the Middle East", Third World Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 5, December 1998, pp. 
896-897. 
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communication, many of these organisations directly challenge the interests and 
legitimacy of the state and erode its capacity to dominate and control society.' 141 
2. Cultural alienation of the state from society: If the state-affiliated 
organisations lose their value in the eyes of the public, the latter will start to look 
for alternative organisations to represent their interests and satisfy their needs. 
This happens not only in socio-economic areas, but also in cultural and political 
affairs. For the intelligentsia, for example, issues of sovereignty and human 
rights are of paramount importance. Thus, if the state fail'> to preserve its 
sovereignty by allowing foreign intervention in its affairs, or violates human 
rights through repression, these groups will form organisations to represent their 
views on these issues, and act as an opposition front to the state. 
3. Existence of social actors able and willing to mobilise various constituents 
for specific goals that may be local or even national in scope: Values, such as 
'tolerance, trust, moderation, and accommodation', are essential for the 
transformation to a democratic society. Social actors who have the power and 
means of mobilisation, through communication networks such as the media, can 
instil these values in society. The dissemination of these values, through 
organised voluntary activity, enhances the process of democratisation. 
4. Political effects of economic adjustment and liberalisation: Economic 
adjustment programmes are usually adopted after the failure of state capitalism 
141 Kamrava, M., and F. Mora, "Civil Society and Democratisation in Comparative Perspective: 
Latin America and the Middle East", Third World Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 5, December 1998, pp. 
896. 
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or large-scale IS based industry. The impact of these economic reforms is the 
transfer of economic power from the state to the society represented in market 
forces. This 'empowers' civil society. As the state rolls back from performing its 
functions, civil society steps in to find ways to help reduce the impact of reforms 
on groups harmed by these programmes. Consequently, authoritarian regimes 
lose some of their control over society, as civil society becomes no longer 
dependent on the state. Thus, civil society enhances its autonomy at the expense 
of the state. 
A consequence of adopting economic reforms in LDCs has been the proliferation of 
private voluntary organisations (PVOs). PVOs are a subset of civil society. As their 
name implies, one of their essential features is that they are voluntarily organised. 
They have been identifined by Salamon and Anheier as organisations that have the 
following features: 142 
• Institutionalised; 
• Privately owned; 
• Enjoy autonomy from the state; 
• They do not distribute profit to owners; 
• They control their own activities; 
• They are voluntary-based; in other words, there is a significant degree of 
voluntary participation in their activities. 
142 Salamon, and Anheier cited in Billis, D., and H. Glennerster, "Human Services and the Voluntary 
Sector: Towards a Theory of Comparative Advantage", Journal of Social Policy, vol. 27, no. 1, 
January 1998, pp. 80-81. 
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Voluntary organisations, or the third sector, have a comparative advantage over the 
state, especially in welfare provision, as they tend to be less bureaucratic and rigid. 
Furthermore, they tend to be specialised and more efficient. Their personnel and 
clients enjoy a mutually beneficial relationship, where the former gain experience 
and help their communities, and the latter are involved in self-help projects that 
improve their conditions in the long run. 143 
Acknowledging the merits of PVOs, the state can cooperate with them by funding 
their activities, which tends to be cheaper for the public budget. However, this can 
compromise the autonomy of PVOs, as they become dependent on the state. They 
will have to be accountable to the government rather than their owners or clients, 
who may all seek different objectives. For example, the government may want to 
cut its costs whilst the owners of the PVO tend to promote other cultural or equity 
objectives, and clients want to benefit more from the products offered to them by 
the PVO in question. In addition, voluntary organisations tend to be familiar with 
their customers, and, therefore, can cater for their needs better than state officials. 
PVOs also tend to be more innovative and have more flexibility in trying new 
projects.144 Finally, they receive more contributions from the public. 145 
143 Graycar, A. (ed.), "Retreat from the Welfare State", Retreat from the Welfare State: Australian 
Policy in the 1980s, (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1983), pp. 9. 
144 Graycar, A. (ed.), "Retreat from the Welfare State", Retreat from the Welfare State: Australian 
Policy in the 1980s, (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1983), pp. 9. 
145 Billis, D., and H. Glennerster, "Human Services and the Voluntary Sector: Towards a Theory of 
Comparative Advantage", Journal of Social Policy, vol. 27, no. 1, January 1998, pp. 83. 
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All this makes them a viable solution to the problems of local communities, as they 
can relieve the state from its fmancial burden and deliver a more efficient service 
with a higher quality than that provided by the state. Most LDC states have been 
reluctant, however, to accept this option, as they fear that the success of these PVOs 
will highlight their failure in the promotion of the welfare of their societies. This 
will lead to further alienation of the population, who will also become cognisant of 
the limitation of the social contract formulae offered by their regimes. This may 
eventually compel these regimes to choose to modify the terms and conditions of 
the social contract, by liberalising the political system and allowing more 
participation, which can ultimately result in the dismantling of these regimes. 
Conclusion 
In this research, the author argues that state-society relations in LDCs have been 
governed by a social contract forged by the regime to ensure its stability and 
survival. This contract is based upon an exchange of acquiescence for patronage 
and welfare provision. In this chapter, we have introduced the two parties to a social 
contract, the state and society. 
We have examined the state, looking at different approaches to the study of the state 
and existing defmitions. The state has been defined as institutions and individuals 
controlling these institutions that have supreme authority to recognise any group 
within society; they have a monopoly over means of coercion, and they rule a 
nation confined to a certain territory. Central to our understanding of the state and 
its relations with society are three concepts, strength, autonomy, and legitimacy. 
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We have discussed the strength of the state, defmed as the ability of the state to 
formulate and implement decisions and policies. We have also considered strong 
and weak states. The strength of the state exists along a continuum and it changes 
over time. At one point, the state may be able to implement policies in spite of 
resistance from society, without being able to change the behaviour of private 
actors; at other times, it can convince private actors to 'follow' these policies, but it 
is not able to change the structure of the 'domestic environment'; still at other times 
it can manage to change the behaviour of actors as well as the domestic structure. It 
has been argued that strong states are not only the ones that can carry out their 
decisions and policies in spite of resistance, but also those that can abstain from 
intervention. 
An autonomous state has been identified as one that can execute policies that are 
not congruent with interests of influential interest groups in society. Marxists argue 
that the state is not autonomous; it serves the interests of the dominant bourgeois 
class. The Bonapartist state manipulates the conflicting interests of different interest 
groups within society whilst preserving those of the dominant class. 
Neo-Marxists have expanded their view of the 'dominant class' to encompass other 
influential economic and political groups within society. They have also argued that 
the state enjoys relative autonomy if it manages to avoid following the interests of 
the dominant class. A state can enjoy autonomy from influential groups through two 
ways, either through authoritarian rule or institutionalisation of systems based upon 
legality. 
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Authoritarian states that use repression to control society may be able to carry out 
unpopular polices. However, they are not immune to penetration; influential groups 
may still manage to infiltrate the system, through corruption, and impose their 
preferences. In the long run, this system is not stable, as resentment accumulates, 
and marginalised groups rise against the regime. 
On the other hand, institutionalisation tends to result in a more stable outcome. This 
is because institutions secure legitimacy through legality. Legitimacy in 'modem 
states', based upon legality rather than charismatic authority, is marked by long-
term stability. 
Acquiescence of the public does not necessarily mean that the state is legitimate, 
nor does it eventually translate into state legitimacy, as the public may accept the 
regime for negative factors, because they fears punishment or exclusion due to non-
compliance; or positive factors, where they gain power, status or economic favours 
in exchange for acquiescence. The problem with both sets of factors is that negative 
factors can lead to an uprising in the long run, due to the accumulation of 
resentment and frustration. The second type of factors, on the other hand, can lead 
to questioning of regime legitimacy once the resources of the state have been 
exhausted. We have used Held's scale of acquiescence, which presents seven types 
of acquiescence, only two of which exhibit acquiescence situations where the 
acquiescence of the public reflects regime/state legitimacy. 
Alternatively, in an ideal state, legitimacy ought to be based upon the conviction of 
the populace that this is the best arrangement available. In this state, the public is 
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allowed to express its opinions freely and voice its opposition; in short, it allows the 
populace to affect the outcome of the political process through genuine 
participation. Such a system generates consensus, and maintains social cohesion in 
society due to the existence of a durable social contract between the state and 
society that promotes the common interest. 
Social contract theory attempts to explain legitimacy of political authority based 
upon an agreement between the ruler and the governed. The author has used 
Locke's contract theory to explain the legitimacy of political authority in LDCs 
because it entitles citizens to resist their government when the latter 'acts contrary 
to its trust'. According to Locke, the authority of the ruler is legitimate as long as 
he/she meets his/her obligations of the contract. These obligations include, 
preserving life, liberty, and property, and promoting moral values in society. To 
contractarians, the ruler must promote liberties in society. Welfare cannot be 
promoted at the expense of liberties. 
In LDCs, leaders have sought to generate legitimacy for their regimes by drawing a 
social contract with their societies. The ruling elite has been co-opted in corporatist 
systems, through patronage. Other members of society have been offered welfare 
products in return for their support of their regimes. Moreover, foreign policy has 
been used sometimes to accumulate credit in terms of legitimacy. However, lacking 
rational legitimacy grounded in strong institutions of the state, this type of contract 
based upon material exchange has proved to be non-durable. This is because this 
contract does not promote social cohesion in society. Moreover, it is tied to the 
resources of the state, which are limited. 
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So long the regime has been able to deliver, it has been able to deny the population 
its right to participation. It should be noted that although in most LDCs, power is 
concentrated in the hands of one man who controls the instruments of power - the 
bureaucracy, the army, and the police - and despite the lack of a dynamic political 
life, political life in LDCs has not been 'static'. There has been a continuous 
struggle to bring about change. 146 This movement has intensified with the failure of 
the state to provide the promised welfare. 
As the state has failed to meet the demands and needs of several groups in society, 
civil society has managed to offer a viable alternative to the state in welfare 
provision. Civil society associations have proved to be more effective than the state 
in meeting the needs of their members because they are based upon voluntary 
activity, and due to their sensitivity to the needs of the communities they serve. 
However, as the state allows the civil society to operate more freely, it risks losing 
the control it exercises over society. This has been the case particularly in societies 
where state and regime legitimacy has been so weak, and the regime has relied upon 
welfare provision as a principal component of the social contract in order to 
enhance its legitimacy. 
146 Heikal, M., The Autumn of Fury: The Assassination of Sadat, (London: Andre Deutsch, 1983), 
pp. 201. 
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Chapter Two 
The Welfare State 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we looked at the state, its strength, autonomy, and 
legitimacy vis-a-vis society. We argued that regimes in most LDC states lack 
legitimacy; they have, therefore, engaged in a social contract with their populations 
based on patronage and welfare provision to gain their support. Welfare provision, 
in particular, has proved effective in reaching lower income groups, who have 
otherwise been inaccessible to regimes in LDCs, which lack strong institutions to 
generate the required support to sustain their rule. We also discussed briefly the 
failure of these regimes to sustain the social contract because of the limited 
resources of their states. Eventually, most LDC states that have adopted welfare 
policies have experienced financial difficulties and have been unable to meet the 
demands and needs of their populations; the latter have looked for alternatives 
within civil society. 
Most regimes in LDCs, after independence, have made welfare provision the 
cornerstone of their social contract declaring products, such as education and health 
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care, as the 'right' of every citizen. However, these states could not afford to 
expand in welfare provision to meet the needs of the growing populations because 
of their limited resources. Subsequently, whenever a state has tried to retreat from 
delivering the rights of its citizens, beneficiaries have resisted. They have perceived 
the state/regime unworthy of their support because it has encroached upon their 
rights; and the fragility of legitimacy has been exposed. Since the focus of this 
research is the social contract in LDCs based upon welfare provision, it is 
imperative to examine the welfare state. Although the welfare state emerged in 
advanced Western capitalist societies, the author argues that the concept is 
applicable to states in LDCs that have engaged in welfare provision. 
In this chapter, we will propose a definition of the welfare state suitable for the 
purpose of the research. We will trace the evolution of the welfare state in the West, 
and especially in Britain, as this was the cradle of what came to be known as the 
'welfare state'. We will also analyse the reasons behind the emergence, expansion, 
and retrenchment of the welfare state in advanced capitalist societies. 
This examination of the welfare state in advanced capitalist societies will enable us 
to comprehend how the welfare state can serve as a legitimating machine, and why 
regimes in LDCs, which have lacked legitimacy, have found a remedy to their 
problem in the welfare state. In particular, this chapter will highlight the difference 
between the Western model of the welfare state, which has evolved over nearly two 
centuries, and the welfare state that emerged in LDCs rather as a 'quick fix' in order 
to generate legitimacy. 
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In order to understand how the state has become a provider of welfare, and what 
other alternatives are available to individuals when the state fails to meet their 
needs, we need to identify the possible channels of welfare provision in any society. 
Systems of Welfare Provision 
There are four systems that provide welfare in society: 1 
o informal system; 
• private sector or market system; 
• voluntary sector (the third sector); 
• the state; 
• Informal system: Traditionally, the family or household (sometimes people 
living within the same household are not related by kinship) has been the main 
provider for the individual. This informal system has also included friends and 
neighbours. In LDCs, and among poor communities, in particular, this network 
still constitutes the main source of assistance for the poor. With the rise of 
industrialisation and capitalism in Western societies, the role of the family has 
declined as the main source of provision, and it has been incrementally replaced 
by market forces. 2 
1 Wolfenden Committee, The Future of Voluntary Organisations: Report of the Wolfenden 
Committee, (London: Croom Helm, 1978), pp. 15. 
2 Bryson, L., Welfare and the State: Who Benefits, (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 70-71. 
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• Market system: With industrialisation, individuals started to earn wages, which 
could be exchanged for goods and services in the market. Employed workers, 
who earned modest wages, could no longer support members of their 
family/households who did not earn a living. Therefore, groups who could not 
earn a living, such as the elderly, disabled, sick and children, were made 
vulnerable by market arrangements. These groups received support from 
voluntary organisations. 3 
• Voluntary sector: In capitalist societies, since the eighteenth century, voluntary 
organisations have offered assistance to individuals when the family/household 
has failed to provide for its members. These organisations have experienced 
periods of rise and decline due to constraints of their resources. Subsequently, 
the state stepped in to meet human needs that were beyond the means of the 
voluntary sector, and could not be sufficiently provided by the market system.4 
o The state: The rising interest in social justice, citizenship rights, and 
accordingly, the welfare of all citizens in society led to the intervention of the 
state in welfare provision, and the development of what came to be known as 
the welfare state. 5 
3 MacPherson, S., and J. Midgley (eds.), "Introduction: The Third World and Comparative Social 
Policy'', Comparative Social Policy and the Third World, (Sussex: Wheatsheaf, 1987), pp. 6. 
4 Henriques, U., Before the Welfare State: Social Administration in Early Industrial Britain, 
(London: Longman, 1979), pp. 3-4. 
5 Marshall, T., "Citizenship and Social Class", in C. Pierson, and F. Castles (eds.), The Welfare 
State: A Reader, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000). 
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The role played by the fourth agent, the state, in the provision of welfare will be the 
focus of this chapter. We will examine the philosophy and the origins of the welfare 
state. Then we will discuss proposed explanations for its emergence, rise and 
decline looking at the relevance of these phases to the social contract based upon 
welfare provision. Although the circumstances that led to the evolution of the 
welfare state in capitalist societies are different from the circumstances that led to 
its imposition in LDCs, welfare provision still passed through the same phases. The 
implications of these phases for regime legitimacy will be investigated later in this 
chapter. Finally, we will consider the various kinds and forms of welfare provided 
by the state. 
The Welfare State 
Most of the literature on the welfare state has focused on the rise of the welfare 
state. Little attention has been given to defining the welfare state. However, 
defining the welfare state is important for the identification of any state (in this 
research, Egypt) as a welfare state.6 Therefore, we will explore competing 
defmitions of the welfare state in order to reach a working defmition suitable for the 
purpose of this study. 
6 Esping-Andersen, G., The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1990), pp. 18. 
88 
The Philosophy 
Welfare literally means 'well-being', which adds little to the conceptualisation of 
welfare. Using a utilitarian approach, Brandt defined welfare as universal needs that 
have to be satisfied to attain fulftlment. 7 
Conventionally, the term 'welfare state' has referred to a state that 'promised to 
deliver economic security to those who are at a disadvantage within the market 
economy of capitalist societies'. 8 This definition of the welfare state implies that 
products provided by the state are limited to ensuring economic security, and the 
recipients of those products are the 'disadvantaged' only. As will be explained later 
in this chapter, this definition describes early versions of the welfare state in 
capitalist societies, which extended welfare only to the poor, and where welfare was 
designed to ensure that a minimum standard of living was achieved for all citizens. 
Another perspective characterises a welfare state as one where 'benefits' in cash or 
kind, such as social security, health, education, and housing, are provided to 
targeted individuals, but not in exchange for a contribution to the national output. 
The significance of using targeted individuals in the definition of the welfare state 
is to point out the difference between these goods and services and public goods, 
7 Brandt, R., "The Concept of Welfare", inN. Timms, and D. Watson (eds.), Talking about Welfare: 
Readings in Philosophy and Social Policy, (London: Routledge & Kegan, 1976), pp. 64-85. 
8 Bryson, L., Welfare and the State: Who Benefits, (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 1-2. 
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where nobody can be excluded once the good/service has been provided; the classic 
example being defence where all citizens benefit from it. 9 
As the welfare state had developed in Western capitalist societies, its functions 
increased and its beneficiaries expanded to include other groups in society. Piet 
Thoenes defmed the welfare state as 'a form of society characterised by a system of 
democratic, government-sponsored welfare placed on a new footing and offering a 
guarantee of collective social care to its citizens, concurrently with the maintenance 
of a capitalist system of production' .10 
This defmition of the welfare state specifies three conditions for a state to be 
identified as a welfare state. First, the welfare state must have a democratic system 
of government; this type of government is essential to ensure freedom for all 
members of society. In this sense, this defmition is broader than the previous one, as 
it stresses not only economic security but also human security. 
Second, it suggests that welfare provision is offered universally to all members of 
society. This suggests that the concept of the welfare state has moved away from 
focusing only on the disadvantaged. Alternatively, it is based upon citizenship, 
defined as 'passive and active membership of individuals in a nation-state with 
certain universalistic rights and obligations at a specified level of equality', where 
passive rights refer to the 'rights of existence' and active rights refer to the rights of 
9 Wilson, T., and D. Wilson, The Political Economy of the Welfare State, (London: Allen & Unwin, 
1982), pp. 4-5. 
10 Thoenes, P., The Elite in the Welfare State, edited by J. A. Banks, translated by J. E. Bingham, 
(London: Faber & Faber, 1966), pp. 125. 
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political participation and influencing the decision-making process. 11 Welfare 
provision based on citizenship is associated with the ideas of T.H. Marshall, who 
argues that the process of rights involves three spheres: civil, political, and social. 12 
According to this perspective, the welfare state ensures solidarity and integration of 
all members within the community as welfare is provided to all members of society 
regardless of their class or economic ability. 13 
It should be noted that advocates of this approach are not interested in economic 
egalitarianism per se. They are more concerned with social rights that are based 
upon full membership of a community. The welfare state compensates the 
disadvantaged for their plight and the cost of providing welfare is borne by other 
community members out of duty, and not only because they are responsible for the 
misfortune of others.14 This idea stems from the social contract, which 
acknowledges the benefits of a system where individuals give up some of their 
resources in order to help create an environment free of brutality and poverty, and 
also to insure themselves against the risk of destitution. 15 
11 Janoski, T., Citizenship and Civil Society: A Framework of Rights and Obligations in liberal, 
Traditional, and Social Democratic Regimes, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 
9. 
12 Marshall, T., Social Policy in the Twentith Century, (London: Hutchinson, 1975). 
13 Esping-Andersen, G., The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1990), pp. 25. 
14 Tiunuss, R., Essays on 'The Welfare State', (London: Allen & Unwin, 1963). 
15 Coleman, J., "The Balance between Rights Individually Held and Rights Collectively Held", in 
M. Lessnoff(ed.), Social Contract Theory, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), pp. 189, 194-195. 
91 
This definition is, therefore, grounded in Rousseau's social contract, which 
underscores the notions of solidarity and promotion of the common good of society 
identified in the 'general will' .16 To this end, individuals surrender some of their 
resources in order to preserve their own interests represented in the maintenance of 
solidarity within a capitalist system of production, whilst the state takes on the role 
of providing social care for its citizens. 17 
Third, according to Thoenes' definition of the welfare state, the welfare state may 
depend on 'market forces' in the provision of basic services, but its aim is to 
contribute to the 'well-being of its citizens'. The welfare state has emerged in 
capitalist economies. Proponents of citizenship theory aver that capitalism and 
market systems produce inequalities that should be rectified by the state. They 
claim that the state is more efficient than markets in providing welfare, since the 
market can lead to the overpricing of products or even shortage in production due to 
imperfect information and externalities. It should be noted, however, that 
proponents of citizenship theory do not advocate the abandonment of capitalism; 
they argue that the state should intervene in areas of welfare provision only within a 
capitalist system of production because economic growth alone cannot ensure the 
welfare of society. They assert that in periods of recession, welfare provision can 
help sustain demand, and, hence, contribute to growth. 18 
16 Rhodes, M., and Y. Meny (eds.), "Introduction: Europe's Social Contract under Stress", The 
Future of European Welfare: A New Social Contract?, (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), pp. 3. 
17 Wilson, T., and D. Wilson, The Political Economy ofthe Welfare State, (London: Allen & Unwin, 
1982), pp. 20-21. 
18 Harris, D., Justifying State Welfare: The New Right versus the Old uft, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1987), pp. 27-34. 
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After World War II, the philosophy of the welfare state, in Western capitalist 
societies, incorporated the broader objective of eliminating inequalities by 
embracing other groups in society under the welfare umbrella and not by limiting 
itself to providing for the poor and needy. The concept of the welfare state was 
expanded to include 'physical, mental and moral' aspects of life and not only 
material improvement of the poor. 19 
Giddens has pointed out that welfare should not be considered as an economic 
condition of citizens, but it is a 'psychic' concept. In a welfare society, the state is 
not the sole provider of welfare; other institutions in society contribute to promoting 
welfare within society. In other words, it is not just provision of goods and services, 
but the investment in human capital that serves the general welfare of society. 
Furthermore, over the last twenty years, there has been a challenge to existing 
narrow orthodox studies of welfare, which has tended to exclude certain groups 
within society. These disadvantaged groups include women and other races in 
multiracial societies.20 However, for the purpose of this research, we will not 
address these groups; we will adopt a narrow concept considering only the welfare 
of middle and lower income groups. This is because welfare policy in LDCs has 
been mainly concerned with providing for these groups. 
19 Robson, W., Welfare State and Welfare Society: Illusion and Reality, (London: Allen & Unwin, 
1976), pp. 12-14, 139. 
20 Giddens, A., The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Denwcracy, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 
pp. 117. 
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As we have discussed the philosophy of the welfare state, we will now examine the 
origins of the welfare state in order to be able to understand the reasons behind its 
emergence, expansion and decline in Western capitalist economies. 
Origins of the Welfare State 
The tradition of the welfare state first emerged in Britain. It started, in a very 
primitive form, as early as the fourteenth century in the form of Poor Laws, though 
it was not known as a welfare state then. At the beginning, the state aimed at 
mitigating destitution by passing acts to punish beggars, and finding work for the 
unemployed. 21 However, most of the services targeting the poor were extended 
through local parishes that looked after their own poor. This situation lasted for 
nearly 300 years. 22 
For a long time, poverty had been perceived as 'inevitable'. It was believed that 
people were born poor; accordingly, they could be helped through charities and 
almsgiving. Nevertheless, they would essentially remain poor. In the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, as a result of industrialisation and the modernisation of 
agriculture, many peasants lost their primary source of income and moved to urban 
21 These laws were mainly 'punitive' in nature, as their purpose was to 'repress vagrancy'; however, 
they also tried to relieve the destitute. Henriques, U., Before the Welfare State: Social Administration 
in Early Industrial Britain, (London: Longman, 1979). 
22 d Marsh, D., The Welfare State: Concept and Development, 2" ed., (London: Longman, 1980), pp. 
2-14. 
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centres. It was during this period that voluntary organisations expanded in providing 
relief to the destitute. 23 
It was also during the nineteenth century, that the state in Britain became active in 
the realm of social policy by developing a central system of residual welfare for the 
destitute. It tried to mitigate poverty by introducing, through the Parliament, 
services under the Law of 1834. These policies, which extended welfare only to the 
deserving poor after subjecting them to a means test, covered areas such as public 
health, education, factory conditions, and housing. However, social policy was 
designed such that the standard of living guaranteed by the Poor Laws was lower 
than that of employed individuals to prevent abuse of the system and to discourage 
people from relying on this system rather than working. 24 
In 1883, the first social insurance state, which became an essential ingredient of any 
welfare state, was established by Bismarck in Germany?5 The German model of 
welfare relied heavily on the private voluntary sector to deliver welfare. This model 
was mainly earnings-related and provided insurance for beneficiaries against 
23 Keithley, J., "United Kingdom", in J. Dixon and R. Scheurell (eds.), Social Welfare in Developed 
Market Countries, (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 311. 
24 Room, G., The Sociology of Welfare: Social Policy, Stratification and Political Order, (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1979), pp. 15. 
25 Bismarck developed this system to pacify the labour movement as it constituted a political threat 
to stability. The system was aimed specifically at employees, and not to the whole population, and 
was financed through contributions of employees and employers. See Bonoli, G., "Classifying 
Welfare States: A Two-dimension Approach", Journal of Social Policy, vol. 26, no. 3, July 1997, pp. 
358, 367. 
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sickness, industrial accidents, old age, and invalidity. 26 The German model was then 
reproduced by other states, especially in the field of social insurance; however, the 
voluntary sector was assigned different parts in the distribution of welfare in 
different countries. For instance, whereas in Austria and Belgium the voluntary 
sector has been a major agent in welfare delivery, it has played a minimum role in 
Sweden.27 
In the early twentieth century, the writings of Booth and Rowntree, which revealed 
the misery of the poor in Britain,28 caused a change in attitudes towards poverty. 
The rise in awareness about the prevalence and extent of poverty coincided with the 
affluence of the economy, due to economic growth generated by imperialism. Both 
factors contributed to the rise of interest in social policy. Policies were initiated to 
mitigate poverty, improve working conditions, eradicate illiteracy, eliminate slums 
and inferior housing, and to suppress inequality. More steps were taken to protect 
the most vulnerable groups in society, mainly the elderly, the poor, and 
unemployed. The Liberal Government of 1906-14 introduced minimum standards 
for wages, health, unemployment insurance, housing, and nutrition. These minimum 
standards were set as a limit below which no one was supposed to fall. This 
26 Wislon, T., and D. Wilson, The Political Economy of the Welfare State, (London: Allen & Unwin, 
1982), pp. 7. 
27 Lord Beverdige, 'the architect of the British welfare state' (although he detested the term welfare) 
copied the German system after his visit to Germany in 1907. See Giddens, A., The Third Way: The 
Renewal of Social Democracy, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), pp. 111-112. 
28 See for example, Booth, C., Life and Labour of the People of London, (London: Macmillan, 1902-
1904); and Rowntree, B., Poverty: A Study of Town Life, (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1901). 
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minimum was increased incrementally, and the circle of beneficiaries was expanded 
to include the disabled, children, and single mothers. 29 
The term 'welfare state', in particular, gained circulation after the publishing of the 
Beveridge report, entitled Social Insurance and Allied Services, in 1942.30 The 
Inter-Departmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services was 
commissioned by the Minister without Portfolio (the Rt. Hon. Arthur Greenwood, 
M.P.), in June 1941, to survey the 'existing national schemes of social insurance 
and allied services, including workman's compensation' and to draw up some 
recommendations for improving those schemes. In his report, Beveridge 
emphasised that welfare provision should be universal, comprehensive, and 
adequate to overcome 'Want, ... Disease, Ignorance, Squalor, and Idleness' .31 
Welfare provision was 'comprehensive' in two senses. First, contributors to the 
social insurance scheme were insured against 'all risks which might deprive' them 
of earning an income. Second, by stipulating that everyone should join the scheme, 
it ensured that citizens enjoyed an equal treatment by the state, and, hence, avoided 
the stigma associated with entitlements based upon a means test. 32 
29 Robson, W., Welfare State and Welfare Society: Illusion and Reality, (London: Allen & Unwin, 
1976), pp. 20-22. 
30 Although the term 'welfare state' was first used by Archbishop Temple in 1941, it was not until it 
was cited by Lord Beveridge in 1942 that it gained circulation. Marsh, D., The Welfare State: 
Concept and Development, 2nd ed., (London: Longman, 1980), pp. 13-15. 
31 Beveridge, W., Social Insurance and Allied Services, (London: Her Majesty's Office, 1974), pp. 
5-7. 
32 Lowe, R., "Lessons from the Past: The Rise and Fall of the Classic Welfare State in Britain, 1945-
76", in A. Oakley, and A. Williams (eds.), The Politics of the Welfare State, (London: UCL Press, 
1994), pp. 38-39. 
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Accordingly, welfare went beyond providing a minimum standard of living to 
enhancing the quality of life. It also aimed at protecting society by fostering co-
operation and integration, especially after the World War II. 33 World War II 
contributed to the birth of the 'welfare state'. Although the process started since the 
mid nineteenth century, it was fmalised after World War II, and the welfare state 
came officially into being on 5 July 1948.34 It was the need for social 
reconstruction, after the depression of the 1930s, compounded by the war that 
brought about the change in attitudes towards welfare. The risk imposed by the War 
on the whole society, mostly civilians rather than the military only, indiscriminately 
made people realise the need to share resources as they share the risks. 35 The 
solidarity produced because of the War, manifested in an active social policy, could 
be attributed to the fact that the 'otherwise privileged groups discovered that they 
shared a common interest in reallocating risk with the disadvantaged'. 36 With the 
expansion of welfare provision by the state, social services were extended to the 
whole population rather than focusing only on the poor or disadvantaged groups. 
33 Robson, W., Welfare State and Welfare Society: Illusion and Reality, (London: Allen & Unwin, 
1976), pp. 22-24. 
34 See Marsh, D., The Welfare State: Concept and Development, 2"d ed., (London: Longman, 1980), 
pp. 1-2. 
35 Marsh, D., The Welfare State: Concept and Development, 2"d ed., (London: Longman, 1980), pp. 
22-23. 
36 Baldwin, P., The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-
1975, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 292; Titmuss, R., Essays on 'The 
Welfare State', (London: Allen & Unwin, 1963), pp. 83-85. 
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Expansion of the Welfare State 
The flourishing of the welfare state in the advanced economies, after World War II, 
was concomitant with the adoption of Keynesian policies, which stressed the 
expansion of a demand-led economy as a means of avoiding a recurrence of the 
high unemployment experienced during the inter-war period. Full employment was 
embraced as an objective of the state.37 In seeking full employment, industrialised 
states tried to enhance their competitiveness by engaging directly in production. 
They enjoyed high economic growth levels due to the prospering liberal 
international trade environment. Accordingly, these states were able to fmance the 
expansion of the welfare state. It was assumed that all interests within society could 
be 'reconciled' under a capitalist system. This could be achieved by insuring people 
'against the uncertainty of the market'. Therefore, welfare products were extended 
to all members of society, rather than to a specific group, as a universal right. 38 
The welfare state prospered also in Scandinavian or Nordic countries after World 
War II. Nordic states have been able to fmance their welfare states from the growth 
enjoyed in the post-war era. They have provided welfare services by expanding the 
public sector. 39 Nordic countries, especially Sweden, are often cited, by social 
policy scholars, as the ideal model for welfare states. The unique quality of their 
37 Mishra, R., The Welfare State in Capitalist Society: Policies of Retrenchment and Maintenance in 
Europe, North America and Australia, (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), pp. 12. 
38 Bryson, L., Welfare and the State: Who Benefits, (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 45-46. 
39 Longue cited in Bryson, L., Welfare and the State: Who Benefits, (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 
112. 
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welfare states lies in their 'combination' of welfare programmes, and residual and 
universal policies. They have been influenced by the British experience, particularly 
the writings of Titmuss. The welfare state has found favour in the eyes of Swedish 
citizens because of their social homogeneity and minimal social divisions. This was 
manifested in the nineteenth century when the state did not intervene to 'evict' the 
peasants for the advantage of large landowners, as happened in Britain. 
Additionally, the state in Sweden showed concern, particularly, for workers by 
enacting laws that warranted their rights in case of accidents and sickness.40 
Esping-Andersen and Korpi characterise Nordic welfare states as having three main 
features: comprehensiveness of services, institutionalisation of entitlements as 
rights based on citizenship rather than contribution, and solidarity and universality 
of 'social legislation' .41 The state provides a broad range of services, such as 
maternity benefits, cash allowances, and care for children and the elderly, and they 
are parcelled out to the public as democratic rights to citizens stipulated in 'some 
form of legislation' .42 
By extending welfare universally to all citizens, the state engages all members of 
society in the social contract. Those in employment fmance the administration and 
40 Olsson, S., "Sweden", in 1 Dixon, and R. Scheurell (eds.), Social Welfare in Developed Market 
Countries, (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 264-269. 
41 Esping-Andersen and Korpi cited in Bryson, L., Welfare and the State: Who Benefits, (London: 
Macmillan, 1992), pp. 115. 
42 Rosenthal, A., The Social Prgrams of Sweden: A Search for Security in a Free Society, 
(Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1969), pp. 3-11. 
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distribution costs in the welfare state through 'high taxes' .43 Beneficiaries of the 
system buy into the contract, and they provide their support for the welfare state. 
Meanwhile, the state has to ensure that the services offered are of high quality to 
meet the needs of the elite, who benefit more from these services but also make 
contributions to the system; otherwise they will make use of private services and 
their support for the welfare state will wane.44 
Thus, we can conclude that the welfare state flourished in Western capitalist 
economies after World War II. These states were able to fmance welfare because 
they experienced economic growth due to the liberal international trade 
environment. However, as the international environment changed in the 1970s, 
states found it difficult to sustain their welfare policies, and the welfare state started 
to decline. 
Decline of the Welfare State 
In the late 1970s, world recession coupled with rising inflation after the oil shocks 
in the mid-1970s put economic pressures upon all welfare states. The economic 
difficulties that these capitalist welfare states faced led liberal thinkers, who 
opposed state intervention, to argue that these economic difficulties were caused by 
state involvement in economic life.45 They believed that the role of the state should 
43 Rhodes, M., and Y. Meny (eds.), "Introduction: Europe's Social Contract under Stress", The 
Future of European Welfare: A New Social Contract?, (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), pp. 7. 
44 Haveman cited in Bryson, L., Welfare and the State: Who Benefits, (London: Macmillan, 1992), 
pp. 129. 
45 Hall, J., and J. Ikenberry, The State, (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1989), pp. 78-79. 
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be minimised, as only markets could guarantee 'basic rights and freedom' as wel1 as 
efficient production and competitiveness.46 Liberal governments, especially 
Thatcher's in Britain and Reagan's in the US, argued for the 'rolling back of the 
state' and the reduction of state intervention.47 
The pressures exerted, by detractors and beneficiaries of the welfare state, on the 
state were pulling it in different directions. Liberal economists argued that the fiscal 
crisis of the state dictated a cut of expenditure on welfare and the retrenchment of 
the state. On the other hand, the recession was hurting more people and making 
them more vulnerable, and demands increased for more help from the state.48 
Thus, the 'welfare state' started to decline, in the late 1970s, in response to the 
heavy financial burden imposed by welfare polices. These states responded to the 
fiscal crisis by moving more towards a free market economy. Since the early 1980s, 
states in developed economies have adopted structural adjustment programmes and 
assumed a more entrepreneurial role by encouraging a competitive business 
environment. Most of these states have embraced policies of 'deregulation' 
especially in taxation, financial markets, labour markets, and product markets. They 
46 Bryson, L., Welfare and the State: Who Benefits, (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 43-44. 
47 Pierson, P., Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Retrenchment, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
48 Cox, R., "The Consequences of Welfare Reform: How Conceptions of Social Rights Are 
Changing", Journal of Social Policy, vol. 27, no. 1, January 1998, pp. 1-2. 
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have tried to enhance the international competitiveness of their economies by 
encouraging privatisation and economic liberalisation. 49 
This trend has intensified throughout the 1990s, with the rise of globalisation and 
weakning of the state's bargaining power vis-a-vis multinational corporations, 
which seek higher profitable operations by relocating production in countries with 
cheaper labour.50 The implication of relocation of production in other countries for 
the Western welfare state has been the intensification of struggle between capital 
and labour, as a consequence of the rise of long-term unemployment in advanced 
industrialised economies. This has constituted a major challenge to the state's 
ability to distribute resources and restrain 'competition between national capital and 
labour' in society, which has enabled the state to maintain social cohesion. This was 
perceived in many advanced industrialised economies as the foundation of the post 
World War IT social contract.51 Most states have responded to this change in 
international investment environment and rising unemployment by retrenchment 
49 Ayubi, N., "Political Correlates of Privatization Programs in the Middle East", Arab Studies 
Quanerly, vol. 14, no. 2 & 3, spring/summer 1992, pp. 40. 
50 Swank, D., "Political Institutions and Welfare State Restructuring: The Impact of Institutions on 
Social Policy Changed in Developed Democracies", in P. Pierson (ed.), The New Politics of the 
Welfare State, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 201-205. 
51 Jordan, B., "European Social Citizenship: Why a New Social Contract (Probably) Will Not 
Happen", in M. Rhodes, and Y. Meny (eds.), The Future of European Welfare: A New Social 
Contract?, (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), pp. 247-248. See also Rodes, M., "Globalization, 
Labour Markets and Welfare States: A Future of 'Competitive Corporatism'?", in M. Rhodes, andY. 
Meny (eds.), The Future of European Welfare: A New Social Contract?, (London: Macmillan Press, 
1998), pp. 179. 
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reflected in a shift to a residual model of welfare provision, relying on private 
insurance, and lower taxes. 52 
Hence, many Western states adopted retrenchment programmes, especially in 
welfare provision. Retrenchment was manifest not only in budget cuts, but also in 
limiting eligibility of recipients, and encouraging private provision.53 This process 
was accelerated as liberals became prominent in policy-making. They claimed that 
the state should retreat from welfare provision. This came to be known as the 'crisis 
of the welfare state', which was highlighted in the 1980s. It came to be seen not 
only as a crisis of the welfare state but also a 'crisis of the capitalist state'. The state 
came under pressure to 'maintain a viable economy' and promote an economic 
environment that would be conducive to capital accumulation and growth, whilst 
retaining the support of its citizens, who got used to 'a certain level of social 
provisions and relatively high levels of government expenditure' .54 The welfare 
state was unsustainable because the left could not raise taxes due to the economic 
slowdown, and the right could not dismantle welfare programmes without public 
• 55 
resiStance, 
52 Swank, D., "Political Institutions and Welfare State Restructuring: The Impact of Institutions on 
Social Policy Changed in Developed Democracies", in P. Pierson (ed.), The New Politics of the 
Welfare State, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 204. 
53 Pierson, P., Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Retrenchment, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 14-16. 
54 Bryson, L., Welfare and the State: Who Benefits, (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 10-11. In 1980, 
a conference was held by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on 
the 'Crisis of the Welfare State'. The Welfare State in Crisis: An Account of the Conference on 
Social Policies in the 1980s, OECD, Paris, 20-23 October 1981, (Paris: Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, 1981). 
55 Huber, E., and J. Stephens, ''Welfare State and Production Regimes in the Era of Retrenchment", 
in P. Pierson (ed.), The New Politics of the Welfare State, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
pp. 125. 
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In order to minimise opposition to retrenchment efforts, regimes have adopted 
different techniques. They have obfuscated reform policies by making it more 
difficult for their constituencies to obtain information about reforms or making 
reforms more complex so that their effects are less visible. They have also offered 
transitional compensation to those harmed by the retrenchment project, mainly the 
reduction of the public sector. 56 
One of the major implications of the weakening of the welfare state has been the 
crack of the social contract in these states. In other words, the failure of the state to 
control unemployment has led to the need to reformulate the social contract, as the 
state has failed to deliver its obligations. The state could no longer sustain welfare 
provision, and hence, the solidarity of members of society has been compromised. 
Critics of the welfare state maintain that 'high levels of welfare spending and 
growth are incompatible'. The state has been under pressure to cut its costs in face 
of the opposition of beneficiaries, who perceive welfare policies as their social 
rights, based on citizenship, grounded in the social contract. 57 
The effectiveness of citizens' resistance to the retreat of the state from welfare 
provision is usually determined by the model of welfare employed. For example, in 
cases where welfare provision has been universal and based on citizenship, such as 
health and education, beneficiaries have acted as a powerful pressure group against 
retrenchment attempts in these areas. Citizens, in these cases, perceive welfare 
56 Pierson, P., Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Retrenchment, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 19-24. 
57 Rhodes, M., and Y. Meny (eds.), "Introduction: Europe's Social Contract under Stress", The 
Future of European Welfare: A New Social Contract?, (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), pp. 8-10. 
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products as their social rights, and an essential obligation of the state, which has an 
obligation to guarantee not only the security of society but also its welfare. They are 
unwilling to surrender these rights. Social rights are, therefore, crucial to the social 
contract.58 On the other hand, in situations where the state relies on a means-test 
model, such as income support benefits, and welfare is targeted, recipients are not 
able to act as a powerful pressure group to resist rescinding of welfare. 59 
Models of welfare provision by the state determine how welfare is perceived by 
recipients. This is particularly significant for regimes that have based their social 
contracts on welfare provision. Thus, it is important to examine the different models 
of welfare provision. 
'Models' of Welfare Provision 
States have differed in the form and finance of welfare they have offered, the 
selectivity or universality or the system of welfare, and the degree of in/dependency 
on the market that their beneficiaries are subject to because of the welfare system. 
Esping-Andersen identifies three 'models' of welfare offered by the state:60 
58 Andersen, B., ''The Quest for Ties between Rights and Duties - A Key Question for the Future of 
the Public Sector", in A. Evers, H. Nowotny, and H. Wintersberger (eds.), The Changing Face of 
Welfare, (Aldershot: Gower, 1987), pp. 174-182. 
59 Pierson, P., Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Retrenchment, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 166. 
60 Esping-Andersen, G., The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1990), pp. 21-26. 
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1. Means-test: In the means-test model, as its name implies, recipients are 
subject to a needs-based test to check their eligibility to receive welfare. 
Such a system usually offers minimum assistance to limit dependence on 
welfare benefits. Nineteenth century Poor Laws represent a typical example 
of this type of welfare. Designers of early social policies were concerned 
about the impact of welfare provision by the state on economic growth. 
They reasoned that if workers were granted benefits above the prevalent 
wage level, they would opt to leave employment. They, therefore, proposed 
that benefits should be kept at a minimum level. Hence, this system makes 
beneficiaries more dependent on the market, as it compels them to engage in 
market activities. The financing of this system comes from public revenues. 
This system has always been criticised for the stigma associated with the 
needs test, which makes some people who are eligible to receive benefits 
abstain from resorting to the system. 
2. Social insurance: This model, exemplified in the German welfare state, 
refers to welfare provision to individuals based on their contribution to a 
compulsory insurance scheme, which has recently become earnings-related. 
Welfare provision in this case is tied to employment, as only those 
employed, and who contribute to the scheme, are entitled to welfare. This 
type of welfare model, Esping-Andersen argues, offers 'alternatives to 
market dependence', in the sense that individuals are not made vulnerable if 
they are out of employment. However, as it is conditioned by previous 
contribution to an insurance scheme, it is exclusive because it does not offer 
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assistance to other disadvantaged groups, such as children and the disabled, 
who have never joined the labour force. 
3. Citizenship: The third welfare model is right-based. Welfare is provided as 
a right to all citizens regardless of their ability to pay. This model stresses 
the right to freedom of individuals not only of want, but also of choice to 
join or leave labour market whenever they want. This system aims at 
enhancing solidarity in society, as all citizens receive the same benefits 
regardless of their class. This model offers the highest level of independence 
for recipients from the market. Finance of this welfare system is based upon 
taxation, which entrenches the concept of citizenship rights. 
Depending on the chosen model of welfare provision, states use one or a mixture of 
two approaches, universal and selective. 
Universal vs. Selectnve Welfare Schemes 
There are two approaches to welfare provision, residual and institutional. In the 
residual approach, welfare is provided selectively only if other 'natural 
mechanisms' for supporting individuals, mainly family and voluntary organisations, 
fail. The state intervenes only to provide a minimum level of welfare below which 
people should not be allowed to fall. This approach stresses individualism, since the 
individual provides for himself either through the market or relatives. The state does 
not intervene to correct for the failures created by the market. In this sense, state 
intervention can be characterised as residual. 
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According to this approach, welfare provision is not perceived as a right, but rather 
as a satisfaction of a need, which should be provided selectively, usually after a 
means test has been applied, to those who are in need to keep them just above the 
level of subsistence.61 Many states have adopted this system on the pretext of 
avoiding an abuse of the system, by those who do not need it. The welfare system is 
available only to the needy, and, hence, it does not necessarily guarantee a more 
egalitarian society. On the contrary, it tends to perpetuate inequality. This system is 
also motivated by a concern about the inability or unwillingness of the state to 
sustain welfare provision, as it will act as a drain on the resources of the state. The 
residual approach is believed, especially by economic liberals, to be superior to the 
institutional approach. 62 
The institutional approach conceives of welfare as a right that should be provided 
by the state universally to all its citizens in order to improve their well-being. 
Unlike the residual approach, it asserts that welfare should not only be targeted at 
the needy. All citizens are eligible to receive welfare unconditionally. Under this 
approach, services are provided 'outside the market' universally to all citizens 
regardless of their need.63 States that have adopted this approach recognise market 
failures, accordingly, the essentiality of welfare provision in a capitalist society. 
61 Jamrozik, A., "Universality and Selectivity: Social Welfare in a Market", in A. Graycar (ed.), 
Retreat from the Welfare State: Australian Policy in the 1980s, (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1983), pp. 
172-173. 
62 Olsson, S., "Sweden", in J. Dixon and R. Scbeurell (eds.), Social Welfare in Developed Market 
Countries, (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 265. 
63 Tibnuss, R., ''Welfare State and Welfare Society'', in N. Timms, and D. Watson (eds.), Talking 
about Welfare: Readings in Philosophy and Social Policy, (London: Routledge & Kegan, 1976), pp. 
150-151. 
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Protagonists of this approach argue that this system is egalitarian and avoids the 
stigmatisation involved in selectivity and means-test methods. 
The principal difference between the selective and universal policies of welfare 
provision is in the criteria for receiving the benefits. With selective policies the 
individual has to fulftl certain criteria related particularly to the circumstances of 
this individual, such as falling below a minimum level of income. The criterion for 
universal policies, on the other hand, is the individual's membership of a broad 
group, such as being a child to be eligible for child benefit or free education. 64 
In assessing whether to employ universal or selective policies, the state has to 
consider the merits of each system. Although the universal system is more costly for 
the state, it does not involve the negative attitudes and stigma associated with the 
selective system. Such negative attitudes may prevent people from claiming the 
benefits to which they are entitled in order to avoid being associated with these 
negative qualities. 65 Additionally, there is a risk of excluding individuals, who are 
in need of these benefits but they do not satisfy the criteria for receiving welfare.66 
Moreover, if the poor become selectively the only target group entitled to certain 
benefits, then the state is unlikely to be able to preserve the quality of these benefits 
or even protect them from erosion. This is because the poor lack political power and 
64 Parker, J., Social Policy and Citizenship, (London: Macmillan, 1975), pp. 149-152. 
65 Tiunuss, R., Essays on 'The Welfare State', (London: Allen & Unwin, 1963), pp. 227-229. 
66 Castles cited in Bryson, L., Welfare and the State: Who Benefits, (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 
63, 130. 
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influence to ensure that their demands are heard. 67 Furthermore, the elite will not be 
willing to contribute to government revenues, through taxation, in order to finance 
expenditure on these benefits unless they themselves are benefiting from them. 68 
Universal schemes tend to gain more political support than selective schemes 
because the former tend to benefit influential groups who can exert pressure on 
policy makers. Selective schemes by definition target more vulnerable groups who 
tend to be less influential. This explains why, in the long run, the real value of a 
selective subsidy may be subject to decline. 69 
Universal schemes have, therefore, been more popular than selective ones in LDCs 
that base their social contract upon welfare provision. Benefits have been extended 
to the whole population as rights of citizens enshrined in the constitution. Over 
time, these states became burdened by the rising costs of welfare; and many of them 
tried to retreat from this area. However, these attempts have been met with popular 
resistance, as the population saw these benefits as their rights and the basis of their 
social contract with the state for which they gave up their right to participation. 
67 Ferrera, M., "The Four 'Social Europes': Between Universalism and Selectivity'', in M. Rhodes, 
andY. Meny (eds.), The Future of European Welfare: A New Social Contract?, (London: Macmillan 
Press, 1998), pp. 88. 
68 Castles cited in Bryson, L., Welfare and the State: Who Benefits, (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 
63; and 130. 
69 Stewart, F., Adjustment and Poverty: Options and Choices, (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 96. 
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The Welfare State and the Social Contract 
From the above presentation of the origins and models of the welfare state, we can 
conclude that there are two explanations to the rise of the welfare state. The first 
explanation is that the welfare state is the outcome of social action to improve the 
conditions of the 'disadvantaged'. This action emanated from two sources, the 
struggle of workers for their rights, and the rise of solidarity within societies that 
came to realise their vulnerability in the aftermath of World War II. As citizens 
became cognisant of the fact that they all share the same risk in time of war, they 
devoted more effort to equal distribution of resources in time of peace. The welfare 
state has, therefore, been instituted in an attempt to overcome inequalities that result 
from the market system, which increased remarkably with industrialisation and the 
rise of capitalism in the late nineteenth century. Thus, the welfare state, which is 
'redistributive' in nature, emerged as a natural development of the introduction of 
citizenship, and one of its main objectives was to extend the rights of workers. 70 
The second view (which follows a Marxist tradition) is that the welfare state is a 
mechanism for generating legitimacy in a capitalist system of production. We will 
elaborate more on this perspective, as it is particularly relevant for the subject of 
this research, legitimacy. 
According to Marxists, such as Gough and Offe, the welfare state is an outcome of 
the inherent 'contradictions' of the capitalist system and the nature of the ownership 
70 Pierson, C., Beyond the Welfare State? The New Political Economy of Welfare, 2"d ed., 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), pp. 48-52. 
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of the means of production. 71 This explanation of the welfare state highlights how 
the state has manipulated welfare policies to gain legitimacy. 
The state has introduced welfare policies as a means to control the proletariat and 
cater for the needs of the bourgeoisie. 72 The proletariat, and other groups who are 
disadvantaged because of the structure of production, has been incorporated in the 
system through provision of welfare in the form of free education and health care. 
By providing welfare to workers and the poor, the state mitigates the potential evils 
of the capitalist system, thereby reducing the likelihood of attempts, by the 
disadvantaged groups, to overthrow the system. The welfare state serves the 
interests of the bourgeoisie, and ensures stability in order to perpetuate the capitalist 
system and enhance the process of capital accumulation, by supplying the system 
with the required healthy, skilled labour. 73 
Gough recognises that welfare provision carne about because of the struggle of 
workers against capitalists, and that it is not intentional on part of the capitalists. 
Capitalists had to give in to the demands of the workers; an interventionist state has 
proved crucial for sustaining the capitalist system. 74 
71 See Gough, 1., The Political Economy of the Welfare State, (London: Macmillan, 1979); and Offe, 
C., Contradictions of the Welfare State, (London: Hutchinson, 1984). 
72 Yates, I., and A. Graycar, "Non-government Welfare: Issues and Perspectives", in A. Graycar 
(ed.), Retreat from the Welfare State: Australian Policy in the 1980s, (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 
1983), pp. 167. 
73 Gough, 1., The Political Economy of the Welfare State, (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 51-54. 
74 Gough, I., The Political Economy of the Welfare State, (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 64-66. 
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Marxists aver that the welfare state has been used as a means of 'political-
ideological control'. They point out to the disparity between citizenship rights, upon 
which the claim of beneficiaries to receive welfare services is based, and workers 
rights, which are dictated by their relationship to the means of production. Thus, the 
state helps create a false consciousness amongst the proletariat. 75 Recipients of 
welfare are made to believe, by the ruling elite, that they are entitled to welfare by 
virtue of their citizenship. Meanwhile, the system perpetuates their misery by 
favouring the bourgeoisie. 
This analysis of the welfare state, especially its function as a means of generating 
legitimacy, has been supported by Offe. Offe has argued that the capitalist system is 
based on market relations that work against the interests of some groups in society, 
and, therefore, result in a conflict of interests. He opines that the state has attempted 
to get around this antagonism, and pacify the disadvantaged groups through welfare 
provision. By intervening, the state manages to keep social peace through two 
mechanisms. It provides for individuals who do not benefit from the market 
exchange system; and co-opts some potentially active groups who may otherwise be 
threatening to the system, such as labour unions. 76 
Thus, social policy can be utilised as a tool to formulate a 'social contract' 77 
between capital, labour, and the state. By extending goods and services to its 
75 Offe, C., Contradictions of the Welfare State, (London: Hutchinson, 1984), pp. 154-157. 
76 Offe, C., Contradictions of the Welfare State, (London: Hutchinson, 1984), pp. 147. 
77 The notion of the social contract is used here as it has been defined in the previous chapter, an 
exchange agreement between rulers and the governed where both parties are bound by the rights and 
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population, and/or incorporating them into the system, the state secures the support 
of its population and helps produce the conditions conducive to promoting capital 
accumulation and growth. 78 
The Western Welfare State and the Social Contract 
Political thinkers have used the notion of the social contract to describe the 
relationship between the state and society. The social contract bestows legitimacy 
on the state so long it promotes moral objectives and ends.79 The contractual 
relationship means that both parties are bound by the rights and obligations dictated 
by the contract. These rights and obligations are conditional, as each party's rights 
depend upon his/her fulfilment of his/her obligations. 80 
This applies to the welfare state in Western societies. The state, in Western 
societies, has assumed welfare provision functions in order to maintain social 
cohesion within society. Through welfare provision, the state has achieved a 
balance between the conflicting interests of capital and labour. Thus, citizens have 
engaged into a 'contractual relationship' with the state, whereby they give up some 
of their liberties in order to promote their own interests in the form of welfare. As a 
obligations dictated by the contract. These rights and obligations are conditioned by each party's 
fulfilment of his/her obligations. 
78 Gough, 1., The Political Economy of the Welfare State, (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 149-151. 
79 Steinberg, J., Locke, Rousseau, and the Idea of Consent: An Inquiry into the Liberal-democratic 
Theory of Political Obligation, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 72-73. 
80 Lessnoff, M., "Introduction: Social Contract", Social Contract Theory, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1990), pp. 3-4. 
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consequence, it has been noted by some social policy theorists, such as Rhodes and 
Meny, that the state in Western societies is experiencing a legitimacy crisis, due to 
its retreat from welfare provision. Moving away from welfare provision is 
threatening the basis of solidarity and social cohesion within society. As the state is 
withdrawing from its welfare obligations, beneficiaries of the welfare state are 
threatened by the exclusionary policies of retrenchment. They feel that the social 
contract is not binding; they have, therefore, tried to defend their rights and resist 
the diminution of the welfare state. This has led these social policy analysts to argue 
for the need to redefine the social contract in Western societies. 81 
The LDC Welfare State and the Social Contract 
This stands in sharp contrast to LDC regimes that have adopted welfare models to 
generate legitimacy for their rule without allowing the public genuine political 
rights to influence policy formulation. In these LDCs, the public have been granted 
welfare products in return for giving up their liberties and right to political 
participation. Although such an exchange does not promote a moral end, it can still 
be described as a social contract because it is based upon an agreement that entitles 
the population rights (welfare) in return for obligations (no participation). In 
addition, it acts as a source of legitimacy. As long as the regime fulfils its 
obligation, to provide welfare products to the public, the latter owes it allegiance. 
81 Rhodes, M., and Y. Meny (eds.), "Introduction: Europe's Social Contract under Stress", The 
Future of European Welfare: A New Social Contract?, (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), pp. 8. 
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Kant, however, repudiates this type of state, which he identifies as a 'paternal state', 
whose primary objective is to enhance the welfare of individuals even at the 
expense of their right to freedom. He describes such a state as despotic because 'it 
treats its citizens as children'.82 To Kant, the priority of the state should be to 
protect and promote the right of citizens to freedom rather than seek to advance 
their welfare to the detriment of their freedom. 83 
Another problem with this type of contract is that it is not durable for two reasons. 
First, although LDC regimes usually market welfare policies to the populace as 
rights based upon citizenship, in reality they are not. This is because in most LDCs, 
populations remain subjects rather than citizens with civil rights, especially in the 
absence of political rights, for which the regime has exchanged welfare policies. 
Second, it is highly constrained by the availability of funds that are scarce in LDCs, 
which are overburdened by debt. 
The crisis of legitimacy due to the failure of the social contract based upon welfare 
provision is more acute in LDC states than in Western states. This is because in 
Western states the post-war social contract reinforced 'an "ideology of social 
partnership", in which policy emerges from the cooperative and consensus-oriented 
routines of repeated interactions of labour and business'. In other words, the 
82 Kant, I., The Metaphysical Elements of Justice: Part I of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated 
with an introduction by J. Ladd, (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1965), pp. 82. 
83 Medina, V., Social Contract Theories: Political Obligation or Anarchy?, (Savage: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1990), pp. 80. 
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political system cultivates 'norms of reciprocity, trust, and a sense of duty to other 
social partners and the common interest'. 84 
These norms and values are produced through the democratic institutions that allow 
citizens to influence the decision-making process. Thus, even if the welfare state 
were to diminish, citizens will still owe their allegiance to the political system 
because the democratic system ensures that the interests of all citizens, even those 
of the weakest groups in society, are taken into consideration. 85 Legitimacy of the 
state is grounded in rationality and is created and maintained through the 
institutions of the state. In LDCs, on the other hand, in the absence of economic 
gains and channels for genuine political participation, to represent and promote its 
interests, the public has no interest in supporting the political system. 
In seeking to acquire legitimacy through providing welfare to different sections of 
the population, the state uses different kinds of welfare. 
Kinds of Welfare 
Titmuss identified three kinds of welfare:86 
84 Swank, D., "Political Institutions and Welfare State Restructuring: The Impact of Institutions on 
Social Policy Changed in Developed Democracies", in P. Pierson (ed.), The New Politics of the 
Welfare State, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 208-209. 
85 Swank, D., "Political Institutions and Welfare State Restructuring: The Impact of Institutions on 
Social Policy Changed in Developed Democracies", in P. Pierson (ed.), The New Politics of the 
Welfare State, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 209-210. 
86 Titmuss, R., Essays on 'The Welfare State', (London: Allen & Unwin, 1963), pp. 42. 
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e Social welfare: Social welfare involves the traditional welfare targeted by the 
state at selective groups, such as income transfers for the poor, or universally 
provided to all citizens, such as subsidised health care or education. This kind of 
welfare can either be provided in tangible or intangible forms. The state can 
extend tangible welfare to citizens via two means:87 
I. Cash: through cash transfers made directly by the state to specific target 
groups, such as unemployment benefit, and housing benefit. 
2. In-kind: by producing goods and services, such as subsidised foodstuff, 
and public health care, and then delivering them to citizens. 
On the other hand, intangible forms of welfare comprise increased access to 
employment opportunities, decision-making process, and political power. 
• Fiscal welfare: Fiscal welfare represents income transfers made by the 
government in the form of tax concessions and allowances. These income 
transfers are considered a kind of welfare because they offer benefits to 
recipients in the form of tax relief, and they represent lost revenues for the state. 
They serve to raise the level of disposable income of those granted the tax 
concessions; and, hence, they act as direct flows paid by the government. 
However, for reasons of 'accounting convenience', they are hardly recognised as 
a welfare expenditure, like other forms of social welfare. Fiscal welfare in theory 
should serve the poor, as those who earn income below certain levels are 
exempted from income taxes; however, this is not necessarily the case. For 
example, individuals who earn an income above the exempted level, though they 
87 Barr, N., The Economics of the Welfare State, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 6-7. 
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may still be poor, as they support a large number of dependencies, do not benefit 
from this kind of welfare. 88 
• Occupational welfare: Occupational welfare comprises benefits that employees 
receive over and above their salaries. These benefits are also known as employee 
benefits, fringe benefits, or remuneration packages. Occupational welfare is 
different from social welfare in two aspects. First, it is confmed to individuals in 
the workforce. By confming it to individuals in the workforce, the system 
perpetuates inequalities, as the unemployed (who are usually more 
disadvantaged) are excluded. Also empirical studies have shown that employees 
further up the professional ladder tend to receive more of these benefits. This 
means that women are at a disadvantage when it comes to occupational welfare 
because they tend to be either unemployed or occupy low-end jobs. Second, 
unlike social welfare, though implemented selectively, this form of welfare is not 
stigmatising. On the contrary, it is perceived as prestigious, as it reflects 
'occupational power'. This is reinforced by the fact that it is positively correlated 
with higher professions, and higher levels of income. 89 
In LDCs, states have used a combination of the three kinds of welfare to secure the 
support of all groups in society. In-kind social welfare, in the form of free education 
and public health care, has usually been provided universally as a right of citizens. 
Fiscal welfare has been more targeted at capitalists, in the form of tax exemptions 
88 Tiunuss, R., Essays on 'The Welfare State', (London: Allen & Unwin, 1963), pp. 44.-46 
89 Jamrozik, A., "Universality and Selectivity: Social Welfare in a Market", in A. Graycar (ed.), 
Retreat from the Welfare State: Australian Policy in the 1980s, (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1983), pp. 
184. 
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granted to the private sector in order to co-opt this important interest group into the 
system to secure their support. This has been facilitated by the permeability 
between the public and private sectors Occupational welfare, in the public sector 
and civil service, has been provided to employees, who have usually been the 
produce of the free education (social welfare system). 
Thus, the social contract based on welfare has benefited many groups in LDC 
societies differently. The part of the contract related to capitalists has been more 
enduring because they control the resources of society. Other less influential groups 
in society, such as low-income groups, have had to fight to protect their rights 
whenever the state has tried to reduce its welfare provision due to fmancial 
constraints. 
Conclusion 
The state regulates relations between different interest groups in society and itself, 
as well as among these different groups. In the process, it seeks to preserve its 
autonomy and enhance its legitimacy. Legitimacy is secured through a social 
contract with society. Many LDC regimes have rested the social contract between 
the state and society upon welfare provision. In other words, they have promoted 
their states as welfare states. 
121 
LDC states have 'copied' their welfare policies from Western models,90 where the 
welfare state emerged after industrialisation partly because of the struggle of 
workers for their rights and then developed remarkably after World War II. The 
welfare state in LDCs, though, differs fundamentally from its counterpart in the 
West, as it not grounded in the same ideas about welfare and society. In general, the 
Western welfare state has three tenets: seeking full employment as an objective of 
the state; universality of provision of social services as rights to which citizens are 
entitled; and maintaining a minimum national standard of living to protect society 
. illn d 1 91 agamst poverty, ess, an squa or. 
Many LDC states can be described as welfare states based on the definition of the 
welfare state adopted in this research, which identifies a welfare state as a state that 
offers 'benefits' in cash or kind, such as social security, health, education, and 
housing, selectively to specific individuals or universally not in exchange for 
contribution to the national output. However, the welfare state in LDCs differs from 
Western welfare state. The latter has its roots in a social contract among members 
of society, who have a responsibility towards each other in times of conflict as well 
as in times of peace, 92 whereas the welfare state in most LDCs stems from a social 
contract between the regime and its subjects based upon exchange of political rights 
for economic gains. 
90 Midgley, J., "Theoretical Implications of Third World Social Policy Research", inS. MacPherson, 
and J. Midgley (eds.), Comparative Social Policy and the Third World, (Sussex: Wheatsheaf, 1987), 
pp. 121. 
91 Mishra, R., The Welfare State in Capitalist Society: Policies of Retrenchment and Maintenance in 
Europe, North America and Australia, (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), pp. 117. 
92 Rhodes, M., and Y. M~ny (eds.), "Introduction: Europe's Social Contract under Stress", The 
Future of European Welfare: A New Social Contract?, (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), pp. 3-4. 
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Regimes in LDCs have manipulated welfare policies to maintain their legitimacy. 
They have employed different forms of welfare to court different interest groups in 
society. 93 The state has co-opted the private sector through fiscal welfare policies in 
the form of tax exemptions, thereby promoting capital accumulation and economic 
growth.94 Disadvantaged groups, on the other hand, have been granted in-kind 
subsidies in the form of free education and public heath care as rights based on their 
citizenship, and guaranteed employment in civil service and the public sector. Civil 
servants and public sector employees have been recipients of occupational welfare. 
Welfare provision to the disadvantaged groups has also served the interests of the 
private sector indirectly, by producing 'healthy skilled' labour to meet the demands 
of labour markets in the private sector. Furthermore, it has generated stability as 
long as resources to fmance the welfare state were available. 95 
Thus, welfare states in LDCs have delivered goods and services to maintain the 
loyalty of their political base. However, these states have not been able to keep their 
pledges of prosperity due to the exhaustion of their modest resources, a 
considerable proportion of which has been dedicated to welfare provision thereby 
compromising economic growth and welfare provision in the long run. Therefore, 
welfare provision has been under continuous threat due to the risk of fiscal crises. 
This has constituted a problem for states that have relied on welfare as the 
93 Midgley, J., "Theoretical Implications of Third World Social Policy Research", inS. MacPherson, 
and J. Midgley (eds.), Comparative Social Policy and the Third World, (Sussex: Wheatsheaf, 1987), 
pp. 126-127. 
94 O'Connor, J., The Fiscal Crisis of the State, (St. James Press, 1973), pp. 6. 
95 Gough, I., The Political Economy of the Welfare State, (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 149-151. 
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foundation of their social contract, and, therefore, legitimacy. They have had to 
search for alternative sources to base their legitimacy upon. 
Dissatisfied with their states, beneficiaries of welfare systems have looked for 
alternative sources of welfare provision. It has been noted in this chapter that 
welfare provision is not confmed only to the state. Other sources of welfare 
provision are family, voluntary organisations, and the market. Welfare in society 
equals the summation of welfare provided by all these sources. Hence, the retreat of 
one sector does not necessarily mean a diminution of total welfare in society. To the 
contrary, it may invite other sources, such as voluntary organisations and the market 
to step in to satisfy the unmet demand for welfare. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that channels of welfare provision are not perfect 
substitutes. This is because they have different means and ends in providing 
welfare. When the state provides universal welfare, it is an entitlement of citizens, 
which is not the case with other sectors, which may be more efficient and effective 
in welfare provision. The market sector functions according to efficiency criterion 
based on market forces of supply and demand. Voluntary organisations, on the other 
hand, provide for the needy, and encompass no obligations on the part of the 
provider, and 'those in need do not have any right or entitlement to assistance from 
private sources [therefore] must be grateful for what they may receive.96 
96 Misbra, R., The Welfare State in Capitalist Society: Policies of Retrenchment and Maintenance in 
Europe, North America and Australia, (New York: Harvester Wbeatsbeaf, 1990), pp. 108-112. 
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In the following chapters, we will apply the theoretical tools examined so far to 
Egyptian state-society relations. This will enable us to determine whether we can 
describe the state in Egypt as a welfare state. And if it can be classified as one, how 
far it has served the interests of the middle and lower income groups and managed 
to improve their living conditions. 
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Chapter Three 
The State and Society in Egypt 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to examine the social contract in LDC states and its 
durability, using the Egyptian experience as a case study. In chapter one, we defined 
the social contract as an exchange agreement between the state/ruler and the 
governed defining the rights and obligations of each party. The rights of one party 
depend on his/her fulfilment of his/her obligations. Thus, the legitimacy of the 
authority of the ruler is dependent upon his/her fulfilment of his/her obligations, as 
defmed by the social contract. 
As we have laid the theoretical foundation of research, we will apply it to the 
Egyptian case. In this chapter, we will examine the evolution of the state in Egypt 
since the revolution of 1952, and investigate state-society relations and the sources 
of its leaders' legitimacy. This will enable us to comprehend the different formulae of 
the social contract presented by Egyptian leaders to their populations, since 1952, in 
order to legitimise their rule. 
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In their quest for legitimacy, Egyptian leaders, since 1952, have tried to forge a 
social contract with their populations. They have committed themselves to achieve 
declared, domestic and international, objectives in return for the support of their 
populations. However, as they have failed to fulftl their promises, they have had to 
continuously modify the terms of the social contract. We will analyse the versions of 
the social contract pursued by Egyptian leaders since 1952 and evaluate their 
durability as a source of legitimacy for the regime. 
In this chapter, the author will outline state-society relations by examining the 
relevance of the social contract, under Nasir, Sadat, and Mubarak, to three main 
constituencies in society, namely, the ruling elite, middle and lower income groups, 
and civil society. We will investigate how each of these groups has been influenced 
by the social contract formulae presented by the three leaders. 
The ruling elite in Egypt, since 1952, have been held hostage to regime dispositions. 
They do not act autonomously from the regime; they have been dependent on the 
state for patronage and making profits. The regime's social contract formula has, 
therefore, influenced the composition of the ruling elite, as well as their political and 
economic power. 
Middle and lower income groups have been courted by the three regimes, which 
have purported to guard their interests. The term 'middle and lower income groups' 
has been chosen by the author because it is comprehensive, as it includes 
professionals, workers, peasants, and civil servants; and it does not carry the 
implications of conflict, embedded in class terminology. These groups are 
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particularly important to this study because they are the ones to whom welfare 
policies have been addressed, in order to gain their support. Thus, they are crucial 
for the assessment of the Egyptian welfare state, which has constituted an essential 
component of the social contract in Egypt since 1952, as will be discussed in the 
following chapter. 
In assessing the social contract, we have to examine civil society because civil 
society, as defmed in chapter one, is the mediator between the state and the 
individual. It promotes particular and universal demands. Thus, when the regime 
does not meet its obligations, according to the social contract, a powerful civil 
society can act as a pressure on the regime/state to abide by the contract or alter the 
formula of the contract. 
To appreciate the concept of legitimacy within the Egyptian context, we need to 
revisit the pre-revolutionary era in order to understand how the 'modern' Egyptian 
state has evolved. Firstly, we will consider monarchical Egypt, prior to the 1952 
revolution, in order to ascertain why the revolution took place as a way of 
comprehending the contemporary presidential and state legitimacy. After that, we 
will be ready to look at the political system in Egypt and be in a position to discuss 
the social contract formulae that have governed state-society relations since 1952. 
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Monarchical Egypt 
In spite of having a long tradition of statehood, Egypt had suffered domination by 
the Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Fatimids, Ayyubids, Mamluks, and Ottomans 
for almost two thousand years. Egyptians had long lost their independence and their 
right to choose their own leader until Muhammad 'Ali came to power, with the 
support of the Egyptian population in spite of his foreign origin. He was declared 
sultan of Egypt by Istanbul in 1805.1 
'Ali is considered by Dodwell to be the 'founder of modem Egypt' ,2 as he aimed to 
modernise the country and create a strong state to fulfil his ambitions. His efforts 
were brought to an end with his humiliating defeat, in 1840, by the Anglo-Turkish 
forces, whose interests were threatened by his expansionary ambitions. As a result of 
his defeat, Muhammad 'Ali's military power was curtailed and his modernisation 
project came to a halt. The Ottoman sultan, however, granted him and his 
descendents the right of hereditary rule of Egypt.3 Muhammad 'Ali was followed by 
weak rulers who did not share his will or ambitions. Egyptians challenged the 
authority of his successors on basis of their foreign origin and lack of interest in the 
welfare of the population. A turning point in the history of modem Egypt was in 
1881, when Colonel Ahmad 'UrabT led the revolt against .Khediev Tawfiq. The result 
I Woodward, P., Nasser, (London: Longman, 1992), pp. 1-5. 
2 Dodwell, H., The Founder of Modem Egypt: A Study of Muhammad 'Ali, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1931). 
3 Al-Sayyid Marsot, A., Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1984), pp. 245-247. 
129 
of this confrontation was the subjugation of Egypt to British occupation in 1882, 
which lasted until1956.4 
During the period of British occupation, Egyptians continuously struggled for their 
national independence. In 1918, Sa'd Zaghliil, a nationalist who led the Egyptian 
struggle for independence, requested the British High Commissioner to send a 
delegation (wafd) to the Paris Peace Conference; this conference was based on the 
right to self-determination. When told he had no 'official capacity' to represent 
Egyptians, Zaghliil started collecting petitions from Egyptians to support him and 
other leaders to participate in the conference. Nevertheless, his request was declined; 
and instead he was sent to exile in Malta. This ignited a spark of rebellion in 1919, 
and Egyptians from all social strata united in their demonstration demanding the 
release of Zaghliil, whereupon he was released and allowed to attend the Paris 
Conference, though not as a negotiator.5 
The 1919 revolution culminated in the grant of nominal independence and the end of 
the protectorate on 28 February 1922. Subsequently, the second constitution was 
announced in 1923;6 the new constitution allowed the formation of political parties. 
The British administration thought that this would serve its interests by distracting 
4 Vatikiotis, P., The History of Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak, 3'd ed., (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1985), pp. 141-153. 
5 Vatikiotis, P., The History of Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak, 3'd ed., (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1985), pp. 260-266. 
6 The first constitution was declared in 1882, but was eventually cancelled by the British. See The 
Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, (Cairo: The General Organisation for Official 
Publications, 1998), pp. ix-x. 
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the attention of Egyptian politicians over the struggle for power. The Wafd Party, 
under the leadership of its founder Zaghliil, became the leading party in Egypt after 
winning the parliamentary elections.7 However, the constitution did not last long, as 
it was abrogated in 1930 by King Fuad, who ruled Egypt at that time.8 Again this 
aroused the anger of the population, and the King had to submit to its will after its 
rebellion in 1935. Political life in Egypt was then confmed to strife among the Wafd 
and other political parties,9 and the quest for independence. Eventually, negotiations 
between Egyptian political parties and the British led to the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian 
Treaty of Alliance and Friendship, which tied the future of Egypt to Britain by 
continuing British military domination over Egypt. 10 
At the regional level, 1948 was a significant year in the modern history of the Arab 
world. In that year, the state of Israel- which was to remain a thorn in the side of 
the Arab world - was created. The Palestine War took place and the Arabs were 
defeated due to their fragmentation and lack of co-ordination. 11 Since 1948, 
Palestine has played a crucial role in foreign as well as domestic politics of Arab 
7 Woodward, P., Nasser, (London: Longman, 1992), pp. 8-9. 
8 Vatikiotis, P., The History of Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak, 3'd ed., (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1985), pp. 287. 
9 These parties included, Ummah (1907), National Democratic (1907), Reform of Constitutional 
Principles (1907), Constitutionalist Liberals (1922), Constitutionalist Brothers (1922), Sa'dist 
Organisation (1937). See Mustafa, H., al-Ahziib [The Parties], (Cairo: Al-Ahram Centre for 
Strategic Studies, 2000), pp. 100-103. 
10 Botman, S., Egypt from Independence to Revolution, 1919-1952, (New York: Syracuse 
University Press, 1991), pp. 39-41. 
11 Stephens, R., Nasser: A Political Biography, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971), pp. 81-82. 
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states not only due to its Arab identity, but also because of its Islamic significance 
and symbolic value in the struggle against colonialism and Zionism, which is 
considered an extension of imperialism in the region. 
Thus, the scene was ripe for a revolution: the weakening of the British Empire after 
the end of World War II, frustration with the corrupt foreign dynasty that supported 
the occupation, and the defeat in the Palestine War, which Egyptians believed was 
caused by their disinterested weak rulers. 12 The revolution13 was carried out by the 
Free Officers under the leadership of Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir. 14 
Now that we have painted the pre-1952 scene, we will move on to investigate the 
strength, autonomy and legitimacy of the state and successive Egyptian regimes 
since the revolution. To be able to examine these issues, we need to describe the 
12 Williamson, B., Education and Social Change in Egypt and Turkey: A Study in Historical 
Sociology, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 114-115. 
13 At first the revolution was known as the movement of the Free Officers. However, as soon as the 
Officers started issuing their own laws in the name of the people without the need for the 
parliament, on the pretext that they carried out a revolution on behalf of the people, its name was 
changed to revolution. However, the 1952 revolution cannot be called a revolution in the proper 
sense of the word because it was not carried out by civilians, like the French or Russian revolutions, 
but rather by military officers which qualifies it to be a military coup. See al-Haldm, T., 'Awdat al-
wa'yl [The Return of Consciousness], (Cairo: Dar al-Shuliiq, 1974), pp. 20-21. Woodward aruges 
that it was a coup d'etat as it was not thought through as a revolution with objectives and a plan to 
carry out these objectives but considering the outcome of the act and its impact on the social 
structure, it can certainly be described as 'more than a coup but less than a revolution'. See 
Woodward, P., Nasser, (London: Longman, 1992), pp. 148. 
14 The Free Officers was a movement formed by Nasir in 1949. It comprised officers in the army 
who had a common goal, namely to rid Egypt of colonial rule and the monarchy. The movement 
had its origins in the 1948 Palestine War. During the War, these officers carne to realise that the 
cause behind their occupation and defeat lay in Egypt. Thus, they had to fight first in their 
homeland before expanding their struggle to Palestine. Members of the movement included: Gamal 
'Abd al-Nasir, 'Abd al-Haldm 'Amir, Anwar al-Sadat, Salah Salim, Hasan Ibrahim, Khalid Muhyt 
al-Drn, and 'Abd al-Latrf al-Bughdadr. See Dekmejian, R., Egypt under Nasir: A Study in Political 
Dynamics, (London: University of London Press, 1972), pp. 20-21. 
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political system in Egypt in order to comprehend the relationship between the state, 
the President, and society. 
The Political System 
The political system in Egypt is based on a multiparty system. 15 Public political 
participation is supposed to be achieved through political parties on all levels and in 
all domains within lawful and constitutional bounds. Freedom of the press is 
stipulated by the Constitution.16 The three pillars of the political system are the 
legislative (People's Assembly), the executive, and the judicial authorities. For the 
purpose of this research, which is examining state-society relations, we are 
concerned with the first two elements of the political system. This is because the 
President resides at the head of the political system in Egypt; he is the ultimate 
authority in the executive. 17 And the People's Assembly, in theory, represents the 
will of the people. 
15 http:/ /www.uk.sis.gov.eg/parUparbook/btmUpg9fm.btm 
16 The Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Articles 206-211, (Cairo: The General 
Organisation for Official Publications, 1998), pp. 42-43. 
17 Kassem, M., In the Guise of Democracy: Governance in Contemporary Egypt, (Reading: Ithaca 
Press, 1999), pp. 31. 
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The President 
In Egypt the political system is highly dominated by the executive, headed by the 
President. 18 The President is nominated, according to the 1971 Constitution, by the 
People's Assembly with a two-third majority. The appointment is confirmed through 
a popular referendum. 19 According to the 1971 Constitution, the President is elected 
for one term of six years to be renewed for one time. This was modified by Article 
77 in the amendments of 22 May 1980, which states that the term of presidency is 
six years, starting from the date of the declaration of the plebiscite, and it is legal for 
a president to be re-elected for other terms. 20 
The executive is dominated by the President, as he nominates the prime-minister and 
the Cabinet. Furthermore, the Cabinet is accountable to the President and not to the 
People's Assembly.21 Thus, the President is the ultimate decision-maker in the state 
and is responsible for laying down the policies of the state along with the Council of 
18 The Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Article 137, (Cairo: The General Organisation 
for Official Publications, 1998), pp. 26. 
19 Ayalon, A., "Egypt (Jumhuriyyat Misr al-' Arabiyya)", Middle East Contemporary Survey, vol. 
XI, 1987, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 330. 
20 The Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Article 77, (Cairo: The General Organisation 
for Official Publications, 1998), pp. 14. 
21 Al-Sayyid Marsot, A., A Short History of Modern Egypt, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), pp. 145. 
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Mini~ters.22 Moreover, according to the Constitution, the President is the Chief of 
the Armed Forces and the Head of the Supreme Council for Judiciary Affairs. 23 
In addition, because of his constitutional powers, the President can pass legislation 
when the parliament is not in session by issuing presidential decrees that are later 
approved by the parliament. The President also has the right to make decisions that 
have the force of law, when necessary, in exceptional cases, and upon authorisation 
by the People's Assembly. The law is then presented to the Assembly, when in 
session, for approval based upon a referendum. In theory, the Assembly can block 
the law if it is not approved. 
The President can also bypass the parliament, in case of a conflict between himself 
and the parliament, by referring directly to the public through a plebiscite. Enjoying 
these powers, the President is not accountable to the parliament or the public. 24 
Furthermore, the President has the authority to dissolve the People's Assembly, only 
if necessary, and after a public referendum. The President of the Republic issues a 
decree to terminate the sessions of the Assembly and conduct a referendum within 
thirty days. If the majority of voters approve the dissolution of the Assembly, the 
President decrees its dissolution, and candidates run for parliamentary elections.25 
22 The Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Article 138, (Cairo: The General Organisation 
for Official Publications, 1998), pp. 26. 
23 The Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Articles 150, and 173, (Cairo: The General 
Organisation for Offidal Publications, 1998), pp. 28, 34. 
24 Hinnebusch, R., Egyptian Politics under Sadat: The Post-populist Development of an 
Authoritarian-modernizing State, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 78-79. 
25 http://www.uk.sis.gov.eg/parllparbook/htmllpg9fm.htm 
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Thus, the Constitution has afforded the President considerable power vis-a-vis other 
institutions of the state and society. And, 'the President, whoever he is and whatever 
his personal preferences happen to be, is inclined to use them in defence of both 
himself and the interests with which he is associated. '26 
The People's Assembly 
Parliamentary life started in Egypt on 19 November 1866.27 The parliament had 
acted more like a consultative body than a legislative organ since its inception and 
until 1913, when the Legislative Society (al-gam'iyah al-tashri'iyah) was 
established. 28 Throughout the period 1957-7 6, the institution was inactive m 
legislation due to the dominance of the executive over the political system.29 
Since 1977, because of political reforms initiated by the regime in order to revive 
political life in Egypt, the People's Assembly has been in charge of legislation. It 
decrees the general policy of the state, approves the budget as well as social and 
development plans submitted by the government, and monitors the work of the 
26 Cooper, M., The Transformation of Egypt, (London: Croom Helm, 1982), pp. 177. 
27 Niifi', I., R'iyiih al-dfmuqriit'iyah [The Winds of Democracy], (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1984), pp. 
9. 
28 Mustafa, H., al-Ahzab [The Parties], (Cairo: Al-Ahram Centre for Strategic Studies, 2000), pp. 
100-105. 
29 Waterbury, J., The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 365. 
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government. 30 The Constitution stipulates that at least one half of the members must 
be workers and farmers. 31 The duration of the term of the Assembly is five years 
starting from the date of its first meeting. 32 
Candidates are elected based on an individual election system. Egypt is divided into 
222 constituencies with 2 members elected for each constituency, one fi'iit 
(categories) the other 'ummiil (workers). The fi'iit candidate should have a 
university degree or an equivalent, and the 'ummiil candidate, who represents 
workers or peasants, should have less than a university degree education. This 
ensures that the Assembly comprises 50% workers or peasants.33 Thus, the number 
of People's Assembly members amounts to 454, of whom 10 members are appointed 
by the President. 34 
Dominated by the ruling party, which is headed by the President of the state, the 
People's Assembly does not enjoy much autonomy in legislation. Hence, it lacks 
credibility in the eyes of the populace that believes that the results of the elections 
are 'manipulated by the government'. Although the institution adheres to a 
30 The Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Article 86, (Cairo: The General Organisation 
for Official Publications, 1998), pp. 16. 
31 The Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Article 87, (Cairo: The General Organisation 
for Official Publications, 1998), pp. 16. 
32 The Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Article 92, (Cairo: The General Organisation 
for Official Publications, 1998), pp. 17. 
33 Kassem, M., In the Guise of Denwcracy: Governance in Contemporary Egypt, (Reading: Ithaca 
Press, 1999), pp.105. 
34 http://www.uk.sis.gov.eg/parl/parbook/html!pg9fm.htm 
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democratic framework, it lacks effective power, which is concentrated in the hands 
of the President. The Assembly rarely opposes any laws proposed by the executive; 
moreover, any proposal that is unwelcomed by the regime is dismissed. For example, 
Kandeel points out that, in 1990, 214 laws proposed by the government were 
passed, and out of 7 laws proposed by the Assembly, only 1 was promulgated. The 
same happened in 1991, when 451 laws proposed by the government were passed, 
and again 1 out of 7 laws proposed by the Assembly was ratified. 35 
The limitation of the powers of the Assembly is manifest in the narrow scope of 
issues it deals with, mainly 'public utilities, housing, food, and supplies'. Foreign 
affairs and national security issues lie within the ambit of the President's authority. 
Also the supervisory role of the Assembly over the government is never fully 
realised, as the opposition is disorganised and its presence is limited in the Assembly, 
rendering it ineffective. Accordingly, there has never been a no confidence vote in 
the government of any minister, despite widespread inefficiency and corruption.36 
The People's Assembly has, thus, been a weak institution incapable of asserting the 
will of the people. Since the revolution, political institutions, such as the People's 
Assembly and Arab Socialist Union (ASU), which were supposed to represent social 
forces in society, have acted more as a means of incorporating political forces into 
the system through a network of patronage. They have served the interests of the 
35 Kandeel cited in Goodson, L., and S. Radwan, "Democratization in Egypt in the 1990s: 
Stagnant, or Merely Stalled?", Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 1, winter 1997, pp. 7-8. 
36 Goodson, L., and S. Radwan, "Democratization in Egypt in the 1990s: Stagnant, or Merely 
Stalled?", Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 1, winter 1997, pp. 8. 
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ruling elite, and helped the regime gain legitimacy through the endorsement of 
welfare policies to middle and lower income groups in return for giving up their right 
to genuine participation. 
This exchange has formed the essence of the social contract in Egypt since the 
revolution. As was pointed out in chapter one, social contract theorists argue that 
political authority is legitimate so long the regime meets its obligations according to 
the social contract. Therefore, in order to assess the legitimacy of the regime, it is 
essential to examine the formula of the social contract within the society in question, 
to identify the obligations and rights of the regime/state and those of the public. 
Hence, we need to explore the formulae of the social contract of Egyptian regimes 
since 1952. 
The Social Contract 
The Egyptian state, after the rule of Muhammad 'Ali and prior to the revolution of 
1952, can be described as weak. Socio-political life was marked by public resistance 
to monarchical authority and British occupation. The continuous collision between 
the Palace and politicians was manifest in the frequent change of the Cabinet. 37 
The 1952 revolution brought about a radical transformation in the political and social 
system in Egypt. Measures of redistribution of income, introduced by the 
37 Al-Sayyid Marsot, A., A Short History of Modern Egypt, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), pp. 86-106. 
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revolutionary regime, led to a change not only in the composition of the ruling elite, 
but also of social and political values of society, which ultimately altered state-
society relations. 
Egyptian leaders, since 1952, have attempted to maintain the strength and autonomy 
of their regimes vis-a-vis society. Egyptian regimes, since the revolution, have tried 
to secure autonomy from different interest groups in society. To a large extent, they 
have been successful in achieving this aim. However, the degree of autonomy 
enjoyed by these regimes has not been the same in all areas. Usually, they have been 
able to act independently in the areas of high politics, mainly foreign affairs,38 
domestic politics, and the military; yet, in low politics issues, economic decisions, 
they had to take into consideration the demands and needs of the differing interests 
groups in society. This can be explained by the significance and relevance of 
economic issues to the lives of these groups. Hence, they have been more assertive 
in these areas. 
In order to ensure their autonomy, Egyptian regimes, since 1952, have based their 
rule upon a tacit social contract that has restricted freedoms and political 
participation, and expanded the power of the President. The degree of restriction has 
been dictated by what these regimes could offer in return to their population, at the 
international and domestic levels. The social contract has, therefore, been modified 
continuously under the rule of Nasir, Sadat and Mubarak to adjust to changes in the 
international and domestic environment. 
38 Ayubi, S., Nasser and Sadat: Decision Making and Foreign Policy (1970-1972), (Lanham: 
University Press of America, 1994), pp. 10-18. 
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Nasir 
Nasir was the first Egyptian to rule Egypt since Pharaonic times. He was 
representative of the average Egyptian, with a rural background from Upper Egypt. 
Nasir, therefore, enjoyed the support of most of the population; yet, his legitimacy 
was mainly based upon his charisma and his achievements, and not on rationality. 
Nasir's charisma made him accessible to Egyptians, and facilitated their acceptance 
of his vision for the nation. 'Nasir's charisma served an important legitimizing 
function for the Egyptian political system by rendering compatible key traditional 
and revolutionary values and structures: Islam and secularism, Egyptian nationalism 
and Arabism, patriarchy and presidency.' 39 
Nasir promoted himself as the leader of the Arab nation who knew how to lead his 
nation to national and economic independence. After centuries of foreign rule, 
Egyptians saw in him the redeemer of their sovereignty and independence; hence, 
they readily accepted his social contract formula. They gave up their right to political 
participation, and followed their leader in his struggle for independence and 
development. This struggle, which was conceived by Egyptians as a desired 
objective, was a cornerstone of his legitimacy. In his quest for legitimacy, therefore, 
Nasir operated on two levels, domestic and international. 
39 Hudson, M., Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1977), pp. 242. 
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Domestic 
On the domestic level, Nasir's legitimacy was founded upon his commitment to an 
assertion of national independence, socio-economic reforms, and the pursuit of 
economic development.40 Through his achievements in these areas, Nasir was able to 
gain the support of middle and lower income groups, and the rising new elite. 
Nasir managed to assert the national independence of Egypt through the 1952 
military coup; subsequently, the British left Egypt (in 1956) after seventy-four years 
of occupation. Even to those who did not necessarily agree with his other policies, 
this elevated him in their eyes. 41 
Once in power, Nasir's regime had no programme for governing the country other 
than the six principles of the revolution; and these were: ridding Egypt of colonialists 
and their collaborators, feudalism, monopoly and dominance of capitalism; 
establishing social justice; building a strong national army; and instituting a 
democratic system.42 To achieve these objectives, Nasir redesigned the political map 
of Egypt; he abolished the old institutions: the monarchy,43 the parliament, and 
40 Lesch, A. M., "Democracy in Doses: Mubarak Launches His Second Term as President", Arab 
Studies Quarterly, vol. 11, no. 4, fall 1989, pp. 88. 
41 Woodward, P., Nasser, (London: Longman, 1992), pp. 93-94. 
42 Fiiy1z, M., Mishwiiri ma' 'Abd al-Niisir: muziikiriit Mansur Fiiyiz, al-tabib al-khiis li/ ra'is 'Abd 
al-Niisir [My way with 'Abd al-Nasir: The Memoirs of Fiiy1z Mansiir, President 'Abd al-Nasir's 
Private Doctor], (Cairo: Diir al-Huriyah, 1988), pp. 17. Waterfield, G., Egypt, (London: Thames & 
Hudson, 1967), pp. 161. 
43 Egypt was declared a republic on 19 June 1953. See Dekmejian, R., Egypt under Nasir: A Study 
in Political Dynamics, (London: University of London Press, 1972), pp. 26. 
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political parties. The aim behind this move was to strip the ruling elite, mainly large 
landowners, of their political power, to secure the autonomy of the new regime; and 
to advance social justice, through income redistribution, in order to gain legitimacy 
with middle and lower income groups. 
The balance between different interests within society was achieved by the expansion 
of the state and its responsibilities in the socio-economic life of the population. It 
provided an infrastructure, and when the private sector proved to be incapacitated, it 
became the main investor and a capitalist state emerged. The state carried out 
production and marketing activities, set pricing policies, allocated international aid to 
different projects, and became an employer of last resort.44 
Nasir pursued development as a goal to attain economic independence and to 
enhance his legitimacy. Among Nasir's major economic achievements were the 
construction of the High Dam project, and the launching of the first five-year plan 
1959/60-1964/65. The relative success of the plan, signified in a modest economic 
growth rate of 5.5% per annum, along with the 'sweeping nationalisation' of 1961, 
raised Nasir's credit in the eyes of the public. However, these victories did not last 
long. The economy showed signs of deterioration with a soaring public sector 
payroll - due to a rise in government employment, and the growing deficit in the 
balance of payments.45 As a consequence, the state could not afford to expand in its 
developmental plans and welfare provision. 
44 Jreisat, J., Politics without Process: Administering Development in the Arab World, (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 1997), pp. 97. 
45 Woodward, P., Nasser, (London: Longman, 1992), pp. 93-94. 
143 
International 
Nasir used foreign policy to unite national forces and acquire legitimacy. He enjoyed 
considerable autonomy in foreign policy making; he made decisions independent of 
influential interest groups and the ruling elite. Nasir's legitimacy partially stemmed 
from his commitment to three main themes: Arabism, anti-imperialism, and 
nonalignment.46 Given the regional Arab history of foreign occupation, these 
objectives appealed to Egyptians. Nasir's successes in foreign policy, therefore, 
raised his popularity at home and made him a hero in the eyes of Egyptians. As 
Hudson puts it 
By identifying with pan-Arabism, antiimperialism, and Third World nonalignment, 
the revolutionary regime in Egypt was able to fashion for itself a legitimacy formula 
of considerable strength. The legitimacy mechanism employed was unusual in that it 
did not arise exclusively from the domestic political arena. Instead, it was a "reflected 
legitimacy," deriving its effect from behavior in the regional and international 
system. By winning approval in the Arab world outside and in the broader 
constituency of the Third World, the new Egyptian regime became even more 
legitimate in the eyes of Egyptians; indeed, by all accounts it gave Egyptians a sense 
of dignity and some substantial psychic gratifications.47 
Nasir's strategy for achieving his objectives encompassed operating within three 
circles, namely: Arab, African, and Islamic. Nasir conceived that his field of 
operations was not limited to Egypt's territorial boundaries, but extended to other 
areas that shared common interests with Egypt. He recognised that Egypt and its 
46 Stephens, R., Nasser: A Political Biography, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971), pp. 251. 
47 Hudson, M., Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1977), pp. 241-242. 
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Arab neighbours shared a common history as well as common political, cultural, and 
economic interests. He also thought that by being part of Africa and having the 
'artery of life', the Nile, which springs from Africa, Egypt had a role to play in 
securing the independence of its neighbours. Finally, he realised that mobilising the 
forces and resources of the Islamic world could add to the political weight of the 
Islamic countries, of which Egypt was a significant member. 48 
Nasir sought to make Egypt independent of super and regional powers; and with his 
foreign policy successes, Egypt emerged as a regional power. Nasir defied the 
world's major powers on several occasions. This defiance gained him legitimacy with 
the Egyptian public, who perceived him as the deliverer of its long lost national 
independence. 
Nasir challenged US foreign policy in the region, particularly on two issues: the 
Baghdad Pact, and purchase of arms from the Soviet Union. The US proposed the 
Baghdad Pact, which was a 'mutual security pact' that involved forty states, 
including the states of the Middle East, in 1955.49 The Baghdad Pact was developed 
by the West in an attempt to contain communism. Nasir recognised that Turkey, 
Pakistan, Iran, and possibly Israel would be part of the Pact. Although he perceived 
some areas of co-operation with the three former states, he thought that they would 
not join the Arabs in their struggle against Israel. Accordingly, Nasir attacked the 
48 Nasir, G., Falsafat al-thawrah [The Philosophy of the Revolution], (Cairo: al-Dar al-Qawmryah, 
1955), pp. 53-73. 
49 It was a development of the idea of Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO) which was 
refused by Egypt and other Arab countries even before the revolution. See Heikal, M., Bisriihah li-
Misr Iii li- 'Abd al-Niisir [In Honesty to Egypt not to 'Abd al-Nasir], 1976, pp. 66. 
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idea of the Pact, especially when Iraq invited other Arab countries to join. Saudi 
Arabia and Syria supported Egypt, and in the end the Pact collapsed. 50 
Until 1956, the West had held a monopoly over arms sales to the Middle East, Nasir 
managed to break this monopoly by purchasing arms from the Soviet Union through 
Czechoslovakia. Nasir realised that the West, especially the US, would not provide 
the Arabs with arms to fight Israel, so he had to look for an alternative source of 
arms. The environment of the Cold War, where each superpower was trying to 
extend its sphere of influence and secure allies in the region, afforded him this 
opportunity. 51 
After 1956, the political environment in the region changed. The Soviet Union 
emerged as a major player. It provided Nasir with arms, technical assistance, and 
steel products. In addition, it became the major importer of Egyptian cotton. 52 
Although Nasir was reluctant to ally Egypt with the Soviet Union, because he did 
not wish to compromise the independence of Egypt, his options were limited. The 
deterioration of relations with the West with their refusal to fmance the High Dam 
50 Heikal, M., Bisriihah li-Misr Iii li- 'Abd al-Niisir [In Honesty to Egypt not to 'Abd al-Nasir], 
1976, pp. 66-69. 
51 Heikal, M., Bisriihah li-Misr Iii li- 'Abd al-Niisir [In Honesty to Egypt not to 'Abd al-Nasir], 
1976, pp. 89-90. 
52 Zaalouk, M., Power, Class and Foreign Capital in Egypt: The Rise of the New Bourgeoisie, 
(London: Zed, 1989), pp. 31-32. 
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project, 53 on the pretext that such a giant project was beyond the capabilities of a 
small country like Egypt, left him no choice. 
Since the project required technical and financial capabilities beyond the resources of 
Egypt, Nasir looked for foreign assistance. The World Bank was going to offer 
Egypt a loan of $200 million, and the US pledged to provide an 'unconditional loan' 
of US$56 million, and Britain US$14 million. However, as relations strained 
between Egypt and the US, the latter refused to provide the required funds. 54 
Nasir was able to secure technical and fmancial assistance for building the High Dam 
from the Soviet Union. Furthermore, he declared the nationalisation of the Suez 
Canal, on 26 July 1956.55 The nationalisation of the Canal asserted Egypt's national 
independence once again. Consequently, this act provoked the two demising colonial 
powers: France and Britain. Although it was the US that obliged the attacking forces 
to leave, to the overwhelmed Egyptian population it was another victory for their 
great leader who challenged the world's major powers. 56 
53 The Dam signified a symbol of national and economic independence, as it would supply 
electricity, contribute to the reclamation of arable land in Egypt, and restrain the Nile floods. See 
Wheelock, K., Nasser's New Egypt: A Critical Analysis, (London: Atlantic, 1960), pp. 179-182. 
54 Aoud~. I., ''From National Bourgeois Development to lnfitah: Egypt 1952-1992", Arab Studies 
Quarterly, vol. 16, no. 1, winter 1994, pp. 4-5. 
55 The Suez Canal was an international company whose headquarters was located in Paris, and 
therefore, Nasir's action was regarded as 'theft'. See Hopwood, D., Egypt: Politics and Society 
1945-1990, 3'd ed., (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 46-49. 
56 For an account of the escalation of the Suez crisis see Stephens, R., Nasser: A Political 
Biography, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971), pp. 183-247. 
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After 1956, Nasir followed a foreign policy that promoted nationalism and 
independence of Third World countries in general, especially African countries, and 
the Arab world in particular. Egypt, under Nasir's leadership, supported the 
liberation movements in many African countries; and, hence, it came to symbolise the 
national struggle against imperialism. However, this wave of nationalism was fanned 
when in 1967, Egypt suffered a humiliating defeat in the war against Israel.57 
The defeat of 1967 left Egypt a weak regional player with parts of its land under 
Israeli occupation. Domestically, Nasir's regime was also shaken, though Nasir 
himself remained popular. Although the defeat of 1967 struck a blow to Nasir, in 
terms of legitimacy, Nasir managed to survive the setback because he remained 
committed to the Arab cause and Palestine. 
Nasir's Social Contract 
After the success of the military coup had brought the Free Officers to power, the 
new regime had to establish its legitimacy, and mobilise support for the revolution. 
This was attained through attempts to effect transformation in society and seeking 
national and economic independence. In order to achieve these objectives, Nasir 
believed that a unity of social forces was essential. To gain the support of the 
majority of the population, Nasir, therefore, adopted populist policies. One can 
57 Stephens, R., Nasser: A Political Biography, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971), pp. 251-253, 
310-311. 
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conclude that this support has been realised at the expense of the old ruling elite, by 
stripping them of their political and economic power. 
Considering Nasir's domestic and foreign policies, we can deduce that Nasir's social 
contract entailed attaining national and economic independence, extending 
patronage, and embracing welfare policies. In return, Nasir claimed autonomy from 
all groups in society, and the support of the population. The legitimacy of Nasir's 
regime was conditioned by its ability to deliver its promises. Once the regime failed, 
its legitimacy waned, and it was challenged by different interest groups in society. To 
understand Nasir's formula of the social contract we need to analyse its relevance to 
three main constituencies in society, the ruling elite, middle and lower income 
groups, and civil society. 
The Ruling Elite and the Social Contract 
The radical socio-political transformation that took place under Nasir's rule entailed 
a change in the composition of the ruling elite. Nasir dismantled the old ruling elite 
by stripping them of their economic and political power through the dissolution of 
political parties, land reforms, and later the nationalisation of most of the private 
sector enterprises. This move empowered the new regime and the state vis-a-vis the 
ancien regime. After that, Nasir had a free hand to steer the country according to his 
vision. His main ambition was to attain national and economic independence for 
Egypt.ss 
58 Hinnebuscb, R., Egyptian Politics under Sadat: The Post-populist Development of an 
Authoritarian-modernizing State, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 21-22. 
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Lacking a constituency, and reluctant to co-operate with elements of the ancien 
regime, Nasir had to found his own base of support. The most accessible 
constituency was the military, especially members of the Free Officers. Hence, 
officers were granted key positions in the state based on their loyalty rather than 
expertise. 59 To fill the vacuum left by the landed elite, the new regime encouraged 
the rise of a new elite from the middle class. By the early 1960s, they had reached 
the apex of power, and entrenched their interests. They mixed with members of the 
ancien regime and made considerable profits by running the state economy. They 
tried to preserve the status quo as it served their interests. 60 
The new elite also included bureaucrats and technocrats of the civil service who 
shared the same urban middle class background with the Free Officers. The new 
elite, thus, became dependent on the state and networks of patronage for the 
advancement of their interests. 61 
Although a new elite emerged, and their 'long-term' interests were preserved, the 
regime remained autonomous, until the mid-1960s, as it resided above all forces in 
society. This manifested itself in the establishment of a strong regime that was able 
to implement policies that were inimical to the interests of the ancien regime, and to 
restructure the domestic environment. The regime instituted a centrally planned 
59 Hinnebusch, R., "From Nasir to Sadat: Elite Transformation in Egypt", Journal of South Asian 
and Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 8, no. 1, falll983, pp. 27. 
60 Hinnebusch, R., Egyptian Politics under Sadat: The Post-populist Development of an 
Authoritarian-modernizing State, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 131. 
61 Kamrava, M., and F. Mora, "Civil Society and Democratisation in Comparative Perspective: 
Latin America and the Middle East", Third World Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 5, pp. 905. 
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economy with a series of nationalisations, and embraced socialism as the ideology of 
the state. 62 
By the mid-1960s, the ruling elite realised that socialist policies no longer served 
their economic interests. They sought new opportunities that could offer them higher 
protits, as the state resources were depleted. Although for them the social contract 
ceased to be binding, they had not been able to challenge the regime, due to its 
popularity, until the defeat of 1967, when the soundness of the regime's policies and 
vision was questioned. The defeat of 1967 afforded Nasir's opponents from the 
ancien regime and the new elite the opportunity to challenge his policies and demand 
the liberalisation of the economy.63 
Middle and Lower Income Groups and the Social Contract 
Before the 1952 revolution, democracy was seen, by Egyptians, in conjunction with 
independence; they were 'two sides of the same coin'. Independence was a 
prerequisite for democracy. After 1952, the two issues were separated. Although 
instituting a democratic system was one of the six principles of the revolution, 
Nasir's distrust of political parties, his reluctance to share power, and his perception 
of democracy as a threat to national unity made him quickly postpone the project of 
democracy indefinitely. Accordingly, he introduced a single organisation system that 
62 Hinnebuscb, R., Egyptian Politics under Sadat: The Post-populist Development of an 
Authoritarian-modernizing State, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 24-26. 
63 Zaalouk, M., Power, Class and Foreign Capital in Egypt: The Rise of the New Bourgeoisie, 
(London: Zed, 1989}, pp. 50-55. 
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encompassed all forces of society. Nasir believed that a unity of social forces was 
required to embark on the national project of economic development and 
independence. The regime managed to block all avenues of political participation, 
and resorted to repression of all opposition to secure short-term stability.64 
For middle and lower income groups, Nasir's contract, therefore, translated into 
populist policies that offered them limited redistribution of wealth through land 
reforms, subsidies on few basic commodities, free education and health care, and 
guaranteed employment. In return, these groups offered their support for the 
regime's policies forgoing their right to political participation.65 So long as the 
regime could deliver these goods and services, the population was acquiescent. 
However, by the mid-1960s, the economy began to show signs of exhaustion. In 
particular, strained relations with the US meant a reduction in foreign aid, which 
restricted the ability of the regime to provide the promised goods and services. 
The 1967 defeat brought about an end to this formula of the social contract. 66 The 
defeat of 1967, the inability of the regime to live up to its slogans of nationalism, and 
its subsequent failure to deliver economic promises that formed the foundation of the 
contract dictated a redefinition of the social contract. The regime proved incapable 
64 Hudson, M., Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1977), pp. 245-246. 
65 Ibrahim, S. (ed.), "Civil Society and Prospects of Democratization in the Arab World", in Egypt, 
Islam, and Democracy: Twelve Critical Essays, (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 
1996), pp. 251-252. 
66 Hudson, M., Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1977), pp. 239. 
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of even protecting its territories and standing up to its promises of preserving 
independence. As the regime had failed to meet its obligations, according to the 
terms of the contract, Egyptians were not willing to keep their part of the contract. 
They resisted the regime, and declared their aspiration for more political 
participation and liberty through worker and student demonstrations. 
With the 1967 defeat, the ability of the regime to defend Egyptian territory became 
questionable. Hence, the link between democracy and independence was re-
established. The abrogation of the contract manifested itself in the popular rise of 
workers and students against the regime in 1968, triggered by the lenient sentences 
to officers held responsible for the defeat.67 This uprising resulted in the redefinition 
of the contract represented in the March 1968 declaration. The declaration 
acknowledged the need for a system of participation of 'true' social forces in the 
political process.68 However, Nasir died before he could deliver his promise of 
liberalisation. 
Civil Society and the Social Contract 
Before outlining the implications of Nasir's formula of the social contract for 
Egyptian civil society, we need to trace the rise of civil society in Egypt in order to 
67 Springborg, R., Mubarak's Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order, (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1989), pp. 96. 
68 Korany, B., "Restricted Democratization from Above: Egypt", in B. Korany, R. Brynen, and P. 
Noble (eds.), Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, vol. 2, (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 56-57. 
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appreciate the relevance of Nasir's social contract to the development of civil 
society. 
Civil Society in Egypt 
In most societies, voluntary activity has sprouted from religious traditions and 
principles. Egypt knew a prototype of civil society in the form of PVOs from the lOth 
century.69 Egyptian voluntary activity emerged in the form of religious endowments, 
awqiif.70 The first secular PVO, the Greek Society in Alexandria, was set up in 1821. 
It encompassed the largest foreign group in Egypt at that time. Subsequently, other 
Egyptian cultural societies were established, such as the Institute for Research of the 
Egyptian Civilisation (1859); and the Society of Knowledge (1868); as well as 
religious ones, such as the Islamic Charitable Society (1878); the Coptic Society for 
Seeking Charities (1881); and the Coptic Tawfiq Society (1891). Many of these 
societies tried to contain the influence of the British occupation, and dealt with 
significant issues at the time, such as modernity and traditionalism. 71 
69 Higgins, J., States of Welfare: Comparative Analysis in Social Policy, (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1981), pp. 74-76. 
7
° Currently, religious endowments operate under the Ministry of Awqaf. Ibrahim, S., Egyptian 
Law 32 on Egypt's Private Sector Organizations: A Critical Assessment, (Cairo: Ibn Khaldoun 
Center, Ibn Khaldoun Working Papers, no. 3, November 1996), pp. 12. 
71 Mitwali, N., "Guhiid al-gam 'Iyat ghair al-hukiimiyah fi Misr fi magal al-ta 'Urn: lamhah 
tarikhiyah" [The Efforts of Non-governmental Associations in Egypt in the Domain of Education: 
A Historical Glimpse], in S. Sulaiman (ed.), Tanshft dur al-gam'iyiit ghair al-hukumiyah fi al-
ta'lim qabl al-giimi'i: diriisah istikshiifiyah [Revitalising the Role of Non-governmental 
Associations in Pre-university Education: An Exploratory Study], (Cairo: The National Centre for 
Research, 1996), pp. 58-60. 
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After the Constitution of 1923 had allowed the formation of PVOs, there was a 
proliferation ofPVOs; they reached more than 300 by 1925, and 500 by 1936. PVOs 
played a significant role in different arenas of life such as politics, culture, education, 
and religion. This was enhanced by the liberal environment of the period 1923-1952. 
These organisations, especially the Egyptian Red Crescent, were particularly active 
during World War II, when the government was preoccupied with the war and could 
not provide the services offered by them. The advent of the revolution of 1952, 
however, marked the beginning of a new era for the Egyptian civil society.72 
Civil Society after the Revolution 
The period following the 1952 revolution witnessed a shrinking in the number and 
role of PVOs. This was mainly due to the gradual encroachment of the state upon 
the autonomy of various organisations functioning in different aspects of life. The 
dissolution of political parties and the multiparty system, and the direct control that 
the state exercised on PVOs by means of Law 32/1964 symbolised the encroachment 
and dominance of the state on civil society. Nevertheless, voluntary activity was not 
totally obliterated as members of the upper class, who were denied access to political 
operations, reverted to philanthropic activities, which they had already been 
controlling prior to the revolution. 73 
72 Ibrahim, S., Egyptian Law 32 on Egypt's Private Sector Organizations: A Critical Assessment, 
(Cairo: Ibn K.haldoun Center, Ibn K.haldoun Working Papers, no. 3, November 1996), pp. 13-15. 
73 Ibrahim, S., Egyptian Law 32 on Egypt's Private Sector Organizations: A Critical Assessment, 
(Cairo: Ibn K.haldoun Center, Ibn K.haldoun Working Papers, no. 3, November 1996), pp. 13-15. 
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The revolution entrenched the corporatist trend that was underway, with a special 
relationship evolving between the new regime and trade unions. Leaders of trade 
unions were co-opted into the system; however, their close links with the state 
apparatus compromised their credibility and their ability to serve the interests of their 
. . 74 
constituencies. 
Nasir's concern with a unity of social forces, translated into a diminished 
associational life. In the process, the autonomy of civil society was compromised. 
The state expanded to dominate all aspects of society, with only two actors rising in 
prominence, namely the military and the single organisation (Liberation Rally, 
National Union, or ASU).75 In this formula, there was no place for the organisations 
of civil society. These organisations were marginalised due to the tight grip of the 
regime over civil life. 
The state was assigned a larger role in the provision of welfare; consequently, 
voluntary associations were overlooked. As the state became burdened with wars 
and the rise in population, voluntary associations managed to reassert themselves. 76 
Nevertheless, the voluntary sector remained hindered by Law 32 for the year 1964, 
74 See Posusney, M., lilbor and the State in Egypt: Workers, Unions, and Economic Restructuring, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1997). 
75 Kamrava, M., and F. Mora, "Civil Society and Democratisation in Comparative Perspective: 
Latin America and the Middle East", Third World Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 5, pp. 905-906. 
76 Sullivan, D., "Islam and Development in Egypt: Civil Society and the State", in H. Mutalib, and 
H. Hashimi (eds.), Islam, Muslims and the Modem State: Case Studies of Muslims in Thirteen 
Countries, (London: Macmillan Press, 1996), pp. 215. 
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which gave the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA) 77 control over voluntary 
associations. 'In other words, the voluntary sector was ready to take over the burden 
off the state, but the government was not ready to give up its control over society'. 78 
The state violated respect for private property and personal freedom with a series of 
sequestrations of private property conducted in the name of social justice. This 
action curtailed the socio-political power of landowners, who had also been the 
major players in civil society prior to the revolution. Socio-political life in Nasir's 
Egypt can be divided into three main stages: 79 
1. Etatism (1952-56): The main organisation during this period was the Liberation 
Rally (hay'at al-tahrir). In an attempt to mobilise all social forces, 'contain' 
political opposition, and to avoid any division in society (along partisan lines), 
Nasir established the Liberation Rally in 1953.80 The Liberation Rally was meant 
to fill the vacuum left by political parties. The new single organisation embraced 
all forces in society; it was intended to represent all interest groups in society. Its 
77 MOSA was established by the state in cojunction with PVOs, in 1936, with the aim of 
coordinating efforts in the voluntary sector. Ibrahim, S., Egyptian Law 32 on Egypt's Private 
Sector Organizations: A Critical Assessment, (Cairo: Ibn Khaldoun Center, Ibn Khaldoun Working 
Papers, no. 3, November 1996), pp. 13. 
78 Sullivan, D., "Islam and Development in Egypt: Civil Society and the State", in H. Mutalib, and 
H. Hashimi (eds.), Islam, Muslims and the Modern State: Case Studies of Muslims in Thirteen 
Countries, (London: Macmillan Press, 1996), pp. 222. 
79 Dessouki, A., ''The Transformation of the Party System in Egypt 1952-1977", in A. Dessouki 
(ed.), Denwcracy in Egypt, (Cairo: The American University of Cairo, Cairo Papers in Social 
Science, vol. 1, monograph 2, 1978), pp. 9. 
80 Dekmejian, R., Egypt under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics, (London: University of 
London Press, 1972), pp. 25. 
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declared aims were to fulfil the objectives and political interests of the public; 
guarantee social and political rights, and essential freedoms; make the populace 
aware of their duties; and emphasise co-operation to work for the development of 
the country. 81 Branches of the Rally were established in major cities, and citizens 
became members upon vowing an oath. However, the Rally failed to achieve its 
aims, as it lacked a 'well-defined structure', experienced 'political cadres' (as 
important positions in the Rally were filled by officers), ideology, and a 'criteria 
for recruitment'. Nevertheless, the organisation was successful in limiting the 
influence of opposition represented by Wafdists, Muslim Brotherhood, and 
communists. As it became clear that the Liberation Rally was ineffective, and after 
accomplishing its main purpose of creating support for the new regime, the 
organisation was 'disbanded' .82 
2. Populism (1956-62): The National Union (al-itihiid al-qawmf) was established in 
1957, upon the declaration of a new constitution in 1956, to replace the 
Liberation Rally. This was supposed to be a grouping of citizens (governors and 
governed) that aimed to establish a socialist co-operative society. It was 
promoted as an Arab national organisation working to accomplish Arab unity and 
build a society where welfare prevailed and feudalism and exploitation were 
81 Mustafa, H., al-Ahziib [The Parties], (Cairo: Al-Ahram Centre for Strategic Studies, 2000), pp. 
115. 
82 Dessouki, A., "The Transformation of the Party System in Egypt 1952-1977", in A. Dessouki 
(ed.), Democracy in Egypt, (Cairo: The American University of Cairo, Cairo Papers in Social 
Science, vol. 1, monograph 2, 1978), pp. 10-11. 
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nonexistent.83 However, the new organisation suffered from the same ills as its 
predecessor. It attempted at reconstructing society, but again it lacked a 
'comprehensive program of change' and 'clarity of purpose'. It also suffered 
from ambiguity of its organisation and hierarchy.84 
3. State socialism (1962-67): The Charter for National Action was declared, in 
May 1962, as an expression of Nasir's vision of Egypt and an ideology of the 
regime. However, socialism was adopted not as an ideology but rather as a way 
to solve problems.85 Admitting the failure of the National Union, the ASU (al-
itihiid al- 'arabf al-ishtriiki) was established in 1962. The ASU was meant to 
reflect the unity of working forces; hence, 50% of its members and those in 
parliament had to be peasants and workers. The ASU was to lead the public and 
express their will, and guide national work. It, therefore, represented the alliance 
of all forces in society, encompassing all its categories, based on commitment to 
work. 86 As Dessouki notes: 
The party was never meant to be an active institution with decision-making powers, 
but was conceived basically as a civic association to mobilize the people in an effort 
83 Mustara, H., al-Ahziib [The Parties], (Cairo: AI-Ahram Centre for Strategic Studies, 2000), pp. 
116. 
84 Dessouki, A., "The Transformation of the Party System in Egypt 1952-1977", in A. Dessouki 
(ed.), Democracy in Egypt, (Cairo: The American University of Cairo, Cairo Papers in Social 
Science, vol. I, monograph 2, 1978), pp. 11-12. 
85 Mustafa, H., ai-Ahziib [The Parties], (Cairo: AI-Ahram Centre for Strategic Studies, 2000), pp. 
117-118. 
86 Mustafa, H., ai-Ahziib [The Parties], (Cairo: AI-Ahram Centre for Strategic Studies, 2000), pp. 
117-118. 
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to stimulate social and economic development. Indeed, it was viewed more as a 
means of mobilizing political support than as a vehicle for popular participation. 87 
The ASU, thus, contained the same limitations as the previous organisations, 
namely, a lack of a comprehensive ideology, 'competent cadres', and 
autonomy,88 as well as an 'imbalance between politics and administration' .89 
Power was concentrated in the president's hands, and the executive, legislative, 
and the judiciary branches were 'merged under his control'.· This organisation 
eventually became another handicapped bureaucracy, rather than a machine for 
articulating public views.90 
The defeat of 1967 resulted in a remarkable change in state-society relations. 
Elements of the ancien regime, who were active players in civil society prior to the 
revolution and remained nascent until the 1967 defeat, used the opportunity to voice 
their exasperation with the system. They attributed the defeat to·a lack of a liberal 
democratic system. They aspired for more political and economic freedom. In 
addition, there was mounting public pressure for more liberalisation. Accordingly, 
87 Dessouki, A., "The Transformation of the Party System in Egypt 1952-1977", in A. Dessouki 
(ed.), Democracy in Egypt, (Cairo: The American University of Cairo, Cairo Papers in Social 
Science, vol. 1, monograph 2, 1978), pp. 14. 
88 Dekmejian, R., Egypt under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics, (London: University of London 
Press, 1972), pp. 144-145. 
89 Dessouki, A., "The Transformation of the Party System in Egypt 1952-1977", in A. Dessouki 
(ed.), Democracy in Egypt, (Cairo: The American University of Cairo, Cairo Papers in Social 
Science, vol. 1, monograph 2, 1978), pp. 13. 
90 Lesch, A. M., "Democracy in Doses: Mubarak Launches His Second Term as President", Arab 
Studies Quarterly, vol. 11, no. 4, fall1989, pp. 88. 
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Nasir conceded to these demands; however, he died before completing the process 
of liberalisation. 
State-society Relations under Nasir 
Thus, for most of his rule Nasir managed to maintain a strong state. The regime 
enjoyed both high autonomy and support. His policies reflected his preferences and 
were supported by society. The acquiesence of the population emanated from a 
normative agreement. The vision of national independence, signified in the call for 
Arab unity and liberation of Palestine, and the socio-economic development that 
Nasir offered them made them believe that the path of their leader was the right one 
and that he would deliver them to both ends. Therefore, they offered him their 
support. However, Nasir did not succeed in achieving his objectives, as his rule 
ended with Egyptian territory under Israeli occupation, and his socio-economic 
plans faltered. 
Sadat 
Sadat became president upon Nasir's death in 1970, by virtue ofbeing appointed as 
a vice-president by the late president.91 Thus, his legitimacy was based upon 
legality, represented in his appointment as a vice-president that made him eligible 
91 It is doubted though whether Nasir really wanted Sadat to become his successor. He decided to 
accept Sadat's resignation after he had tried to take possession of the residence of General Ibrahim 
Mugi that adjoined Sadat's villa on the Nile. See Hirst, D., and I. Beeson, Sadat, (London: Faber & 
Faber, 1981), pp. 102. 
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for presidential office, and tradition, as Egyptians thought that this was the wish of 
their late leader. To Egyptians, though they accepted his leadership, they did not 
believe in Sadat's capabilities as they did in Nasir's.92 Sadat was previously known 
to Egyptians, as he was a Free Officer, the Speaker of the National Assembly, and 
vice-president. However, unlike Nasir, Sadat, at the beginning of his rule, did not 
'appear to be charismatic, resourceful, or forceful' .93 
Once in office, Sadat realised that he needed to legitimise his rule in order to secure 
the survival of his regime. The formula of the social contract put in place by Nasir 
prior to the 1967 defeat had fallen apart; Nasir had died before a new formula took 
shape. Sadat, therefore, had to find a new formula for the social contract. Like 
Nasir, Sadat built his legitimacy by operating on two levels, domestic and 
international. 
Domestic 
Although Sadat vowed to go along the path of Nasir,94 he initiated what came to be 
known as the 'de-Nasirisation' of Egypt.95 He attacked the institutions established 
92 Heikal, M., Sphinx and Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Arab World, 
(London: Collins, 1978), pp. 217. 
93 Ibrahim, S. (ed.), "Governance and Structural Adjustment: The Case of Egypt", in Egypt. Islam, 
and Democracy: Twelve Critical Essays, (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1996), pp. 
138. 
94 Ibrahim, S. (ed.), "Governance and Structural Adjustment: The Case of Egypt", in Egypt, Islam, 
and Democracy: Twelve Critical Essays, (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1996), pp. 
138. 
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by Nasir, such as the security services and the ASU, and later criticised Nasir 
himself. Sadat established his power by isolating other centres of power. The power 
struggle between Sadat and 'Ali Sabri, who was appointed by Nasir after the defeat 
of 1967 to restructure the ASU, ended up by relieving Sabri of his responsibilities 
and putting him in jail. Sadat accused Sabri and his collaborators of conspiring 
against the regime and attempting a coup d'etat.96 
After establishing his own uncontested power base, Sadat claimed that the 
legitimacy of the ruler ought to be based on institutions rather than the person of the 
ruler; in other words, the source of legitimacy should be rational rather than 
charismatic.97 Sadat advocated three slogans: rule by law, government by 
institutions, and political freedom.98 He set out to build his 'state of institutions' 
with the corrective movement of 1971. This movement, Sadat claimed, aimed at 
correcting the excesses of the 1952 revolution. The achievements of the movement 
included: releasing political prisoners; returning some of the property sequestrated 
during Nasir's rule to its owners;99 and drafting a new permanent constitution.100 
95 Hanafi, H., "The Relevance of the Islamic Alternative in Egypt", Arab Studies Qua11erly, vol. 4, 
no. 1&2, spring 1982, pp. 62. 
96 Hirst, D., and I. Beeson, Sadat, (London: Faber & Faber, 19&1), pp. 111-120. 
97 Ansari, H., Egypt, the Stalled Society, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), pp. 
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98 Dessouki, A., "The Transformation of the Party System in Egypt 1952-1977", in A. Dessouki 
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Through the 1971 Constitution, which placed the President above all authorities and 
institutions within the state, Sadat empowered the office of the President rather than 
the state. 
After that, Sadat turned to the economy; he speeded up the process of economic 
liberalisation, already initiated under Nasir, that aimed to change the structure of the 
domestic environment. In April 1974, Sadat issued a working paper that came to be 
known as the October Paper. 101 In this paper, Sadat praised the public sector and 
counted its advantages; nevertheless, he pointed out the 'neglect' of the private 
sector and the critical role it should play in economic development. He called for an 
open door policy (infitah), which would be financed by Arab and foreign capital and 
would bring benefits to the economy with the provision of technology by the 
West. 102 The main aim of the open-door policy was to attract private investment and 
technology that were needed to enhance the performance of the economy. 
Sadat also tried to liberalise the political system. He reorganised political life in 
Egypt by restructuring the ASU. 103 In 1976, Sadat presented a paper to the National 
Assembly for discussing the role of the ASU. After being re-elected in September 
100 Until then Egypt was operating according to the provisional constitution of 1964. See The 
Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, (Cairo: The General Organisation for Official 
Publications, 1998), pp. x. 
101 The October Paper was put for referendum in May 1974; and it won massive support. See 
Posusney, M., Labor and the State in Egypt: Workers, Unions, and Economic Restructuring, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 201-202. 
102 Posusney, M., Labor and the State in Egypt: Workers, Unions, and Economic Restructuring, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 200-201. 
103 Hirst, D., and I. Beeson, Sadat, (London: Faber & Faber, 1981), pp. 119. 
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1976, Sadat introduced political reforms in October 1976. 104 Political platforms 
were allowed to be formed within the framework of the ASU. Sadat claimed it was 
'too early' for political parties. Instead, he allowed the formation of three 'pulpits', 
namely, the right, represented by the Socialist Liberal Democrats; the left, 
represented by the National Progressive Unionists; and the centre, represented by 
the Egyptian Arab Socialists. Significant political forces, such as the Wafdists, 
Muslim Brotherhood, Nasirists, and communists were not allowed to be part of the 
new formula. Later that year, elections took place; the elections were regarded by 
the populace as relatively fair, since the opposition won 24 seats in the Assembly. 105 
After the elections, Sadat dissolved the ASU and allowed these platforms to be 
turned into political parties. 106 The ease with which Sadat dissolved the ASU 
reflects the weakness of the organisation. It was created from above and never 
became entrenched enough in society to allow the formation of interest groups that 
would resist its dissolution. 107 In 1977, three political parties were legalised, 
namely, the Socialist Liberal Party (right wing); the Socialist Misr Party (centre), 
104 Aoude, 1., "From National Bourgeois Development to Infitah: Egypt 1952-1992'', Arab.Studies 
Quarterly, vol. 16, no. 1, winter 1994, pp. 12. 
105 Out of 280 seats, the Liberal Party (right wing) won 12 seats, and the NPUP won 2 seats, while 
independents won 48 seats. See Korany, B., "Restricted Democracy from Above", in B. Korany, R. 
Brynen, and P. Noble (eds.), Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, 
Volume 2: Comparative Experiences, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp-49.. 
106 Hirst, D., and I. Beeson, Sadat, (London: Faber & Faber, 1981), pp. 246-247. 
107 Waterbury, J., The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 367. 
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whose vice-president was Sadat's brother-in-law, Abu Wafiyah;108 and the National 
Progressive Unionist Party (NPUP) (left wing). 
However, the experiment failed as both the left and right lost favour in Sadat's eyes. 
He accused the left of instigating the riots of 1977, and the NPUP came under 
surveillance, and its activities were curtailed. On the other hand, the right wing was 
not pleased with the package of political and economic liberalisation offered by 
Sadat; it sought more liberalisation that would allow its members to increase their · 
influence. Hence, members of the former Wafd Party formed the New Wafd Party 
(NWP), under the leadership of Fu'ad Sirag al-Din, in 1978. But because Sadat 
perceived it as a 'rival' to the centre Misr Party, as it appealed to its main targeted 
constituencies the upper and middle classes, he conducted a referendum to prevent 
individuals who were convicted of corruption in 1953 from practising politics. 
Accordingly, three members of the New Wafd were prevented from engaging in 
politics. Thereupon, the party froze its activities in protest. 109 
Seeing that the experiment was collapsing, Sadat formed and headed the National 
Democratic Party (NDP), in July 1978.110 Most of the members of the Misr Party 
108 Ibrahim, S. (ed.), "The Vindication of Sadat in the Arab World", in Egypt, Islam, and 
Democracy: Twelve Critical Essays, (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1996), pp. 
206. 
109 El-Mikawy, N., The Building of Consensus in Egypt's Transition Prcoess, (Cairo: The American 
University in Cario Press, 1999), pp. 32-35. 
110 The NDP was named after the party established by of Mustafa Kamil, who was an active member 
in the national struggle against British occupation, in 1907. See Mustafii, H., al-Ahziib [The Parties], 
(Cairo: Al-Ahram Centre for Strategic Studies, 2000), pp. 102. 
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defected to the new party. 111 Thus, the NDP inherited the assets of the ASU, and 
later those of the Misr Party. Sadat 'encouraged' another party to form to represent 
the left, and act as 'a loyal opposition' instead of the NPUP; this was the Socialist 
Labour Party. 112 
Hence, Sadat introduced limited democracy; he authorised political parties to 
function as a 'kind of loyal opposition'. Sadat allowed the opposition to operate in 
order to express acceptable contradictions within society, and contain conflict 
arising from such contradictions. Opposition, however, was not meant to criticise 
the regime. 113 Political parties provided an arena for public discussion of economic 
and political issues. The formation of parties also served as a democratic fac;ade for 
Sadat's rule. The democratic fac;ade underscored the shift away from the repressive 
image of Nasir's regime; it, therefore, facilitated the flow of foreign aid from the 
West.II4 
Although Sadat claimed that he would establish a 'state of institutions', the 
institutions of the state remained weak. Sadat, in fact, bypassed the parliament by 
111 Hashish, A., "Ra'Is al-gumhiirlyah bam al-hiyad wa al-hizbiyah" [The President of the Republic 
between Neutrality and Partisim], in Lihazii nu 'iirid Mubiirak [This is Why We Oppose Mubarak], 
(Cairo: Al-Ahaii, 1987), pp. 72. 
112 EI-Mikawy, N., The Building of Consensus in Egypt's Transition Prcoess, (Cairo: The American 
University in Cario Press, 1999), pp. 35. 
113 Musta:ra, H., al-Ahziib [The Parties], (Cairo: AI-Ahram Centre for Strategic Studies, 2000), pp. 
125. 
114 Owen, R., "Socio-economic Change and Political Mobilisation: The Case of Egypt", in G. 
Salame (ed.), Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World, 
(London: LB. Tauris, 1996), pp. 190. 
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giving issues to the populace for referendum and passing decrees that were merely 
approved by the parliament. The parliament, therefore, did not serve as a genuine 
vehicle for legislation, but rather it gave the regime a fa~ade of democracy. What 
Sadat was successful in institutionalising was in fact the presidential office, through 
considerable constitutional powers, rather than the whole political system. 115 
International 
Nasir's legacy included the 'no war no peace' situation with Israel. After the defeat 
of 1967, Nasir launched a war of attrition in 1969; the army was not ready for a full 
confrontation with Israel after the destruction of its air force. The war was 
suspended when Nasir accepted the cease-fire plan, Rogers plan, offered by the US 
in 1970. This war was never renewed due to Nasir's death. When Sadat came to 
power, he vowed to fight Israel until the occupied territories were liberated. 
Sadat believed that the US held '99% of the cards' needed for the peace process. He 
recognised that Egypt's interests lay with the West; and therefore, he wanted to ally 
Egypt with the West. He sought to shift Egypt's alliance from the Soviet Union to 
the US. Accordingly, Sadat expelled some 15,000 Soviet experts in July 1972.116 
Sadat took this 'daring step' probably for two reasons. First, he wanted to court the 
US by showing his anticommunist stance. He thought this act would demonstrate 
115 Hinnebusch, R., Egyptian Politics under Sadat: The Post-populist Development of an 
Authoritarian-modernizing State, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 302. 
116 The figure cited by Shaz!I (1980) is 8,000 of whom 6,014 were field unit personnel. See 
Waterbury, J., The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 393. 
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his 'goodwill', and the US would hasten to intervene in order to secure a diplomatic 
solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict. Second, Sadat was growing impatient with the 
Soviet delay in supplying arms to Egypt, which increased the unpopularity of the 
Soviets among Egyptians. 117 
From 1970 to 1973, Sadat kept claiming each year would be the year of decision. By 
1973, nobody believed him, not even his domestic constituency. Though 
unintentional, this disbelief served the purpose of the war, as Israel· was taken by 
surprise on 6 October 1973. Through collaboration with Syria and Saudi Arabia, 
limited 'victory,t 18 was realised against Israel in October 1973. This victory opened 
room for negotiations with Israel over the liberation of the Sinai. 119 It also led to the 
opening of the Suez Canal, which had been closed since the defeat of 1967. Sadat's 
potential power was, thus, actualised with the limited victory realised over Israel in 
1973. This victory earned Sadat some credit in terms of legitimacy, which was 
probably the maximum he had ever attained during his rule. However, this did not 
last long, for the economic conditions did not improve, as Sadat had promised; 
117 Hirst, D., and I. Beeson, Sadat, (London: Faber & Faber, 1981), pp. 132-137. 
118 Israel managed to arrange a counter-crossing and was about to achieve another total victory if the 
UN had not passed Resolution 338, which asked all parties to ceasfire within 12 hours and retain the 
positions occupied by then. As Israel had refused to apply the ceasefire, the Soviet Union threatened 
the US to act alone if the US failed to force Israel to ceasfire. Due to nuclear threat, a UN 
'emergency force arrived in the battle zone' on 24 October 1973. See Hirst, D., and I. Beeson, Sadat, 
(London: Faber & Faber, 1981), pp. 156-167. 
119 Quilliam, N., Syria and the New World Order, (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1999), pp. 180. 
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moreover, the Sinai was still under Israeli occupation despite the signing of two 
disengagement agreements, in 1974 and 1975.120 
The escalating economic pressures led Sadat to give in to the US inducement to 
conclude a peace treaty with Israel in order to guarantee the flow of foreign aid. 
Hence, Sadat made his historic visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, which was 
then followed by signing the Camp David Accords with Israel in 1979. The peace 
deal 'effectively removed Egypt from the Arab-Israeli conflict'; and shifted the 
regional balance of power in favour of Israel. 121 
Although a steady flow of aid followed the signing of the peace treaty, the peace 
treaty damaged Sadat's legitimacy. Most opposition groups in Egyptian society 
resented Sadat for concluding a separate peace deal with Israel. Although the peace 
deal led to the return of the Sinai, in 1984, it was perceived by most Egyptian 
opposition groups as a betrayal to the Arab cause and a means to secure Western 
interests in the region. With the signing of the peace treaty, Egypt was ousted from 
the Arab fold, 122 and the headquarters of the Arab League123 was moved from Cairo 
120 Hinnebusch, R., Egyptian Politics under Sadat: The Post-populist Development of an · 
Authoritarian-modernizing State, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 55-57. 
121 Quilliam, N., Syria and the New World Order, (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1999), pp. 122, 180. 
122 Jreisat, J., Politics without Process: Administering Development in the Arab World, (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 1997), pp. 99. 
123 The Arab League was established after World War II, in 1945, with the 'encouragement' of 
Britain to enhance British interests in the Arab world. Hudson, M., Arab Politics: The Search for 
Legitimacy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 240-241. 
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to Tunis. The opposition's criticism of Sadat for signing the peace treaty with Israel 
culminated in his assassination on 6 October 1981. 
Sadat's Social Contract 
Sadat's vision for Egypt was different from Nasir's. He sought economic 
development through allegiance with the West, even at the expense of national 
independence. In contrast to Nasir, who defied the West by adopting an anti-
Western foreign policy, Sadat pursued a foreign policy that served Western interests 
in the region by concluding a separate peace deal with Israel, which did not take into 
account the interests of the Palestinians. 
Sadat's vision dictated the new formula of the social contract. In order to ally Egypt 
with the West, Sadat embraced economic liberalisation. In doing so, he effectively 
shifted alliance away from middle and lower income groups, who were the main 
beneficiaries of Nasir's populist policies, towards the business elite, who formed the 
main constituency of Sadat. 124 
The new formula involved delivering peace; econorruc prosperity, through 
economic liberalisation and foreign aid; limited participation; and extending 
patronage and welfare policies. The obligation of the population was to stand 
behind their leader and not challenge his policies. Sadat tried to secure the 
124 Hinnebusch, R., "The Politics of Economic Liberalization: Comparing Egypt and Syria", in H. 
Hakimian, and Z. Moshaver (eds.), The State and Global Chang: The Political Economy of 
Transition in the Middle East and North Africa, (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2001), pp. 116. 
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autonomy of his regime from societal forces by placing the President above all the 
institutions and political forces in society. He allowed opposition to operate as long 
as it did not criticise his policies. This formula had different implications for the 
ruling elite, middle and lower income groups, and civil society. 
The Ruling Elite and the Social Contract 
In spite of being one of the Free Officers, and appointed vice-president by Nasir in 
1969, Sadat was overshadowed by Nasir's glorious reputation. 'Sadat's sudden and 
unexpected promotion to the presidency was thus not so much an expected 
inheritance as a stopgap move.' 125 He realised that to assert his power, he had to get 
rid of the existing centres of power. Hence, he removed Sabri and his collaborators, 
who thought they could manipulate him to serve their own interests. Then, he 
started to form his own constituency from amongst the ruling elite that emerged 
under Nasir. 
Sadat's main constituency was composed of members from the ancien regime, in 
addition to the new elite of technocrats formed under Nasir. The rising elite formed 
under Nasir was consolidated by occupying key positions in the state; they mixed 
with members of the ancien regime, through marriage, conducting business and 
forming political alliances with them, and adopting the latter's values. 126 
125 Woodward, P., Nasser, (London: Longman, 1992), pp. 130. 
126 Hinnebusch, R., "Children of the Elite: Political Attitudes of the Westernized Bourgeoisie in 
Contemporary Egypt", The Middle East Journal, vol. 36, no. 4, autumn 1982, pp. 560. 
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During Sadat's rule, although the military continued to be well represented in 
power, though not as they were under Nasir, technocrats gained prominence. Prime 
ministers and ministers tended to be technocrats (especially engineers) from the 
bureaucracy. 127 
Thus, there were two main differences between the elite under Nasir and Sadat. The 
elite became more diversified under Sadat, as it included, technocrats, bureaucrats, 
politicians and businessmen, as well as the military. However, the elite was 
recruited more from civilians than the military. This could be attributed to the 
difference in policy orientation and vision between the two presidents. Sadat wanted 
to consolidate his position and move away from the military rule of his predecessor 
that had emphasised the external threat posed by Israel. Probably, Sadat also wanted 
to show the West the shift in policy orientation from the previous regime, and pave 
the way for the enhancement of business class interests. This implied that the skills 
of the old elite were no longer suitable for the new era, which required more 
business skills to attract Western and Arab investments. The new elite composition, 
therefore, served two purposes, namely, to establish a new base of support for Sadat, 
and to adjust to the requirements of the new period of market economy and alliance 
. h h w 128 wit t e est. 
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Sadat allowed the new elite to advance their socio-economic interests by enhancing 
the economic liberalisation process initiated under Nasir. Thus, Sadat launched the 
open door policy, infitah, in 1974. lnfitah opened opportunities for more gain for 
both public officials and the private sector through commissions and access to 
imported goods. Public officials capitalised on the opportunity and managed to 
profit from dealings with the private sector. 129 
The state and the private sector became intertwined with the emergence of several 
figures, who worked for the public sector, and in the meantime were employed as 
consultants by the private sector, owned private enterprises, or whose relatives 
owned private enterprises. This pattern emerged so that the private sector could 
secure connections to facilitate smooth operations, and gain from infitah through 
foreign aid and commissions. 130 In the absence of effective political institutions, the 
process was enhanced by a functioning patrimonial system that allowed these 
figures to acquire influence and resources by virtue of their connections. 131 Thus, in 
spite of the flourishing of the business elite, under Sadat, they continued to remain 
dependent on the state. 
129 Hinnebusch, R., Egyptian Politics under Sadat: The Post-populist Development of an 
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130 AI-Sayced, M., "The Concept of Civil Society in the Arab World", Political Liberalization and 
Democratization in the Arab World, Volume 1: Theoretical Perspectives, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
1998), pp. 139. 
131 Hinnebusch, R., Egyptian Politics under Sadat: The Post-populist Development of an 
Authoritarian-modernizing State, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 90-91. 
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The business elite had direct access to the president through influential figures, such 
as 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman, and Mansur Hassan. This helped them advance 
policies that catered for their interests. 132 The formation of business associations, to 
represent the interests of businessmen, was encouraged by the government. 
Nevertheless, the business 'class' was not united, as different sectors had different 
interests that sometimes conflicted with other sectors, and sometimes even clashed 
with the interests of the state itself. The state tried to balance these interests, while 
preserving its autonomy. It needed the support of businessmen, and their 
investment; however, it also needed revenues from taxation. 
In other words, the regime maintained its autonomy vis-a-vis the different interest 
groups within the elite. The autonomy enjoyed by the regime was illustrated in 
Sadat' s attack of widespread corruption, tax evasion, and the excesses of infitah. He 
criticised the middlemen and abusers of infitah, who tried to exploit the 
Iiberalisation policy and make profit at the expense of the public purse. 133 
Thus, Sadat's social contract served the interests of the ruling elite. The end of the 
war with Israel and the launching of injltah policy that followed brought about the 
stability and liberalisation needed for investment. Furthermore, the patrimonial 
system fostered by Sadat allowed them access to the president, and public officials, 
and, hence, to influence economic policy to their advantage. The environment 
132 Springborg, R., Mubarak's Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order, (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1989), pp. 34. 
133 Hinnebusch, R., Egyptian Politics under Sadat: The Post-populist Development of an 
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created by Sadat, therefore, afforded them the opportunity to make considerable 
profits through their dependence on their links with the state. The new elite, on their 
part, supported the president and did not oppose his policies. 
Middle and Lower Income Groups and the Social Contract 
Although Sadat's mam constituency was the business elite, he realised that the 
support of middle and lower income groups was essential for the survival of his 
regime. Sadat recognised that he needed to redefine the formula of the social 
contract to accommodate his new vision for the country, which entailed alliance 
with the West. His contract with the populace was, therefore, based upon economic 
prosperity, limited political participation, and peace with Israel. 
Although the infitah policy mainly served the interests of the new ruling elite, Sadat 
sold it to his population, which was exhausted by five wars since 1948 (including 
the civil war in Yemen 1962-65), as the solution to Egypt's economic difficulties 
that would bring prosperity to everybody. 134 He declared that it was a 'legitimate 
dream' for 'every Egyptian to have his own villa and car' .135 
The expectations of the Egyptians were raised with the launching of the 
'consumptive' infitah policy m 1974. However, the expectations of most of the 
134 Hirst, D., and I. Beeson, Sadat, (London: Faber & Faber, 1981), pp. 202-204. 
135 Ibrahim, S. (ed.), "The Vindication of Sadat in the Arab World", in Egypt, Islam, and 
Democracy: Twelve Critical Essays, (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1996), pp. 
208. 
176 
middle and lower income groups were fmstrated as they were deprived from sharing 
the profits of infitah. Widely known stories of cormption, including members of 
Sadat's family, in addition to the increased social inequality, contributed to the 
rising fmstration and disappointment. 'Although most Egyptians had not been 
happy in the late Nasir period, they now lamented those years with nostalgia.' They 
expressed their fmstration by resisting law and order, and ultimately through 
riots. UG 
A high point of popular fmstration, under Sadat' s mle, came in 1977, when the 
Cabinet raised the prices of 25 essential commodities overnight, in spite of 
government reassurances to keep the prices constant. 137 Although these riots were 
economic in nature, they 'took on a political character', when students and members 
of the intelligentsia and opposition joined the upheaval. They demanded more 
freedom and genuine democracy. This incident exposed the vulnerability of the 
regime and its dependence on the military; it had to invite the army to intervene to 
put an end to the riots, which lasted for two days. 138 
Instead of addressing the real problem and admitting the cause behind the riots, 
Sad at referred to the riots as the 'upheaval of thieves'; and he accused communists 
and Nasirists of being the inciters of the riots. He purported that they committed acts 
136 Ibrahim, S. (ed.), "Governance and Structural Adjustment: The Case of Egypt", in Egypt, Islam, 
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of sabotage in order to seize power. He also hinted that, in addition to communists 
and Nasirists, external agents had contributed to the events, rather than the unwise 
economic policies of his Cabinet, which raised the prices of 25 essential 
commodities overnight. 139 Thus, he clamped down on the NPUP, accusing it of 
masterminding the uprising. 140 
Sadat realised that opposition forces in society needed an outlet for their grievances 
in order to prevent them from rebelling against his regime. Thus, he introduced 
measures of political liberalisation, as has already been outlined. However, Sadat 
did not mean to fully democratise the political system. Although he allowed 
political parties to function, he exercised control over the democratic experience 
through presidential constitutional powers, and by heading the ruling party. The 
motto of the party reflected Sadat's basis of the social contract: 'Food for every 
mouth, a house for every individual, and prosperity for all' .141 The party, thus, 
carried the image of economic prosperity. 
Nevertheless, Sadat's era was like that of Nasir's, full of promises that remained 
unfulfilled. The October War was a disappointment for Egyptians, as although Sadat 
declared that he would not stop fighting until Sinai had been liberated, Sinai was 
still occupied. Neither did the economic situation improve. Sadat implemented 
139 Hirst, D., and I. Beeson, Sadat, (London: Faber & Faber, 1981), pp. 246-252. 
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repressive policies, but 'to cover it offered some freedom for political parties'. The 
populace looked for 'freedom and liberties', but its aspirations never 
materialised. 142 
The failure of the regime to meet its obligations meant that the public was no longer 
obliged to be acquiescent; it had the right to resist the regime. To the majority of 
middle and lower income groups, the regime lost its legitimacy. The ultimate 
manifestation of the loss of legitimacy of Sadat was his assassination in a military 
parade celebrating the 61h of October 'victory', on 6 October 1981. This was 
underscored by the absence of lamentation by the Egyptian populace. 143 
Civil Society and the Social Contract 
Although Sadat's formula of the social contract revived Egyptian civil society 
through more freedom and pluralism, civil society remained constrained because of 
limited participation. Sadat promoted freedom, respect for private property, and 
pluralism. This was manifested in the release of political prisoners in 1971; the 
return of sequestrated properties; the regime's commitment to the private sector; 
and the introduction of a multiparty system, which allowed the formation of 
political parties. 
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Additionally, the return of members of the ancien regime to participate in socio-
economic life was fully endorsed by Sadat with the launching of infitah, and the 
alignment of Egypt with the West. However, by then, they had become 'more 
"bourgeois" than "landed'". Their wealth was no longer mostly concentrated m 
land; it included real estate, and stock in privately owned enterprises. 144 
By the 1970s, the ruling elite, formed of the old upper class, the bureaucrats, and the 
returning wealthy migrants from rich Arab oil states, had almost 'exhausted' what 
could be offered by socialism. They were looking for new opportunities that lay in a 
more open economy as well as a political environment, which could produce laws 
that would serve their interests. The returning migrants from rich Arab oil states, in 
particular, wanted to invest their newly acquired wealth, something not possible in 
the centrally planned economy of Egypt, where the state was the major investor. 145 
All this necessitated the presence of a more open and autonomous civil society 
representing the rising economic interests in society. 
On the other hand, limited participation meant that members of society seeking 
more liberties and political participation, such as the intelligentsia and students, had 
to turn to voluntary activity. In the absence of legitimate avenues for participation, 
144 Ibrahim, S. (ed.), "Egypt's Landed Bourgeoisie", in Egypt, Islam, and Democracy: Twelve 
Critical Essays, (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1996), pp. 122-126. 
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PVOs started to increase in number. 146 In 1976, the number of PVOs totalled 7,593, 
whilst in 1981, they reached I 0, 731. 147 
The proliferation of PVOs can partly be attributed to the ability of PVOs to serve 
the socio-economic, cultural, political, and professional needs of 'individuals and 
local communities'. Members of middle and upper classes who aspired for more 
'cultural, professional, and political variety' tried to satisfy their needs through 
voluntary work in these areas. PVOs tried to meet the socio-economic needs of 
lower and lower middle classes. Free education has raised the 'expectations' and 
'consciousness' of Egyptians at the lower end of the social strata. Members of these 
social groups wanted to improve their conditions and their communities, through 
education and health service facilities. They, therefore, sought an alternative to the 
state, as the state failed to meet those needs both in terms of quantity and quality. 148 
Despite the regime's tolerance of freedom and its encouragement of the private 
sector, civil society was still under the tight control of the state. For example, Law 
3211964, which discouraged voluntary activity, remained unchanged. 149 
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Additionally, Law 42/1977 for political parties was introduced. According to this 
law, new parties have to be approved by a committee of political parties. Parties are 
restricted by six main factors, which amount to: 
• the party's programme should comply with the principles of Islamic shari 'a; 
• the party's programme should comply with the principles of 1952 revolution and 
May corrective movement of 1971; 
• the party's programme should comply with national unity, social peace, socialist 
democratic order, and socialist gains; 
• half of the founding members should be farmers or workers; 
• the programme of each party should be distinct from other parties; 
• the party should not be established along class, confessional, or religious lines. 
Furthermore, the trend of corporatism in civil society intensified under Sadat's rule. 
National chambers of commerce were established, and these chambers formed 
alliances with both public officials and members of the ruling party. Related 
syndicates in health and technical professions formed new federations. These 
federations did not enjoy much autonomy from the state, as the regime was involved 
in choosing leaders who were supportive of the regime. The leadership of these 
federations benefited from their connections with the state and the regime. In return, 
they offered their support to the regime during election time. However, this was 
university Education: An Exploratory Study], (Cairo: The National Centre for Research, 1996), pp. 
62. 
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achieved at the expense of their credibility in the eyes of their members, and their 
ability to serve the interests of their members. 150 
Sadat' s tolerance of a liberal system, eventually reached its limit. As soon as Sadat 
had discovered that an active civil society, especially the multiparty system, was 
used to criticise his policies, and that political parties started to act as powerful 
pressure groups demanding a substantial shift towards democratisation, he placed 
1,536 people, who were critical of his policies, in jail on 3-5 September 1981. 151 
State-society Relations under Sadat 
Sadat's state, with the exception of the events of 18 and 19 January 1977, when it 
exhibited weakness, can, therefore, be described as an independent state. Sadat's 
regime enjoyed high autonomy but low support. The regime implemented its 
policies regardless of the preferences of society. This was particularly true of 
signing the peace treaty with Israel in 1979. 
Sadat enjoyed low support by the majority of the population during most of his rule, 
the highest point in this support being after the crossing of the Suez Canal. In 
general, the support that Sadat enjoyed was instrumental. The public supported him 
as long as he delivered his promises of prosperity. Once he failed to do so, the 
150 Bianchi, R., Unruly C01poratism: Associational Life in Twentieth-century Egypt, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 86-87. 
151 Lesch, A.M., "Democracy in Doses: Mubarak Launches His Second Term as President", Arab 
Studies Quarterly, vol. II, no. 4, fall 1989, pp. 89. 
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populace withdrew its support and rebelled against him. This was evident in the 
riots of 1977. Prior to this event, most Egyptians were not particularly satisfied with 
his liberalisation or foreign policies, yet their acquiescence was motivated by their 
desire to secure their food. However, when he cancelled the subsidies, they turned 
against him. 
Thus, Sadat's social contract was so fragile; and its collapse led to his own 
downfall. The main beneficiaries from Sadat's formula were the ruling elite, in the 
form of profits made from shifting to a free market economy. Middle and lower 
income groups' expectations in terms of welfare and economic prosperity were not 
met satisfactorily. Even the peace that the regime delivered was unacceptable to 
most Egyptians, who saw it as a betrayal to the Arab cause and Palestinian case. 
Hence, the regime was unable to fulfil its obligations; accordingly, the population 
was not willing to provide its allegiance to the regime. One can argue that public 
resistance to the regime culminated in the assassination of Sadat on 6 October in 
I 981. 
Mubarak 
Mubarak, who was vice-president under Sadat for seven years, came to power in 
1981 after the assassination of Sadat. Mubarak ascended to power through a 
constitutional process. He was nominated by the People's Assembly and approved 
by the populace through a public referendum. Thus, his rule was based on legality. 
Mubarak recognised his lack of revolutionary credentials, but he had earned 
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prominence and respect as Commander of the Air Force during the October War in 
1973. 152 
Since his ascensiOn to power, Mubarak's priority has been the establishment of 
social stability, and 'popular confidence' in his government. The political system 
that he inherited from Sadat was marked by instability, weak legitimacy, and 
'limited institutionalization' .153 Seeking to consolidate his rule, Mubarak declared 
that his rule would be grounded in democracy based upon participation; 
transparency in decision making; purity and sanctity of the judiciary; and dealing 
with the economic crisis according to 'scientific means' .154 
Mubarak, like his predecessors, has worked on two levels to secure his legitimacy, 
domestic and international. 
Domestic 
Mubarak's assumption of power was smooth, and accepted by the Egyptian 
populace due to its legality. 155 Mubarak's immediate power base was the NDP. He 
152 Moench, R., "The May 1984 Elections in Egypt and the Question of Egypt's Stability", in L. 
Layne (ed.), Elections in the Middle East: Implications of Recent Trends, (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1987), pp. 51. 
153 Lesch, A. M., "Democracy in Doses: Mubarak Launches His Second Term as President", Arab 
Studies Quarterly, vol. II, no. 4, fall I989, pp. 87. 
154 Mustata, H., al-Ahziib [The Parties], (Cairo: Al-Ahram Centre for Strategic Studies, 2000), pp. 
123. 
155 Hinnebusch, R., Egyptian Politics under Sadat: The Post-populist Development of an 
Authoritarian-modernizing State, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, I985), pp. 302. 
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was appointed a Vice Chairman of the party ( 1978) when he was vice-president; and 
as he assumed the presidency, he became the head of the ruling party by default. 
At the beginning of his rule, Mubarak carried out an anti-corruption campaign and 
stressed 'production', 'combating waste', and 'correcting "the excesses"' of infitah, 
to try to distance his regime from that of Sadat. 156 However, his rule has essentially 
been a continuation of that of his predecessor. This can be detected in two areas, the 
political domain, and the economy. 
The Political Scene under Mubarak 
Since he assumed power in 1981, Mubarak has declared that the main priority of his 
government is to establish democracy. 157 Mubarak has embraced a policy that 
emphasises the rule of law, freedom of the press, 158 and a multiparty system, which 
all retlect his declared concern for constitutional processes. However, as with 
Sad at's rule, this has not meant a total transformation to a democratic system. The 
regime perceives democracy as a means to hold on to power, not as a system in 
156 Ibrahim, S. (ed.), "Governance and Structural Adjustment: The Case of Egypt", in Egypt, Islam, 
and Democracy: Twelve Critical Essays, (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1996), pp. 
156. 
157 Lesch, A. M., "Democracy in Doses: Mubarak Launches His Second Term as President", Arab 
Studies Quarterly, vol. II, no. 4, fall 1989, pp. 103-104. 
158 Although the press in Egypt has enjoyed more freedom under Mubarak's regime than his 
predecessor, the press suffered a blow in 1995 with the promulgation of the law, mistakenly known 
as, the Press Law. The significance of the law is that it sent a message to the opposition that their 
criticism of the regime and 'public figures' would not be tolerated beyond a certain limit. According 
to the law, offenders are liable to a fine up to E£10,000 and 6 months imprisonment. See Goodson, 
L., and S. Radwan, "Democratization in Egypt in the 1990s: Stagnant, or Merely Stalled?", Arab 
Studies Quarterly, vol. 19, no. I, winter 1997, pp. 15. 
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which rotation of power may occur peacefully. The opposition has been expected to 
provide solutions to improve the programme of the regime rather than to compete 
for power. 159 Within this framework, change occurs through the policies of the 
regime; there is no need for political reform. 160 
This experiment with limited democracy in Egyptian political life has made it 
possible to have political parties licensed by the government as a kind of a loyal 
opposition. They serve as a limited arena for public discussion and debate of socio-
economic issues. 161 Mubarak sometimes equates participation with the right of the 
opposition to say no and the 'unrestricted debate in the People's Assembly and the 
press'. 162 Nonetheless, the People's Assembly is a handicapped body that is 
incapable of effecting change due to its dominance by the ruling party, the NDP. 163 
Although, under Mubarak, the opposition has been granted a larger space to voice 
their criticism of the regime, critics of the regime can express themselves freely in 
the press as long as they do not 'directly attack the president or the military'. 164 
159 MursT, F., "Ta'mlm al-mu'aradah: hal bada' al-'ad al-tanazulT lil-wisiil ila Sibtambir 'akhar?" 
[Nationalisation of Opposition: Has the Counting Down for Another September Started?], in Lihazii 
nu 'arid Mubarak [This is Why We Oppose Mubarak], (Cairo: Al-Aha!T, I 987), pp. I I4. 
160 Nafi', I., Rlyah al-dlmuqratlyah [The Winds of Democracy], (Cairo: Dar al-Ma 'arif, 1984 ), pp. 
I IS-1 I 7. 
161 Haddad, Y., "Islamic 'Awakening' in Egypt", Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 9, no. 3., Summer 
I987, pp. 241. 
162 Lesch, A. M., "Democracy in Doses: Mubarak Launches His Second Term as President", Arab 
Studies Quarterly, vol. I I, no. 4, fall I989, pp. 104. 
163 D. Sullivan, and S. Abed-Kotob, Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society vs. the State, 
(London: Lynne Rienner, I 999), pp. I 34. 
164 Rubin, B., Islamic Fundamentalilsm in Egyptian Politics, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 
pp. I37-I38. 
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Opponents and critics of state policy are marginalised or accused of being 
terrorists. 165 
The regime 'controls virtually all the power and most of the wealth of society' 
through a large bureaucracy and the military, rather than the claimed support of the 
people expressed in the 99.9% results of elections. 166 Moreover, the democracy 
offered by Mubarak continues to be limited, as the military and security services are 
the 'key institutions underpinning the regime' and the state of emergency is still 
retained. 167 In Mubarak's Egypt, the military and security forces remain the 
backbone of the regime. They provide it with security and stability; it is difficult for 
the regime to reduce the 'size and influence' of the military or security forces. This 
was highlighted in 1986, when the army has been invited to quell the riots of 
Central Security Forces, and restore order. 168 Furthermore, by retaining a state of 
emergency, Mubarak has maintained the right to: restrain the freedoms of citizens in 
gathering, movement and passing in certain places at certain times; arrest suspects 
165 Lesch, A. M., "Democracy in Doses: Mubarak Launches His Second Term as President", Arab 
Studies Quarterly, vol. II, no. 4, fall 1989, pp. 104. 
166 Sharabi, H. (ed.), "Introduction: Patriarchy and Dependency and the Future of Arab Society", in 
The Next Arab Decade: Alternative Futures, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 4. 
167 Owen, R., "Socio-economic Change and Political Mobilisation: The Case of Egypt", in G. 
Salame (ed.), Democracy without Deomocrats?, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994), pp. 194. 
168 These riots were cuased by the low living standards and ill-treatment of the Central Security 
conscripts by their officers, amidst rumours of extending the duration of their conscription. See 
Cassandra, "The Impending Crisis", Middle East Journal, vol. 49, no. I, winter 1995, pp. 21-22. 
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and those posmg danger to national security and public order and search their 
homes; and censor newspapers and publications. 169 
Thus, Egyptian leaders, smce the revolution of 1952, have failed to establish 
democratic institutions to maintain stability without resorting to repression. For the 
regime, stability has meant continuity, which involves absence of rotation of power 
and political reform, and restriction of liberty. 170 
As during Sadat's rule, the President still enjoys considerable constitutional power, 
residing over the political structure, and rules by emergency. Mubarak's 
unwillingness to give up his presidential powers has been manifested in his 
reluctance to introduce political and constitutional reform. Although he has 
prioritised stability over political reform, Mubarak has failed to recognise that 
political reform is the guarantee for stability. In his fourth presidential campaign in 
1999, he declared that the new term was not the time for political reform; he averred 
that economic as well as national stability were his priority during the following 
169 Martial law was applied 1952-June 56, October 1956-March 1964; June 1967- up to 1980; and 
finally from Sadat's assassination until the present time. See Bishri, T., "The 1952 Revolution and 
Democracy", in A. Dessouki (ed.), Democracy in Egypt, (Cairo: The American University of Cairo, 
Cairo Papers in Social Science, vol. I, monograph 2, 1978), pp. 35; and See 'Abd al-RazTq, H., Misr 
.fi 18 wa 19 Yaniiyfr: diriisah sfyiisfyiih wathii'iqfyah [Egypt in the Events of 18 and 19 January: A 
Political Documentary Study], (Cairo: ShahTd, 1985), pp. 35-37. 
170 Goodson, L., and S. Radwan, "Democratization in Egypt in the 1990s: Stagnant, or Merely 
Stalled?", Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 19, no. I, winter 1997, pp. 6. 
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period. 171 However, constitutional reform is essential if democracy, which is a right 
of citizens rather than a grant from the ruler, is to prevai1. 172 
Thus, although Mubarak has identified popular participation as 'the essential 
underpinning of social and economic stability', his version of stability is a security-
oriented one; and, stability remains to be a priority over democratisation. 173 Such an 
approach to democracy and stability has been criticised, by many Egyptian 
observers, on the basis that an 'order imposed by the police and electoral measures 
designed to reinforce the regime is no substitute for voluntary civic obedience. 
Because emergency laws [restrict] freedom in the name of freedom, they 
[undermine] the stated goal' .174 This approach guarantees neither national nor 
economic stability. 
171 Tal' at, A., "Law of Political Parties in Egypt", lecture given at the Coptic Patriarchate, Cairo, 6 
August 1999. 
172 Badawf, H., "Maza ba'd 'an bada'at al-sanah al-thanfyah min hukm Mubarak?! Al-gurnhilrfyah 
al-rabi'ah wa ahlam al-taghyfr" [What after the Second Year of Mubarak's Rule Has Started?! The 
Fourth Republic and the Dreams of Change], in Lihazii nu 'arid Mubiirak [This is Why We Oppose 
Mubarak], (Cairo: AI-Ahalf, 1987), pp. 88-90. 
173 On one occasion, Mubarak said: 'Without stability, there will be no democracy at all because 
instability leads to disorder which conflicts with democracy ... [therefore] the first duty of those who 
advocate democracy is to be keen on socio-economic stability, which is the only way for democracy'. 
Quoted in Kassem, M., In the Guise of Democracy: Governance in Contemporary Egypt, (Reading: 
Ithaca Press, 1999), pp. 53-57. 
174 Lesch, A.M., "Democracy in Doses: Mubarak Launches His Second Term as President", Arab 
Studies Quarterly, vol. II, no. 4, fall 1989, pp. 103-104. 
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The Economy 
A prominent feature of Mubarak' s Egypt, inherited from Sadat' s era, is that 
economics has replaced politics in the life of Egyptians. 175 This trend has been 
underscored by Mubarak, as he has emphasised the economic dilemmas of Egypt, 
particularly during his election campaigns, which concentrate on the president's 
economic achievements. Mubarak responded to Egypt's economic crisis, 176 which 
culminated in Egypt's inability to service its debt or pay its import bills, by adopting 
economic reforms recommended by the IMF in 1991. These reforms comprised 
liberalisation measures, thereby marking a further step on Sadat's path to a free 
market economy. 
The regtme realised that it could not afford to make promises of economic 
prosperity. Mubarak was cognisant of the fact that he could not base the legitimacy 
of his regime on promises of economic prosperity due to Egypt's economic 
dilemmas. Sadat's experience demonstrated that the failure of the regime to fulfil 
these promises could be costly in terms of support. In addition, Egypt's dependence 
on annual US aid has meant that Egypt cannot pursue an independent foreign policy, 
which may be inimical to US interests, such as the abrogation of the peace treaty 
with Israel. The alliance between Egypt and the US, initiated by Sadat, has to be 
maintained for the survival of the regime. 
175 Hirst, D., and I. Beeson, Sadat, (London: Faber & Faber, 1981 ), pp. 231. 
176 Egypt's economic crisis during Mubarak's rule will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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International 
Mubarak' s cautious, moderate regional and international foreign policies have 
constituted the major success of his policies. His achievements in foreign policy 
have earned him legitimacy at home, and thus, contributed to the preservation of his 
regime. He has followed in the steps of Sadat by adhering to the peace treaty with 
Israel, and maintaining the alliance with the US. However, relations between Egypt 
and Israel have not been 'truly' normalised due to Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 
1982 and refusal to address the issues of Palestinians and settlements. 177 
With regard to the US, Mubarak's close relations with the US have secured Egypt 
an annual aid of US$3 billion, and leniency in negotiations with the IMF. 
Nevertheless, Mubarak's regime has on occasions distanced itself from the US to 
avoid compromising its national independence, and, hence, its legitimacy at 
home. 178 
When Mubarak came to power, Egypt was still ousted from the Arab fold, because 
of the peace treaty that Sadat had signed with Israel and which had proved 
detrimental to his regime. Mubarak realised that Egypt could not withstand a 
military confrontation with Israel. Mubarak, therefore, sought Egypt's rehabilitation 
into the Arab world without renouncing the peace treaty. Mubarak adopted a policy 
177 The freezing of relations between Egypt and Israel facilitated the return of Egypt to the Arab fold. 
See Egypt: Countt)' Report, 1989-90, (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1989), pp. 8. 
178 Baker, W., "Egypt in the Time and Space of Globalism", Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 3, 
summer 1999, pp. 5. 
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of 'peace and co-operation' in the region. It was evident that Egypt would not retreat 
from the path of peace chosen by Sadat. This was underlined when Egypt responded 
to Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 by withdrawing its ambassador from Israel 
instead of breaking the peace treaty. 
Mubarak's objective of rehabilitation into the Arab world was facilitated by the 
regional environment of the 1980s, due to the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88). Egypt 
capitalised on the opportunity by providing Iraq, throughout the war, with military 
weapons and ammunition worth US$500 million. 179 The rehabilitation process was 
completed with the re-admission of Egypt into the Arab League, after the 
improvement of relations with Libya and the restoration of diplomatic ties with 
Syria and Lebanon, and the establishment of Arab Co-operation Council (ACC) 
with Yemen, Iraq, and Jordan in 1989. Egypt's re-admission to the Arab fold was 
attributed to Mubarak' s wise foreign policy and his 'commitment to higher Arab 
interests' .180 
Egypt returned to the Arab fold, though, as a 'natural member' rather than a 'natural 
leader'. The distribution of power in the region had changed dramatically since the 
expulsion of Egypt from the Arab League. 'Small states [such as Jordan] have been 
consolidated by then and they have grown in stature. Also, Egypt was no longer the 
military leader it used to be with the expansion of military power of Iraq and Syria. 
179 Sullivan, D., "Contrary Views of Economic Diplomacy in the Arab World: Egypt", Arab Studies 
Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 4, fa111999, pp. 73. 
180 Ayalon, A., "Egypt (Jumhuriyyat Misr al-'Arabiyya)", Middle East Contemporary Survey, vol. 
Xl/1, 1989, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 305-308. 
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The decision to return the headquarters of the Arab League to Cairo was made only 
in March 1990'. 181 
Mubarak's commitment to the Arab cause has been driven by two reasons, namely, 
seeking to be a powerful regional player, and to generate legitimacy. This is 
illustrated by Egypt's adherence to the peace treaty with Israel despite Israel's 
transgressions against the Palestinians, and its expansion in the settlements; and the 
regime's decision to join the US-led coalition against another Arab state, Iraq. 
After its return to the Arab fold, Egypt has acted as a mediator between Israel and 
the Arab states, thereby assuming a leading role in promoting peace in the region. 
Adherence to the peace treaty with Israel has generated legitimacy for the regime for 
two reasons. First, peace with Israel has secured Egypt an annual aid of US$3 
billion, 182 which has mitigated the severity of Egypt's economic crisis, and has, 
therefore, contributed to the survival of the regime. Second, peace in itself has 
served as an essential component of the social contract. It has saved Egypt the cost 
of another confrontation with Israel. Yet, the regime has not forgone Arab interests. 
Egyptians, who perceive themselves as an integral part of the Arab nation, 
command commitment of their regime to the Arab cause. Hence, Mubarak's regime 
has been committed to the peace process, which has promoted Egypt's position as a 
powerful regional player and reinforced its alliance with the US. 
181 Ayalon, A., "Egypt (Jumhuriyyat Misr al-'Arabiyya)", Middle East Contemporary Survey, val. 
Xlll, 1989, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 305-308. 
182 Baker, W., "Egypt in the Time and Space of Globalism", Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 3, 
summer 1999, pp. 5. 
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Mubarak's rational decision to join the US-led coalition in the aftermath of Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990 has been rewarded by a debt write-off of US$14.4 
billion owed to the US, and the Gulf Arab states. 183 Although the regime has been 
criticised domestically for joining the US against an Arab state, Mubarak's decision 
has improved Egypt's economic condition, through the writing off and rescheduling 
of a large proportion of its external debt. This has validated the regime's decision 
and enhanced its legitimacy. 
Furthermore, the Oslo peace accords, between the Palestinians and Israel in 1993, 
and the signing of a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, in 1994, 184 vindicated 
Sadat and Mubarak's commitment to peace with Israel. As a consequence, this has 
earned Mubarak credit in terms of legitimacy; his rational foreign policy has been 
admired even by his critics. 185 Mubarak's achievements in foreign policy have, 
therefore, served as a font of legitimacy for his rule, as he has been relatively 
successful in meeting his obligations of the contract on the international level. 
Mubarak's Social Contract 
The assassination of Sadat marked the collapse of the social contract; it had to be 
redefined. Mubarak has realised that economic prosperity cannot be part of the new 
183 Quilliam, N., Syria and the New World Order, (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1999), pp. 162. 
184 Quilliam, N., Syria and the New World Order, (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1999), pp. 198-206. 
185 Ibrahim, S., "The Vindication of Sadat in the Arab World", Egypt, Islam, and Democracy: 
Twelve Critical Essays, (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1996), pp. 221-222. 
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formula due to Egypt's economic dilemmas. He has based his social contract on 
limited participation and a commitment to the Arab cause (and Palestinian case), 
though not to the extent of defying US interests in the region. Given the dependence 
of Egypt on US aid, pursuing a foreign policy of national independence to generate 
legitimacy for his rule is not also a possibility. Peace with Israel, therefore, has to be 
a main component of the new formula. 
Mubarak's social contract entails peace with Israel; seeking solutions to Egypt's 
economic hardships, through economic liberalisation and foreign aid; limited 
participation; and extending patronage. Mubarak's social contract is, thus, much 
similar to Sadat's. Mubarak, however, has not made promises of economic 
prosperity; his economic liberalisation has emphasised productive infitah rather than 
consumptive infitah. Moreover, Mubarak has allowed more freedom of expression 
in order to establish democracy. Mubarak has also promised stability; yet, stability 
is not to stem from sound democratic institutions representing the different interests 
of society. It is equivalent to continuity of the regime. 
In the remaining part of the chapter we will investigate the consequences of the 
social contract under Mubarak's rule with regard to the ruling elite, middle and 
lower income groups, and civil society, and state-society relations under Mubarak. 
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The Ruling Elite and the Social Contract 
The ruling elite under Mubarak is an alliance of the infitah bourgeoisie as well as 
old bourgeoisie, bureaucrats, and the military. 186 However, the military has lost 
grounds to businessmen, who have become more influential in the decision-making 
process, particularly during the 1990s, with the adoption of economic reforms. They 
have been involved by the regime in the formulation of policies that affect their 
. 187 
mterests. 
Co-operation between private businessmen and public officials continues to be a 
salient feature of socio-economic life in Egypt. Public officials benefit from higher 
salaries, which they receive for their work as managers and consultants in private 
enterprises. In return, they secure businessmen public resources and 'approvals' 
needed in order to run their businesses. 188 Businessmen receive 'preferential 
treatment' by forming joint ventures with public sector enterprises. They trade in 
subsidised goods instead of using them for production purposes; and they are 
protected by public officials. By doing so, businessmen maximise gain and 
186 Springborg, R., Mubarak's Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order, (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1989), pp. 2-3. 
187 Al-Sayyid, M., "A Civil Society in Egypt?", The Middle East Journal, val. 47, no. 2, spring 
1993, pp. 238. 
188 Springborg, R., Mubarak's Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order, (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1989), pp. 69-70. 
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minimise risk. 189 They remain dependent on the state for profits from rent-seeking 
activities. 
In spite of the symbiotic relationship between the state and business elite, the state 
has managed to preserve its autonomy even from this influential group; and 
sometimes it has promoted the interests of other groups in society at the expense of 
this group. This is highlighted by the slow pace of the privatisation process, which 
constitutes a major part of economic reforms, in order not to antagonise labour and 
risk social unrest. Furthermore, the fact that economic reforms have been initiated 
by the regime in 1991, due to Egypt's economic crisis, rather than due to the 
submission of the state to the interests of the business elite, points to the relative 
autonomy enjoyed by the state from this significant interest group. 190 
This can be partly explained by the fact that the business elite still do not form a 
coherent class; they seek conflicting 'goals', and they do not act in synchronisation 
to promote their interests. For example, there is a conflict of interests between 
'industrialists' and 'importers'. Although both favour a liberal economy, 
industrialists prefer low tariffs on imported inputs to their production, whilst 
importers seek low tariffs on imported finished goods. 191 
189 Youssef, S., "The Egyptian Private Sector and the Bureaucracy", Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 30, 
no. 2, April 1994, pp. 371-373. 
190 Zaki, M., Egyptian Business Elites: Their Visions and Investment Behavior, (Berlin: Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung, 1999), pp. 132-139. 
191 Zaki, M., Egyptian Business Elites: Their Visions and Investment Behavior, (Berlin: Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung, 1999), pp. 210-211. 
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The business elite have, in general, welcomed the liberalisation measures adopted 
by the regime. Nevertheless, they have showed more interest in economic than 
political liberalisation. This is in spite of the fact that a liberal political environment 
can better serve their interests, as it will afford them more influence in policy 
formulation by virtue of being one of the significant interest groups in society. 192 
Two factors can explain this apparent lack of interest in politicalliberalisation. 
First, businessmen are probably concerned that too much political liberalisation can 
empower groups that have a vested interest in the prevalent socio-economic system, 
which favours a large public sector and a centrally planned economy. As many of 
these groups, mainly middle and lower income groups, will be hurt by economic 
reforms, they may try to protect their interests by using the political system to hinder 
economic reforms. Hence, a liberal political system can impede the process of 
economic liberalisation to the detriment of the interests of the business elite. 193 
Second, the business elite do not wish to jeopardise the 'cosy' relationship that they 
have managed to build with the regime by antagonising the regime over political 
reform, given the latter's reluctance to fully democratise the political system. 194 
The social contract, forged by Mubarak, has, therefore, served the interests of the 
business elite. In particular, they have benefited from the promotion of economic 
192 Hinnebusch, R., "Children of the Elite: Political Attitudes of the Westernized Bourgeoisie in 
Contemporary Egypt", The Middle East Journal, vol. 36, no. 4, autumn 1982, pp. 559. 
193 Zaki, M., Egyptian Business Elites: Their Visions and Investment Behavior, (Berlin: Konrau-
Adenauer-Stiftung, 1999), pp. 106-108. 
194 Zaki, M., Egyptian Business Elites: Their Visions and Investment Behavior, (Berlin: Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung, I 999), pp. 225. 
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liberalisation and the private sector, which has been an outcome of the alliance with 
the US, and persisting economic difficulties. They have also benefited from the 
networks of patronage that link the private sector to the public sector, and facilitate 
their business operations. The stability promoted by Mubarak has also created an 
environment suitable for conducting business. The tight grip of the regime over 
radical forces in society has in general preserved their interests, despite occasional 
damage caused by Islamic activists. 
Middle and Lower Income Groups and the Social Contract 
Mubarak realised that to attain political credibility, he needed to distance himself 
from the 'excesses' of Sadat's regime, and establish an institutional basis for his 
regime's legitimacy. At the beginning of his rule, Mubarak mobilised support for 
his regime by his anti-corruption campaign that rid the regime of 'some of the worst 
of the patrimonial practices' under Sadat. 195 Mubarak has sought to advance his 
legitimacy with middle and lower income groups by promising to address Egypt's 
economic problems, and promote democracy. 
At the economic level, Mubarak has not promised economic prosperity; rather he 
pledged to address Egypt's economic dilemmas. Mubarak realised that given 
Egypt's limited resources, prosperity was no longer possible, at least in the short 
run. Economic reforms were imperative; these reforms entailed the downsizing of 
the public sector, reducing subsidies, and following contractionary monetary and 
195 Hinnebusch, R., Egyptian Politics under Sadat: The Post-populist Development of an 
Authoritarian-modernizing State, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 302. 
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fiscal policies. In spite of Mubarak's attempts to deal with Egypt's economic 
problems effectively 'in a scientific way' for the last twenty years, and some 
improvements on the macro level, most Egyptians still live in hardship. They have 
not felt considerable improvements in their living conditions; to the contrary, for 
many of them life has become more difficult with the phasing out of subsidies, 
which have been withdrawn slowly but steadily since the mid-1980s. These reforms 
have mainly helped improve the performance of the economy and increased the 
opportunities for gain for the private sector and the ruling elite. However, the living 
conditions of lower income groups have deteriorated. 196 
Another component of Mubarak's social contract has been the consolidation of 
democracy. As already noted, democracy in Mubarak's Egypt has been more of a 
fac;ade. AI-Sayyid argues that the fac;ade democracy in Egypt, manifested in freedom 
of expression, is not motivated by a belief in democracy. Rather it is the 
consequence of the repressive events of 1981, which culminated in the assassination 
of Sadat. The regime realises that repression of all opposition forces will lead to 
exasperation and frustration, which can only be counterproductive, as it will drive 
the opposition underground, and can eventually jeopardise the regime's survival. 197 
Thus, although Mubarak's source of legitimacy when he first came to power was 
legal, his rule is no longer legitimate in the eyes of many Egyptians. He has allowed 
no room for the rotation of power; and the NDP continues to be the dominant party. 
196 Cassandra, "The Impending Crisis", Middle East Journal, vol. 49, no. I, winter 1995, pp. 11-13. 
197 AI-Sayyid, M., "A Civil Society in Egypt?", The Middle East Journal, vol. 47, no. 2, spring 
1993, pp. 235-236. 
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The results of the plebiscite for granting a pledge of allegiance to the president are 
reported to be above 90%. 198 No other candidate stands for presidential elections, 
which implies that Mubarak is probably going to remain president for life. 
All this has led the majority of Egyptians to develop a fatalistic view of the political 
system. Their acquiescence to the regime can be described as pragmatic. They do 
not like the situation - it is neither satisfactory nor 'ideal'. Nevertheless, as things 
cannot be imagined to be really different, they do not resist the regime. Hence, 
Egyptians have shown low interest in participating in elections and political life in 
general. They do not have confidence in elections, so they stay away from them, in 
spite of government claims of turnout of 50%. 199 
In fact, Egyptians have shown apathy towards elections and democracy in general, 
because they do not believe that democracy is going to solve their problems, 
especially the socio-economic ones.200 Part of the problem is caused by the 
government's perception of democratisation as an 'outlet' for people's anger rather 
198 In 1987, President Mubarak won the referundum by 97. I%, then in 1993 the result was 96.3% 
and finally in 1999 it was 93.8 (with a turnout of 79.2%). See Egypt: Country Report, 41h Quarter 
1999, (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1999), pp. 12-13. 
199 Goodson, L., and S. Radwan, "Democratization in Egypt in the 1990s: Stagnant, or Merely 
Stalled?", Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 19, no. I, winter 1997, pp. 12. 
20° Korany, B., "Restricted Democratization from Above: Egypt", in B. Korany, R. Brynen, and P. 
Noble (eds.), Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, val. 2, (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 64. 
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than a means for rotation of power through free elections. Thus, it serves to contain 
opposition and to 'neutralise' opposition forces in society. 201 
Mubarak's regime has resorted to repression to counter its radical opponents, 
mainly Islamic activists. The regime has used repression rather than 'political 
means' to deal with rising discontent with economic and political conditions. As 
Ibrahim puts it: 'The regime's favored way of dealing with discontent is to resort to 
security measures, followed by a state media blitz.' 202 The situation has been made 
worse by the 'near complete absence' of power rotation. The real challenge for the 
regime remains to be able to deal with the 'root causes' of Islamic activism and to 
overcome the alienation of civil society by introducing political reform.203 
One can conclude that there are inherent problems and contradictions with the 
democracy offered by the regime. Being granted by the ruler, the ruler purports that 
the public is not ready for democracy. Therefore, the ruler emphasises stability and 
control and tries to avoid the risk of instability. The question posed by Ibrahim in 
the late 1970s remains relevant even more today '[t]he question is not whether the 
people of Egypt are ready for democracy but whether the ... [regime] is ready for 
201 Ahmad, M., "FT al-'am al-sadis min ri'asat Mubarak" [In the Sixth Year of the Presidency of 
Mubarak], in Lihazii nu 'arid Mubiirak [This is Why We Oppose Mubarak], (Cairo: Al-Ahalf, 1987), 
pp. 346. 
202 Ibrahim, S., "Governance and Structural Adjustment: The Egyptian Case", Egypt, Islam, and 
Democracy: Twelve Critical Essays, (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1996), pp. 
171. 
203 Ibrahim, S., "Governance and Structural Adjustment: The Egyptian Case", Egypt, Islam, and 
Democracy: Twelve Critical Essays, (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1996), pp. 
171-172. 
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the people's participation' ,204 since that will translate into constraints on the power 
of the regime, and holding it accountable to the public. 
The majority of middle and lower income groups have, thus, been left out of the 
formula of the social contract under Mubarak. Improvements in the macroeconomic 
performance have not translated into better economic conditions for middle and 
lower income groups. Furthermore, political participation has been reduced to 
making connections as a means to acquire resources. Those who do not have the 
connections ultimately lie outside the system; they have either exhibited anomie or 
taken an 'anti-regime' path trying to over-throw it.205 The educated groups in 
society have been unable to identify with the regime, which 'has further weakened' 
regime legitimacy.206 Many of these disenchanted groups have sought solutions to 
their problems in voluntary activity of the civil society. 
Civil Society and the Social Contract 
Mubarak's political liberalisation has basically meant more freedom manifested in 
freedom of the press; and the existence of sixteen political parties;207 and modest 
204 Ibrahim, S., 'The Socio-economic Requisites of Democracy", in A. Dessouki (ed.), Democracy 
in Egypt, (Cairo: The American University of Cairo, Cairo Papers in Social Science, vol. I, 
monograph 2, 1978), pp. 55. 
205 Hinnebusch, R., Egyptian Politics under Sadat: The Post-populist Development of an 
Authoritarian-modernizing State, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 20-21. 
206 Jreisat, J., "Managing National Development in the Arab States", Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 
14, nos. 2 & 3, spring/summer 1992, pp. 8. 
207 These parties are: National Democratic (1978), New Wafd (1978), National Progressive Unionist 
(1976), Socialist Labour (1978), Arab Democratic Nasserist (1992), Socialist Liberals (1976), The 
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expansion of PVOs, which increased from 10,731 in 1981 to 15,109 in 1992?08 
Nevertheless, civil society 1s still dominated by the regime. The operation of 
political parties under Law 4011977, and the replacement of Law 32/1964 by Law 
153/1999, which contains the same restrictions on PVO activity as the previous law, 
attest to the unwillingness of the regime to lose its control over civil society. 
However, the liberalisation of economy in 1991, with the adoption of economic 
reforms, has empowered associations of civil society vis-a-vis the state. Attempts to 
cut down the budget deficit have compelled the state to retrench its activities in the 
area of welfare provision. Downsizing of the state, along with the phasing out of 
subsidies, has translated into economic hardships for many who have already been 
struggling to sustain themselves?09 Not only has the state failed to meet the needs of 
middle and lower income groups, but it has also denied them access to legitimate 
channels of political participation to influence the decision-making process and 
protect their interests. Many associations have capitalised on this opportunity to 
extend their area of operations. The government has allowed them to operate, 
though under close supervision. It recognises the significance of the role that they 
can play especially in the areas of education and health services, and creation of 
Nation (1983), Misr Arab Socialist (1976), Young Egypt (1991), The Egyptian Green (1991), 
Unionist Decomcratic (1991), The People's Democratic (1992), Social Justice (1993), Social 
Takaful ( 1993 ), National Detente (2000), and Egypt 2000 (200 I). Ten of these parties gained 
recognition through a court ruling. See Mustafii, H., al-Ahziib [The Parties], (Cairo: Al-Ahram Centre 
for Strategic Studies, 2000), pp. 128-130; and http://www.ahram.org.eg/weekly/2001/529/eg5.htm. 
208 Zaki, M., Civil Society and Democratization in Egypt, 1981-1994, (Cairo: Konrad-Adenauer-
Stiftung, 1995), pp. 59. 
209 Zaki, M., Civil Society and Democratization in Egypt, 1981-1994, (Cairo: Konrad-Adenauer-
Stiftung, 1995), pp. 165. 
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employment opportunities. The process has been facilitated by the support that the 
US and international actors, mainly, the IMF and the World Bank, lend to the 
PVOs. 210 
Yet, the regime has been reluctant to offer associations of the civil society more 
autonomy in running their operations. The regime has effectively hindered these 
associations from sharing the burden with the state, lest their success highlights 
their ability to provide a viable alternative to the state, and, hence, exacerbate the 
legitimacy deficit already experienced by the regime. The regime probably fears that 
civil society may act as a vehicle for democratisation by empowering opposition 
forces. If these forces are allowed to operate freely, they may mobilise enough 
support to challenge the regime and demand more accountability and responsiveness 
on part of the government. This explains why, for example, the major opposition 
group in society that poses a direct challenge to the regime, because of its 
popularity, organisation, and financial resources, the Muslim Brotherhood, is still 
denied a legal status. 211 
Limited political participation and the failure of the state to deal with the economic 
plight of many Egyptians have led to the frustration and disillusionment of many 
segments of the Egyptian society, especially those at the lower end of the social 
strata. Some of these disenchanted groups have joined radical Islamist movements 
210 Goodson, L., and S. Radwan, "Democratization in Egypt in the 1990s: Stagnant, or Merely 
Stalled?", Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 19, no. I, winter 1997, pp. 13. 
211 Zaki, M., Civil Society and Democratization in Egypt, 1981-1994, (Cairo: Konrad-Adenauer-
Stiftung, 1995), pp. 112-122. 
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and engaged in violent actions against the state, smce the early 1990s, which 
coincided with the initiation of the economic reforms. Most of these attacks have 
been directed at state officials, such as ministers, the police, along with tourists in 
an attempt to damage a main source of revenues for the state. These actions have 
also embarrassed the regime by highlighting its inability to deal with rising domestic 
discontent. 
State-society Relations under Mubarak 
According to Nordlinger's typology, one can describe Mubarak's Egypt as an 
independent state, marked by high autonomy and low support. The regime has been 
able to maintain the autonomy of the state from all interest groups in society, 
including influential ones, such as the business elite. Nevertheless, the regime has 
fostered the business elite, especially since the early 1990s, because of its need to 
generate domestic support for the adopted economic reforms. And, the business 
elite is the constituency that will benefit most from economic reforms. 
The regime has enjoyed low support on two accounts, economic dilemmas and 
limited political participation. In spite of its pledge to address Egypt's economic 
problems, the regime has failed to ameliorate the living conditions of middle and 
lower income groups. The economic reform programme pursued since 1991, while 
benefiting the business elite, and the private sector in general, has added to the 
plight of many segments in society. In the absence of viable political channels, or 
other legitimate avenues within civil society, to influence policy formulation in 
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Egypt, many disenchanted groups have joined radical opposition; others have shown 
apathy towards the political system manifested in a low turnout at the election time. 
Frustration, of the intelligentsia in particular, with the regime has been exacerbated 
by the latter's failure to carry out political and constitutional reforms to empower 
the populace in order to influence policy formulation, in spite of its continuous 
rhetoric of establishing a democratic system in Egypt. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have used social contract theory to explain the legitimacy of 
political regimes in Egypt since 1952. According to contract theorists, citizens make 
an express or tacit agreement with their ruler to promote certain moral objectives. A 
ruler has the right to citizens' obedience as long as he/she fulfils his/her obligations. 
Nevertheless, if he/she fails to meet these obligations, citizens have a right to resist 
his/her authority. 
We argued that Egyptian rulers, since the 1952 revolution, have attempted to 
mobilise support for their rule, and contain all their opponents, by forging a social 
contract with their populations. The social contract was based upon an exchange 
between citizens and rulers. Citizens gave up their right to political participation for 
the achievement of certain domestic and foreign policy objectives dictated by the 
visions of these regimes. 
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Since 1952, Egypt has known three rulers with differing 'socio-political 
orientations', and visions for their country. This has been reflected in their domestic, 
economic and foreign policies. Nasir, who sought to establish Egypt as a powerful 
regional player and to secure its national and economic independence, pursued a 
foreign policy based upon nationalism and non-alignment. This policy was inimical 
to Western interests. Domestically, Nasir favoured a unity of social forces and 
centralisation; thereupon, he abolished political parties and established a centrally 
planned economy. 
Sadat was disposed to allying Egypt with the West. He, therefore, adopted policies 
that promoted the image of Egypt as a liberal state. He opened up the economy 
through infitah, reintroduced a multiparty system, and sought peace with Israel. 
Thus, he brought Egypt into the Western sphere of influence, especially through 
dependence on foreign aid. 
Mubarak's lack of a vision, when he rose to power, has been reflected in his pledge 
to establish a democratic system, ensure stability, and address Egypt's economic 
problems. His determination to preserve the presidential powers that he inherited 
from Nasir and Sadat has been manifested in his stress on stability without political 
or constitutional reform. He realises that his regime cannot survive without foreign 
aid to secure food imports; thus, he cannot pursue an independent foreign policy 
from the US. The economic reforms adopted since 1991, as will be discussed in the 
next chapter, were not motivated by a belief in a market economy, but rather as a 
response to Egypt's economic crisis, and negotiations with the IMF, which tied 
loans to economic reforms. 
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Egyptian regimes have secured the acquiescence of their populations as long as they 
have been able to meet their obligations. When regimes failed to meet their 
obligations, Egyptians resisted their regimes through riots and rising demands for 
liberties. Reluctant to surrender their powers, Egyptian regimes have tried to modify 
the terms of the contract in order to hold on to power and legitimise their rule. 
Throughout the process, regimes since 1952 have managed to empower the office of 
the President rather than Egyptian citizens.212 The President, who has portrayed 
himself as the guardian of the common good of society, resides over all forces and 
institutions in society. He enjoys considerable constitutional powers, and has often 
ruled by decree. 213 
The president tends to 'treat the state as if it were his private property, and the 
citizens his political dependents'. This has led the opposition to criticise the 
president who treats them as subjects rather than citizens with rights. It ts the 
president who knows the good of his subjects and works for their interest.214 
The analysis of the social contract in Egypt since 1952 has highlighted the different 
implications of the formulae of the social contract of the three regimes for three 
212 
al-HakTm, T., 'A wdat al-wa'yl [The Return of Consciousness], (Cairo: Dar ai-Shuriiq, 1974), pp. 
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214 Sa'cl al-DTn, I., "al-Musharakah fi al-mas'iiiiyah wa mas'iiiTyat al-qarar" [Participating in the 
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Oppose Mubarak], (Cairo: Al-AhaiT, 1987), pp. 462. 
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groups in society, namely, the ruling elite, middle and lower income groups, and 
civil society. 
The change in the vision of the regime has involved a shift in the composition of the 
ruling elite under the three regimes away from the military and towards 
businessmen. Under the rule of the three Egyptian leaders, the ruling elite have 
managed to accumulate enough economic and political power to protect their 
interests, although they have not become totally autonomous. This is because the 
executive headed by the President has continued to preside over all forces in society. 
Middle and lower income groups have given up their right to political participation 
for the sake of nationalism, social justice, and economic prosperity. However, as 
Egyptian regimes have failed to achieve most of these objectives, these groups have 
protested and demanded more liberties. Their protests against the regimes have been 
the main cause behind the redefinition of the social contract in Egypt. 
The state has been trying, since 1952, to 'suppress' civil society on the grounds that 
internal security should be a priority for different objectives, mainly, 'true 
independence, Arab unity, socialism, development, and most importantly victory 
over Israel'. However, 'the state has exhausted itself', and has failed in achieving all 
of these objectives.215 Hence, different forces in society have challenged the state 
215 Ibrahim, I., "Forecast for the Future: State and Society in Egypt, Sudan, and Libya in 1995", in 
H. Sharabi (ed.), The Next Arab Decade: Alternative Futures, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 
15-16. 
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and demanded more autonomy to allow them to cater for the needs of the groups 
abandoned by the state. 
Civil society has been struggling to reassert itself vis-a-vis the state and gain more 
autonomy. This has posed a dilemma for Egyptian regimes. The regime recognises 
the importance of an outlet to society, and the need for an active civil society that 
can share the burden of providing for middle and lower income groups with the 
state. Nevertheless, the regime is also cognisant of the fact that affording civil 
society too much autonomy can jeopardise the survival of the regime, as the civil 
society may challenge the regime. Furthermore, a prosperous civil society can speed 
up the process of alienation, as members and beneficiaries of this civil society 
become critical of the state, which cannot provide for them and denies them 
participation. Consequently, the state and the regime will lose out in terms of 
legitimacy, which is already weak. Hence, Egyptian regimes since the revolution of 
1952 have tried continuously to co-opt potentially active groups who might 
otherwise threaten the system, such as professional syndicates, labour unions, and 
political parties. 
A major area of challenge for the state since 1952 has been welfare provision. Since 
Nasir's rule, the state has promoted itself as the patron of disadvantaged groups in 
society by embracing welfare policies. Welfare provision has been the cornerstone 
of Nasir's contract with middle and lower income groups. Sadat's attempt to tamper 
with welfare policies highlighted the centrality of these policies to the social 
contract in Egypt. Realising this, Sadat expanded in welfare provision, especially 
food subsidies. 
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Thus, the abandonment of welfare provision will translate into immediate deficit in 
legitimacy for the regime, which can threaten its survival. Therefore, Mubarak's 
regime, when faced with economic difficulties, has had to be cautious in addressing 
the issue of retreat from welfare provision. This is underscored by the fact that the 
alternative provider, civil society, sets a challenge to the state as it testifies to the 
failure of the state to carry out its 'declared' commitment to care for its citizens. 
In the following chapter, we will examine the rise, expansion and retrenchment of 
the welfare state in Egypt as a major component of the social contract. Egyptian 
regimes, since 1952, have introduced welfare policies, mainly financed through 
foreign aid and other forms of rent. Nevertheless, as the resources of the state have 
dried up, these policies have become a heavy burden on the state;216 and it has tried 
to retreat. The inability of the regime to fulfil its welfare obligations has led to rising 
demands for more participation and politicalliberalisation?17 
216 Springborg, R., Mubarak's Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order, (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1989), pp. 10. 
217 Brumberg, D., "Survival Strategies vs. Democratic Bargains: The Politics of Economic Reform in 
Contemporary Egypt", The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East, in H. Barkey (ed.), 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 76-78. 
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Chapter Four 
The Welfare State: 
The Egyptian Case 
Introduction 
In chapter two, we proposed that the welfare state emerged in the West due to a 
combination of factors, such as industrialisation, modernisation, and a struggle of 
the working class for their rights. Marxists argue that the welfare state has been an 
instrument of the capitalist class, serving two purposes. First, the welfare state has 
supplied the capitalist system, through the provision of free education and health 
care, with the required healthy, skilled labour, and, therefore, has contributed to the 
process of capital accumulation. Second, the provision of welfare products to the 
working class has eliminated a potential source of resentment that could have 
rocked the capitalist system of production. 
We concluded that the Western welfare state is a manifestation of the social 
contract because its principal aim is to promote social cohesion and peace in 
society. We demonstrated how the Western welfare state has evolved, especially 
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after World War II, due to the advocacy of right to welfare based on citizenship by 
Marshall and Titmuss. As all members of society share the same risk in time of war, 
they must share it in time of peace. Hence, the state has tried to reconcile the 
interests of all members of society, through the regulation of capital-labour 
relations, and the distribution of resources in order to maintain social cohesion. In 
effect, the welfare state has acted as a means to insure members of society against 
the risk of unemployment, poverty, or illness. 
It was also suggested in chapter two, that the threat to the social contract in Western 
societies emanates from the retrenchment of the state, and, consequently, the 
undermining of the social cohesion that underlies the welfare state. As the Western 
state has faced escalating fiScal pressures, it has retreated from the market, through 
deregulation of capital-labour relations, downsizing the public sector, and reduction 
of welfare provision. Consequently, conflict has re-emerged between capital and 
labour, manifested in rising demonstrations against globalisation, as labour is left to 
negotiate the distribution of resources in society. 
Since the main purpose of this research is to study the durability of the social 
contract based upon welfare provision in Egypt, as an example of an LDC welfare 
state, we will focus, in this chapter, on the Egyptian welfare state. The researcher 
argues that a social contract based on this formula has not been durable in Egypt for 
two reasons. First, it has not enhanced social peace and solidarity among citizens. 
This is because except for the rhetoric of the regime that welfare is based upon 
citizenship rights, social rights and obligations are not promoted in society. The 
absence of political rights means that the populace has no power to influence the 
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decision-making process; and, hence, it has no stake in the political system. Second, 
the social contract is conditioned by the availability of resources. Once resources 
have been exhausted, the regime will attempt to curtail the welfare state, thereby, 
undermining the source of its legitimacy. 
The author of this research argues that Egyptian regimes, since 1952, have used 
welfare provision as a central component of their social contract with their 
populations to legitimise their rule. It was argued in the previous_ chapter that 
although Egyptian regimes since the 1952 revolution have redefined the social 
contract continuously, welfare has remained a principal obligation of the regime. 
Egyptian regimes have offered welfare products as an inducement to middle and· 
lower income groups, in order to expand their autonomy vis-a-vis society. 
This path, however, has proved too costly for these regimes in terms of legitimacy, 
when the regime tried to curtail the welfare state. The recipients of welfare products .. 
have been unwilling to give up their entitlement to these products, which they 
perceived as their right. Facing popular resistance, regimes have had two- options,-to 
reinstate welfare programmes, which has only postponed the problem, or redefine 
the terms of the social contract. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the relevance of the welfare state to the 
social contract in Egypt since 1952. In particular, we will investigate whether the 
welfare state has contributed to the durability of the social contract, and 
accordingly, regime legitimacy, in Egypt. In order to do this, we need to examine 
the welfare state in Egypt since the revolution of 1952. We will discuss the rise, 
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expansion, and retrenchment of the Egyptian welfare state. We will explore the aim 
behind the adoption of welfare policies in Egypt. We will demonstrate how 
Egyptian regimes, since 1952 revolution, have manipulated social policy, especially 
in the areas of food subsidies, education, and health care, in order to consolidate 
their rule and acquire the support of their populations. But before we examine 
welfare policies in Egypt, we need to consider whether Egypt qualifies as a welfare 
state. 
A Welfare State in Egypt? 
To be able to answer the question whether there is a welfare state in Egypt, we need 
to examine the Egyptian experience in the light of the defmition of the welfare state 
proposed in chapter two. We defined the welfare state as a state that provides 
'benefits' in cash or kind, such as social security, health, education, and housing, 
selectively, to specific individuals, or universally, to all citizens, not in exchange for 
their contribution to the national output. 
According to this definition, the Egyptian state can be described as a welfare state. 
For example, the state in Egypt provides universally 'free' education, at least in 
theory, and 'almost' free health care, regardless of the efficiency and quality of 
these services. None of these products are offered in exchange for output. 
Although Egypt can be identified as a welfare state, it differs from Western welfare 
states. In the Egyptian case, the populace have exchanged political liberties for 
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welfare gains.1 The welfare state has not been a means to maintain social cohesion, 
as in Western states, but to preserve social peace without sharing social duties and 
responsibilities. In fact, welfare provision by the state has been manipulated by the 
regime to serve two objectives: to suppress civil society, and replace political 
participation. As the state has assumed one of the main functions of civil society, 
civil society has been neglected. Moreover, as welfare was already provided by the 
state, there was no need for political participation; hence, participation was reduced 
to receiving welfare products. 
This type of exchange has been condemned by contractarians, such as Kant and 
Rawls, for whom liberty takes precedence over welfare. They identify the main 
function of the state to promote liberty. However, in the absence of democratic 
institutions that can generate stability, Egyptian regimes have sought to consolidate 
and prolong their rule by using this formula as the basis of the social contract. 
Egyptian regimes have marketed welfare programmes to their population as a right 
based upon citizenship; effectively, 'citizens' have traded one right (political 
liberty) for another (welfare). Welfare policies were introduced as part of a national 
project of attaining national and economic independence. The regime sought to 
mobilise support for its national project by extending welfare benefits to the 
population. Slogans of social justice and citizenship rights appealed to the majority 
of Egyptians who had suffered from discriminatory policies under the monarchical 
rule and the British occupation. Legitimacy generated through this exchange, 
1 Murphy, E., "Legitimacy and Economic Reform in the Arab World", The Journal of Nonh African 
Studies, vol. 3, no. 3, autumn 1998, pp. 77. 
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however, has been so fragile, in comparison to legitimacy in Western societies. This 
is because the Western social contract is based upon promoting moral values within 
society, such as maintaining solidarity and social cohesion. Also, the Western 
welfare state has flourished in societies where the state respected liberties. 
Egyptian regimes, on the other hand, have superimposed the notion of right to 
welfare based on citizenship on society. Social rights have no roots in society; they 
did not evolve from a moral and philosophical proclivity within society. Social 
rights, as argued by Marshall, form the fmal step in the process of rights; civil and 
political rights precede social rights in this process. Furthermore, welfare has been 
emphasised as a right based on citizenship, but the rights of citizenship have not 
been tied to obligations of citizenship, such as respect for law and order. The 
welfare state has afforded Egyptian regimes the opportunity to gain the support of 
their beneficiaries at the expense of liberties and power sharing. 
Welfare policies have formed part of the social contract since the 1952 revolution. 
Egyptian regimes, since 1952, have drawn a social contract with their populations in 
order to legitimise their rule. The three successive Egyptian regimes have adopted 
various welfare policies in the name of equity and social justice, in order to 
establish a large base of support. The formula of the contract has been redefmed 
continuously because of changes in regimes' visions and dispositions, as well as 
because of differing national and international circumstances to which they have 
had to adjust, as pointed out in the previous chapter. 
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In this chapter, we will consider how welfare provision has served the purpose of 
the social contract formulae of the three regimes. This will highlight the difference 
between the development of the Western welfare state and the Egyptian one. 
The Egyptian welfare state, like its Western counterpart, has passed through three 
main phases: rise; expansion; and retrenchment. Interestingly, these three phases 
correspond to Egypt's three leaders since the revolution. We will examine these 
phases below; we will discuss the socio-economic conditions that led to the rise, 
expansion and retrenchment of the welfare state by focusing on social welfare 
policies in the areas of food subsidies, education, and health care. We will then 
relate the welfare state to the formulae of the social contract of these three regimes. 
Nasir: The Rise of the Welfare State 
In order to understand the reasons behind the emergence of the welfare state in 
Nasir's Egypt, we need to relate it to the social contract drawn between the regime 
and society after the revolution of 1952. As was outlined in the previous chapter, 
Nasir's social contract with society was based upon attaining national and economic 
independence, and extending patronage and welfare to the population in exchange 
for their liberties and right to political participation. This enabled the regime to 
maintain its autonomy in order to steer the country according to its vision.2 We 
argued that Nasir's vision encompassed national and economic independence. He 
2 Baker, R., Egypt's Uncertain Revolution under Nasser and Sadat, (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1978), pp. 235-239. 
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embraced different strategies, such as Arab nationalism, anti-imperialism, and non-
alignment, to attain his objectives. 
This formula of the social contract served as a basis for the legitimacy of Nasir's 
rule. Social policy, in the name of social justice and income distribution, was 
employed by the regime as a tool to enhance its legitimacy and autonomy vis-a-vis 
society. The new regime that came to power after the 1952 coup d'etat declared 
establishing social justice as one of its six aims. The regime proclaimed that the 
wide gap between the rich and the poor emanated from the exploitation of the large 
poor population by the capitalist elite. For example, by 1950, 44% of rural families 
were landless, whereas 0.4% owned 35% of the total cultivated area. Therefore, 
only 1% of landowners controlled 72% of agricultural land. 3 
Nasir's regime pledged to establish social justice by improving the standard of 
living of middle and lower income groups.4 At the beginning of its rule, Nasir's 
regime applied a mixture of, tangible and intangible, re-distributive policies, which 
were fmanced through taxes and social insurance schemes, rather than commodity 
subsidy. 5 Since the late 1950s, and particularly after embracing socialism as an 
ideology of the state, Nasir's regime employed transfer policies, such as social 
3 Waterbury, J., The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 207. 
4 Amin, G., Egypt's Economic Predicament: A Study in the Interaction of External Pressure, 
Political Folly and Social Tension in Egypt, 1960-1990, (Leiden: Brill, 1995), pp. 121-122. 
5 Weinbaum, M., Egypt and the Politics of U.S. Economic Aid, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 
pp. 131. 
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security, extensive food subsidy programmes, free education, and public health 
care, in order to influence income distribution in society and bring about equity. 6 
Welfare provision expanded under Nasir after the regime had adopted socialism as 
an ideology of the state. Socialism in the Egyptian experience was the result of the 
pragmatism of the regime, rather than a belief in socialist ideology. The decision to 
embrace socialism was motivated by two sets of factors. First, the private sector 
proved to be unwilling or unable to carry out its role in economic development. 
This can be mainly attributed to Nasir's land reforms and nationalisation policies 
that antagonised and curtailed the economic power of the capitalist class. As a 
consequence, the state had to assume a larger role in the development process to fill 
the vacuum left by the diminishing private sector. Second, the affinity between 
Egypt and socialist countries and member states of the non-alignment movement, 
which sought development of their economies independent of international powers, 
propelled Nasir to adopt socialist policies. 7 
Nasir's Socialism 
In 1957, the National Union introduced the term 'socialism' as a major component 
of the ideology of the state. It announced that the state would adopt a socialist, co-
6 Ikram, K., Egypt: Economic Management in a Period of Transition, (Washington, D.C.: John 
Hopkins University Press for IBRD, 1980), pp. 23. 
7 AI-Biblawy, H., Dilr a/-dawlah fi al-iqtisiid [The Role of the State in the Economy], (Cairo: 
General Egyptian Book Organisation, 1991), pp. 209. 
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operative, and democratic approach to development. 8 Socialism was conceived as 
industrialisation carried out through the co-operative efforts of the workers and 
employers, with the help of the state. 9 
According to Nasir's version of socialism, with regards to welfare provision, the 
state should provide a minimum level of welfare. 10 In fact, Nasir emphasised 
industrialisation even at the expense of welfare provision. This was highlighted in 
his speech, during the inauguration of the Iron and Steel complex in Hilwan: 
Thus, if a factory is built near a village, there is no need to spend half a million or a 
quarter of a million pounds on the construction of living quarters for the workmen, 
they should try to accommodate themselves in the village and this half a million 
pounds should be used instead in the construction of another factory . . . In my 
opinion, it is better to have work for an unemployed worker than build a house for a 
workman who has a job already, for an unemployed worker is a burden on the state. 11 
This speech reveals Nasir's priorities in terms of welfare and economic growth. 
According to Nasir, industrialisation and economic growth had to take precedence 
over welfare provision. His proposition that the workmen should accommodate 
themselves in the village suggests Nasir's preference for a larger role for civil 
society in welfare provision, thereby allowing the state to allocate resources to 
industrialisation rather than welfare. However, Nasir's regime controlled liberties, 
8 Wahba, M., The Role of the State in the Egyptian Economy: 1945-1981, (Reading: Ithaca Press, 
1994), pp. 78. 
9 Ata Alia, M., Arab Struggle for Economic Independence, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974), 
pp. 46. 
10 Wahba, M., The Role of the State in the Egyptian Economy: 1945-1981, (Reading: Ithaca Press, 
1994), pp. 75. 
11 Wahba, M., The Role of the State in the Egyptian Economy: 1945-1981, (Reading: Ithaca Press, 
1994), pp. 76. 
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which is a prerequisite for a dynamic civil society that could play the role envisaged 
by Nasir in his speech. 
As pointed out in the previous chapter, the state's dominance in socio-economic life 
and its encroachment upon liberties led to the suppression of civil society. 
Furthermore, the abolition of political parties and their replacement by a single 
organisation and the emphasis of the regime on unity of social forces proved to be 
detrimental to pluralism, which is dependent upon respect for liberties. Thus, the 
regime failed to create an environment conducive to the operation of a dynamic 
civil society capable of sharing the burden of welfare provision with the state. 
Alternatively, the regime sought to promote itself and the state as the provider of 
welfare based on citizenship rights. One can argue that the regime chose this model 
of welfare provision to make beneficiaries of the system dependent upon the state. 
The Five-year Plan 
In order to transform the economy into a 'socialist, democratic, and co-operative 
society', the regime launched a five-year plan in 1959/60-64/65. 12 The plan was 
hoped to be a major step in the path of economic growth accompanied by a rising 
welfare. The objectives of the plan amounted to the following: 
1. doubling national income over a ten-year period; 
2. expansion of employment opportunities; 
12 O'Brien, P., The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System: From Private Enterprise to Socialism 
1952-1962, (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 236. 
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3. achievement of more social equality in terms of opportunities and mcome 
distribution. 13 
However, the plan was not successful as was hoped, and national product grew only 
by 60%. 14 Furthermore, the economy suffered from a serious deterioration in the 
balance of payments, as the deficit rose from £E42 million in 1959 to £E128 million 
in 1964, and the balance of trade deficit increased from £E65 million in 1959 to 
£E180 million in 1964, resulting in a reduction in output. 15 This deficit can be partly 
attributed to the expansion in welfare provision and the fast population growth. 16 
Hence, the regime started to shift towards a liberal economy in the early 1960s; and 
Egypt had to negotiate with the IMF in 1962 because of its balance of payments 
crisis. Consequently, the pound was devalued, whereupon Egypt received a standby 
credit.17 However, as soon as the crisis 'abated', the regime reverted to its socialist 
policies, to maintain its credibility. The public sector was allowed to expand and 
more private property was expropriated in 1963 and 1964. 18 
13 Mabro, R., The Egyptian Economy: 1952-1972, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 115-123. 
14 QER, Egypt: Annual Supplement 1974, (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1974), pp. 4. 
15 QER, Egypt: Annual Supplement 1964, (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1964, 1967), 
pp. 13; and QER, Egypt: Annual Supplement 1967, (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
1964, 1967), pp. 19. 
16 The population was growing at a rate of 2.54% between 1960 and 1970. QER, Egypt: Annual 
Supplement 1974, (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1974), pp. 5. 
17 Mabro, R., The Egyptian Economy: 1952-1972, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 176. 
18 Posusney, M., Labor and the State in Egypt: Workers, Unions, and Economic Restructuring, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 168. 
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In spite of the rising deficit in the current account, Egypt could afford large imports 
until the mid-1960s because of US foreign aid. When this aid was withdrawn in 
1965, due to the tension between the US and Nasir, the quantity of imports and, 
accordingly, the level of investment dropped. 19 
Thereupon, the process of state retrenchment started, in 1965, as Nasir appointed 
Zakarlya Muhyl al-Oin as Prime Minister who introduced price and tax raises, and a 
reduction in consumer subsidies. In addition, he encouraged private investment, 
tried to reduce imports and reschedule the repayment of short-term foreign debt.20 
He also restarted negotiations with the IMF, which required the further devaluation 
of the pound by 40%. Again Nasir retreated, dismissing Muhyl al-Din and 
cancelling the agreement with the IMF, due to mounting social pressures. 21 
However, no further socialist measures were introduced after mid 1965.22 
After we have outlined the orientations of Nasir's regime, especially towards social 
equity and welfare provision, we will now examine some of the principal welfare 
policies extended under Nasir. These include, land reforms, and social welfare. 
19 Mabro, R., The Egyptian Economy: 1952-1972, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 176. 
20 Hosseinzadeh, E., "How Egyptian State Capitalism Reverted to Market Capitalism", Arab Studies 
Quanerly, vol. 10, no. 3, spring 1988, pp. 311. 
21 Posusney, M., Labor and the State in Egypt: Workers, Unions, and Economic Restructuring, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 168-169. 
22 Posusney, M., Labor and the State in Egypt: Workers, Unions, and Economic Restructuring, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 131. 
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Land Reforms 
One of the first measures used by the 1952 regime to address socio-economic 
inequalities in Egypt were land reforms. The declared objective of the land reforms 
in 1952 was to 'build Egyptian Society on a new basis by providing free life and 
dignity to each peasant and by abolishing the wide gap between classes and by 
removing an important cause of social and political instability'. 23 Land reforms 
served three main purposes, namely, to redistribute 'rural resources'; to diminish 
the political power of landowning elite; and to use agricultural surplus for 
industrialisation. 24 
The reform laws of 1952 limited individual landownership to 200 feddans and 
assigned small plots of land, of 2-5 feddans, to landless peasants. In 1961, 
individual landownership was further reduced to 100 teddans, and fmally it was cut 
down to 50 feddans in 1969.25 The impact of these land reforms was a distribution 
of 13% of the cultivated land to 9% of the peasants. However, the main 
23 Land Reform Act No. 178, 9 September 1952 quoted in Bush, R., Economic Crisis and the 
Politics of Reform in Egypt, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), pp. 13. 
24 Bush, R., Economic Crisis and the Politics of Reform in Egypt, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), 
pp. 11. 
25 For a detailed account of the agrarian reform consult: Mabro, R., The Egyptian Economy: 1952-
1972, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 58-82. See also: Vatikiotis, P., "Some Political 
Consequences of the 1952 Revolution in Egypt", in P. Holt (ed.), Political and Social Change in 
Modern Egypt: Historical Studies from the Ottoman Conquest to the United Arab Republic, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 375. 
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beneficiaries of land reform were the middle class landowners, because of their 
connections with public local officials, rather than landless peasants.Z6 
Through land reforms, the regime tried to co-opt the peasantry into the political 
process, and generate support for its rule in the countryside. Accordingly, 
agricultural co-operatives were established to organise production and market 
agricultural crops. In addition, co-operatives provided interest-free loans, seeds, 
fertilisers, and technical advice to peasants. Interest, however, was reintroduced 
after the defeat in 1967.27 
Social Welfare 
Social welfare under Nasir included mainly tangible services in the form of in-kind 
products, such as food subsidies, education and health care. Nasir's 1957 Charter 
endorsed the state's commitment to welfare provision. The Charter highlighted the 
rights of citizens to social welfare, such as education, health care, employment, and 
social insurance for the elderly. 28 The right to welfare based on citizenship was 
consolidated in the 1962 Charter. It stated: 
the right of each citizen to free medical care, whether treatment or medicine, would 
not become a commodity for sale and purchase ... The right of each citizen to receive 
26 Dessouki, A., ''The Politics of Income Distribution in Egypt", in G. Abdel-Khalek, and R. Tignor 
(eds.), The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Egypt, (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1982), 
pp. 64-66. 
27 Mabro, R., The Egyptian Economy: 1952-1972, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 60-77. 
28 Aoud~. 1., ''From National Bourgeois Development to ln.fitah: Egypt 1952-1992", Arab Studies 
Quarterly, vol. 16, no. 1, winter 1994, pp. 8. 
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education. The right of each citizen to secure a job ... Insurance against old age and 
sickness must be provided. 29 
The Charter found resonance with segments of the population who had not been 
privileged under monarchical rule and the British occupation. The discourse of the 
regime emphasised that it was one of the functions of the state to provide for its 
citizens. The regime repeatedly claimed that social and class differences had been 
eliminated from society with the 1952 revolution, as all citizens had a right to free 
education and public health care. 
The state took over the traditional role of family and associations of civil society, 
which were active prior to the revolution, in welfare provision. Accordingly, civil 
society was overshadowed by the state under Nasir. The right to welfare was 
guaranteed by the state through universal provision of welfare products, such as 
food subsidies, free education and public health care. The regime aimed, through 
this system, to promote equality and social justice in society, as all citizens received 
the same benefits regardless of their economic ability. Consequently, Egyptians 
came to perceive welfare goods and services as their rights. 
Food Subsidies 
The regime also tried to influence the distribution of income in urban areas by 
controlling the prices of necessities through subsidies. 30 A subsidy is a system 
29 Quoted in Ata Alia, M., Arab Struggle for Independence, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974), 
pp. 52. 
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whereby products are sold at a price below/above their price as determined by the 
forces of supply and demand. 31 
Subsidies are offered by the state to support certain groups in society. Although the 
state usually bears the cost of subsidy, this is not always the case; sometimes other 
parties have to bear the cost. For example, when farmers are obliged to sell their 
produce at a price lower than the market price, in this case, the subsidy is borne by 
farmers (producers). 32 
Subsidies have been used, by both developed and developing states, to protect 
consumers against price fluctuations. They are usually employed as a means of 
providing a minimum level of certain products, identified as necessities, to lower 
income groups in society. Subsidies act as an income transfer,33 as subsidised 
products are offered to lower income groups at a price lower than their production 
k . 34 cost or mar et pnce. 
30 O'Brien, P., The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System: From Private Enterprise to Socialism 
I952-I962, (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 243. 
31 Alderman, H., and J. Von Braun, The Effects of the Egyptian Food Ration and Subsidy System on 
Income Distribution and Consumption, (Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research 
Institute, 1984}, pp. 83. 
32 Da 'm al-aghnfyii' wa da 'm al-fuqarii' [The Subsidy of the Rich and the Subsidy of the Poor], 
(Cairo: al-Ahiill, 1985), pp. 21. 
33 Alderman, H., and J. Von Braun, The Effects of the Egyptian Food Ration and Subsidy System on 
Income Distribution and Consumption, (Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research 
Institute, 1984), pp. 98. 
34 
al-'lsawi, 1., al-Da'm [The Subsidy], (Cairo: Dar al-Mawqifal-'Arabi, 1987), pp. 32. 
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Consumer subsidies were introduced in Egypt in 1942, during World War II, when 
certain commodities, such as oil, sugar, tea, and kerosene, were offered universally 
to all consumers through a rationing system at a subsidised price. The system was 
not targeted at the poor. 35 The rationing system was designed to help the population 
adjust to the wartime economic pressures. It helped consumers in two ways: by 
offering commodities at a relatively cheaper price to protect them against inflation; 
and by guaranteeing rationed quantities to protect consumers against commodity 
shortages. 36 Subsidies amounted to less than E£1 million in 1945, and remained 
more or less stable during the 1950s, due to the stability of world food prices. 37 
By 1960, consumer subsidies had expanded to reach E£9 million. 38 Ration cards 
were used extensively for food items, especially flour, after the rnid-1960s. This 
was due to the suspension of the PL480 (food aid) programme in 1966, which 
resulted in the shortage of wheat, caused by the deterioration in Egypt's relations 
35 Ali, S., and Adams, R., "The Egyptian Food Subsidy System: Operation and Effects on Income 
Distribution", World Development, vol. 24, no. 11, November 1996, pp. 1778. 
36 Egypt Human Development Report 1997/98, (Cairo: Institute of National Planning, 1998), pp. 68. 
37 Economic Bulletin, vol. xxxiv, no. 3, (Cairo: The National Bank of Egypt, 1981}, pp. 128. 
38 Egypt Human Development Report 1997/98, (Cairo: Institute of National Planning, 1998), pp. 68. 
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with the US. 39 The situation was exacerbated by the stagnation of exports and the 
rise in military expenditure after the military defeat of 1967.40 
The 1967 defeat signified the need to redefme of the social contract. The 
significance of the defeat is not only that it dealt a severe blow to the deteriorating 
economy, but it also caused a crack in the already weak legitimacy of the regime. 
Most Egyptians had placed their faith in their leader and had given up their right to 
participate in the political process and establish a democratic system because they 
believed he would deliver the nation to the promised national and economic 
independence. This vision collapsed with the defeat, and the regime had to tap other 
sources, such as food subsidies and introducing some liberalisation measures, in 
order to protect its credibility and preserve its survival. 
The defeat of 1967 resulted in a major disappointment for the population with the 
failure of the grand project of national independence. Nasir responded to this 
disappointment by expanding the subsidy. He aimed to prevent prices from being a 
'source of resentment' in order to save his popularity. Accordingly, in 1969, the 
subsidy went up to E£11.6 million, most of which was devoted to bread and edible 
il 41 0 . 
39 PlA80, The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistant Act (Food for Peace), is an US aid 
programme tbat was originally designed 'to dispose of surplus US food commodities on 
concessionary terms to client states' to assist US farmers in facing hardships due to falling prices of 
commodities and overproduction. It has usually been used by tbe US as a means to promote its 
strategic interests, by exerting pressure on recipient states to comply witb tbe demands of tbe US. 
See Bush, R., Economic Crisis and the Politics of Reform in Egypt, (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1999), pp. 19-22. 
40 Mabro, R., The Egyptian Economy: 1952-1972, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 176. 
41 Economic Bulletin, vol. xxxiv, no. 3, (Cairo: The National Bank of Egypt, 1981), pp. 129. 
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Thus, by the end of Nasir's rule, in 1970-71, state expenditure on consumer 
subsidies reached E£23 million, 75% of which went to food commodities.42 
Although consumer subsidies provided modest benefits to consumers, in per capita 
terms, they constituted a serious burden on the public purse in the aggregate.43 
Education 
The second major component of Nasir's social welfare was education. The regime 
extended universal free education, at all levels of education, to achieve two 
objectives, namely, to transform the economy and society, and to generate 
support.44 As Nasir's nationalist regime believed that education was 'stifled' under 
the British occupation, education represented a priority on its agenda.45 Education 
was identified as an essential means for development and economic growth by 
supplying the required manpower, especially in technical tields. Furthermore, the 
regime manipulated education to exercise hegemony over society; school curricula 
were used to mobilise support for the vision of the regime. For example, the 
curricula stressed the Arab struggle against Western occupation and Zionism. Also 
education was used as a means to emphasise the achievements of the revolution.46 
42 Egypt Human Development Report 1997/98, (Cairo: Institute of National Planning, 1998), pp. 68. 
43 Lal, D., and H. Myint, The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth: A Comparative 
Study, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 170. 
44 Hopwood, D., Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-90, (London: HarperCollins, 1991}, pp. 136-138. 
45 Mansfield, P., Nasser's Egypt, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965), pp. 120. 
46 Szyliowicz, J., Education and Modernization in the Middle East, (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1973), pp. 278-280. 
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Furthermore, the regime raised the aspirations and expectations of Egyptians by 
guaranteeing employment for high school and university graduates. Education was, 
therefore, highlighted as a means of social mobility.47 Free education was 
welcomed by lower income groups, who could not afford education for all their 
children before the revolution. To them, free education meant 'enlightenment, 
upward mobility, respectability', and better job opportunities.48 
According to Ibrahim, upward mobility was at its peak between the mid-1950s and 
mid-1960s, due to the expansion in free education. The process of mobility was 
enhanced by the commitment of the regime to guaranteed employment for 
graduates.49 The regime was able, at least temporarily, to meet its obligation of 
guaranteed employment because of the expansion in the role of the state in socio-
economic life, as it led industrialisation and undertook large-scale projects that 
created job opportunities for graduates of the education system. Thus, the number of 
those employed in the government and the public sector soared from 350,000 in 
1951-1952 to 1.2 million in 1969-1970.50 
47 Williamson, B., Education and Social Change in Egypt and Turkey: A Study in Historical 
Sociology, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 172-176. 
48 Waterbury, J., The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 219-220. 
49 Springborg, R., Mubarak's Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order, (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1989), pp. 137. 
50 Ibrahim, S., "Social Mobility and Income Distribution in Egypt, 1952-1977", in G. Abdel-Khalek, 
and R. Tignor (eds.), The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Egypt, (New York: Holmes 
& Meier, 1982), pp. 431. 
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Nasir's regime expanded in free education at all levels to promote equity and social 
justice (see table 4.1). This expansion in free education translated into higher state 
expenditure on education, which increased from £E25 million (12.24% of 
government expenditure) in 1952/53, to £E104 million in 1969170 (14.7% of 
government expenditure).51 
Table 4.1: Expansion in enrolment in primary, preparatory and secondary 
education during the period 1953/54-1969/70 
Stage of %Growth 
1953/54 1963/64 1960170 
Education 1953/54-1969/70 
Primary 1,392,741 3,129,692 3,618,750 159.83 
Preparatory 351,814 451,062 797,965 126.81 
Secondary 134,808 224,577 534,734 296.66 
Total 1,879,363 3,805,331 4,951,449 163.46 
Source: Calculated from U.A.R. The Year Book, 1966, (Cauo: The Mmtstry of NatiOnal Gmdance, 
1966), pp. 147; and al-Kitiib al-ihsii''f al-sanaw'f 1952-1974 [Statistical Year Book 1952-1974], 
(Cairo: CAPMUS, 1975). pp. 152-154. 
However, the increase in the quantity of education provided was achieved at the 
expense of quality. For example, under-qualified teachers, who did not have 
adequate training to teach, were employed to overcome the shortfall of teachers, 
especially at the primary level.52 The problem was compounded by the seconding of 
teachers to other Arab countries, such as Algeria, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia, to 
51 
al-Maliimih al- 'iimah li-s'fyiisat al-ri 'iiyah al-igtmii '!yah fi al-ta 'l'fm qabl al-giimi "f [The General 
Features of the Social Care Policy in Pre-university Education], (Cairo: The Regional Arab Office 
for Research and Documentation in Social Science, 1988), pp. 34-35. 
52 Szyliowicz, J., Education and Modernization in the Middle East, (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1973), pp. 270. 
235 
assist these countries in their development process; the number of seconded 
teachers reached nearly 5,000 in 1964.53 
Public Health Care 
Nasir's nationalist regime identified a healthy population as the key to higher 
productivity. The regime aimed to raise the 'health standard of the population', 
which was so poor under the rule of British colonialists. 54 Hence, expenditure on 
health care, as a percentage of the national budget, increased from 3.6% in 1952-53 
to 8.9% in 1969-70.55 
The idea of a free public health care, to all 'citizens', was introduced within the 
socialist framework outlined in the 1962 Charter, which declared: 
The ftrst right of all citizens is health care- not the bare treatment and drugs like 
goods bought and sold, but rather the unconditional guarantee of this care to every 
citizen in every corner of the country under conditions of comfort and service. 56 
Health services were offered on the basis of the 'need' of individuals 'rather than 
their ability to pay'. To this end, the regime nationalised 13 private hospitals in 
53 Mansfield, P., Nasser's Egypt, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965), pp. 122. 
54 Waterbury, J., The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 218. 
55 Fumia, A., The Arab Republic of Egypt, (SYNCRISIS: The Dynamic of Health, vol. XVI, 
September 1975), pp. 73. 
56 Quoted in Baker, R., Egypt's Uncertain Revolution under Nasser and Sadat, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 218. 
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1964~ and the first Curative Care Organisation was established 'to provide high 
quality medical care at affordable cost'. 57 
Furthermore, the Health Insurance Organisation (HIO) was established in 1964 to 
cater for the health needs of the population through a programme of social 
insurance, which was designed to cover the whole population within 10 years. The 
two first groups to benefit from the health insurance scheme were industrial workers 
and government employees. This is probably because these two groups formed the 
major constituencies of the regime. The regime sought to mobilise support for the 
socialist system it has embraced, by highlighting its benefits. In 1964, 3 million 
employees were covered under a comprehensive insurance scheme. 58 
However, the system did not expand to other sectors of the population in the 
following years, according to the plan, due to fmancial pressures imposed on the 
state by the burden of the war with Israel. 59 This was reflected in the decline in state 
per capita expenditure on health care after 1967; per capita outlay on health services 
rose from E£0.48 in 1951-52, to E£1.5 in 1964-65, but dropped to E£1.2 in 1967-
68, due to the 1967 war.60 
57 Egypt Human Development Report 1997/98, (Cairo: Institute of National Planning, 1998), pp. 52. 
58 Mansfield, P., Nasser's Egypt, (Hannondsworth: Penguin, 1965), pp. 109-110. 
59 Nandakumar, A., M. R Reich, M. Chawla, P. Berman, and W. Yip, "Health Reform for Children: 
The Egyptian Experience with School Health Insurance", Health Policy, vol. 50, no. 3, January 
2000, pp. 158. 
60 Waterbury, J., The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 219. 
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Nasir's Welfare State and the Social Contract 
One of the main strategies that Nasir used to legitimise his rule was welfare 
provision. In other words, welfare provision formed one of the main obligations of 
the regime's formula of the social contract. Welfare policies have been effective in 
eliciting the support of middle and lower income groups. They came to perceive the 
state/regime as their guardian, and one of its main functions was to provide welfare 
for citizens. Thus, Nasir instituted a welfare state in Egypt, where the right to 
welfare was based upon citizenship. 
Although Nasir's regime managed to establish a welfare state in Egypt, its goals of 
equity and social justice proved to be too ambitious for Egypt's economic stage of 
development. With modest economic growth, redistribution was possible only to a 
limited extent. Welfare objectives clashed with plans of economic progress, and the 
costs of welfare were beyond the capabilities of the state.61 Eventually, the regime 
faced a dilemma of choosing between investment and welfare objectives. However, 
as the legitimacy of the regime was based upon its ability to meet its obligations of 
the social contract, which entailed its commitment to social justice and equity, 
curtailing welfare would have undermined the credibility of the regime. 
Accordingly, development and investment plans were compromised. 
After the mid-1960s, the regime found it difficult to deliver the promised welfare 
products to middle and lower income groups, due to the escalating trade deficits 
61 Egypt: Alleviating Poverty during Structural Adjustment, (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1991), 
pp. xv-xvi. 
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with the West as well as with Communist countries. The economic situation 
deteriorated with the defeat of 1967, as vital resources were redirected towards 
building up military capability. This was exacerbated by the loss of revenues from 
traffic in the Suez Canal after the closure of the Canal, as well as from oil with the 
occupation of the Sinai.62 
The June War of 1967 marked a major change in the regime's strategies, both 
politically and economically. The regime could no longer sustain socialism and 
national independence.63 In response to mounting pressure for liberalisation, Nasir 
promised more liberties, in both the economic and political realms, in the 
declaration of March 1968. However, he died before he could deliver his 
promises. 64 It can, therefore, be concluded that the 1967 defeat created the 
environment conducive for the liberalisation measures adopted by his successor, 
Anwar Sadat. 
62 Said, M., H. Chang, and K. Sakr, "Industrial Policy and the Role of the State in Egypt: The 
Relevance of the East Asian Experience", in H. Handoussa (ed.), Economic Transition in the Middle 
East: Global Changes and Adjustment Strategies, (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 
1997), pp. 222. 
63 Zaalouk, M., Power, Class and Foreign Capital in Egypt: The Rise of the New Bourgeoisie, 
(London: Zed, 1989), pp. 50-51. 
64 Hosseinzadeh, E., "How Egyptian State Capitalism Reverted to Market Capitalism", Arab Studies 
Quarterly, vol. 10, no. 3, spring 1988, pp. 316. 
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Sadat: Expansion of the Welfare State 
Sadat assumed power in 1970; he inherited a truncated defeated country, with the 
loss of the Sinai to Israel. He had to also deal with the ailments of the economy 
symbolised by a soaring balance of payments deficit and external debt. 
From 1970 to 1973, the Egyptian economy can be accurately described as a war 
economy. Most of the resources of the state were directed to military purposes. 
Accordingly, the imports of arms and foodstuffs continued to rise. On the other 
hand, exports stagnated, with the ultimate effect being that the trade deficit 
escalated from £E160 million in 1970 to £E260 million in 1972. Thus, Egypt had to 
rely upon loans from international organisations, such as the World Bank, and 
socialist states, mainly the Soviet Union, as well as Arab aid. By the end of 
December 1973, Egypt's external debt had reached US$3.5 billion.65 
Grants from Arab countries, which amounted to more than US$900 million, helped 
finance the current account deficit between 1973 and 1976. However, as Sadat 
sought peace with Israel, the antagonised Gulf Arab states ceased their flow of 
aid.66 In 1975, the current account deficit amounted to US$1.4 billion, nearly 19% 
of GOP, compared to a deficit of US$0.145 million, which was nearly 0.6% of 
GOP, in 1970.67 By the end of 1976, the external debt rose to 37% of GOP and the 
65 Zaalouk, M., Power, Class and Foreign Capital in Egypt: The Rise of the New Bourgeoisie, 
(London: Zed, 1989), pp. 55-56. 
66 QER, Egypt: Annual Supplement 1985, (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1985), pp. 41. 
67 QER, Egypt, Sudan: Annual Supplement 1972, (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1972). 
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debt service ratio was equal to almost one third of total exports (see table 4.2). The 
current account deficit reached a peak of US$1.54 billion in 1979, the highest figure 
in the 1970s. 68 
Table 4.2: Current account and external debt 1974-80 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
C/ A in US$ billion -0.81 -0.82 -0.93 -1.54 -0.44* 
External Debt in 
5.86 8.1 9.92 15.88 17.43 
US$ billion 
Debt/GDP (%) 36.5 38.5 39.6 58.7 50.3 
Debt service/ 
n.a. n.a. 14** 24 22 
exports ratio % 
*The llllprovement m the current account balance m 1980 can be attributed to the remittances 
of workers abroad, which amounted to nearly US$2. 8 million in 1980. 
** The debt service ratio declined because Egypt repaid US$850 million, and because major 
creditors agreed to reschedule and refinance payments amounting to US$1.45 billion to 
longer maturities. QER, Egypt: Annual Supplement 1979, (London: The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 1979), pp. 22. 
Source: QER, Egypt: Annual Supplement, (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1974-
85). 
Although the IMF had been trying to pressure Egypt to adopt liberalisation policies 
since the early 1960s, its recommendations were not adopted until the debt crisis in 
1975. Most of Egypt's debt was short-term that was subject to an exorbitant interest 
rate of nearly 18%. The IMF claimed that earnings from the Suez Canal and oil 
were insufficient to pay off this debt. At that time, the four main sources of income 
for Egypt were generated from: the Suez Canal, oil, tourism, and remittances from 
68 There are no 'precise' figures for external debt. The World Bank's tables present different figures 
every issue in every year. See Abdel-Wabeed, M., "Aid and Debt Issues in Egypt: Past Trends and 
Future Prospects", L'Egypte Contemporaine, no. 446, April1997, pp. 78. 
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workers abroad.69 The demands of the IMF, during this period, can be summarised 
as follows: 
• reallocating investment 'outlays'; 
• devaluation of the Egyptian pound in order to promote exports and attract 
foreign investment; 
• cutting down government subsidies. 70 
In return, the IMF pledged to secure foreign exchange from the West in order to 
meet the requirements of the Egyptian economy, including the importation of 
foodstuffs. 
Sadat's strategy to deal with Egypt's economic problems was a product of his 
liberal disposition, and belief that Egypt's interests lay with the West. Sadat's 
approach to economic development was different from that of Nasir; he renounced 
socialism and showed more inclination towards openness and integrating Egypt into 
the world capitalist economy. He sought economic growth through a shift towards a 
liberal economy. Hence, to secure autonomy from societal forces to be able to 
implement his strategy, whilst preserving his regime, Sadat had to redefine the 
formula of the social contract. Sadat's formula involved delivering peace; economic 
prosperity, through economic liberalisation and foreign aid; limited participation; 
and maintaining the patrimonial and welfare systems developed under Nasir. 
69 Jreisat, J., Politics without Process: Administering Development in the Arab World, (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 1997), pp. 105. 
70 Zaalouk, M., Power, Class and Foreign Capital in Egypt: The Rise of the New Bourgeoisie, 
(London: Zed, 1989),pp.56. 
242 
Social Welfare 
Under Sadat social justice and equity were not a priority; to the contrary, Sadat's 
regiiTie acknowledged the legitimacy of inequality in income distribution. The 
regime built close links with businessmen, who formed one of the main 
constituencies of the regime. Thus, many of the properties sequestrated under Nasir 
were returned to their owners; and a shift to a free market economy, with all the 
negative implications for income distribution, was launched.71 
However, social welfare policies instituted by Nasir were expanded under the rule 
of Sadat to avoid the resentment of middle and lower income groups that could pose 
a threat to the survival of the regime. This was manifested in the increase in food 
subsidies, which absorbed most of the government funds allocated to social welfare. 
Thus, the right to welfare based upon citizenship remained the basis to welfare 
provision. Sadat's regime was able to fmance this expansion through foreign aid, 
and revenues from oil, Suez Canal, and remittances from workers abroad. 
Food Subsidies 
When Sadat came to power, he found it essential for the stability of his regime to 
keep subsidies in tact. This can be attributed to two factors, namely, the legacy of 
Nasir's subsidy policies; and the rise of the prices of wheat grain in 1973. At the 
beginning of his rule, Sadat could not dismantle the welfare policies instituted under 
71 Waterbury, J., The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 223. 
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Nasir, which were identified as one of the main achievements of the revolution, 
without undermining his credibility. Sadat was disposed to a liberal economy, and 
he identified the business elite as his main constituency. He exalted the merits of a 
liberal economy and the prosperity it would bring to all segments of society. 
Nevertheless, he had to co-opt middle and lower income groups into the system to 
avoid their resentment, especially at a time of world inflation caused by the 
international increase in oil prices and the ensuing rise in food prices. 72 The most 
accessible means to generate support for his regime and its policies was food 
subsidies. 
In the early 1970s, food subsidies were used to protect consumers, especially urban 
consumers, from world inflation. Subsidies were expanded to include more items, 
such as beans, lentils, rice, and maize. Whereas in 1970-71, subsidies amounted to 
E£23 million, they went up to £E105 million in 1973, then they rocketed to E£420 
million in 1975 (see table 4.3). Nevertheless, in 1976, food subsidies dropped to 
E£281 million, due the 'relative' decline in world prices of some food 
d. . 73 commo 1t1es. 
With pressure from the IMF on the Egyptian government to cut the budget deficit in 
1975, the government had to cut expenditure on one or more of the following items: 
defence, public sector investment, debt service, or subsidies. As the struggle with 
Israel had not been resolved, cutting expenditure on defence was not an option. 
72 Cooper, M., The Transformation of Egypt, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 
1982), pp. 115. 
73 Economic Bulletin, vol. xxxiv, no. 3, (Cairo: The National Bank of Egypt, 1981), pp. 130-134. 
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Downsizing the public sector was not possible because of the entrenched interests 
of the bureaucracy, which formed an inherited constituency from the previous 
regime that emerged due to the regime's welfare policies of free education and 
guaranteed employment. This influential group constituted part of the elite by the 
end of Nasir's rule. The regime did not want to alienate them by harming their 
interests, as they also served as a link between the state and the private sector, 
which was fostered by Sadat. Reducing debt service was not also an option because 
the government could not abstain from servicing its debts without risking its 
fmancial credibility, which would compromise its ability to borrow. Thus, the 
regime opted for reducing subsidies. 
The regime underestimated the power of the beneficiaries of the subsidies; the 
government expected the least resistance from adopting this altemative.74 However, 
this action sparked the anger of the 'deprived' population. The harmed groups were 
unwilling to give up what was sold to them by Nasir, and later Sadat with the 
rhetoric of infitah, as their rights, defmed within the supposed 'social contract'. 
They protested, as they saw the regime breaking the contract by taking away from 
them their 'rights', without offering them anything in return. Political participation 
was still limited, and their national independence, manifested in the Israeli 
occupation of the Sinai and other Arab territories, was still lost. They were 
disappointed to see themselves bypassed in the process of economic prosperity 
triggered by infitah, which encompassed mainly the ruling elite. 
74 Hinnebusch, R., Egyptian Politics under Sadat: The Post-populist Development of an 
Authoritarian-modernizing State, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 135. 
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The 1977 Food Riots 
Upon the announcement of pnce increases of 25 basic commodities, which 
included, edible oil, com, tea, sugar, textiles (cotton, wool, and synthetic), meat, 
butagas, and cigarettes,75 on 17 January 1977, spontaneous riots started, on 18 
January, in Alexandria. The riots subsequently erupted in Cairo and spread from 
there to other major cities. Rioters included men and women who felt threatened by 
the elimination of subsidies. For middle and lower income groups, life had already 
been difficult, they waited vigilantly for improvements in their living conditions; 
however, the little they had was at risk. During the riots, they chanted: 'with life and 
blood we will bring prices down!' 76 Rioters were asking the President, 'where is our 
breakfast?' The slogans of the riots revealed the disappointment of demonstrators 
with their leader who had promised them prosperity that never materialised and who 
was insensitive to their needs and enjoyed an opulent lifestyle. Burrell noted: 
The slogans of the demonstrators were now more bitter and critical of the president 
himself: 'You live in style and we live seven to a room. You change your clothes three 
times a day and we change once a year'. The underlying motive of the riots, however, 
was stated most simply on the placards that read 'There can be no liberalization 
without food'. 77 
Prime Minister, Mamdlih S~ilim, a former policeman and Minster of Interior, 
deployed ordinary police forces as well as forces from Central Security Forces to 
75 
'Abd al-Raziq, H., Misr fi 18 wa 19 Yaniiylr: diriisah sfyiisfyiih wathii'iqfyah [Egypt in the 
Events of 18 and 19 January: A Political Documentary Study], (Cairo: Shahid, 1985), pp. 22. 
76 Waterbury, J., The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 220-221. 
77 Burrell, R., and A. Keildar, Egypt: The Dilemmas of a Nation- 1970-1977, (Beverly Hills: Sage, 
The Washington Papers, no. 48, 1977), pp. 6. 
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confront the demonstrators. Sadat himself was being interviewed by a reporter in 
As wan, his favourite winter resort, as he was unaware of the riots. 78 This showed 
how detached the president was from the problems of the majority of the Egyptian 
population. 
The Prime Minister asked for the intervention of the army after the police forces 
had failed to quell the rioters, who continued their upheaval the following day. 
General 'Abd al-Ghani al-Gamasi, Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief, 
refused on the pretext that the regime had made a pledge after the October War to 
use its forces only against external enemies in order to protect the nation, and not 
against its civilians. Sadat made this promise to promote his image as the guarantor 
of liberties that were repressed under his predecessor. 
The riots continued more violently for a second day. Some property was destroyed 
and looted, partly by criminals and partly by the frustrated demonstrators. With the 
escalation of the events, the army stepped in to suppress the riots upon the request 
of Sadat. The demonstrations were suppressed by the army after the death of 80 
people, injury of 600, the arrest of 2000, and an estimated damage to the economy 
of US$1 billion.79 The president's announcement of rescinding the subsidy cuts was 
repeated several times on the radio to calm down the rioters. 80 
78 Heikal, M., The Autumn of Fury: The Assassination of Sadat, (London: Andre Deutsch, 1983), 
pp. 90-92. 
79 Weinbaum, M., Egypt and the Politics of the U.S. Economic Aid, (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1986), pp. 143. 
80 Heikal, M., The Autumn of Fury: The Assassination of Sadat, (London: Andre Deutsch, 1983), 
pp. 91-92. 
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The riots were contained, after two days of protest, with the arrival of the army at 
the scene. Shocked by the upheaval and concerned about the consequences, if it did 
not retreat, the regime ultimately repealed the announced price increases. 
Sadat's decision to increase the prices shows his underestimation of the power of 
middle and lower income groups, as he tried to abrogate his part of the contract 
without offering them anything in return. 81 The riots, therefore, exposed the fragility 
of the social contract. The regime could not meet its obligation by providing welfare 
indefinitely, as it was limited by the fmancial capabilities of the state.82 However, 
the beneficiaries of the system stood firm in defending what they perceived as their 
rights. Consequently, to preserve its survival, the regime had to submit to their will. 
As Sadat realised the significance of subsidies, he manipulated them as a means for 
generating support. Once again like his predecessor, he sought to promote himself 
as the guardian of the interests of middle and lower income groups through welfare 
policies. The decision to rescind the increase in prices, therefore, marked a 
restatement of the terms of the social contract based upon welfare provision. 
Subsidies made several products that were previously unsubsidised, such as frozen 
fish, meat and chicken, available to middle and lower income groups. Eventually, 
food subsidy became the means for the government to reach those at the 'bottom of 
81 Cooper, M., The Transformation of Egypt, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 
1982), pp. 241-242. 
82 Jreisat, J., Politics without Process: Administering Development in the Arab World, (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 1997), pp. 77-98. 
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the social structure', thereby making these segments of society dependent upon the 
state 'for their subsistence'. 83 
Subsequently, the regime expanded subsidies, which soared as a component of the 
government budget (see table 4.3, and table 4.4). In 1980, the new budget had a 
22% increase in the subsidy bill, reaching E£1.5 billion, in an attempt to court 
middle and lower income groups. 84 This expansion was made possible because of 
the aid from the US, which allowed Egypt to pay for its wheat imports. 85 Through 
subsidies, Sadat managed to avoid another major upheaval until the termination of 
his rule on 6 October 1981. 
83 
Cooper, M., "State Capitalism, Class Structure, and Social Transformation in the Third World: 
The Case of Egypt", International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 15, 1983, pp. 461-465. 
84 
Waterbury, J., The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 215. 
85 
Harik, I., "Subsidization Policies in Egypt: Neither Economic Growth nor Distribution", 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 24, 1992, pp. 490-491. 
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Table 4.3: Subsidies as a percentage of total government expenditure 
Year Foodstuff Other subsidies Total Percentage of total 
government expenditure 
1973 105 50 155 ---* 
1974 319 116 435 10.39 
1975 420 174 594 9.68 
1976 281 162 443 7.42 
1977 331 144 475 6.73 
1978 435 255 690 7.76 
1979 997 278 1,275 9.86 
*--- not avatlable. 
Source: Computed from Daniels, C., Egypt in the 1980s: The Challenge, Special Report no. 158, 
1983, pp. 54-55; and QER, Egypt: Annual Supplement, (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
several issues). 
Table 4.4: Subsidies as a proportion of total public current expenditures, 
1970-1980 in E£ million 
Current Expenditure Subsidies (2)/(1) 
(1) (2) 
1970-71 661.4 51.0 7.7 
1974 839.7 355.5 42.3 
1976 1,289.6 433.5 33.6 
1978 1,664.0 710.0 42.6 
1980 2,182.0 1,279.0 58.6 
.. Source: cued m Waterbury, J., The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of 
Two Regimes, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 214. 
In 1981/82, the annual food subsidy amounted to E£1473.1 million, which 
constituted 30.1% of total current expenditure. It should be noted that the rise in the 
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absolute cost of subsidy during the period 1974-1981/82 is partially due to inflation 
and the depreciation of the Egyptian pound. 86 
Therefore, during Sadat's rule, universal food subsidies constituted a fundamental 
component of the Egyptian welfare state. Though they were extended universally to 
all the population, they were more significant for middle and lower income groups. 
The regime expanded in the provision of food subsidies after it had failed to deliver 
economic prosperity, which it promised would follow the victory over Israel and the 
infitah. The regime expanded in food subsidy to try to gain the support of middle 
and lower income groups, or at least avoid their resentment. 87 
Education 
The regime emphasised the right of citizens to education by stipulating it in the 
1971 Constitution, drafted by Sadat's regime. During the early years of the regime, 
education represented the same proportion of total government expenditure (19.26% 
in 1969 and 19.58% in 1975)88 as under Nasir. However, this percentage declined 
sharply after 1975 (8.59% in 1976), probably because of economic pressures. After 
that time it never reached the same level until the end of Sadat's rule in 1981 
86 Da'm al-aghniyii' wa da'm al-fuqarii' [The Subsidy of the Rich and the Subsidy of the Poor], 
(Cairo: Al-Ahalr, 1985), pp. 49-50. 
87 Lal, D., and H. Myint, The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth: A Comparative 
Study, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 170. 
88 Statistical Yearbook, 1976, (New York: United Nations, 1977), pp. 724. 
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(10.63% in 1980)89 because most of resources allocated to social welfare were 
probably dedicated to financing the rising bill of food subsidies. 
The achievement in education under Sadat's rule, in terms of enrolment of students 
in the age of education, was not remarkable. This is because the expansion in 
education could not keep up with the rapid expansion in population (2.24% ). 90 
Consequently, enrolment in primary schools, as a percentage of the children aged 6 
12, reached 67% in 1976 compared to 74.6% in 1965-66. However, enrolment of 
boys (80.1 %) continued to be higher than that of girls (52.7%).91 Expansion in 
enrolment in education was higher at the preparatory and secondary levels (see table 
4.5), because they were perceived as the avenue to higher education. 
Table 4.5: Expansion in enrolment in primary, preparatory, and secondary 
education during the period 1970171-1980/81 
Stage of 1970/71 1973/74 1980/81 %Growth 
Education 1970171-1980/8 1 
rnmary 3,740,551 3,919,861 4,548,058 21.59 
!Preparatory 851,936 1,099,702 1,574,233 84.78 
~econdary 569,456 642,653 1,107,233 94.44 
lfotal 5,161,943 5,662,216 7,229,524 40.05 
Source: Calculated from al-Kitab al-ihsa'f al-sanawf [Statistical Year Book], (Cairo: CAPMUS 
1975, 1984). 
89 Statistical Yearbook, 1981, (New York: United Nations, 1983), pp. 240. 
90 
al-Kitab al-ihsa'z al-sanawz 1952-1976 [Statistical Year Book 1952-1976], (Cairo: CAPMUS 
1977), pp. 8. 
91 Waterbury, J., The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 220-221. 
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The policy of expansion in free education continued, under Sadat, however, the link 
between education, especially in state schools, and upward mobility was weakened. 
The infitah afforded many people opportunities to earn higher incomes through 
brokerage and import/export activities rather than employment in the government 
and public sector. Graduates of private foreign language schools could easily obtain 
a highly paid job in the private sector.92 Moreover, the migration of skilled workers 
to the Gulf Arab states opened opportunities for semi-skilled and unskilled workers. 
These workers were not able to obtain a contract to work in the Gulf Arab states, so 
they took advantage of the shortage in skilled labour in Egypt, and tried to make as 
much money as possible in order to secure a standard of living similar to that of 
their counterparts who managed to go to the Gulf Arab states. Therefore, education 
was no longer the only route to upward mobility.93 
Public Health Care 
The performance of the state in the field of public health care provision under Sadat 
has been poor. Unti11975, the level of health expenditure was maintained as under 
Nasir; state health expenditure as a percentage of total government expenditure 
increased slightly from 5.87% in 1969170 to 6.35% in 1975. Escalating economic 
problems, however, resulted in a decline in the funds allocated to health care after 
1975. Health expenditure as a percentage of total government expenditure, 
92 Cochran, J., Education in Egypt, (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 54-55. 
93 Amin, G., "Migration, Inflation and Social Mobility: A Sociological Interpretation of Egypt's 
Current Economic and Political Crisis", in C. Tripp, and R. Owen (eds.), Egypt under Mubarak, 
(London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 109-111. 
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therefore, dropped to 2.67% in 1976 and picked up after that to reach 3.25% in 
1979. This implies that during this period health care did not constitute a priority for 
the regime.94 This can be attributed to the fact that the regime diverted state 
resources to food subsidies after the events of 1977, as food subsidies proved to be 
more critical for the lives of middle and lower income groups. The major 
achievement in the realm of health care, under Sadat, has been the improvement in 
overall health standards. For example, the crude death rate declined from 15.1 per 
thousand in 1970 to 10.2 per thousand in 1981.95 
Sadat's Welfare State and the Social Contract 
Welfare provision continued to be one of the obligations of the regime in the social 
contract under Sadat. The expansion of the welfare state under Sadat's regime is 
reflected in the increase in the funds allocated to subsidies, and the number of 
subsidised food items. The regime's failure to meet its obligations of commitment 
to welfare provision represented an abrogation of the social contract for middle and 
lower income groups. This break of the social contract was signified in cancelling 
the subsidies on some essential food items. The harmed groups perceived these 
subsidies as their rights; the regime had proclaimed, since 1952, that citizens were 
entitled to welfare products, and that the state was responsible for their welfare. 
94 Sulaiman, A., Dirasah tahlUiyah li-mustawa al-khadamat al-sih~yah fi muhafazat gumhiiriyat 
Misr at- 'arab'iyah [An Analytical Study of the Level of Health Services in the Governorates of Arab 
Republic of Egypt], (Cairo: National Institute for Planning, January 1987), pp. 80-81 
95 Statistical Year Book, Arab Republic of Egypt 1952-1983, (Cairo: CAPMUS, 1984). pp. 30. 
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Thus, these groups had a right to resist the regime that broke the social contract; and 
they chose to use this right during the riots of 1977. 
The attack of demonstrators on private property in the riots of 1977 reflects the 
failure of the regime to create social peace among the privileged and 
underprivileged in society. The regime responded to social discontent by increasing 
the subsidies. This expansion, however, formed a burden on the Egyptian economy. 
Subsequently, the next regime had to deal with the challenge of managing Egypt's 
fiscal crisis and the retrenchment of the state, whilst maintaining its stability. 
Mubarak: Retrenchment of the Welfare State 
'Mubarak inherited a hybrid system which combined contradictory legacies of Nasir 
and Sadat.'96 Traces of Nasir's socialist policies have continued to prevail in many 
sectors of the economy. Furthermore, Nasir's heritage could be identified in a 
massive bureaucracy, a large public sector, a centrally planned economy, and a 
welfare state. 
These features were irreconcilable with Sadat's liberal policies signified in a 
'consumptive infitah', dependency on the United States, and the reliance of the 
regime upon the bourgeoisie.97 Sadat's infitah promoted a 'consumption' culture, 
96 Hinnebusch, R., "The Politics of Economic Reform in Egypt", Third World Quarterly, vol. 14, 
no. 1, 1993,pp. 159-160. 
97 Hinnebusch, R., "The Formation of the Contemporary Egyptian State from Nasser and Sadat to 
Mubarak", in I. M. Oweiss (ed.), The Political Economy of Contemporary Egypt, (Washington, 
D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1990), pp. 204. 
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through imports, which led to the emergence of a capitalist class that mainly relied 
upon connections (wasta) and corruption in conducting business. This class looked 
for quick profits, therefore, investing in projects geared towards consumption rather 
than production. As a consequence, Egypt was submerged into debt. 98 
Both legacies have been so entrenched in society, as they have their influential 
protective interest groups, that it has been difficult for Mubarak to foster one and 
ignore the other. Alternatively, the regime has attempted to apply 'incremental 
changes' to establish its own third way. Mubarak has aimed to create a liberal 
economy that emphasises production in order to disengage his regime from the 
corruption associated with the infitah policy. However, Mubarak, unlike his 
predecessors, has been less radical and more cautious in his approach. He did not 
want to antagonise the influential interest groups in society; he has persistently 
pursued stability at the expense of implementing substantive solutions to Egypt's 
economic ailments. Such an approach has acted as a constraint on Mubarak, and has 
prevented him from addressing Egypt's cumulative dilemmas.99 
Consequently, Mubarak has failed to address the problems that arose as a result of 
infitah, such as the spread of corruption, and the emergence of what came to be 
known as the 'fat cats', who exploited infitah policies to accumulate wealth. lnfitah 
produced millionaires, but it did not provide productive foreign investment at home, 
98 Hinnebusch, R., "The Politics of Economic Reform in Egypt", Third World Quanerly, vol. 14, 
no. 1, 1993, pp. 160. 
99 Hinnebusch, R., "The Formation of the Contemporary Egyptian State from Nasser and Sadat to 
Mubarak", in I. M. Oweiss (ed.), The Political Economy of Contemporary Egypt, (Washington, 
D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1990), pp. 204. 
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as foreign direct investment during the period 1974-78 amounted to less than 
US$300 million, most of which was invested in light consumer goods.100 Infitah 
failed to attract investment in both the industrial and agricultural sectors; 
meanwhile, it promoted the service sector, especially banking. The net effect was 
the widening of the gap between the rich and the poor. 101 
Failure to deal with the ailments of the economy led to a rise in the external debt 
from US$22.18 billion in 1981, to US$35.8 billion in 1985.102 Subsequently, 
negotiations with the IMF were initiated in 1986. The negotiations resulted in the 
rescheduling of civilian and military debt of US$12 billion (of which US$4.5 billion 
103 
was owed to the Gulf Arab states). 
At the beginning of his rule, Mubarak was reluctant to implement economic 
reforms, particularly economic restructuring which entailed privatisation104 
Mubarak understood that Sadat's pursuit of liberalisation undermined his popularity 
with many societal groups, especially industrial workers who had a vested interest 
in state industries. For Egyptian nationalists, the public sector has been, since 
100 Zaki, M., Egyptian Business Elites: Their Visions and Investment Behavior, (Berlin: Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung, 1999), pp. 83-87. 
101 Weinbaum, M., Egypt and the Politics of U.S. Economic Aid, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 
pp. 41-42. 
102 Me Dormett, Egypt from Nasser to Mubarak: A Flawed Revolution, (London: Croom Helm, 
1988), pp. 79. 
103 Butter, D., "Debt and Egypt's Financial Policies", in C. Tripp, and R. Owen (eds.), Egypt under 
Mubarak, (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 134-135. 
104 Moench, R., "Oil, Ideology and State Autonomy in Egypt", Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 10, no. 
2, spring 1988, pp. 180. 
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Nasir's era, a symbol of national independence. Even for those who recognised the 
necessity of reforms, dismantling the public sector was an unthinkable task. 
Therefore, Mubarak 'publicly' declared his commitment to '"no diminution and no 
sale of the public sector" (la masas wala bi' al-qita' al- 'amm)' .105 
But at the same time, the regime tried to discourage graduates from joining the 
public sector or civil service by making the waiting period to employment in these 
sectors longer. 106 The policy of guaranteed employment, introduced under Nasir's 
rule, has been a form of 'welfare handout' that the state could no longer sustain. 
Finally, the policy for guaranteed employment was dropped quietly for secondary 
school graduates in 1984, and for university graduates in 1985. Since then, the 
government and the public sector have employed graduates based on their 
• 107 
requrrements. 
The regime found it easier to submerge itself in external debt, rather than to 
increase taxes or reduce the size of the public sector, in order to bring expenditure 
in line with revenues, as the other options were more hazardous to the regime's 
weak legitimacy. 108 Hence, external debt accumulated rapidly reaching an 
unprecedented level of nearly US$51 billion in 1987. Real growth declined from 
105 Posusney, M., Labor and the State in Egypt: Workers, Unions. and Economic Restructuring, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 184. 
106 Posusney, M., Labor and the State in Egypt: Workers, Unions. and Economic Restructuring, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 181. 
107 Interview with an anonymous public official, 28 September 1999. 
108 Luciani, G., "Economic Foundation of Democracy and Authoritarianism: The Arab World in 
Comparative Perspective", Arab Studies Quanerly, vol. 10, no. 4, fall 1988, pp. 466. 
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9.9% in 1982/83 to 4.2% in 1986/87; the inflation rate was around 20%109 (see table 
4.6); and unemployment rate was as high as 20%. 110 
109 Some economists argue that the inflation rate was higher than the reported one. This is because 
the one that appears in official reports is based on the calculation of some goods at subsidised prices 
that are not available for consumers. Egypt: Country Repon, 1992, (London: The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 1992), pp. 20. 
110 Egypt: Country Repon, 1989-90, (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1989), pp. 17. 
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Table 4.6: Some economic indicators during the period 1981-90 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
I 
Current account -2.14 -1.85 -0.41 -1.16 -1.45 -1.29 -0.41 -1.19 -0.47 0.63 
in US$ billion 
External debt in 22.18 25.54 28.52 37.04 41.39 46.32 50.78 52.49 51.50 40.44 
US$ billion* 
Debt/GNP (%) 54.6 68.6 81.1 121.3 127.0 159.6 173.1 145.8 138.4 126.5 
Debt service/ 27.3 26.2 26.8 24.8 27.6 28.7 19.0 25.0 28.5 26.3 
exports ratio % 
Inflation** 10.4 14.9 16.6 17.1 12.1 23.9 19.7 17.6 21.3 16.8 
GDPgrowth 6.2 7.3 7.3 8.5 7.7 6.1 4.2 2.6 2.9 1.1 
' 
I 
----------
L___ ___ 
Source: Egypt: Country Repon, (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1986-94); and World Debt Tables: External Debt of Developing Countries, (Washington, D.C.: 
The World Bank, 1988-1992). 
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Thus, in May 1987, Egypt signed a reform agreement with the IMF that provided 
Egypt with a SDR 250 million standby credit over 18 months. Egypt benefited from 
this deal as US$6.5 billion owed to 17 OECD creditors was rescheduled with a ten-
year agreement. 111 A new realistic free market exchange rate was used, which 
meant a 40% devaluation of the Egyptian pound. However, consumers were 
protected from inflation by using a stronger rate for the import of basic goods, 
which constituted around 60% of total imports. On the other hand, the government 
agreed to eliminate subsidies on energy, and price distortions of agricultural 
products. This initiative undertaken by the Egyptian government encouraged the 
Paris Club to reschedule the outstanding arrears as of December 1986, interest, and 
principal payments due on government and government-guaranteed loans. 
However, by the end of the 1980s, Egypt had accumulated arrears on some of its 
payments, and the balance of payments deteriorated even further. 112 Implementation 
of economic reforms was imperative at this stage. 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait afforded Egypt the opportunity to adopt the painful 
contractionary reform policies more smoothly. 113 Egypt's participation in the US-
led coalition was rewarded with windfall gains that relived Egypt from its heavy 
debt-service. Egypt was rewarded for its 'upique contribution in galvanising 
international support against Iraqi aggression' by writing-off US$7 .1 billion (of 
111 Egypt: Country Profile, 1990-91, (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1990), pp. 44. 
112 Posusney, M., Labor and the State in Egypt: Workers, Unions, and Economic Restructuring, 
(York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 210. 
113 Hinnebusch, R., "The Politics of Economic Liberalization: Comparing Egypt and Syria", in H. 
Hakimian, and Z. Moshaver (eds.), The State and Global Chang: The Political Economy of 
Transition in the Middle East and Nonh Africa, (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2001), pp. 132. 
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which interest arrears and penalty charges amounted to US$2.55 billion) of its 
military debt to the US. 114 Moreover, the US exerted pressure on the IMF to be 
lenient in its terms of negotiations with Egypt, and to secure fmancial aid from 
Western and Gulf Arab states. 115 Subsequently, the Gulf Arab states wrote-off 
US$7 billion of Egyptian debt, and granted Egypt US$2 billion cash flows for 
participating in the liberation of Kuwait. 116 
Hence, in 1991, Egypt agreed with the IMF to adopt an Economic Reform and 
Structural Adjustment Programme (ERSAP). The regime always emphasised that 
the reforms did not compromise the national independence of Egypt in choosing its 
own economic path. In many of his speeches, Mubarak has stressed that economic 
policies proposed by the IMF were just recommendations, which the government 
could accept or decline. 117 The regime marketed these policies as reforms that 
would translate into a lower cost of living for the poor, and to transform the 
economy into a free market economy that would, eventually, lead to prosperity. 118 
114 Quoted in Egypt: Country Profile, 1991-92, (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1991), 
pp. 48. 
115 Egypt: Country Profile, 1990-91, (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1990), pp. 8-9. 
116 Egypt: Country Profile, 1990-91, (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1990), pp. 44. 
117 Zaki, M., Egyptian Business Elites: Their Visions and Investment Behavior, (Berlin: Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung, 1999), pp. 106. 
118 Butter, D., "Debt and Egypt's Financial Policies", in C. Tripp, and R. Owen (eds.), Egypt under 
Mubarak, (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 124. 
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Social Welfare 
Economic difficulties forced the regime to adopt economic reforms. These reforms 
entailed reducing the state intervention in the economy. One of the implications of 
the curtailment of the state was the retrenchment of the welfare state. This 
retrenchment was a response to the fiscal crisis in the absence of sources to fmance 
welfare expenditure. The regime was able to rationalise the state while avoiding 
mass riots because of employing several techniques, such as obfuscation of 
'winners and losers' of the privatisation process, or by not announcing the adopted 
austerity measures, as was the case with food subsidies. 119 However, the economic 
reforms have hurt middle and lower income groups, who have to face economic 
hardships due to the rescinding of the welfare state, especially in the area of food 
subsidy. 
Food Subsidies 
In 1980, food subsidy encompassed 18 items, and amounted to 17% of total 
government expenditure. 120 Aware of the significance of food subsidies for the 
social contract, Mubarak's regime had to face the challenge of cutting down the cost 
of subsidy, in order to reduce the budget deficit, without undermining regime 
legitimacy. The regime views food subsides as a political and social issue due to 
119 Zaki, M., Egyptian Business Elites: Their Visions and Investment Behavior, (Berlin: Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung, 1999), pp. 105-106. 
120 Ali, S., and Adams, R., "The Egyptian Food Subsidy System: Operation and Effects on Income 
Distribution", World Development, vol. 24, no. 11, November 1996, pp. 1777. 
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their significance for middle and lower income groups. 121 It recognises that the 
elimination of subsidies may lead to popular upheavals. Thus, successive 
governments under Mubarak tried to reduce the cost of the subsidy by phasing out 
the subsidy or reducing the proportion of population covered by the subsidy 
programme. 
For example, in 1981, the government reduced the level of subsidy by dividing 
holders of ration cards into two 'categories', fully subsidised (green cards); and 
partially subsidised (red cards). Green cards covered public sector or government 
employees; those claiming pension or social insurance; those who are in irregular, 
seasonal or temporary employment; widows and divorcees of members of the 
aforementioned categories; owners of 10 feddans or less; and Sudanese, 
Palestinians, and political refugees residing in Egypt. 122 Holders of red ration cards, 
on the other hand, included private sector employees or individuals earning high 
incomes; and owners of 10 feddans or more. 123 
Additionally, the government removed the subsidy from some commodities, such as 
beans, lentils, and frozen meat, in spite of the regime's declared commitment to the 
food subsidy programme. Raising the prices of commodities separately meant that 
121 Ayalon, A., "Egypt (Jumhuriyyat Misr al-'Arabiyya)", Middle East Contemporary Survey, vol. 
XIII, 1989, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 296. 
122 In 1996 (Law No. 152) the last group was removed from the list entitled to green cards. 
123 Egypt Human Development Report 1997/98, (Cairo: Institute of National Planning, 1998), pp. 
70; and Law No. 483/1987, al-Waqii'i' al-misriyah [Egyptian Events], issue 187, 20 August 1987, 
pp. 932-934. 
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the population has not experienced a drastic increase in the cost of living.124 The 
slow process of phasing out subsidies has involved raising the prices of some 
products slowly but steadily, and introducing different packages of the product for 
higher prices. For example, in 1984, the price of baladi bread was effectively 
raised, as the weight of the loaf sold for P.T.1 was reduced from 140 grams to 69 
grams, and an 'improved loaf sold for P.T.2 was introduced alongside the ordinary 
loaf, which was made less available at bakeries, until it was phased out totally. 125 
After signing the agreement with the IMF in 1987, the prices of some commodities, 
for example, sugar and cigarettes, were increased by 20%. However, Mubarak 
declared an exceptional raise of 20% for all employees on the public payroll in 
order to pre-empt any protests that may have arisen due to the rise in prices of these 
commodities. The result of this raise was that the government was unable to meet 
its promised cut in its expenditures. 126 
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the government managed to gradually cut 
down the size of the subsidy as a percentage of government expenditure and 
GDP. 127 The government has employed 'psychological conditioning' in phasing out 
124 Springborg, R., "Egypt", Economic and Political Liberalization in the Middle East, in T. 
Niblock, and E. Murphy (eds.), (London: British Academic Press, 1993), pp. 149. 
125 
'Abd al-Raziq, H., "Nabnu wa al-ra'rs wa mashakil al-nas [We and the President and the 
Problems of the People]", in Lihazii nu 'iirid Mubiirak [For This We Oppose Mubarak], (Cairo: Al-
Abalr, 1987), pp. 305. 
126 Posusney, M., Labor and the State in Egypt: Workers, Unions, and Economic Restructuring, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 199. 
127 Egypt Human Development Repon 1997/98, (Cairo: Institute of National Planning, 1998), pp. 
68. 
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subsidies. Instead of eliminating subsidies outright, it has provided goods/services 
of low quality, and through delayed delivery, thereby forcing people to seek these 
commodities elsewhere in the market. 128 This policy has produced the desired 
result, as people have become more tuned to price increases, and there have been no 
major mass protests over price increases. Thus, by 1995, only four items were 
subsidised, namely, wheat flour (82% extraction), bread, edible oil (0.5 kg per 
person monthly), and sugar (1 kg per person monthly); and food subsidies 
constituted 6% of total government expenditure and 5.5% of GDP.129 
Education 
Expansion in education remained a priority under Mubarak. Expenditure on 
education as a percentage of social spending increased from 24.6% in 1981/82 to 
60% in 1994/95.130 Expenditure on education as a percentage of government 
expenditure, in 1994/95, reached 14.9%, of which 66.7% went to pre-primary, 
primary, and secondary education, and the rest went to tertiary education. 131 
Accordingly, literacy rates increased from 39.2% in 1976 to 44.5% in 1986 and 
55.5% in 1996. Gross enrolment in basic education increased by 97% during the 
128 Harik, 1., "Subsidization Policies in Egypt: Neither Economic Growth Nor Distribution", 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 24, 1992, pp. 497. 
129 Egypt Human Development Report 1997/98, (Cairo: Institute of National Planning, 1998), pp. 
69-71. 
130 Egypt Human Development Repon 1997/98, (Cairo: Institute of National Planning, 1998), pp. 
37. 
131 Human Development Report 2000, (New York: Oxford University Press, published for UNDP), 
pp. 163, 196. 
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period 1980-1996/97. The number of pre-university schools increased by 12% 
during the period 1991/92-1995/96.132 However, most of the expansion in pre-
university education under Mubarak's rule was achieved at the preparatory and 
secondary levels, as is detected in the tables below. 
Table 4.7: Expansion in enrolment in primary, preparatory, and secondary 
education during the period 1981/82-1997/98 
Stage of % Growth 1981/82-
1981/82 1992/93 1997/98 
Education 1997198 
Primary 4,748,414 6,333,703 7,499,303 57.93 
Preparatory 1,652,949 3,344,246 3,927,445 137.60 
Secondary 1,209,060 2,192,526 2,701,621 123.45 
Total 7,610,423 11,870,475 14,128,369 85.64 
Source: al-Maliimih al- 'iimah li-siyiisat al-ri 'iiyah al-igtmii 'iyah fi al-ta 'lim qabl al-giimi 'i [The 
General Features of the Social Care Policy in Pre-university Education], (Cairo: The Regional Arab 
Office for Research and Documentation in Social Science, 1988), pp. 26-28.; and National 
Statistics, (Cairo: Ministry of Education, several issues). 
Nevertheless, according to Al-Ahiill, expansion in education, under Mubarak, is not 
as impressive as it seems. Although the budget of education doubled between 1981 
and the early 1990s, the real value of expenditure on education (after adjusting for 
inflation) did not change; in fact, it decreased. In addition, 40% of school buildings 
are not in a good condition, and the density of students in classrooms reached 60 
students. 133 
132 Egypt Human Development Report 1997/98, (Cairo: Institute of National Planning, 1998), pp. 
33. 
133 Al-Ahiili, Wednesday 17 May 2000, pp. 4. 
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Furthermore, in spite of the expansion in free education, which was decreed as a 
universal right in the 1971 Constitution, 134 not everyone enjoys this right. This is 
because of constraints related to sex, family background, fees, and geographical 
location of family135 - as some places in Egypt have no access to schools.136 The 
implication of this is that lower income groups have less access to education. This 
was confirmed by an unpublished report prepared by the People's Assembly in 
2000, which pointed out that 43% of low-income groups are illiterate, and 40% of 
them have finished their primary education only. 137 Sometimes poor families need 
the income of their children so they make them leave education to provide a 
supplement source of income for the household. 138 
Moreover, upper income groups can afford better education for their children, even 
those attending state schools, through private lessons. 139 In general, children from 
134 Education was declared as compulsory in iiS ftrst stage and free in state school in 1956 
Constitution as well as the provisional one in 1958. The 1964 Constitution extended free education 
to all stages in state schools and even the university. This was retained in 1971 Constitution. In 
1981, compulsory education was extended to the preparatory stage, which was added to the primary 
stage; and they both became known as basic education. See Takiifii' al-furas .fi al-siyiisah al-
ta'limiyah.fi Misr [Equal Opportunities in Educational Policy in Egypt], (Cairo: The National Centre 
for Social and Criminal Research and Labour Force, 1991), pp. 63-66. 
135 Williamson, B., Education and Social Change in Egypt and Turkey: A Study in Historical 
Sociology, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987}, pp. 127. 
136 Takiifii' al-furas .fi al-siyiisah al-ta' lfmiyah .fi Misr [Equal Opportunities in Educational Policy in 
Egypt], (Cairo: The National Centre for Social and Criminal Research and Labour Force, 1991), pp. 
88-89. 
137 Al-Ahiili, Wednesday 17 May 2000, pp. 4. 
138 Tabalah, Z., Wiiqi' al-ta'lim al-i'diidf wa kaifiyat tatwiruh [The Reality of the Preparatory 
Education and the Mechanism of iiS Devlopment], (Cairo: Centre of National Planning, 1994), pp. 
43. 
139 Sabagh, G., "Migration and Social Mobility in Egypt", in M. Kerr, and S. Yassin (eds.), Rich 
and Poor States in the Middle East: Egypt and the New Arab Order, (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1982), pp. 87. 
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poor families have lower chances of finishing their education (this was confirmed 
through the fieldwork conducted by the researcher) due to absence, repetition, and 
eventually drop out;140 and, hence, they have a lower chance of obtaining well-paid 
jobs than their counterparts from well-to-do families, who are able to complete their 
university studies. Thus, the principle of equal rights to education, as stipulated in 
the Constitution, is violated. 141 
This difference between children from a low socio-economic background and those 
from a higher one is amplified by the positive correlation between performance at 
school and the financial and educational background of parents, the environment at 
home, and the occupation of the father, as detected through empirical studies. 142 
Also, the presence of different kinds of schools (state, experimental, and private), 
which offer different skills for different fees, produces individuals with different 
qualifications. This system deepens socio-economic inequalities in society. In other 
words, parents from higher socio-economic background send their children to better 
schools, in terms of facilities and language teaching; and they receive better 
140 According to a study undertaken by El-Shikhaby, general secondary students with lower 
socioeconomic background tend to score lower than those from higher socioeconomic one. The 
process is further accentuated by the state, which supplies high socioeconomic areas with more 
qualified teachers and better facilities. Cited in McDonald, M., "Egyptian Education and 
Development", Journal of Arab Affairs, vol. 5, no. 1, spring 1986, pp. 73. 
141 McDonald, M., "Egyptian Education and Development", Journal of Arab Affairs, vol. 5, no. 1, 
spring 1986, pp. 73. 
142 Takiifii' al-furas fi al-siyiisah al-ta 'limiyah fi Misr [Equal Opportunities in Educational Policy in 
Egypt], (Cairo: The National Centre for Social and Criminal Research and Labour Force, 1991), pp. 
108-110. 
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education in these schools. Consequently, they obtain better jobs, thereby, 
perpetuating inequalities in society. 143 
This multiple system of education has expanded under Mubarak's rule. Thus, the 
share of household expenditure on education has been rising. In other words, free 
education has continued to diminish under Mubarak, as school fees (even in state 
schools) have risen dramatically; fees for primary, preparatory, and secondary 
education rose from E£2, E£3, and E£4 in 1985, to E£21.60, E£34; to E£56 in 1999 
respectively. 144 Although students do not pay tuition fees for education in state 
schools, education in these schools is not free, despite the official rhetoric of free 
education in Egypt. Students pay school fees under different names, such as 
parents' council, activities, examination, and admission fees. In addition, they pay 
for group studies at school, external textbooks, and private tutoring. Those who can 
afford private education pay more fees to receive better education, and enhance 
their chances in life.145 
Inequality in opportunity for lower income groups has been exacerbated by the 
abrogation of guaranteed employment. This meant that upward mobility for lower 
143 Takiifii' al-jurasfi al-siyiisah al-ta'llmlyahfi Misr [Equal Opportunities in Educational Policy in 
Egypt], (Cairo: The National Centre for Social and Criminal Research and Labour Force, 1991), pp. 
105. 
144 Ihsii'lylit wiziirat al-tarbiyah wa al-ta'lim [Ministry of Education Statistics], (Cairo: The 
Ministry of Education, 1985, 1999). 
145 Egypt Human Development Repon 1997198, (Cairo: Institute of National Planning, 1998), pp. 
35-36. 
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income groups through education is blocked, 146 especially in the absence of 
alternative employment opportunities in the private sector, which could not absorb 
all graduates from the education system. 
Public Health Care 
In Egypt, health care is available through four main channels: 
• Public hospitals and clinics; 
• Health insurance system (covers government employees, industrial workers, and 
school students); 
• PVOs (mainly affiliated to religious institutions); 
• Private polyclinics and hospitals. 
The health care system in Egypt is fmanced through various sources, such as 
general revenue, social insurance, and external donors. Public health services are 
provided through a network of health facilities owned and managed by the state. 
The Ministry of Health has over than 3,700 primary, secondary and tertiary health 
care facilities, and over 95% of the population live within five kilometres of a 
government health facility. The state expenditure on health (including the 
government and public sector) represents 44% of total expenditure on health; the 
146 Ebeid, M., "The Role of the Official Opposition", in C. Tripp, and R. Owen (eds.), Egypt under 
Mubarak, (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 45. 
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rest 1s financed by the private sector. 147 This implies that the majority of 
expenditure on health care is borne by households and the private sector. 
The main achievement in the health sector during Mubarak's rule has been the 
school health insurance scheme. 
The School Health Insurance Programme 
Mrs Suzanne Mubarak has shown a commitment to the improvement of the welfare 
of children. 'The 1980s was declared the Decade of the Child in Egypt.' In 1992, 
that the People's Assembly passed Law No. 99 that extended health insurance to 
students in schools. The result of extending health insurance to students in schools 
was increasing the number of citizens insured under the HIO from 3.75 million in 
1988 to 14 million in 1993, to 25 million in 1999. Therefore, the percentage of the 
population covered rose from 5% in 1988 to 25% in 1993, to 37% in 1999. 148 
Covering children at school has three main benefits. First, it helps improve 
children's, especially those from lower socio-economic background, access to 
health care. Second, comprehensive health insurance policies can be negotiated 
147 Nandakumar, A., M. Chawla, and M. Khan, "Utilization of Outpatient Care in Egypt and Its 
Implications for the Role of Government in Health Care Provision", World Development, vol. 28, 
no. 1, January 2000, pp. 188. 
148 Nandakumar, A., M. R. Reich, M. Chawla, P. Berman, and W. Yip, "Health Reform for 
Children: The Egyptian Experience with School Health Insurance", Health Policy, vol. 50, no. 3, 
January 2000, pp. 159-160; Egypt: Country Profile, 2000, (London: The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 1990), pp. 51; and Taqrlr al-mutiiba'h al-sanawy'f 'an nashiit al-hay'ah khiliil 'iim 19989199 
[The Annual Report of the Activity of the Organisation for year 1998/99], (Cairo: National Health 
Organisation, 2000), pp. 1. 
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using school populations as 'an effective grouping mechanism'. Finally, it promotes 
awareness about health care for the children as well as for parents. 149 
For fmancing the programme, each child pays an insurance annual premium of E£4, 
and the government pays E£12 per child, half of which is raised from a cigarette 
consumption tax ofP.T.lO per 20 cigarettes packet, earmarked for this purpose, and 
the rest comes from general revenues of the government. In addition, parents make 
a co-payment of one-third of the costs of prescription drugs, for treatment of non-
chronic conditions. Other sources of funding include co-payments, other charges, 
donations, and interest earnings on investments. 150 
In evaluating this programme, one should look at the equity of the system. The 
system is biased towards urban regions, especially Cairo, which have better 
facilities both in terms of personnel and equipment because they receive more 
funding. Furthermore, the system only covers the children enrolled in school. 
According to Egypt Household Health Care Use and Expenditure Survey 
(EHHUES), which was carried out by the Egyptian Ministry of Health and Data for 
Decision Making Project in 1994-95, nearly 70% of school age children are not 
enrolled in schools, 30% of whom come from the lowest income quintile. This 
149 Nandakumar, A., M. R. Reich, M. Chawla, P. Berman, and W. Yip, "Health Reform for 
Children: The Egyptian Experience with School Health Insurance", Health Policy, vol. 50, no. 3, 
January 2000, pp. 156. 
150 Law No. 99/1992, Article 3, in Zaki, M., Z. Husain, and F. 'Afifi, Tahsln khadmiit al-ta'mln al-
sihylli-talomiz al-marhalah al- 'uta min al-ta 'lim al-asasr: dirasah istiksha.fiyah [Improving Health 
Insurance Services for the Students of the First Stage of Education: An Exploratory Study], (Cairo: 
The Ministry of Education, 1993), pp. 71-72. 
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means that many of the children from a low socio-economic background are 
excluded from the system. 151 
It is also questionable whether the government will be able to sustain such a 
programme, given the limited resources of the state and the increase of new student 
enrolment of 6% every year, and repetition, which is a common problem of the 
education system, especially primary schooling, in Egypt. 152 
It should be noted that this scheme was viable due to two factors. First, it is 
relatively easy to mobilise support for this insurance scheme; second, the scheme is 
possible to administer because this group of beneficiaries is easy to target. On the 
other hand, such welfare reforms have proved very problematic to dismantle, when 
difficulties arise due to limitations of administration and/or funding. 153 
In spite of the improvements in the standard of health of the population, as 
reflected, for example, in a declining infant morality rate (from 40 per thousand in 
1989 to 28.7 per thousand in 1996), 154 rising life expectancy (from 60.5 and 63.5 in 
151 Nandakumar, A., M. R. Reich, M. Chawla, P. Berman, and W. Yip, "Health Reform for 
Children: The Egyptian Experience with School Health Insurance", Health Policy, vol. 50, no. 3, 
January 2000, pp. 167. 
152 Nandakumar, A., M. R. Reich, M. Chawla, P. Berman, and W. Yip, "Health Reform for 
Children: The Egyptian Experience With School Health Insurance", Health Policy, vol. 50, no. 3, 
January 2000, pp. 167-168. 
153 Nandakumar, A., M. R. Reich, M. Chawla, P. Berman, and W. Yip, "Health Reform for 
Children: The Egyptian Experience with School Health Insurance", Health Policy, vol. 50, no. 3, 
January 2000, pp. 169-170. 
154 Egypt Human Development Report 1997/98, (Cairo: Institute of National Planning, 1998), pp. 
53. 
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1986 to 66.7 and 71.5 in 2001 for male and female respectively),155 government 
expenditure in the health sector has been modest. According to an unpublished 
report prepared by the People's Assembly in 2000, health expenditure in Egypt in 
1999 amounted to no more than 1.6% of the GDP, whilst in other LDCs and 
'Western' countries, this percentage amounts to 2%, and 2.9% respectively. The 
government contributed only 28.9% to health care expenditure, and the HIO bears 
14.1 %, whereas the households' share is 54.2%. The report also notes that the poor 
allocate most of their income to 'inferior' health services, as they spend 4.9% of 
their income on health services compared to 3.8% for the rich. Total expenditure on 
using health services in Egypt is distributed as follows: 56% medicine, 36% private 
clinics, and less than 10% for hospitals. The low figure for hospitals probably 
reflects the reluctance of people to use these facilities due to the inferior conditions 
of public hospitals, and the prohibitively expensive services offered by private 
ones.
156 
Due to limited funding, public hospitals have suffered from a shortage in supplies 
and pharmaceutical drugs. As a result, consumers are dissatisfied with these 
services.157 Accordingly, outpatient customers of public hospitals declined by 23% 
during the period 1982-1993.158 Customers prefer to use private facilities, despite 
155 Statistical Year Book 1992-1998, (Cairo: CAPMUS, 1999), pp. 32. 
156 Al-Ahiill, Wednesday 17 May 2000, pp. 4. 
157 Egypt: Alleviating Poverty during Structural Adjustment, (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 
1991), pp. 117. 
158 Egypt Human Development Report 1997/98, (Cairo: Institute of National Planning, 1998), pp. 
62. 
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being more expensive, to receive a service of better quality in terms of competence 
and care of sta:ff.159 
Mubrark's Welfare State and the Social Contract 
Thus, faced with economic difficulties, the regime has been compelled to retrench 
the Egyptian state under Mubarak. The economic reforms undertaken in the 1990s 
have made many groups vulnerable, at least in the short run.160 The regime has 
initiated a process of cutting down the size of the public sector, through a series of 
austerity measures taken upon the recommendations of the IMF after adopting 
structural reforms in 1991. The implication of this retrenchment has been the 
decline of the welfare state, as the main provider of welfare for middle and lower 
income groups, especially in food subsidies. Although investment in education has 
risen under Mubarak, the benefits for middle and lower income groups have been 
eroded by the rising cost of education for households. The main gain achieved was 
in the health sector, especially with the school health insurance scheme. 
In response to the failure of the state to carry out its welfare functions effectively, 
the voluntary sector is reasserting itself. The voluntary sector has emerged as a 
prominent agent in the area of welfare provision. This acts as a challenge to state 
legitimacy, as the public is looking for support from PVOs. 161 
159 See the discussion of the fieldwork in chapter 5. 
16
° Korany, B., "Restricted Democratization from Above: Egypt", in B. Korany, R. Brynen, and P. 
Noble (eds.), Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, vol. 2, (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 60. 
161 Sullivan, D., Private Voluntary Organizations in Egypt: Islamic Development, Private Initiative, 
and State Control, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994), pp. 66. 
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As a consequence, the state has been losing power vis-a-vis society because its role 
as the provider has diminished. This signifies the need to redefme the social 
contract, since the regime's promise to address the economic problems of Egypt has 
not translated into better economic conditions for the majority of the population. 
The regime is aware that the state is not 'powerful enough to impose' the austerity 
measures without 'consensus'. 162 The regime has moved more towards a free 
market economy, strengthening its ties with the private sector in general, and with 
businessmen in particular. This is because businessmen are the group that will 
benefit most from economic liberalisation and a free market economy. 
Middle and lower income groups have lost out, at least in the short run. They have, 
therefore, become more alienated from the regime. The challenge of the regime will 
be to find an alternative formula for the contract that can take the interest of these 
large segments of the population into consideration, and hence act as a durable 
source of legitimacy. 
Conclusion 
Egyptian regimes have always tried to preserve their autonomy and limit the ability 
of their populations to influence policy-making. To this end, they have portrayed 
themselves as the guardians of the 'common interest', who endeavour to achieve 
adopted, domestic and international, objectives. They have offered their populations 
welfare and patronage to give up their political rights and liberties. The main 
162 Bianchi, R., Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth-century Egypt, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 89. 
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beneficiaries from welfare policies have been middle and lower income groups. 
These groups have bought into the contract because they have benefited from 
welfare policies, which have ranged from land reform, food subsidies, free 
education and health care, and guaranteed employment. 163 
This has allowed Egyptian regimes to enjoy a considerable autonomy in steering the 
country according to their visions. Nevertheless, the support they have enjoyed has 
been conditioned by the ability of the regime to provide the promised welfare. Once 
resources dried up, and the regime was unable to honour its part of the contract, 
recipients of welfare products withdrew their support; this was exemplified in the 
riots of 1977 when Sadat reduced food subsidies. Accordingly, the regime had to 
maintain the welfare state, and/or redefme the formula of the contract. 
The welfare state, therefore, acts as a safety valve for the regime; it provides middle 
and lower income households with goods and services that may otherwise be 
prohibitively expensive and beyond the means of these households. The inability of 
these households to secure a supply of these products can be a source of resentment, 
which can be threatening to regime stability. Welfare provision has, therefore, 
constituted a major component of the obligations of Egyptian regimes, according to 
the social contract they have drawn with society since 1952. In other words, welfare 
provision has served as a legitimising tool for Egyptian regimes, as long they were 
able to meet this obligation. 
163 Weinbaum, M., Egypt and the Politics of U.S. Economic Aid, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 
pp. 131. 
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The state has adopted welfare policies, since the 1952 revolution, to improve the 
conditions of middle and lower income groups. 164 Thus, Nasir's policies raised the 
expectations of middle and lower income groups through the extension of free 
education and health care, and guaranteed employment as the rights of citizens. 
These welfare products afforded them an opportunity for upward mobility. The 
process of rising expectations was 'fuelled' by the consumerist policies of Sadat's 
infitah. 
Mubarak tried to maintain the welfare state to preserve the stability of his regime; 
he appeased middle and lower income groups through the maintenance of a large 
public sector, the provision of subsidised foodstuff, and education and health care 
nearly free of charge. However, this was so costly for the public purse, given 
Egypt's meagre resources. The fiscal crisis of the state, in the mid-1980s, dictated 
the adoption of economic reforms. Escalating economic pressures on the state 
commanded the retreat of the state from its patriarchal role, especially in the area of 
welfare provision, and the withdrawal of some of the 'rights' it had conferred upon 
its citizens. This has led to the disappointment of the expectations of middle and 
1 . 165 ower mcome groups. 
However, after welfare benefits have been presented to the populace as rights, based 
on their citizenship, for nearly five decades, the holders of these rights are reluctant 
164 Egypt: Alleviating Poverty during Structural Adjustment, (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 
1991), pp. 1. 
165 MacLeod, A., "The New Veiling and Urban Crisis: Symbolic Politics in Cairo", in M. Bonine 
(ed.), Population, Poverty, and Politics in Middle East Cities, (Gainesville: University Press of 
Florida, 1997), pp. 313-322. 
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to give up their rights. Thus, Mubarak's regime has to be cautious in dismantling 
the welfare state; welfare benefits have been eroded slowly but steadily, signified in 
the declining food subsidy as a percentage of government expenditure and GOP, 
and the rising share of household contribution to the cost of education at state 
schools. 
After we have traced the rise, expansion and retrenchment of welfare policies, we 
can conclude that there has been a welfare state in Egypt, though short-lived. The 
welfare state constituted an essential component of the social contract formula since 
1952. The three Egyptian regimes have continually redefmed the terms of the 
contract to preserve their rule, and maintain their autonomy vis-a-vis society. This 
was reflected in the rise, expansion and retrenchment of welfare provision during 
the rule of Nasir, Sadat and Mubarak respectively. A<> resources dried up, at 
different stages during the rule of the three regimes, they were compelled to curtail 
the welfare state, but have reluctantly offered the population more political freedom 
instead. 
Now that we have presented a macro picture of the welfare state in Egypt since its 
rise under Nasir, we will explore welfare provision at the micro level in the late 
1990s. We will examine the attitudes and perceptions of a sample of lower income 
households of welfare products offered by the state in the areas of food subsidies, 
education, and health care, through a fieldwork conducted by the researcher in 
Cairo during the period 1998-99. This will illustrate how efficient the Egyptian state 
is in delivering welfare products in the aforementioned areas, according to these 
280 
households, and how far the state meets the expectations of the recipients from the 
state. 
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Chapter Five 
Fieldwork 
Introduction 
In the last chapter, we looked at the development of the Egyptian welfare state since 
the revolution. We examined the rise of welfare policies during Nasir's rule as a 
means to appeal to middle and lower income groups. We also discussed the 
expansion of welfare provision under Sadat, particularly, after his liberal Western 
orientated policies, signified in infitah, had not delivered the expected prosperity to 
the majority of the population. Finally, we explored the retrenchment of the welfare 
state under Mubarak because of the state's financial burdens. 
Since the 1952 revolution, Egyptian regimes have constantly stressed their 
commitment to raising the welfare of lower income groups. Egyptian leaders have 
assumed a paternal role towards lower income groups by taking on the 
responsibility to provide for them. To this end, successive governments have 
adopted various policies, such as land reform, subsidies, and income transfers. They 
have manipulated welfare policies to reach these segments of society, after blocking 
avenues of political participation, which could have acted as a vehicle for 
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generating support for the regime, but could have also become a forum for 
challenging its power, and hindering the evolvement of a strong civil society. 
In the light of fifty years of a declared commitment to improve the welfare of lower 
income groups, this chapter aims to look at how lower income households are faring 
in the late 1990s under the prevalent system of welfare in three main areas, food 
subsidies, education, and health care. In this chapter, we will assess the relevance of 
these welfare policies to lower income groups in the late 1990s through a fieldwork 
undertaken by the researcher between December 1998 and October 1999. 
The fieldwork will contribute to our understanding of the access of lower income 
groups to these goods and services and their dependency on the state. It will also 
shed some light on the value of these goods and services to lower income 
households, and how these households perceive the quantity and/or quality of these 
goods and services. This is important for the purpose of the research, as it will show 
how successful the regime has been in providing for these segments of society; in 
other words, how successful the regime has been in fulfilling one of its main 
obligations of the social contract. The author argues that expectations and 
perceptions of lower income groups of welfare provision by the state have been 
shaped by Egyptian regimes since 1952. They perceive welfare provided by the 
state as their right; it is the obligation of the state to meet their welfare needs. 
First, we will discuss the methodology and the design of the fieldwork. Then we 
will look at the sampling technique, the criteria for selecting the sample, and the 
sample. After considering the questionnaire, we will present the results and discuss 
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them. Finally, the concluding section notes the limitations of the study and suggests 
some recommendations for further research on the subject. 
Methodology 
In order to evaluate how the regime has fulfilled its obligation of the social contract 
with reference to lower income groups through welfare provision, we need to 
investigate people's perception of the adequacy of the quantity and quality of goods 
and services provided by the state. A fieldwork asking lower income households 
about their perceptions was the optimal solution. The ideal solution would have 
been to ask the subjects about their expectations from the state and whether they 
thought the state was fulfilling its obligations towards them. However, this was not 
possible as such research areas are prohibited in Egypt. The researcher, therefore, 
conducted a field study, between December 1998 and October 1999, in order to 
evaluate people's perceptions of welfare programmes in Egypt, in the areas of food 
subsidies, education, and health, in the late 1990s, and their contribution to 
improving the welfare of lower income groups. The researcher investigated whether 
these goods and services were utilised by these income groups and how they 
assessed them. 
The fieldwork comprised three elements: a structured survey, focus groups, and 
interviews with heads of some religious organisations. 
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Structured Survey 
The structured survey investigated how far low income households depended on the 
state as their provider in their consumption of the afore-mentioned goods and 
services. It also examined their perceptions of the quantity and quality of these 
products. Alternative coping mechanisms, mainly seeking support from religious 
organisations, were also explored. 
A pilot study of 10 cases was carried out before conducting the survey to make sure 
that the questions were clear, easily understood by the respondents, logical in order, 
and elicited answers. This was very useful for the researcher, as some of the 
questions needed modification. For example, the two questions (19 and 21) 
enquiring when respondents sought medical treatment for adults and children in the 
household, originally, the researcher had prepared an exhaustive list of illness, and 
respondents were supposed to choose as many as applied to them. This proved to be 
too complicated and time consuming, taking into consideration that the researcher 
who filled in the questionnaire herself had to read out the list to them, so the 
researcher had to reduce the answers to two responses 'everything' or 'only in 
serious illness'. This, however, compromised the information obtained, as the 
responses of the subjects depended on what they considered 'serious' rather than a 
predefined list of illness. 
The order of question 7 and 8 needed to be changed, as people who did not possess 
ration cards did not need to choose a preferred type of subsidy. The researcher also 
had to change question 9 on consumption as some of the items, such as poultry and 
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fruit were originally expressed in money terms, but respondents found it easier to 
recall quantities. 
In the education section, questions 10 and lla, a 'does not apply' box had to be 
added for those who were exempted from paying fees. 
In the health section, in questions 20 and 22, ranking the facilities that respondents 
would use in seeking medical treatment had to be taken out, as they were too 
complicated because respondents did not fill in the questionnaire themselves. In 
question 23, where respondents were asked whether they agreed/disagreed with 
statements about the services they used, originally, the question was to specify 
whether they 'strongly agreed', 'agreed', 'neutral', 'disagreed', or 'strongly 
disagreed'; however, as it was too confusing for the respondents, the question was 
limited to 'agree', 'neutral', 'disagree', and 'does not apply' was added. 
Also when explaining some questions, the researcher had to use simple language, 
and avoid using terms that might be unfamiliar to some subjects, especially illiterate 
ones, such as mu 'ahil ta 'lfmi (educational qualification), and da 'm (subsidy). 
Focus Groups 
The researcher also used focus groups to give more insight into the structured 
survey. The researcher held 4 sessions of 30 minutes each with 4 different groups of 
3-5 women. Participants were asked to discuss their living conditions in general, 
and specific issues related to the questionnaire, such as problems perceived with 
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ration cards, the importance of education, and their assessment of health care 
facilities that they usually visited. The discussions provided in-depth material that 
proved to be very beneficial to the interpretation of the data. 
Interviews 
The researcher conducted personal interviews with some of the heads of religious 
organisations (Muslim and Coptic Orthodox). The purpose of these interviews was 
to get some information about the activities of these organisations, and the way they 
had developed recently, and how they served their communities. Also, the criteria 
for deciding whether a candidate could be placed on their list of deserving poor 
were considered. 
Interviews with leaders in Muslim organisations (MOs) revealed that, in general, 
MOs offer assistance in cash and kind to their beneficiaries. Regular monthly cash 
assistance is provided only to orphans (usually E£5-10 per child), who are in 
education. This assistance stops at the age of 16, or before if the child drops out of 
education before this age. In-kind assistance includes free lessons, and free health 
care services to orphans registered with them, only if these facilities are provided by 
the association in question. They also provide free medicine prescribed by their 
doctors if it is available at their facilities. This type of assistance is, however, 
diminishing due to the provision of free health insurance at schools. Additionally, in 
Eids (jitr and adhii), MOs distribute food items to poor families within their 
vicinity. 
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Christian organisations (COs) (churches or associations), on the other hand, provide 
monthly payments to households classified as deserving poor. Although these 
payments differ from one organisation to another, they range between E£10 and 
E£40 per family. COs are different from their Muslim counterparts in the extent and 
range of assistance they provide to their beneficiaries. COs pay (full or partial) 
school tuition fees for those who cannot afford them, and some of them offer free 
lessons for poor school children. They also provide free health care to the poor, by 
referring whom they consider poor to an affiliated health facility, or sometimes 
even paying the fee for a private doctor; in many cases, they also provide prescribed 
free medicine in cases where the sick person cannot afford it. 
Due to the sensitivity of the subject of the study, names and identities of all those 
who facilitated the research and contributed to the fieldwork will be kept 
anonymous in order to protect them. 
Study Design 
In this study, the unit of analysis is the household. The researcher found the 
household more useful than the individual for two primary reasons. First, family 
plays a central role in everyday life of Egyptians, especially lower-income groups, 
as it offers financial and moral support. 1 This is particularly conspicuous at times 
when market solutions fail, as many of these people are unskilled and they are 
involved in casual employment. This leads to the second point, which is that 
1 Singerman, D., and H. Hoodfar (eds.), "Introduction: The Household as Mediator: Political 
Economy, Development, and Gender in Contemporary Cairo", in Development, Change, and Gender 
in Cairo: A View from the Household, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. xvii. 
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members of a household tend to benefit from living together by pooling their 
incomes, especially when several members of the household are employed, or 
sometimes by not contributing any income yet enjoying food consumption with the 
household. 
The researcher studied households from a lower income area in Cairo. This area 
was chosen because the researcher had a network of local contacts, who could 
provide access to households. Because of the sensitivity of the topic, as some 
questions deal with revenues and everyday expenditures, trust was important so that 
people could reveal information about their living conditions. Food expenditures, 
particularly, proved to be a sensitive issue for lower income households, as some 
people seemed to be ashamed of their low levels of consumption of certain items, 
such as beef and fruit, which exposed their poor standard of living. 
Sampling 
The main purpose of this fieldwork is to offer a 'snapshot' of the attitudes and 
perceptions of lower income households of welfare systems in Cairo, rather than to 
present an exact measure of their attitudes. The researcher relied upon a non-
probability sample, as it would have been very difficult to contact people randomly 
if a probability sampling technique had been employed. The sampling technique 
used was purposive sampling in which people were chosen on specific criteria, as 
they were already known by the contacts of the researcher. The advantage of this 
method is that it has allowed the researcher to concentrate on lower income 
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households, who are the focus of the study. This made the study more efficient in 
terms of time and data collection. 2 
Another technique was also used with some cases, namely, snowballing, where the 
researcher was introduced to the frrst subject through a contact, who then helped 
identify other subjects in the area. 3 In this case, these households were asked to 
nominate other households with similar or lower standards of living. Although the 
researcher did not know these people, there was still some trust because the subjects 
knew the referee, and the information collected was, therefore, still reliable. 
The size of the sample was 160 households. Since religious organisations offer 
different types of assistance to their beneficiaries, it was essential to include the two 
major religious elements of society, Muslims and Coptic Orthodox. At the 
beginning, the researcher aimed at choosing 80 Muslim households and 80 
Christian households. However, this was not possible as the researcher was bound 
by her contacts and their religious affiliations, whether they were Christians or 
Muslims. The sample comprised 85 Muslim households and 75 Christian 
households. 
2 See Denscombe, M., The Good Research Guide for Small-scale Social Research Projects, 
(Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998), pp. 15-16. 
3 See Denscombe, M., The Good Research Guide for Small-scale Social Research Projects, 
(Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998), pp. 16. 
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Criteria for Selection of Subjects 
As the purpose of the fieldwork is to assess the accessibility and perceptions of 
lower income households of subsidies in order to evaluate the success of the state in 
meeting its obligation of the social contract, the subjects of the study had to be 
lower income households. The subjects had either to identify themselves or be 
identified by others, the contacts, as lower income households. For the purpose of 
the research, others' identification of lower income households is relevant because 
in order for these households to receive help from religious organisations, they have 
to be identified as poor by these organisations. 
In the case of Christians, the 'poor' who were qualified to receive assistance were 
the ones who did not have a regular source of income, the head of the household 
was not working, or the household comprised a large number of dependents. And in 
the case of Muslims, MOs provided assistance only to orphans, after ensuring that 
the income of the household was low. Some of the households in the sample did not 
fit the criteria of receiving assistance from religious organisations; however, they 
were identified as poor by the contacts of the researcher. In other words, their 
situation was slightly better than those who qualified to receive help. 
The contacts of the researcher came from the chosen 'poor' area in Cairo; so they 
were familiar with the sample of households and their problems. In some cases, the 
contacts were people from the local community who had worked as volunteers in 
religious organisations that serve the areas. Being locals, they also helped prepare 
meetings with Muslim and Christian households from this area. 
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Questionnaire 
The survey was conducted through personal interviews based on a pre-designed 
structured questionnaire. This ensured a 100% response rate. The questionnaire was 
first designed in English then translated into Arabic. The Arabic version was 
checked by a specialist in surveys and questionnaires in order to ensure that it was 
an accurate translation of the English version. 
Most of the questions were closed-ended, and a list of possible answers was drawn 
up. Answers to these questions were coded before data collection. Of course 
respondents came up with answers not anticipated by the researcher; in this case, 
the answers were codified after data collection. Only one question, asking why 
people who had ration cards preferred a certain type of subsidy, was open ended. 
Answers to this question were codified after conducting the fieldwork. Some 
questions allowed respondents to specify their answer when it was not one of the 
given answers; this afforded them the opportunity to include options missed out by 
the researcher; their responses were codified later. 
Outline of the Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was divided into five sections: 
• Background information 
• Food subsidy 
• Education 
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• Health care 
• Income 
The researcher analysed the data from the filled-in questionnaires at the University 
of Durham, using Excel and the statistical programme, SPSS. 
Data Collection 
Personal interviews with the respondents were carried out in Arabic; and the 
questionnaires were completed by the researcher as most of the informants in the 
households were either illiterate or could not read and/or write well enough to 
complete the questionnaire. By personally conducting the survey, the researcher 
could minimise errors arising due to misunderstanding of the questions. However, 
the researcher had to be careful in phrasing the questions neutrally (when 
respondents could not understand the pre-designed question), to avoid leading the 
respondents to answering the question in a way that they thought is favourable to 
the researcher. 
Most interviews were conducted either in the houses of the subjects, or in some 
Christian cases they were organised at Christian associations in the area. Visiting 
the homes of respondents was particularly useful for the researcher to see the 
housing conditions of the household, which though did not constitute a part of the 
study still showed the extent of poverty of the household. Each interview lasted on 
average between 20 to 45 minutes depending on the informants, how willing they 
were to talk about their lives and whether they drifted from the question, or rambled 
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on about their living and health conditions. Most of the time, other family members 
were present and they offered valuable contributions. The researcher made notes of 
all the relevant side information that respondents provided to give some additional 
insight for the analysis. 
The researcher collected the information in most of the cases from women for two 
reasons. First, as the researcher is a woman and most of the interviews were 
conducted at the home of the respondents, which were sometimes composed of 1 
bedroom, it was not culturally appropriate to interview men. Second, women were 
usually better informed about household expenditure on food, and the education of 
their children. However, this also had a disadvantage, as most women did not have 
accurate information about their husbands' real incomes. 
Although in general, people were co-operative with the researcher regardless of 
their religion, religion sometimes proved to be an obstacle. Knowing that the 
researcher was Christian, some Christian respondents, for example, were reluctant 
to say that they used health facilities affiliated with MOs. 
After we have discussed the methodology of the fieldwork, the study design, 
sampling, and data collection, we will now present the results of the survey. 
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Results 
In this section, we will present the results of the survey. The results comprise the 
tive sections of the questionnaire: background information, income, food subsidy, 
education, and health care. Although the income section was placed at the end of 
the questionnaire, in presenting the results we will place the results of the income 
section after the section on background information. This is because income is 
related to the background information, especially employment and means of 
income. 
Background Information 
The first section of the questionnaire covered the background of the households, 
including information such as names of members of household, their age, sex, 
educational qualification, occupation, and means of income. Through this section, 
the researcher was able to establish a rapport with the informants during the 
interviews. 
The sample of 160 households comprised 756 members with an average size of 
household 4.7 (compared to 4.1 for Cairo according to the 1996 population 
census4). Of these households, 16 households were composed of 1 female member; 
and their ages ranged from 44 to 75. The following tables summarise the 
4 The Statistical Year Book, 1992-1998, (Cairo: CAPMUS, 1999), pp. 16. 
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demographic composition of the households that came out from the first sheet of the 
questionnaire (see questionnaire in the appendix): 
Table 5.1: Members of households grouped by age category and sex 
Sex 
IAge category Total 
Male Female 
P-5 28 40 68 
k>-14 85 65 150 
15-24 108 94 202 
125-34 35 48 83 
35-44 33 55 88 
145-54 31 43 74 
~5-64 15 25 40 
65-70 12 21 33 
170+ 12 6 18 
rrotat 359 397 756 
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Figm·e 5.1: Members of households grouped by age category and sex 
Table 5.2: Marital status of members of households grouped by sex 
Sex 
Marital status Total 
Male Female 
Single 146 106 252 
Married 98 107 205 
Separated 0 10 10 
Divorced 3 11 14 
Widow/er 2 60 62 
Underage 110 103 213 
Total 359 397 756 
- ·· 
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Figure 5.2: Marital status of members of households grouped by sex 
Of the 756 members in all 160 households, 567 were not in formal education at the 
time the survey was conducted, The educational qualifications of members of 
households who were not in formal education are presented below, 
2'!X 
Table 5.3: Educational qualifications of members of households not in formal 
education grouped by sex 
Sex 
!Educational qualification Total 
Male Female 
~lliterate 110 176 286 
!Reads and writes 36 25 61 
Signs his/her name 7 6 13 
!Primary 25 12 37 
!Preparatory 10 12 22 
Secondary 0 1 1 
!Diploma 25 23 48 
!Higher education 4 5 9 
lfwo-year institute after secondary education 3 1 4 
!Underage 39 47 86 
lfotal 259 308 567 
Reasons for leaving school or never joining the education system were as follows: 
Table 5.4: Reasons for leaving school or never joining the education system 
distributed by sex (136 cases with 147 responses) 
Sex 
!Reasons for leaving education Total 
Male Female 
IN o desire to learn 41 22 63 
~ncome source for the family 20 0 20 
!Education is expensive 18 22 40 
~llness 5 4 9 
!Not clever/low scores 1 2 3 
!Lack of awareness 1 4 5 
!Help with the housework 0 3 3 
!Marriage 0 2 2 
!Family problems 0 2 2 
lfotal 86 61 147 
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The total number of members of households in education aged between 6 and 25 
was 189, of whom females constituted 89 (47.09%), whilst males comprised 100 
(52.91% ). The following tables show the members of households still in formal 
education compared to total number of members in the sample in this age category 
classified by sex, and the distribution of those in formal education in primary, 
preparatory, secondary, and higher education classified by age category and sex 
respectively. 
Table 5.5: Members of households still in formal education grouped by age 
category and sex compared to total members of households 
Age In formal Number of members in Percent of those in the 
category education the sample sample in formal 
education 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
6-12 50 31 66 41 75.76 75.61 
13-15 22 31 32 38 68.75 81.58 
16-18 20 22 46 36 43.48 61.11 
19-22 7 4 35 30 20.00 13.33 
23-25 1 1 20 24 5.00 4.17 
Total 100 89 199 169 50.25 52.66 
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Table 5.6: Members of households still in formal education grouped by age and 
stage of education 
Stage of Sex 
Age groups of members of households still 
in education Total 
education 
6-12 13-15 16-18 19-22 23-25 
~mary Male 38 2 40 
Female 26 26 
Total 64 2 66 
rreparatory Male 12 16 4 1 33 
Female 5 26 1 32 
Total 17 42 5 1 65 
$econdary Male 4 15 19 
Female 5 17 22 
Total 9 32 41 
Higher Male 1 6 1 8 
education Female 4 4 1 9 
Total 5 10 2 17 
Total 81 53 42 11 2 189 
Members of households who were not in the workforce, at the time the survey was 
conducted, amounted to 545 or 71.99% (210 male and 335 female), whereas those 
in the workforce amounted to 211 or 28.01% (149 male, and 62 female). If we 
exclude those who were still in formal education from those not in the workforce, 
the number of those not in the workforce drops to 357 or 4 7.16% ( 111 male and 246 
female). The following tables summarise the distribution of those who were and 
those who were not in the workforce. 
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Table 5.7: Distribution of members of households not in workforce 
Sex 
Occupation Total 
Male Percent Female Percent 
!Unemployed 57 27.14 72 21.49 129 
Student 99 47.14 89 26.57 188* 
~ousewife N/A N/A 134 40.00 134 
~etired 16 7.62 0 0.00 16 
~onscripted in the army 9 4.29 N/A N/A 9 
!Underage 29 13.81 40 11.94 69 
Total 210 100.00 335 100.00 545 
* The total1s 188, as 1 of the students was working at the same time, so for the purpose of th1s table 
only, he was included among the employed in the sample. 
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Table 5.8: Occupations of members of households classified by sex 
pccupation 
Sex 
Total 
Male Female 
Student and working 1 0 1 
~a.·mal 20 2 22 
Skilled or semi-skilled worker 53 8 61 
Catering 20 11 31 
Domestic cleaner 0 12 12 
Private sector 24 18 42 
White collar 1 1 2 
Blue collar 23 17 40 
Public sector/government 13 9 22 
White collar 7 5 12 
Blue collar 6 4 10 
!Driver 8 0 8 
!Petty trader 2 2 4 
!Construction worker 8 0 8 
jrotal 149 62 211 
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Table 5.9: Means of income of employed members of households grouped by 
sex 
Sex 
Means of income Total 
Male Female 
Working for money 90 45 135 
Working for the family 5 1 6 
Owner of business/self-employed 54 16 70 
!Does not work and wants to work 21 16 37 
!Does not work and is not looking for work 118 272 390 
!Disabled 18 7 25 
!Conscripted in the army 9 0 9 
Pn pension 15 0 15 
!Underage 29 40 69 
rrotal 359 397 756 
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Income 
The fmal section of the questionnaire dealt with household income. Households 
were asked about their average range and source of monthly income. The minimum 
range of monthly income per household chosen by the researcher was less than 
E£100 and the maximum was above E£1000. The researcher based these ranges 
upon interviews with leaders of religious organisations, who suggested that 
considering standards of living in this area E£100 per capita income could be 
regarded as an appropriate poverty line. Information obtained from this section 
revealed the extent of income poverty of the households in the sample, and the 
vulnerability of these households manifested in their dependence on sources of 
income other than employment or pension. 
This section was placed at the end of the questionnaire so that respondents would 
feel comfortable enough to provide the required information, after a rapport had 
been established with the researcher. However, as this information is relevant to the 
background information on employment and means of income, we will present the 
results here. 
The income groups of the households were as follows: 
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Table 5.10: Income groups of households 
!Income category No. of households Percent 
< E£100 57 35.6 
E£101-150 36 22.5 
E£151-250 28 17.5 
E£251-350 30 18.8 
E£351-500 7 4.4 
E£501-700 2 1.3 
Total 160 100.00 
Table 5.11: Income groups classified by religion of household 
!Income category 
Religion 
Total 
Muslim Christian 
< E£100 36 21 57 
E£101-150 19 17 36 
E£151-250 11 17 28 
E£251-350 14 16 30 
E£351-500 4 3 7 
E£501-700 1 1 2 
Total 85 75 160 
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Figure 5.3: Income groups classified by religion of household 
Table 5.12: Income groups classified by number of members in household 
Income category 
Members of households category 
Total 
1 2-3 4-5 6-7 8-10 >10 
< E£100 15 19 14 7 2 0 57 
E£ l 01-150 1 9 15 6 5 0 36 
E£151-250 0 4 10 1 I 2 1 28 
IE£251-35o 0 0 14 9 7 0 30 
IE£351-soo 0 0 0 4 2 1 7 
IE£S01-7oo 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 
Total 16 32 53 38 18 3 160 
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Households with one source of income were as follows: 
Table 5.13: Households with one source of income 
$ource of income No. of households Percent 
rwork 72 79.12 
~Os 3 3.30 
!Pension 10 10.99 
~ndividuals 5 5.49 
~elatives 1 1.10 
rrotal 91 100.00 
Those with two sources of income were as follows: 
Table 5.14: Households with two sources of income 
Source of income No. of households Percent 
Work&COs 7 12.28 
Work&MOs 3 5.26 
Work & relatives 1 1.75 
Work & individuals 9 15.79 
Work & pension 15 26.32 
Pension & MOs 5 8.77 
MOs & individuals 2 3.51 
Pension & COs 7 12.28 
Pension & relatives 1 1.75 
Pension & individuals 6 10.53 
nheritance & relatives 1 1.75 
Total 57 100.00 
Those with three sources of income were as follows: 
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Table 5.15: Households with three sources of income 
!Source of income No. of households Percent 
!Work, pension & inheritance 1 9.09 
!Work, pension & MOs 1 9.09 
!Work, pension & individuals 4 36.36 
!Work, pension & COs 1 9.09 
!Work, individuals & relatives 1 9.09 
1W ork, COs & individuals 2 18.18 
~ension, MOs & relatives 1 9.09 
Total 11 100.00 
There was 1 case with four sources of income, work, pension, MOs, and assistance 
from individuals. 
Thus, the total results were as follows: 
Table 5.16: Sources of income for households (160 responses: 240 answers) 
Source of income No. of households Percent 
Work 117 48.75 
Assistance from COs/MOs 31 12.92 
Assistance from individuals 30 12.50 
Assistance from relatives 7 2.92 
Pension 53 22.08 
nheritance 2 0.83 
Total 240 100.00 
Breaking down those households that received assistance from religious 
organisations by Christian or Muslim organisations, the results were: 
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Table 5.17: Households that receive assistance from COs and/or MOs 
~ovider of assistance 
Number of households receiving 
Percent 
assistance 
MOs 11 35.48 
COs 20 64.52 
Total 31 100.00 
Table 5.18: Percentage of Muslim/Christian households that receive assistance 
fro li . . ti m re tgious orgamsa ODS 
!Religion of household 
Percent of those 
Assistance No assistance Total 
receiving assistance 
!Muslim 11 74 85 12.94 
~hristian 20 55 75 26.67 
rrotal 31 129 160 19.38 
After we have presented the background information of the households, we will 
now present the results of the questions pertaining to the evaluation of welfare 
provision in the areas of food subsidies, education, and health care. 
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Food Subsidy 
The second section of the questionnaire focused on food subsidy. In this section, the 
researcher was measuring the accessibility and usage of ration cards by the 
households in order to assess the utility of the system for these households. It also 
revealed the sample's perceptions and attitudes about the different types of 
subsidies. Finally, respondents were asked about their consumption of certain food 
items. These items were chosen as a guide to indicate the average consumption 
patterns of the households in the sample. 
In answer to whether the household possessed a ration card, 120 households (75%) 
had a ration card, and 40 (25%) did not have ration cards. 
Table 5.19: Household has a ration card 
IHousehold has ration card No. of households Percent 
!Yes 120 75.00 
~0 40 25.00 
rrotal 160 100.00 
Table 5.20: Households that have/do not have a ration card grouped by income 
categories 
Income 
Ration cards Total 
<100 101-150 151-250 251-350 351-500 501-700 
~ation card 42 28 18 23 7 2 120 
No ration card 15 8 10 7 0 0 40 
Total 57 36 28 30 7 2 160 
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When the 40 households were asked why they did not have a ration card the 
following reasons were cited: 
Table 5.21: Reasons for not having a ration card 
Reasons for not having a ration card No. of households Percent 
!Never applied for it 21 52.50 
!Hassle and paper work 3 7.50 
ICard with spouse after divorce 3 7.50 
!Cancelled after husband's death 3 7.50 
INo ID 2 5.00 
!Not entitled 2 5.00 
!Registered with parents 1 2.50 
!Lost 1 2.50 
:Cancelled (son works privately) 1 2.50 
!Entitled to a red card so did not bother 1 2.50 
IN o response 2 5.00 
rrotal 38 100.00 
Out of the 120 households that had ration cards, 91 households (75.83%) had a 
green card (fully subsidised card), whereas 29 (24.17%) had a red one (partially 
subsidised card). 
Table 5.22: Type of ration card 
Type of ration card No. of households Percent 
Green 91 75.83 
Red 29 24.17 
Total 120 100.00 
312 
Table 5.23: Households that have/do not have ration cards grouped by income 
categories 
Ration Income 
Total 
cards <100 101-150 151-250 251-350 351-500 501-700 
Green 33 21 15 13 7 2 91 
Percent 78.57 75.00 83.33 56.52 100.00 100.00 75.83 
Red 9 7 3 10 0 0 29 
Percent 21.43 25.00 16.67 43.48 0.00 0.00 24.17 
Total 42 28 18 23 7 2 120 
In the 120 households that had ration cards, the ration card covered all members of 
the household for 67 households ( 43.33%) whilst in 53 cases (56.67%) it did not 
cover all members. 
Table 5.24: Members of household covered by the ration card 
Members of households covered Percent 
No. of households 
by ration card 
All members 67 55.83 
Not all members 53 44.17 
Total 120 100.00 
In the 53 cases, where the ration card did not cover all members of the household, 
the percentage of members of households not covered by the ration card per 
household ranged between 11.11% and 83.33%. The mode for members not 
included in the ration card was 25%. 
Those who had a ration card were asked whether they had used it in the last three 
months, and if they used it to obtain both subsidised items when they used it. These 
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questions were meant to reveal whether households that possessed ration cards used 
them regularly. 
Table 5.25: Usage of ration card 
!Usage of ration card No. of households Percent 
INot used in last 3 months 9 7.50 
IV sed in last 3 months 110 91.67 
IN ever 1 0.83 
rrotal 120 100.00 
When the case that never used ration cards was asked why the household had never 
used the ration card, the respondent said that the rationed items were of poor quality 
and she faced a lot of trouble purchasing them. 
All households that used ration cards (119) bought both rationed items, oil and 
sugar, with the ration card. The majority of households that had ration cards, 114 
households (95.8%) reported that they consume all the quantities of the two 
rationed items. Only 5 cases (4.2%) reported that they do not use all rationed items. 
Of the 5 cases that did not consume all rationed items, 4 households (80%) noted 
that they sold the unconsumed items, and 1 case said that they gave them to 
relatives. 
Upon asking the 120 households that had ration cards, which type of subsidy they 
preferred, 10 cases (8.4%) said they preferred money subsidy, whilst 82 households 
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(68.91%), preferred food subsidy. Twenty-four cases (20.17%) did not know, and 3 
households (2.52%) were indifferent. 
Table 5.26: Preferred type of subsidy 
Preferred type of subsidy No. of households Percent 
Money subsidy 10 8.40 
Food subsidy 82 68.91 
Do not know 24 20.17 
ndifferent 3 2.52 
Total 119 100.00 
Out of 10 cases that would have preferred a money subsidy 3 said cards were not 
beneficial, 2 said with money they would have more choice to buy what they 
wanted, 2 said rationed quantities were not enough. As respondents were allowed to 
give more than one answer, 1 case noted that the quality of rationed items was so 
poor and there was no shortage of items. Two did not respond. 
Table 5.27: Reasons for choosing money as a preferred type of subsidy (10 
responses: 11 answers) 
!Why money is preferred No. of households Percent 
~ards are not so beneficial 3 27.27 
Quality of items is poor 1 9.09 
rrtiere is no shortage 1 9.09 
!Rationed quantities are not enough 2 18.18 
!More choice to buy what they want 2 18.18 
IN o response 2 18.18 
lfotal 11 100.00 
The majority of the 82 households that chose food subsidy (62 cases) reported that 
they preferred ration cards because items were cheaper with ration cards; 4 cases 
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observed that items were guaranteed with ration cards in case of a shortage; 4 cases 
remarked that the government would not pay money; and 3 thought that money 
could be wasted on other items. Among those who gave more than one answer, 2 
cases reported that items were cheaper with ration cards, and the government would 
not pay money; 1 case noted that items were cheaper with ration cards, and they 
were guaranteed in case of shortage; and fmally 2 cases noted that items were 
cheaper with ration cards, and that if they were given money it would be wasted on 
other items. Four did not respond. 
Table 5.28: Reasons for choosing ration cards as a preferred type of subsidy 
(87 responses: 93 answers) 
Why ration card is preferred No. of households Percent 
Items are cheaper with the ration card 67 77.01 
Government won't pay money 6 6.90 
Items are guaranteed (in case of a shortage) 5 5.75 
Money could be spent on other items 5 5.75 
No response 4 4.60 
Total 87 100.00 
The 3 indifferent cases did not respond. 
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Consumption patterns of some essential food items: 
Below we present the average food consumption of households grouped by income. 
For oil and sugar, the quantities reported include rationed quantities 
Table 5.29: Average food consumption of households grouped by income 
Baladi bread 
Income category No. of Average consumption of loaves of 
of Household households bread per person per day 
f< E£100 57 3.9767 
~£101-150 36 3.9403 
~£151-250 28 3.5963 
E£251-350 30 3.7436 
p£351-500 7 2.9813 
~£501-700 2 2.0779 
160 
(n=160) 
Oil 
Income category No. of 
Average consumption 
of Household households 
No response per person per month 
(in kg) 
< E£100 56 1 0.9956 
E£101-150 35 1 0.8484 
E£151-250 28 0 0.6764 
E£251-350 30 0 0.8674 
E£351-500 7 0 0.6043 
E£501-700 2 0 0.4773 
158 2 
(n=160) 
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Sugar 
Income category No. of 
Average consumption 
of Household households 
No response per person per month 
(in kg) 
< E£100 56 1 2.2132 
E£101-150 36 0 1.7373 
E£151-250 28 0 1.6420 
E£251-350 30 0 1.8109 
E£351-500 7 0 1.5459 
E£501-700 2 0 1.0844 
159 1 
(n=l60) 
Rice 
Income category No. of 
Average consumption 
of Household households 
No response per person per month 
(in kg) 
r=:: E£100 56 1 2.2125 
~£101-150 35 1 1.7799 
~£151-250 28 0 1.3544 
~£251-350 30 0 1.7359 
~£351-500 7 0 1.2126 
~£501-700 2 0 2.2403 
158 2 
(n=160) 
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Ghee 
Income category No. of 
Average consumption 
of Household households 
No response per person per month 
(in kg) 
< E£100 55 2 0.8087 
E£101-150 36 0 0.5206 
~£151-250 27 1 0.4368 
~£251-350 30 0 0.4754 
~£351-500 7 0 0.3718 
~£501-700 2 0 0.5909 
157 3 
(n=160) 
Fish 
Income category No. of 
Average consumption 
of Household households 
No response per person per month 
(in kg) 
< E£100 55 2 0.9800 
E£101-150 35 1 0.6646 
E£151-250 26 2 0.8306 
E£251-350 27 3 0.9321 
E£351-500 5 2 0.4583 
E£501-700 2 0 0.5130 
150 10 
(n=160) 
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Fruit 
Income category No. of 
Average consumption 
of Household households 
No response per person per month 
(in kg) 
< E£100 56 1 1.9676 
E£101-150 33 3 1.8121 
E£151-250 26 2 1.4590 
E£251-350 28 2 1.7361 
E£351-500 5 2 2.3833 
E£501-700 2 0 0.9481 
150 10 
(n=160) 
Tea 
Income category No. of 
Average consumption 
of Household households 
No response per person per month 
(in gm) 
I< E£100 57 0 200.0766 
IE£101-150 36 0 171.8122 
IE£151-250 28 0 110.5230 
IE£251-350 30 0 115.8981 
IE£351-500 7 0 174.4898 
IE£501-?oo 2 0 176.9481 
150 0 
(n=160) 
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Beef 
Income category No. of 
Average consumption 
of Household households 
No response per person per month 
(in kg) 
< E£100 54 3 0.7671 
E£101-150 30 6 0.5365 
E£151-250 25 3 0.6809 
E£251-350 27 3 0.7331 
E£351-500 6 1 0.5792 
E£501-700 2 0 0.3701 
144 16 
(n=160) 
Pasta 
Income category No. of 
Average consumption 
of Household households 
No response per person per month 
(in kg) 
I< E£100 57 0 1.4149 
IE£101-150 36 0 1.1999 
IE£151-250 28 0 1.0571 
IE£251-350 29 1 1.1278 
IE£351-500 7 0 0.8381 
IE£501-700 2 0 0.3247 
159 1 
(n=160) 
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Milk 
Income category No. of 
Average consumption 
of Household households 
No response per person per week 
(in kg) 
I< E£100 56 1 0.9735 
IE£101-150 36 0 0.7117 
IE£151-250 28 0 0.6704 
IE£251-350 26 4 0.6105 
IE£351-500 7 0 0.5202 
IE£501-700 2 0 0.6591 
155 5 
(n=160) 
Chicken 
Income category No. of 
Average consumption 
of Household households 
No response per person per month 
(in kg) 
< E£100 55 2 1.0827 
E£101-150 32 4 0.7269 
E£151-250 26 2 0.8272 
E£251-350 29 1 0.7353 
E£351-500 7 0 0.6179 
E£501-700 2 0 0.7078 
151 9 
(n=160) 
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White cheese 
Income category No. of 
Average consumption 
of Household households 
No response per person per month 
(in kg) 
f< E£100 55 2 0.4138 
~£101-150 36 0 0.2512 
~£151-250 27 1 0.2592 
~£251-350 29 1 0.3027 
~£351-500 7 0 0.5996 
~£501-700 2 0 0.1883 
156 4 
(n=l60) 
Qarish cheese 
Income category No. of 
Average consumption 
of Household households 
No response per person per month 
(in kg) 
< E£100 55 2 0.5406 
E£101-150 36 0 0.3829 
E£151-250 27 1 0.3955 
E£251-350 29 1 0.3709 
E£351-500 7 0 0.5567 
E£501-700 2 0 0.1883 
156 4 
(n=160) 
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Eggs 
Income category No. of No response Average consumption 
of Household households of eggs per person per 
month 
i<E£100 54 3 9.8858 
IE£101-150 36 0 5.7366 
IE£151-250 27 1 7.6512 
IE£251-350 28 2 7.3312 
IE£351-500 7 0 3.3112 
E£501-700 2 0 3.7662 
154 6 
(n=160) 
After we have discussed the results of the food subsidy section in the survey, we 
will now present the results of the education section. 
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Education 
The third section of the questionnaire focused on education. As parents make the 
decision whether to send their children to school and they pay for their children's 
education, the researcher directed the questions pertaining to education at them. 
Parents with children in education were asked if they sent their children to private 
schools or institutes. They were also asked if their children required help with their 
studies, in which case what kind of help they received, and how much it cost them 
on average per month. The question of lessons gave an indicator of how much 
lower income households spent on education (which reflected their valuation of 
education). Respondents were asked what stage of education they expected their 
children to complete. This question was meant to reveal the aspiration parents had 
for their children and the value of education for parents. Responses were classified 
by sex to see whether parents had different expectations for their children based on 
sex. Respondents with children in technical education were asked why their 
children joined this type education in order to explore whether technical education 
was highly valued by these income groups. Finally, respondents were asked what 
they thought was better for their children, schooling education or learning a craft. 
This question was intended to examine the subjects' attitudes and perceptions of 
schooling and craftsmanship. 
Households with children in formal education amounted to 93 households, with 189 
children. Questions pertaining to education (9-17) were, therefore, addressed to 
these 93 cases only. 
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Out of the 93 cases with children in education 14 households (15.05%) reported that 
they had at least one child who went to a private schooVinstitute. The remainder, 79 
cases (84.95%), sent their children to state schools. 
Table 5.30: Anyone in private education 
Household has children in 
No. of households Percent 
private education 
~es 14 15.05 
INa 79 84.95 
rrotal 93 100.00 
When those who sent their children to a private schooVinstitute were asked why 
they did so, 9 cases (64.29%) replied that their children obtained a low score in the 
previous stage of education, and could not join state schools. 
Table 5.31: Reasons for joining private education (14 cases • 13 responses: 14 
answers) 
!Why private education No. of households Percent 
!Low score in previous stage 9 64.29 
tfolearnlanguages 1 7.14 
!Not crowded classes 1 7.14 
Special needs 1 7.14 
tro improve standard of family 1 7.14 
!Not to enter 3 year conscription 1 7.14 
rrotal 14 100.00 
In the question of tuition fees, 13 cases (who attended state schools) reported that 
they were exempted from paying fees because of the death of the father. Out of the 
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80 cases that paid fees, the majority of respondents, 68 cases (85% ), considered the 
fees to be too much, 11 cases (13.75%) regarded them as reasonable, and 1 case 
thought that it was little. 
Table 5.32: Tuition fees (13 cases exempted) 
fruition fees No. of households Percent 
rroo much 68 85.00 
~easonable 11 13.75 
Little 1 1.25 
Total 80 100.00 
Out of the 93 households with children in education, most of the respondents, 85 
cases (91.4%), noted that their children required help with their studies, while 8 
cases (8.6%) said their children required no help. 
Table 5.33: Students require help with their studies 
Require help with their studies No. of households Percent 
!Yes 85 91.40 
INo 8 8.60 
rrotal 93 100.00 
The 85 cases that had children who required help with their studies were asked what 
they did about it. Respondents were allowed to choose more than one answer. 
Those who chose one answer were divided as follows: 29 cases (34.12%) reported 
that their children took study groups at school, 1 case (1.18%) reported that some 
friends helped their children with their studies, 17 cases (20%) reported that their 
children took private lessons, and 5 cases (5.88%) said they did nothing because 
they could not afford it. 
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Those who chose two answers included: 2 cases (2.35%) noted that their children 
took study groups at school and received help from friends/neighbours~ 3 cases 
(3.53%) reported that their children took study groups at school and took lessons at 
COs/MOs; and 21 cases (24.71 %) said that their children took study groups at 
school in addition to private lessons; 1 (1.18%) case said their children relied on 
private lessons in addition to help from friends/neighbours, and fmally 3 cases 
(3.53%) reported that their children took private lessons as well as lessons at 
COs/MOs. 
Those who chose three answers comprised: 1 case (1.18%) where children took 
study groups at school and private lessons, and received help from 
friends/neighbours; and 2 cases (2.35%) where children took study groups at 
school, lessons at COs/MOs and private lessons. 
Therefore, the total answers were as follows: 
Table 5.34: Type of help children receive with their studies (85 cases: 121 
answers) 
l.fype of help with studies No. of households Percent 
Study groups at school 58 47.93 
Help from relatives/friends 5 4.13 
Lessons at MOs/COs 8 6.61 
Private lessons 45 37.19 
Nothing 5 4.13 
Total 121 100.00 
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For the 79 cases where children received help for money (85 required help, 5 of 
whom did nothing, and 1 relied on friends), the results were as follows. 
Out of the 29 cases whose children took study groups at school, the following cases 
were exempted from paying any fees: 
(i) 3 cases were exempted by the schoolteacher, who was sympathetic 
on account of their dire financial situation; 
(ii) 1 case, where children took study groups at school and lessons at 
MOs/COs, and 1 case, where children took study groups at school in 
addition to private lessons were exempted because of the death of the 
father. 
There were 71 households that reported spending money on some kind of help for 
their children with their studies. The minimum average amount of money a 
household spent on help with study for all their children was E£5 (E£1.67 per 
child), and the maximum amount was E£250 (E£100 per child) per month. The 
average per household for those who paid for their children to receive some help 
was E£68.11 (E£35.56) per household per month. It should be noted that the prices 
of lessons (whether private or study groups at school) is higher at higher stages of 
education. For example, a private lesson in primary stage costs on average E£5 per 
child per month, whereas that in preparatory stage costs E£7, and that in secondary 
stage costs E£10. 
Two cases of those taking study groups at school only, and 1 case taking private 
lessons only did not report the money they paid for these lessons. 
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Table 5.35: Average cost of lessons category 
Average cost of lessons per 
No. of households Percent 
month 
~£1-10 - 3 4.2 
~£11-20 5 7.0 
~£21-30 7 9.9 
~£31-40 8 11.3 
~£41-50 8 11.3 
~£51-60 9 12.7 
IE£61-70 4 5.6 
IE£71-80 7 9.9 
E£91-100 8 11.3 
E£100-110 9 12.7 
No response 3 4.2 
Total 71 100.0 
When asked what is the maximum stage that they wanted their sons/daughters to 
reach, respondents gave the following answers: 
Table 5.36: Desired stage of education for boys/girls 
Boys Girls 
Stage of education 
Number Percent Number Percent 
Primary 2 3.13 0 0.00 
Preparatory 2 3.13 0 0.00 
Secondary 7 10.94 6 10.00 
Higher education 53 82.81 54 90.00 
Total 64 100.00 60 100.00 
Out of the 93 cases with children in education, only 15 households had children in 
technical education. These households had 1 child each in technical education, thus 
the total was 15 children (13 boys and 2 girls). 
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Table 5.37: Children in technical education 
Children in technical education Number Percent 
~oys 13 86.67 
Pirls 2 13.33 
Total 15 100.00 
These 15 cases were asked why their children had chosen technical education. As 
respondents were allowed to choose more than one answer, 1 case chose two 
answers, low score in the previous stage of education, and private lessons for 
general education were too expensive; the rest of the answers were as follows: 
Table 5.38: Reasons for choosing technical education (15 responses: 16 
answers) 
!Reasons for choosing technical education No. of households Percent 
!Easier than general education l 6.25 
!More useful than general education 1 6.25 
!Low score in previous stage 7 43.75 
!General education too expensive 4 25.00 
~llness 1 6.25 
If o be with friends 1 6.25 
To improve the standard of living of household 1 6.25 
Total 16 100.00 
Of the 15 respondents who had children in technical education, 11 (73.33%) 
reported that their children benefited from this type of education, 2 (13.33%) said 
they did not, and 2 (13.33%) did not respond. 
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Table 5.39: Have those who are in technical education benefited from it? 
Children benefited from technical education No. of households Percent 
Yes 11 73.33 
No 2 13.33 
No response 2 13.33 
Total 15 100.00 
When those who had children in technical education and not benefited from their 
study were asked why they did not, 1 said the study was too theoretical, and the 
other said the study was too theoretical, the classes were crowded, and although 
equipment was available, students were not allowed to use them. 
Therefore, the total answers were as follows: 
Table 5.40: Why have they not benefited from technical education? (2 
responses: 4 answers) 
Reasons for not benefiting 
No. of households Percent 
from technical education 
Study is too theoretical 2 50.00 
Overcrowded classes 1 25.00 
Students do not use equipment 1 25.00 
Total 4 100.00 
When asked which was better for the child, learning a craft, schooling, or both, 2 
cases (2.15%) said learning a craft only, 39 cases (41.94%) said both learning a 
craft and schooling, and 50 cases (53. 76%) said schooling only. Two did not 
respond. 
332 
Table 5.41: Which type of education is better? 
Response No. of households Percent 
Craft only 2 2.15 
!Craft and schooling 39 41.94 
Schooling only 50 53.76 
No response 2 2.15 
rrotal 93 100.00 
The reasons cited for why learning a craft only was better for the child were as 
follows: 
Table 5.42: Why craft learning a craft is better? (41 responses: 52 answers) 
No. of 
!WhY learning a craft is better Percent 
households 
!Craft provides child with an opportunity to get a job 21 40.38 
Craft provides child with a higher income 25 48.08 
f child is not successful in one then he is in the other 3 5.77 
Craft is useful for everyday life 1 1.92 
Learning both provides a better understanding of life 1 1.92 
No response 1 1.92 
Total 52 100.00 
It should be noted that the two cases that said that craft only is better for the child 
still sent their children to school. When asked why, one of them said because it that 
it gave the child a better understanding of life, whilst the other one said it provided 
more opportunity for the child to get job and gave him/her a better understanding of 
life. 
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When those who sent their children to school were asked why they sent their 
children to school, respondents cited the following reasons: 
Table 5.43: Reasons for sending children to school (93 responses: 160 answers) 
!WhY parents send their children to school? No. of households Percent 
!Provide an opportunity to find employment 38 23.75 
!Provide an opportunity to earn higher income 7 4.38 
!Provide a better understanding of life 81 50.62 
!Provide a social status for the future 23 14.38 
!Parents lacked education 10 6.25 
!Assist their children with their studies 1 0.63 
!Enable the child to benefit society 1 0.63 
rrotal 160 100.00 
Now we will present the results of the last component of welfare assessment in this 
study, namely, health care. 
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Health Care 
The fourth section of the questionnaire covered health care. Households were asked 
if any of their members had been ill during the last month, and if they had sought 
medical treatment, and from where. Those who did not seek medical treatment were 
asked why they had not done so. These questions were designed to reveal attitudes 
about seeking medical advice and the health facilities used recently by the sample. 
Respondents with children aged 0-16 years old were asked with which type of their 
child's illness they sought medical treatment for their children and from where. 
Respondents were asked the same question for adults. The researcher's hypothesis 
was that parents tend to seek treatment for young children more than for themselves 
or other adults in the household. Then respondents were asked about their 
perception of the quality of the service provided at the public and private, and 
religiously affiliated health facilities they visited. This was done by assessing the 
quality of health facilities based upon the perceptions of the respondents in terms of 
four variables: 
• competence of doctors and nurses; 
• care of doctors and nurses; 
• availability of equipment; 
• and affordability of the facility in question. 
Finally, respondents were asked whether they faced any problems in obtaining 
medicine, and if they did what sort of problems they faced. The rationale behind 
these questions was that the researcher learnt from interviews with leaders of 
religious organisations that not all those who sought medical advice were able to 
335 
buy the medicine due to prohibitive prices of medicine. This constituted a problem 
particularly for those who suffered from chronic illnesses. 
When respondents were asked whether any member of the household had suffered 
from any illness during the last month, 50 cases (31.25%) said yes, 88 (55%) said 
that at least one member of the household suffered from a chronic illness, 21 
(13.13%) said no one had been ill during the last month, and 1 case (0.63%) could 
not remember. 
Table 5.44: Anyone ill last month 
IDiness in last month No. of households Percent 
rYes 50 31.25 
!Chronic illness 88 55.00 
INo 21 13.13 
~annot remember 1 0.63 
lfotal 160 100.00 
When those who reported that at least one member of the household had been ill 
during the last month were asked whether all those who were ill sought medical 
treatment, 12 cases (8.7%) reported that none ofthe household sought treatment, 15 
(1 0.87%) said some sought treatment, and 111 (80.43%) said that all those who 
were ill sought treatment. 
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Table 5.45: Did all those who were ill seek medical treatment? 
Members of households who 
No. of households Percent 
sought treatment 
IN one 12 8.70 
Some 15 10.87 
~ 111 80.43 
rrotal 138 100.00 
In cases where none or some members of the household sought treatment when they 
had been ill, the respondents were asked about the reasons why they did not seek 
treatment. Twenty-four cases (88.89%) said for financial reasons; 1 (3.7%) said for 
fear of doctors; 1 (3. 7%) said cannot go down because of ill health; and 1 case 
(3. 7%) - a woman, said that customs and traditions prohibited her from consulting 
male doctors. 
Table 5.46: Why did those who were ill not seek medical treatment? 
Reasons for not seeking treatment No. of households Percent 
Financial reasons 24 88.89 
fear of doctors 1 3.70 
Cannot go down 1 3.70 
Customs and traditions 1 3.70 
Total 27 100.00 
In the 126 cases, where some or all members of the household sought medical 
treatment, respondents were asked where they sought it. 
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Table 5.47: Health facilities visited by those who sought treatment (126 
responses: 177 answers) 
Health facility No. of households Percent 
Public hospital 51 28.81 
Private clinic 23 12.99 
CO clinic 13 7.34 
MO clinic 12 6.78 
Pharmacy 5 2.82 
!Repeated medication 51 28.81 
Social affairs polyclinic 8 4.52 
!Private polyclinic/hospital 2 1.13 
!Family planning polyclinic 1 0.56 
llfealth insurance 3 1.69 
School insurance 7 3.95 
rrreatment at state's expense 1 0.56 
tfotal 177 100.00 
When respondents with children under the age of 16 (105 households) were asked 
with which type of illness they sought medical treatment for their children, 68 cases 
(64.76%) said they sought treatment for everything, and 37 cases (35.24%) said 
only in case of serious illness. Serious illness was identified by respondents as any 
illness other than cold or minor stomach ache. 
Table 5.48: In which type of illness does household seek medical treatment for 
its children? 
rrype of illness No. of households Percent 
!Everything 68 64.76 
Serious illness 37 35.24 
fro tal 105 100.00 
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Table 5.49: Where does household seek medical treatment for its children? 
(105 responses: 224 answers) 
~ealth facility No. of households Percent 
School insurance 63 28.13 
!Public hospital 51 22.77 
!Private clinic 20 8.93 
~0 clinic 20 8.93 
~0 clinic 35 15.63 
!Family planning polyclinic 5 2.23 
Social affairs polyclinic 9 4.02 
!Pharmacy 12 5.36 
!Private polyclinic/hospital 7 3.13 
~are centre for children 1 0.45 
!Health insurance for newborn 1 0.45 
rrotal 224 100.00 
When asked with which type of illness an adult sought medical treatment, 35 cases 
(21.88%) said everything, and 125 (78.13%) said only in case of serious illness. 
Table 5.50: In which type of illness does an adult seek medical treatment? 
rrype of illness No. of households Percent 
!Everything 35 21.88 
Serious illness 125 78.13 
rrotal 160 100.00 
Of those who said that an adult sought medical treatment only in serious illness, 106 
cases (84.8%) said medical treatment was too expensive; 1 case (0.8%) said they 
did not trust doctors; 8 cases (6.4%) said they feared doctors and medicine; 2 
(1.6%) noted that they were immobile. Those who chose two answers included: 4 
cases (3.2%) said medical treatment was too expensive and they feared doctors and 
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medicine; 1 case (0.8%) said medical treatment was too expensive and not to make 
the husband worry; and 1 case (0.8%) said medical treatment was too expensive and 
it was troublesome to travel to the facility. Two cases ( 1.6%) did not respond. 
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So the answers were as follows: 
Table 5.51: Why will an adult not seek medical treatment? (124 response: 130 
answers) 
Reasons for not seeking treatment No. of households Percent 
irreatment is expensive 112 85.50 
:Oo not trust doctors 1 0.76 
fear of medicine and doctors 12 9.16 
~mmobile 2 1.53 
INot to worry husband 1 0.76 
if ravel 1 0.76 
INo response 2 1.53 
rrotal 131 100.00 
Table 5.52: Where does an adult seek medical treatment? (159 responses: 339 
answers) 
!Health facility No. of households Percent 
!Health insurance 20 5.90 
!Public hospital 106 31.27 
!Private clinic 42 12.39 
~0 clinic 33 9.73 
IMO clinic 62 18.29 
Social affairs polyclinic 14 4.13 
!Pharmacy 35 10.32 
!Private polyclinic/hospital 9 2.65 
family planning polyclinic 3 0.88 
School insurance 15 4.42 
lfotal 339 100.00 
The results from the assessment of health facilities used by the households in the 
sample were as follows: 
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Table 5.53: Assessment of health facilities used by households in the sample 
Public Hospital 
Does not 
Criterion Agree Neutral Disagree Total 
apply 
!Doctors/nurses are qualified 69 32 9 49 159 
!Doctors/nurses are caring 64 19 27 49 159 
!Equipment is available 101 3 3 52 159 
Service is affordable 108 1 1 49 159 
CO clinic 
Does not 
Criterion Agree Neutral Disagree Total 
apply 
poctors/nurses are qualified 36 0 0 124 160 
Doctors/nurses are caring 36 0 0 124 160 
Equipment is available 28 1 2 129 160 
Service is affordable 34 2 0 124 160 
Private clinic 
Does not 
Criterion Agree Neutral Disagree Total 
apply 
Doctors/nurses are qualified 48 1 0 110 159 
!Doctors/nurses are caring 47 2 0 110 159 
!Equipment is available 7 0 0 152 159 
Service is affordable 5 5 39 110 159 
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Private polyclinic 
Does not 
Criterion Agree Neutral Disagree Total 
apply 
Doctors/nurses are qualified 10 0 0 150 160 
Doctors/nurses are caring 10 0 0 150 160 
~quipment is available 8 0 1 151 160 
Service is affordable 6 3 1 150 160 
Health insurance 
Does not 
Criterion Agree Neutral Disagree Total 
apply 
Doctors/nurses are qualified 14 2 5 139 160 
Doctors/nurses are caring 13 1 7 139 160 
Equipment is available 17 0 3 140 160 
Service is affordable 20 0 1 139 160 
School insurance 
Does not 
Criterion Agree Neutral Disagree Total 
apply 
Doctors/nurses are qualified 38 15 9 95 157 
Doctors/nurses are caring 37 11 14 95 157 
Equipment is available 55 0 5 97 157 
Service is affordable 61 1 0 95 157 
MO clinic 
Does not 
Criterion Agree Neutral Disagree Total 
apply 
Doctors/nurses are qualified 61 7 1 91 160 
Doctors/nurses are caring 60 4 5 91 160 
~quipment is available 64 2 1 93 160 
Service is affordable 60 2 6 92 160 
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Family planning polyclinic 
Does not 
Criterion Agree Neutral Disagree Total 
apply 
!Doctors/nurses are qualified 5 0 0 155 160 
!Doctors/nurses are caring 5 0 0 155 160 
~quipment is available 5 0 0 155 160 
Service is affordable 5 0 0 155 160 
Social affairs polyclinic 
Does not 
Criterion Agree Neutral Disagree Total 
apply 
Doctors/nurses are qualified 13 4 0 143 160 
Doctors/nurses are caring 13 1 3 143 160 
Equipment is available 16 1 0 143 160 
Service is affordable 13 0 3 144 160 
Children care centre 
Does not 
Criterion Agree Neutral Disagree Total 
apply 
Doctors/nurses are qualified 0 1 0 159 160 
Doctors/nurses are caring 0 1 0 159 160 
Equipment is available 1 0 0 159 160 
Service is affordable 1 0 0 159 160 
Health insurance for newborns 
Does not 
Criterion Agree Neutral Disagree Total 
apply 
!Doctors/nurses are qualified 0 1 0 159 160 
!Doctors/nurses are caring 0 1 0 159 160 
!Equipment is available 0 0 1 159 160 
Service is affordable 1 0 0 159 160 
344 
When asked whether they faced any problems in acquiring medicine, 138 
respondents (86.25%) said they had problems; 19 cases (11.88%) said they had no 
problems; 1 case (0.63%) did not buy medicine as the respondent got the medicine 
from the national health insurance; and 2 cases (1.25%) did not respond. 
Table 5.54: Any problems with medicine 
!Any problems in obtaining medicine No. of households. Percent 
!Yes 138 86.25 
INo 19 11.88 
IDoes not apply 1 0.63 
INo response 2 1.25 
lfotal 160 100.00 
Those who said they faced problems in purchasing medicine were asked what kind 
of problems they had. Of those 138 cases, 135 respondents (97.83%) said medicine 
was expensive, 1 (0.72%) said it was unavailable, and 2 (1.45%) said it was both 
expensive and unavailable. 
Table 5.55: Problems with medicine (138 responses: 140 answers) 
Problems in obtaining medicine No. of households Percent 
Expensive 137 97.86 
Non-available 3 2.14 
Total 140 100.00 
After we have presented the results of the survey, we will discuss these results in 
the following section. 
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Discussion 
After we have presented the results of the fieldwork, we will now analyse the 
answers of respondents with the aid of supplementary information from focus group 
discussions. This will enable us understand the perceptions of a sample of lower 
income groups of welfare products provided by the state, and will illustrate the 
success/failure of the state in carrying out its obligation according to these people's 
perceptions and expectations. The author argues that the state has failed to carry out 
its part of the social contract towards lower income groups; accordingly, they have 
no allegiance towards the state or the regime as their welfare has diminished during 
Mubarak's rule. 
Household Background 
Out of the 567 members of households not in education, if those underage (86) are 
excluded, then the number of those not in education is reduced to 481, of whom 286 
(59.45%) were illiterate. Although illiteracy rate was higher among females (176 
out of 261; 67.43%) than males (110 out of 220; 50%), the percentage of female 
leaving education was only 41.5% compared with 58.5% for men. This means that a 
major part of the high female illiteracy rate can be explained by the fact that those 
females did not join education in the first place. 
Males exhibited a higher tendency to leave school because they had no desire to 
learn. This is reflected in the higher percentage of those leaving for this particular 
reason, 47.67% (41 out of 86) in comparison to 36.01% (22 out of 61) of females. If 
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we combine financial reasons together (viz. providing income source for the family 
and education is expensive), we can conclude that 44.19% of males left education 
for fmancial reasons. By leaving schools to serve as a source of income for the 
household, those males allowed some of their siblings to receive education. Due to 
cultural reasons that do not favour female employment,5 males experience more 
pressure than females to leave education, as they serve as an income source for the 
family. However, if the response 'education is expensive' is examined alone, the 
frequency of leaving education for this particular reason becomes higher for 
females 36.01% vis-a-vis 20.93% for males, which implies that households are less 
willing to make financial sacrifices for the education of females versus males. 
The high tendency for 'no desire to learn' can be explained by a combination of 
unfavourable conditions that children face in lower income households. These 
conditions, as revealed by Tabalah in his study on repetition, which often leads to 
dropout from school, include lack of school activities, lack of teachers' interest in 
students, failure of students to perceive the usefulness of their education, and 
illiteracy of parents. All these factors act as disincentives to students and make them 
leave schools.6 
5 This explanation is validated by the findings of the research, which shows that excluding the under-
aged females (40) and disabled (7), 77.71% (272 out of 350) were not in employment and do not 
want to work, compared with 40.97% (118 out of 288) for males, excluding the under-aged (29), 
disabled (18), conscripted in the army (9), and those on pension (15). 
6 See Tabalah, Z., Wiiqi' al-ta'lfm al-i'diidi wa kaifiyat tatwfruh [The Reality of the Preparatory 
Education and the Mechanism of its Devlopment], (Cairo: Centre of National Planning, 1994); and 
Mughith, K., and F. 'Adli, "al-Silm al-ta'limr' [The Educational Ladder], Itigiihiit al-sfyiisah al-
ta 'lfmfyah fi al-thamiinfniit: diriisah tahflfyah 'an al-ta 'lim at- 'iim fi Misr [The Orientations of 
Educational Policy in the Eighties: An Analytical Study on Education in Egypt], (Cairo: The 
National Centre for Educational Research and Development, 1992), pp. 86-88; and Tabalah, Z., 
Wiiqi' al-ta'lfm al-i'diidi wa kaifiyat tatwfruh [The Reality of the Preparatory Education and the 
Mechanism of its Devlopment], (Cairo: Centre of National Planning, 1994). 
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Only 211 out of 756 members of households were working at the time of 
conducting the survey, which means that all the members of the households were 
supported by 27.91% of the participants in the sample, the rest of the income came 
mainly from pension and assistance from religious organisations and individuals. If 
one looks at the means of income of those working, it appears that more than a third 
of the working sample (70 out of 211 or 33.18%) was self-employed (in other 
words, they did not work for anyone, and did not own a private business), the 
percentage being 36.25% for male and 25.81% for female. Another 10.43% (22 out 
of 211) were employed in casual jobs, and were, therefore, vulnerable as their jobs 
were irregular and tended to be low-paid. 
Discussions showed the frustration of respondents due to the lack of employment 
opportunities that would provide them with a regular source of income. Three 
widows, who were providing for their households by selling food on the street, 
complained that their efforts were hindered by state officials, as they did not have a 
licence to sell their products and obtaining the licence was troublesome. They 
observed that not only the state had failed to provide for them, but also it placed 
obstacles in their way to make a living. 
Income 
Most of the households, 151 (94.38% ), were concentrated in the first four income 
categories. Forty-five cases out of 160 (28.13%) had another source of income 
besides work. 
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Classifying households by religion showed that 42.35% of Muslim households lay 
in the lowest income category (less than < E£100), compared with 28% of Christian 
households. Assuming that all respondents were honest in reporting the income of 
their households, this fmding has to be interpreted with caution as the difference 
could have resulted from two factors. It might mean that Muslim households, in 
general, tend to be poorer than their Christian counterparts. This could be due to the 
difference in the type of support they receive from religious organisations. 
This is affirmed by the fact that whereas only 3 cases relied solely on income from 
COs none relied on assistance from the MOs alone, though two cases relied on 
assistance from individuals in addition to that from MOs. Alternatively, this 
difference could have resulted from a bias in the sample, as households were not 
selected randomly. 
It should be noted that only 2 households in the sample received any form of 
supplementary income from the state, Sadat pension (E£67 per month). Both cases 
thought it was not enough. Although other cases were entitled to this pension, they 
were not aware of their right, and when the researcher informed them, they thought 
it would be troublesome to apply for it. 
Furthermore, individuals who were not employed had to seek assistance from 
relatives, individuals, or religious organisations. In other words, they had to rely on 
the family or the voluntary sector, in case of the failure of market solution. This i~ 
an area of failure for the state in welfare provision probably dictated by its limited 
resources. The state has failed to support citizens who did not have a means of 
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earning a living, not even through a level of income that would guarantee them a 
minimum standard of living. 
Food Subsidy 
There was nearly no correlation between having ration cards and income, Pearson's 
coefficient was -0.066. One would have expected more households in lower income 
groups to have ration cards, but results did not show such a correlation. Most of the 
respondents of the households not in possession of ration cards (52.5%) said they 
had never applied for it. Although the percentage of red ration cards should 
normally rise with income, the sample did not show a consistent trend in the 
distribution of green and red cards in relation to income, as in the lowest income 
bracket of the sample, 21.43% of those with ration cards had red ration cards. The 
percentage rose to 25% in the next bracket, but then dropped to 16.67% in the 
following one and rose again to 43.48%, and then in the highest two income groups, 
households had green cards. This shows how inefficient the targeting system of 
subsidies is, as it ought to be aimed at lower income groups. 
Additionally, the high percentage of households where not all members of the 
household (44.17%) are covered by ration cards means that these households are 
more vulnerable to fluctuations in market prices, as they have to buy larger 
quantities of rationed items at higher market prices. This problem is intense because 
the two rationed items are indispensable for all households. This is reflected in the 
fact that all respondents who used ration cards bought the two items offered on 
ration, oil and sugar, and they consumed more than the rationed quantities. 
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Those who did not use all the subsidised items were asked what they did with 
unconsumed items. If people sold these items that meant that cash subsidies might 
be better for them. For those who gave them away, on the other hand, the subsidy 
was wasted. Of the 5 cases that did not consume all quantities rationed, 4 cases sold 
them. Two of these cases belonged to the lowest income group (one household was 
composed of 2 members and the other 7 members), and the other two belonged to 
the second income group (both with 8 members per household). Thus, the living 
conditions of these households were poor and this is why they opted to sell the 
items sometimes to have cash. 
One cannot consider this case to be a waste of the ration system, as these 
households are poor, and they chose to have their subsidy in a different form that 
would allow them to buy the commodities they wanted or needed. It also shows that 
these households preferred to receive what they perceived as their entitlement from 
the state, rather than leave it altogether because they did not need that form of 
subsidy at the time. 
At all levels of income, most respondents (68.91%) preferred food subsidy, as they 
thought that items were cheaper in the ration cards, and they did not trust the 
government to give out money. Also, discussions in the focus groups showed that 
respondents did not think that the government would adjust cash transfers to 
inflation, as with rationed items whose prices rise in the ration card but they are still 
cheaper than in the market. So they reasoned that with a cash subsidy, they would 
end up with small fixed amounts; and, hence, they would lose out in the long run. 
Only 8.40% preferred a money subsidy that they could use as they wished. Even at 
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the lowest income levels, most respondents still preferred ration cards to money (29 
versus 2). 
It was clear from the discussions that the subjects did not trust that the state would 
act in their benefit. They realised that what they had was already little but it was 
better than nothing. They wanted to take out of the system as much as they could, as 
they perceived their interests not in congruence with those of the state, which is 
trying to take from them the little they had, as after the removal of many items from 
the subsidy, only two items were rationed. In most cases respondents remarked that 
the rationed quantities were not enough. 
Many respondents pointed out that they had to buy their items, most of the time, 
from shops that sold items in small quantities, as they could not afford to buy them 
in larger quantities. This is also why they would not buy their rationed quantities 
regularly; they would usually purchase them every other month, or whenever they 
had money. So in spite of having the ration system, low-income groups could not 
always enjoy its benefits due to shortage of cash. 
It should be noted that the questions on food consumption were designed to enquire 
about food expenditure rather than nutritional consumption. The researcher chose to 
ask about food consumption to give an idea of expenditure on food. 
The researcher expected a strong negative relationship between size of household 
and average consumption. In general, for all items listed in food consumption, a 
negative correlation, though weak in most cases, was detected between the size of 
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the household and average consumption of the item per person. When a Pearson's 
coefficient test was run, it was significant at the 0.01 level. 
When running a Pearson's coefficient correlation test between the income of 
household, and the average consumption of household, the relationship was even 
weaker. The researcher expected a strong negative relationship between each 
household's income and the average consumption of some items, such as pasta and 
tea. This is because it was pointed out in discussions that these items were heavily 
consumed by low-income households, as they were relatively cheap. Also pasta is 
an ingredient in one of the main cheap Egyptian dishes, kusharf. For tea, it seemed 
that, other than being a matter of taste and preference, tea was more consumed by 
low-income households to compensate for less quantities of food. 
Quantities of rationed oil and sugar were not sufficient, as respondents noted that 
they always had to buy more of them at market prices. The problem was intense at 
lower income levels. This is because, as already noted tea was consumed more at 
the lowest income bracket (<E£100) as a substitute for food or other beverages, and 
sugar is a complementary good to tea. The same applied for oil, which is consumed 
more by the lowest income group as they relied more on deep fried food, such as 
aubergine and potatoes. In some cases, however, respondents reported that they 
relied only on the rationed quantities to avoid purchasing these items at expensive 
market prices. 
Although the difference in consumption of fruit among different income groups was 
not significant, the types of fruit consumed were different. Respondents clarified in 
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discussions that if they had little money, they would buy the cheapest fruit available 
in that season (oranges in winter, and local apples in summer). 
Some households pointed out that they did not buy a whole chicken, rather 
drumsticks, wings, or necks, because they were cheaper. 
The irregularity of income was reflected in food consumption patterns. In some 
cases, the informant was unable to report the average consumption of items per 
month. Many respondents noted that they would buy food items if they had money, 
and if they had no money they would not buy. In general, one has to be careful 
when interpreting these results, as quantities are likely to be underestimated. This is 
because respondents could not state the quantities they bought precisely because 
food expenditure depended on their access to money, which is in most cases 
irregular. 
Education 
Most of the households in the sample who had children in formal education, 79 out 
of 93 cases (84.95% ), sent their children to state schools. The majority of those who 
sent their children to a private schooVinstitute, 9 cases (64.29% ), did so because 
their children got a low score in the previous stage of education, and could not join 
other types of education in state schools. This finding shows the value of education 
for these households, as they preferred to bear the tinancial burden of sending their 
child to a private educational institution to ending their child's educational life at an 
early stage. 
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The question on school fees showed that in spite of the relatively small tuition fees 
of state schools, compared to fees at private schools, they still constituted a burden 
for these households. Out of the 80 cases that paid fees, the majority of respondents, 
68 cases (85%), considered the fees to be too much, 11 cases (13.75%) regarded 
them as reasonable, and 1 case thought that it was little. In the discussions, when the 
researcher referred to education in state schools as free, the subjects remarked that it 
was not free. It did not matter for them that the fees they paid fell under different 
categories other than tuition fees, as has already been pointed in the previous 
chapter. Respondents perceived education of their children at state schools as an 
entitlement, which the state is again encroaching upon by raising the fees gradually 
but steadily. 
Most respondents, 85 cases (91.4% ), noted that their children required help with 
their studies. This is probably a reflection of the difficulty of the syllabi and the lack 
of interest of teachers in students. Parents resorted to different means, namely, 
private lessons, study groups at school, lessons at MOs/COs, and asking friends or 
neighbours for assistance, to secure the required help. Some cases, 5 (5.88%), did 
not have the fmancial means so they did nothing. All this added to the fmancial 
burden that education placed on these low-income households. 
In focus group discussions, respondents observed that they preferred private lessons 
if they could afford them. They thought that the quality of tuition offered in private 
lessons is better. Some noted that they send their children to study groups at school 
just to pass the exam, as the schoolteacher would fail the student if he/she did not 
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attend study groups at school. This phenomenon is a reflection of the poor salaries 
of the teachers. 
The fact that 82.81% and 90% of households reported that they would like their 
sons and daughters respectively to complete their higher education reflects the 
expectations and the aspirations of the parents for their children. It further 
highlights the parents' value for education, and their belief that it could enhance the 
chances of their children in life. 7 Parents are still willing to make fmancial sacrifices 
to secure academic education, which was thought to be superior to technical 
education, for their children. 
Parents explained that none of their children who were attending a technical 
education did so because they wanted it. Most of them, 43.75%, chose it because 
they obtained a low score in the previous stage of education. Another significant 
group was the one that chose it due to financial constraints, as private lessons, 
which are seen as a must for completing the general secondary stage successfully, 
are prohibitively expensive. 
Upon close examination of the reasons why parents sent their children to schools, 
one notes that the most frequent answer, 50.62%, was so that they could have a 
better understanding of life. This stems from their belief that individuals could 
make more informed decisions in life if they were educated. The other two 
important reasons were to provide the child with an opportunity for employment 
7 Williamson, B., Education and Social Change in Egypt and Turkey: A Study in Historical 
Sociology, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 133. 
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(23.75%), and a social status in life (13.75%). Very few noted that schooling would 
provide the child with an opportunity to earn a higher income (4.38%). Some 
parents valued education because they were not educated (6.25% ). The rest gave 
other reasons. 
One can conclude that in spite of their poverty, many respondents did not send their 
children to school because they believed they were going to earn a higher income 
through education, rather they did so because they were after a secure employment 
and a social status. This is understandable if we consider the fact that most of the 
members in the sample were engaged in casual jobs, which made their income 
irregular. Additionally, as these jobs tended to be low-end jobs, they did not enjoy a 
high prestige in society, where white-collar jobs are more valued. Moreover, 
Egyptians attach value to educational certificates even if they do not work with their 
qualifications, or if they do not earn a high income compared to a skilled or semi-
skilled labourer. 
From the discussions as well as the responses of parents, it follows that most 
respondents valued education very highly. Education was considered as an 
instrument for upward mobility whether financially or socially through a higher 
status. Therefore, counting on these future benefits, they dedicated many fmancial 
resources to education, even when children did not show a high propensity for 
education. In most cases, respondents noted that it was only after several years of 
repetition and when the child decided that he/she did not want to go to school 
anymore that the parents gave up on the child's education. 
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In general, parents wanted their children to have as good chances in life as possible, 
this was confirmed by their answers why they sent their children to schools as they 
thought schooling would increase the children's chance to get a job, secure them 
financially, broaden their awareness, and provide them with a higher social status. 
Some parents pointed out that they sent their children to schools because they 
themselves had not been educated. This, in particular, shows that parents want their 
children's opportunities to be better than theirs. 
Moreover, it seemed that respondents believed in the significance of education for 
securing employment for their children. One can argue that the link between 
education and secure employment has been entrenched in society due to the policies 
of guaranteed employment adopted since 1964, and which have been abrogated by 
the regime in 1984/85. For these income groups, the link has not been broken yet, 
and it will probably take time for this to happen. The state has, therefore, raised the 
expectations of these lower income groups but has failed to satisfy their wants by 
abandoning genuine free education and guaranteed employment. 
Health Care 
Although 55% of those who reported that they were ill during the previous month 
suffered from a chronic illness, one could not ascertain whether this was related to 
their poor living conditions. However, one can conclude from the data that reported 
chronic illness falls as income rises. 
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Evidently, financial resources act as a constraint on seeking medical treatment, as a 
high proportion of those who did not seek medical treatment (88.89%) indicated 
that this was due to fmancial limitations. Respondents noted that they usually 
sought medical treatment if they had money at the time of illness. 
Public hospitals were the most visited health service facility (28.81%) cited by 
respondents who had been ill during the previous month. This could be due to 
limited financial resources, as public hospital provided the cheapest health services. 
Second came repeated medication, which was used by those who suffered from a 
chronic illness. Obviously, when people could afford it they chose to use private 
health services, as 12.99% of the respondents sought treatment at a private clinic. In 
discussions, people pointed out that when they went to a private clinic, it was 
usually a cheap one, which charged a modest fee of E£7, unless the illness was 
really serious and then they would go to a clinic that charged on average a fee of 
E£10. 
Table 5.56: Fees on average in health facilities used by respondents in E£ 
Health facility Fee Health facility Fee 
Public hospital 1.00 Private clinic 7.00-10.00 
Private polyclinic 3.00-5.00 Social affairs polyclinic 1.25 
Polyclinic affiliated 3.00-5.00 Other types of state 1.10-1.25 
with an MO polyclinics 
Polyclinic affiliated 2.00-5.00 
with a CO 
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In discussions, subjects noted that they usually sought medical treatment for their 
children at what they thought were better facilities, such as private clinics or family 
planning centres for infants. For adults, they used public hospitals because they 
were cheaper or sometimes because they were specialised, such as chest hospitals. 
In case of those who suffered from a chronic illness, patients sought medical 
treatment at a private clinic or a polyclinic. 
Most respondents who used public hospitals did not think that doctors and nurses 
were qualified or caring; however, they acknowledged that public hospitals had 
equipment and they were affordable. Some respondents, though, reported that they 
had to be discharged from a public hospital several times because the hospital did 
not have the basic medical material, such as cotton, and thread, to carry out surgical 
operations; others reported that they had to procure these materials from a private 
pharmacy at market prices to be able to have the operation on time. 
Respondents pointed out that they expected health care to be provided by the state 
and expressed their disappointment in the quality of service offered at public health 
care facilities. Again the state has failed to meet their expectations in the area of 
health care. This is why they are looking for alternative solutions in the voluntary 
and private sectors. 
Interviews revealed that respondents preferred to seek medical advice at private 
facilities, if they could afford them, as they believed that the staff were more caring 
and attentive to their ailments than at public facilities because the former charged 
fees whereas the latter were nearly free. This attitude reflects that respondents were 
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aware of the correlation between the quality of service and charges. They 
recognised that service providers were more responsive and accountable if they 
charged higher fees for these services. 
The main problem for most respondents seemed to be with medicine. The majority 
of the respondents (86.25% or 138 out of 160) had problems in obtaining medicine. 
Of these 137 (99.28%) reported that they found medicine too expensive. Some 
participants in the focus groups pointed out that sometimes although they would 
seek medical advice, they would not purchase the medicine because it was too 
expensive. They suggested to the researcher that the state should subsidise the 
medicine. Once again, it was clear that people had unfulfilled expectations from the 
state in health care provision. 
Limitations of the Research 
This study has two main limitations. First, the research does not assess the attitudes 
of lower income groups towards the state and/or regime and their success or failure 
to carry out their obligations towards them according to their perceptions. However, 
the sensitivity of the topic prevented such a study. This fieldwork was still useful 
because it measures the usage of a sample of lower income groups in Cairo of state 
welfare products; and it was still possible to get an idea of people's expectations 
and frustrations. Second, the sample is not representative of lower income groups; 
subjects were not chosen randomly, as has already been pointed out in the 
discussion of sampling, to enable us to make generalisations. Nonetheless, it still 
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presents a portrait of the usage of state welfare products by lower income groups 
and their evaluation of these products. 
The researcher encountered some problems when collecting the data. Sometimes 
the contacts themselves hindered the research by intervening on behalf of the 
respondents, and leading them to answers, or modifying their answers (this 
happened especially with food consumption when sometimes contacts felt the 
quantities reported by respondents were unrealistic). It was a bit difficult to stop the 
contacts from intervening and affecting the direction of answers without 
antagonising them. This was a sensitive issue because contacts were essential to 
gain the trust of the subjects; furthermore, they also provided valuable contribution 
at times, by engaging in conversation with the subjects, which revealed insightful 
information. However, their presence sometimes proved to be an obstacle because 
people knew them personally, and they felt embarrassed to expose their income and 
consumption patterns in their presence. 
Usually, respondents were intimidated and cautious at the beginning of the 
interview, some of them were reluctant to engage m the survey, but as the 
conversation went on, and they realised that the questions were related to their 
everyday life, they started to feel at ease and the conversation flowed smoothly. In 
some cases, people corrected some of the information that they had given earlier in 
the questionnaire. This of course made the researcher slightly dubious about the 
information collected from other cases, where respondents did not make any 
corrections. But as the corrections were usually not major, the answers could still be 
considered reliable. 
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Sometimes, subjects became too emotional when they talked about their problems, 
which were not always related to the research; one woman, for instance, who had a 
problem with her husband, fainted during the interview, and it took some time to 
bring her back to consciousness and to start the conversation once more. Also as 
people looked for sympathy, they sometimes exaggerated their plight in terms of 
low income, and consumption of some items mainly beef. In some cases, this was 
pointed out later by the contacts and corrections were made. 
The purpose of this 'independent' research was explained clearly to the subjects, 
namely to examine the products provided by the state in the fields of food subsidy, 
education, and health care in order to assess whether the state is fulfilling its 
obligations towards its citizens. However, respondents, in general, were divided 
between those who thought the research was done to take resources from them 
(taxes, removing subsidy), and those who thought that the research was conducted 
to provide them with additional benefits in the aforementioned fields. This of course 
affected their answers. 
Potential Areas of Research 
Based on this survey and discussions in focus groups, the researcher has identified 
the following issues as potential areas that command further research: 
Food Subsidy: Research may be conducted on people's opinion about the utility of 
subsidised items. In other words, whether they would like to have other items sold 
with the ration card instead of oil and sugar. 
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Education: More research may be done on the children's perceptions of and 
attitudes towards education, and how they differ from their parents' attitudes to 
determine whether education is considered to be 'useful' among younger 
generations. Concerning the expenditure on education, other items should be taken 
into consideration, such as buying uniforms, books, and stationery. 
Health: More research should be conducted on the most important criteria for 
people in deciding which health facility to use. As some respondents pointed out in 
the focus groups, for example, that where people sought medical treatment 
depended on factors such as the severity and time of illness (evening or morning). If 
it was severe and at night people would choose the nearest place, even if it was 
expensive; otherwise they could wait until the morning and visit another facility that 
they thought was more affordable but was a bit far. Additionally, the importance of 
competence of staff or their care and the affordability of service in influencing the 
decision of where to seek treatment should be investigated. Another possible area of 
research is comparing usage of health care services by lower and upper groups to 
examine the impact of income on health status. 
Based on this survey of welfare programmes in Egypt in the areas of food subsidy, 
education, and health care, the researcher concludes that there is room for reform in 
welfare policies pertaining to these areas. In the following section, we will draw up 
some conclusions regarding the social contract between the state and lower income 
groups, and recommendations to improve the welfare system in these areas. 
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Conclusion and Recommendations 
Although the sample was not representative, one can still infer that the system 
entails leakage, which can be revealed through a representative survey from all 
income groups in society. The state has introduced a dual system of ration cards to 
target food subsidy more specifically at lower income households. However, the 
fact that among the lowest two income brackets in the sample, 16 out of 70 
households (22.86%) did not have a green ration card, whereas 9 households in the 
sample who lied in the upper two income brackets had green ration cards shows that 
upper income groups may be receiving full subsidy which is denied to those in the 
lowest income groups. 
The respondents revealed their attitudes towards the state indirectly through the 
reasons they cited for preferring the ration subsidy to cash subsidy. The respondents 
did not think that the state cared enough about their welfare to secure them a cash 
subsidy that would not be rescinded over time. They felt that the ration card subsidy 
was more binding for the state. They also realised that once the state replaced the 
in-kind subsidy for cash, it would be easier to abrogate the whole subsidy system 
over time. It seemed that they were aware that the state might remove subsidies 
altogether, as in many cases when the researcher posed the question about the 
preferred type of subsidy, respondents asked instantly whether the government was 
going to repeal the ration system. 
This exposed the weakness of the social contract between these lower income 
households and the state. The system of subsidy was identified by many subjects as 
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inefficient and/or insufficient; and the state was perceived as indifferent to their 
problems, and, hence, respondents did not feel obliged to support the system. This 
was clear in the respondents' comments and observations that showed their 
frustration with the state. Nevertheless, they were also reluctant to give up what 
they perceived as their right in the form of the ration system or the nominally 'free' 
education or health care. 
The survey demonstrated that public education was far from free. Households were 
burdened by tuition fees that go under different names, in addition to supplementary 
lessons that are essential for the child to pass his/her exams. This exhibited the 
ineffectiveness of the alleged 'free' state education, and, therefore, another area of 
failure of the state to meet its obligations of the social contract. The state system of 
education has failed many people in lower income groups, who could not complete 
their education successfully; furthermore, it has failed to secure them the aspired for 
secure employment. 
Finally, movmg on to the area of health care, we encounter another failure. 
Although respondents acknowledged that the services offered at public hospitals or 
national health insurance were affordable, the quality in terms of qualification and 
care of doctors/nurses was not comparable to that of private facilities or even that 
offered by facilities affiliated with MOs and/or COs. This is an area, therefore, 
where civil society can relieve the state by meeting the needs of these communities. 
Since most of the funds allocated by the state to the health sector are wasted on 
salaries rather than drugs or health facilities, the state can help by offering subsidies 
to these organisations and directing subsidies towards drugs instead. However, this 
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may eventually result in a loss in legitimacy and more alienation of the population, 
who still use public facilities, and are already frustrated with the state, as they do 
not think that it provides enough. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we presented the fieldwork conducted by the researcher during the 
period October 1998 - December 1999. The purpose of the fieldwork was to 
investigate the performance of the Egyptian welfare state, in Cairo, in the following 
areas, food subsidy, education, and health. Although not representative, this study 
shed some light on the attitudes and perceptions of some lower income groups, in a 
district in Cairo, of welfare provision. 
Low-income households interviewed made use of welfare products provided by the 
state; however, they were not always content with the quantity and/or the quality of 
these goods and services. They preferred the market option if they could afford it. 
This reveals the failure of the state in welfare provision, and that people are ready to 
seek solution in the market as much as their means will allow them. The voluntary 
sector has also acted as an alternative provider, especially in the area of health care. 
The implication of this for the state and the regime is that the social contract based 
upon welfare provision is falling apart, as these welfare products have fallen short 
of people's expectations. There is an increasing discontent with the performance of 
the state in welfare provision. The state is retreating from welfare provision because 
of its financial burdens. This trend is expected to persist at least in the short run. 
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Thus, welfare provision can no longer serve as a central component of the social 
contract. This means that the regime needs to redefine the social contract. 
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Conclusion 
Introduction 
The researcher used social contract theory to explain regime legitimacy and state-
society relations in Egypt. The researcher's interest in the question of legitimacy in 
Egypt has arisen because of Western, mainly US, preoccupation with the stability of 
Middle Eastern regimes. The Iranian revolution in 1979, which overthrew the 
Western supported regime of the Shah, exposed the fragility of Middle Eastern 
regimes and their weak bases of support in society. 
Since the 1952 revolution, successive Egyptian regimes have tried to preserve the 
stability of their rule, in other words to remain in power, by increasing the powers 
of the President. They have managed to expand their autonomy vis-a-vis society by 
forming a social contract with society based upon restriction of liberties and 
participation of the public in the political process. In exchange, they have made 
commitments to achieve certain objectives, such as national and economic 
independence and prosperity, according to their visions for their country. Changes 
in the objectives of each of these Egyptian regimes, throughout the last four 
decades, necessitated the modification of terms of the social contract. As a 
consequence, state-society relations have been marked by continuous change. 
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In general, state-society relations are dynamic; the strength and autonomy that the 
state and society enjoy vis-a-vis each other are not constant. The state regulates the 
relationship between society and different state institutions, as well as relationships 
among different actors within society. State policies and decisions are supposed to 
serve the 'common interest' of citizens or the 'general will' in society. 1 On the other 
hand, society tries to protect the individual from the excesses of the state through 
the operations of civil society associations. Civil society associations promote the 
right of the individual to 'life, liberty, and property' by advancing and protecting 
the interests of their members and constituencies. 
To be able to pursue independent objectives from the interests of influential groups 
within society, the state has to be strong and enjoy relative autonomy from these 
groups. A strong state is not only the one that intervenes to change political 
outcomes, but also a state that can 'intervene, withdraw, reform or abstain'. On the 
other hand, a weak state fails to change the outcome of private actors and is 
characterised by collusion between public officials and private actors, and serves 
the interests of key groups in society. 
Neo-Marxists consider the state to enjoy relative autonomy, when the state succeeds 
in balancing the interests of conflicting classes. However, it promotes the long-term 
interests of the dominant, political, or economic class. The state secures autonomy 
because of its monopoly over the means of coercion. 
1 Jessop, B., State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in Its Place, (Cambridge: Polity Press), pp. 
341. 
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As the relationship between the state and society is dynamic, the strength and 
autonomy of the state may change over time. A strong state enjoys both high 
autonomy and high support from society; the policies of the state, which reflect its 
preferences, are supported by society. An independent state enjoys high autonomy 
but low support; it implements its policies regardless of the preferences of society. 
A responsive state has low autonomy and high support, as it carries out policies 
that translate the preferences of society. Finally, a weak state scores low on both 
autonomy and support; it fails to act autonomously from the contending preferences 
within society. 
From this typology, it follows that the strength of the state is not only determined by 
the ability of the state to carry out its preferences, but also by the support it enjoys, 
in other words the legitimacy of the state. The legitimacy of the state refers to 'the 
extent to which social and political norms in a given society are accepted, especially 
those applying to the exercise of power or the domination of some individuals or 
groups of individuals by others'. 2 The author used social contract theory to explain 
the legitimacy of the state. 
The Social Contract 
In this research the author has used social contract theory to analyse state-society 
relations in LDC states, focusing mainly on Egypt. Although the utility of social 
contract theory for analysing state-society relations has been questioned by political 
2 Rush, M., Politics and Society: An Introduction to Political Sociology, (New York: Prentice Hall, 
1992), pp. 53. 
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philosophers, such as Hume and Hegel, the author of this research argues that social 
contract theory is relevant for explaining the crisis of legitimacy of political 
authority in many LDCs. 
According to social contract theorists, leaders have certain obligations towards their 
citizens. Citizens owe their leaders obedience as long as the latter are able to carry 
out these obligations. If the leader fails, then his/her rule is no longer legitimate. At 
this stage, some social contract theorists, such as Locke, believe citizens have a 
right to resist the ruler's authority. 
Locke explains that as the leader fails to meet his/her obligation of the social 
contract, political authority ceases to be legitimate and the population has a right to 
resist his/her rule. Nevertheless, this does not mean that they will use their right to 
resist. Accordingly, the fact that they do not resist does not mean that they perceive 
political authority as legitimate. 
Rush argues that acquiescence of citizens does not mean that the authority of the 
leader is legitimate. He classifies other reasons for acceptance of authority into 
negative and positive. Negative acceptance of authority stems from the fear of 
citizens if they do not follow law and order because of physical or material threat. 
They may accept authority also because of lack of interest or feeling that they 
cannot change the situation. Positive acceptance of authority emanates from 
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material gains that citizens acquire from the prevalent political system; these 
include gains from patronage networks. 3 
The researcher argues that social contract theory can be a useful tool for analysing 
the legitimacy of regimes in LDC states. Many LDC regimes have tried to 
consolidate and legitimise their rule through a social contract with society. They 
committed themselves to achieve certain objectives, such as national independence, 
industrialisation, and welfare, in return for the allegiance of their citizens. 
Yet, the formula of the social contract has not been static in LDCs. In the absence of 
strong democratic institutions that can guarantee legitimacy for the regime and 
stability, LDC regimes have often redefined the contract, changing their obligations 
according to domestic and international exigencies. 
One of the main obligations in the social contract in many LDC states has been 
welfare provision. Although the welfare state has been a central component of the 
social contract in advanced countries and in LDCs, and, hence, has served as a 
legitimation tool, the mechanism by which the welfare state generates legitimacy is 
profoundly different in both cases. 
3 Rush, M., Politics and Society: An Introduction to Political Sociology, (New York: Prentice Hall, 
1992), pp. 21. 
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The Western Welfare State 
The Western welfare state has evolved over the last three centuries. At the 
beginning of the state's involvement in welfare provision, its role was confined to 
reducing poverty by fmding jobs for the unemployed. With the rise of 
industrialisation, the state became more active in welfare provision by offering a 
residual system with the aim of improving working conditions, and providing 
health care and education for the deserving poor after subjecting them to a means 
test. However, the welfare provided by the state remained limited, to guaranteeing a 
minimum standard of living below which no one was supposed to fall, in order to 
prevent recipients of welfare from relying on the state welfare system rather than 
employment. 
In the aftermath of World War II, citizens in Western countries came to realise that 
they all shared a risk in time of war; therefore, they should share a risk in time 
peace as well. They had an interest in supporting a welfare system that insured them 
against the risk of destitution, illness, and unemployment. Accordingly, the welfare 
state provided universal welfare for all citizens regardless of their class or economic 
ability. The welfare state shifted from its focus on the poor and disadvantaged 
towards improving the welfare of all members of society, and creating a welfare 
society. In such a society, all members enjoy welfare because of their citizenship 
rights. This shift had a significant impact on Western societies; it emphasised 
solidarity and social cohesion. 
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Thus, the welfare state has, particularly, flourished after World War II, in response 
to rising demands for social rights. Social rights form the last phase of a three-phase 
process that encompasses civil, political, and social rights. These rights are tied to 
duties of citizens towards each other and towards the state. Within this context, the 
state respects the liberties of its citizens. This is guaranteed through the strong 
democratic institutions of the state that promote pluralism and the political 
participation of citizens, and generate stability. This is because the state regulates 
conflict and co-operation among different actors within society; and all members of 
society have a stake in maintaining the political system, which takes their interests 
into consideration. 
In other words, the welfare state has been a manifestation of the social contract in 
Western societies since World War II. The welfare state has been a tool of 
legitimation because it seeks to maintain social cohesion in society. The welfare 
state promotes social cohesion via two means, distribution of resources, and 
managing the conflict between capital and labour. By being involved in the 
production and/or delivery of welfare, the state has enhanced equality in society; all 
members of society are entitled to the same welfare products regardless of their 
economic ability because they are citizens of the state. In addition, the state has 
minimised conflict between capital and labour through regulation of capital, 
product, and labour markets. 
By regulating capital-labour relations, Marxists, such as Habermas and Offe, argue 
that the welfare state, acts as a mechanism for legitimation. This is because it 
provides the capitalist system with its requirements of skilled, healthy labour. 
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Therefore, it contributes to the process of accumulation of capital. On the other 
hand, by providing labour with welfare products, such as health care and education, 
the state eliminates a potential source of discontent. This way, the welfare state 
generates legitimacy for the capitalist system of production by satisfying the 
demands and needs of both capital and labour. 
The state's endeavours to promote harmony between capital and labour, by 
satisfying the needs of both groups, were facilitated by the liberal international trade 
environment that followed World War II. Western economies enjoyed periods of 
fast economic growth that enabled them to sustain the welfare state. However, by 
the late 1970s, the international economic environment changed and many of the 
Western states experienced a fiscal crisis due to slow rates of economic growth. 
This placed a pressure on the state to curb expansion in welfare provision. This has 
been compounded by the increasing pace of globalisation, which necessitates a 
change in socio-economic institutions to adjust to the new environment. The 
retrenchment of the state has led to the diminishing of the welfare state. This marks 
the need for the modification of the social contract to maintain social cohesion and 
solidarity in society. 
The LDC Welfare State 
Many LDC states gained their independence through a military coup d'etat, after a 
long period of struggle against colonial powers. Once they ascended to power after 
a military coup, revolutionary regimes had to consolidate their rule. They were 
faced with the problem of generating legitimacy for their rule, and in some cases for 
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the state as well. Most of these states were artificial creations, and even those who 
had a long tradition of statehood, lacked strong institutions to confer legitimacy 
upon the regime and guarantee its legitimacy. 
Thereupon, many revolutionary regimes m LDCs tried to prolong their rule by 
expanding their autonomy vis-a-vis society using material incentives, such as 
welfare provision, and coercion in order to generate stability, which meant the 
continuity of their rule. To this end, they empowered the regime rather than the 
populace, as they sought to constrain liberties and keep the public away from 
political participation by blocking all avenues of participation. In return, the regime 
pledged to achieve objectives, such as national and economic independence, and to 
provide welfare for the public. 
Thus, the social contract in LDCs was based on exchange and material gain rather 
than promotion of liberties. The public gave up their right to political participation 
for economic benefits, in the form of subsidised food, free education and health 
care. These welfare products were marketed to the public as their rights, in 
emulation of the Western welfare state. These rights, however, were not tied to 
duties or promotion of work ethic and values. They were more the fruit of 
independence, which was secured by revolutionary regimes. This strategy has 
produced stability only in the short term. 
As long as the regime was able meet its commitments and deliver welfare products, 
the public was acquiescent. Once the resources of the state dried up, and the regime 
was unable to carry out its obligations, the populace rose against the regime in 
377 
many LDCs. The public felt that the regime had failed to meet its obligations. The 
regime's response then entailed a redefinition of the social contract. It not only 
expanded in providing welfare to the public, but also introduced some measures of 
politicalliberalisation in an attempt to secure regime survival and gain legitimacy. 
Although leadership in many LDC countries purport to have adopted democratic 
systems, the populace shows apathy and cynicism towards both their states and 
regimes, as evident in a low tum out rate in elections in many LDCs. The 
introduction of democratic institutions has not enhanced regime legitimacy, as the 
public perceives these institutions as a fa~ade for democracy, and not as a 
representation of a true democracy based upon the participation of all members of 
society and a rotation of power.4 
Thus, in the absence of genuine political participation and a democratic system that 
ensures that the interests of all members of society are taken into consideration, and 
that 'citizens' can influence the decision making process, regime legitimacy will 
remain weak; and stability will not prevail within LDC societies. The social 
contract will not be durable as it fails to generate long-term legitimacy and it is not 
a manifestation of social cohesion in society. 
4 Leca, J., "Democratization in the Arab World: Uncertainty, Vulnerability and Legitimacy. A 
Tentative Conceptualitzation and Some Hypothesis", in G. Salame (ed.), Democracy without 
Deomocrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), pp. 49, 54. 
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Egypt's Social Contract 
The author of this research argued that in Egypt, as in many LDC states, welfare 
policies have been manipulated by the regime to acquire legitimacy. Since the 1952 
revolution, the social contract, between society and the regime, has been based upon 
exchange of liberties and participation in the political process for the achievement 
of declared objectives, such as national and economic independence, and welfare 
provision. 
Nasir's Social Contract 
Upon assuming power, after the military coup d'etat of 1952, Nasir sought to 
consolidate his rule by curtailing the power of other influential actors in society, 
such as the landowning elite. He tried to expand the autonomy of his regime by 
committing his regime to attain national and economic independence, and providing 
welfare products to the population. In return, the populace was expected to support 
the regime and give up its right to political participation. 
The main beneficiaries of this formula were middle and lower income groups that 
gained from welfare provision, in the form of land reform, food subsidies, and free 
education and health care. Civil society had no active role in this formula as the 
regime assumed a patriarchal role and expanded the functions of the state to include 
providing for society and taking the lead in industrialisation and development. 
Therefore, civil society associations were overshadowed. 
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Nasir's failure to create a 'durable legitimate system' was exposed by the defeat of 
1967. The defeat resulted in a tear in the social contract, as the regime failed to meet 
its obligations of maintaining national independence, with the loss of the Sinai. 
Furthermore, the economic difficulties that followed the war necessitated the 
retrenchment of the state. As a consequence, regime legitimacy was undermined 
because of the regime's failure to attain its declared objectives. 
With the defeat of 1967, Egyptians became cognisant of the regime's inability to 
meet their expectations. They suffered from humiliation and a loss of pride, after 
Nasir had promised to maintain their independence by adopting anti-Western non-
aligned foreign policy. All the slogans of the revolution, Arab nationalism and 
socialism, had proven to be unattainable. The Egyptians gave up their right to 
political participation for the project of national development. In return they gained 
some immediate benefits, in the form of some kind of 'welfare', mainly free health 
care and education, guaranteed employment, and land reform, which all led to an 
improvement in income distribution. 
The revolt against Nasir came in the aftermath of the defeat. The public came to 
realise that the grand national-development project and victory over their long 
portrayed external enemy, Israel, were unattainable dreams. Nasir responded to the 
rising discontent that ensued the defeat with a combination of repression, and 
political and economic liberalisation measures to contain his critics. 
The failure of the regime to meet its commitments meant that the populace was no 
longer obliged to support the regime. The populace chose to use its right to revolt 
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against its illegitimate regime. The failure of the social contract formula that held 
society together behind their regime necessitated the redefinition of the social 
contract. However, Nasir died before instating a new formula. 
Sadat's Social Contract 
When Sadat came to power, he realised the need to redetine the social contract. 
Sadat' s social contract involved peace with Israel, more economic liberalisation, 
and economic prosperity based on an alignment with the West, and limited political 
participation. 
Sadat's fust major task was to liberate the territories occupied by the Israelis in 
1967, and to end the unbearable situation of 'no war, no peace'. Once this had been 
achieved, through co-ordinating with other Arab countries and the help of the 
Soviets, Sadat set out on his project of realigning Egypt with the West and making 
peace with Israel. He believed that the way to prosperity was peace with Israel. 
Egypt could not afford to fight Israel, which was supported by the US. Furthermore, 
there was no chance of Egypt realigning with the West as long as it continued its 
war with Israel. 
In an attempt to emulate the Western liberal economic model, and following the 
recommendations of the IMF, Sadat launched the open door policy in 1974. He 
hoped to attract foreign investment, and, hence, bring economic prosperity to Egypt. 
However, the infitah was geared more towards a consumptive rather than a 
productive economy. Thus, Sadat's infitah benefited only a small segment of the 
381 
population, namely, the business elite, public officials - who had a stake in private 
investment, and the returning migrants from Arab countries. 
For middle and lower income groups there was shift from Nasir's promised spiritual 
benefits of national independence, dignity and social justice, to material economic 
benefits of welfare products offered by the state. The flow of foreign aid, oil 
revenues, proceeds from the Suez Canal, and remittances of workers from the Gulf 
enabled the regime to expand in welfare provision, and postpone an economic crisis 
until 197 6. In 1977, due to escalating economic pressures, the regime tried to 
introduce some austerity measures, namely, subsidy cuts. 
Upon the announcement of the subsidy cuts, riots erupted; beneficiaries of subsidies 
demonstrated demanding their right to food subsidy. They were submissive as long 
as they received subsidies, once subsidies were removed and it was clear that 
prosperity would not prevail, they turned against Sadat in the mass protests of 1977. 
Hence, one can conclude that the riots of 1977 were a manifestation of the failure of 
Sadat's social contract formula. 
Along with economic liberalisation, Sadat introduced some political liberalisation 
measures, promoting liberties and pluralism. He instituted a multiparty system by 
licensing political parties. Sadat tried to reinstate a controlled democracy by 
creating a loyal opposition and allowing more freedom to the press. This eventually 
led to the revival of a long stifled civil society. Nevertheless, the pluralistic 
experiment came to a halt towards the end of Sadat' s rule, as he placed many of his 
critics in jail. 
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Accordingly, at the end of Sadat's rule, the public became disillusioned with 
Sadat's formula of the social contract. Economic prosperity did not materialise; the 
separate peace deal with Israel represented a betrayal to the Arab cause. Finally, the 
limited political liberalisation experiment fell short of the public's expectations. 
Once again the regime's formula of the social contract, which proved to be so 
fragile, collapsed within less than a decade. This collapse was symbolised with the 
assassination of Sadat on 6 October 1981. 
Mubarak's Social Contract 
Mubarak: assumed office after Sadat's assassination. Throughout his rule, stability 
has been a major priority; Mubarak: sought to avoid meeting the same end as his 
predecessor. Although Mubarak:'s means to achieve this stability have been, like 
Sadat, peace with Israel, addressing Egypt's economic problems, and limited 
political participation, he has been less radical in his policies than Sadat in order to 
avoid antagonising any of his opponents. 
The peace treaty with Israel has remained in place in spite of the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon in 1982, and its expansion in settlement building. Despite demands from 
the opposition to abrogate the peace treaty, the regime has not responded to these 
demands. This is because the regime has been unwilling to risk its relations with its 
ally the US and lose the annual aid of US$3 billion. Furthermore, Mubarak: has been 
cognisant of the fact that Egypt cannot afford to enter into another war with Israel, 
especially given its economic hardships. 
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Unlike Sadat, Mubarak has not promised economic prosperity. His treatment of 
Egypt's economic problems entailed adopting economic reforms in 1991. 
Mubarak's economic policies did not translate into improvements for the majority 
of the population. The main beneficiaries, especially during the 1990s, have been 
the business elite. With the adoption of reforms, the regime intensified its 
connections with the 'recently formed' business associations of the private sector. 
This group gained political and economic influence as it was granted access to the 
'top-level economic policy-makers' .5 Thus, the 1990s proved to be a period of 
victory for Sadat's 'unfinished de-Nasirisation of Egypt' .6 
Mubarak continued with the multiparty system installed by Sadat; he allowed more 
parties to operate and granted more freedom of expression only to the extent that it 
does not jeopardise the stability of his regime. However, this strategy has only led 
to the entrenchment of authoritarian governance. 
This formula of the social contract, which emphasises material gains (economic 
welfare) at the expense of spiritual gains (liberties), does not guarantee stability. 
This is because the population may turn against the regime if they do not perceive a 
change in their material conditions. Improvement in material conditions for the 
majority of the population is not expected in the short-run because of the economic 
reforms that involve contraction in state expenditure. Given the regime's limited 
options, therefore, the only hope lies in democratisation and opening more channels 
5 Posusney, M., Labor and the State in Egypt: Workers, Unions, and Economic Restructuring, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 185. 
6 Hinnebusch, R., "The Politics of Economic Reform in Egypt", Third World Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 
1, 1993, pp. 160. 
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for participation. But the regime has been reluctant to take large steps in this 
direction because it will probably mean the end of the regime itself. 
The Egyptian Welfare State 
The definition of the welfare state used in this research is a state that provides cash 
or in-kind benefits to its citizens not in return for any contribution to output. Using 
this defmition, the author argues that there has been a welfare state in Egypt since 
1952. The welfare state was instated by Nasir, expanded under Sadat, and fmally 
retrenched during Mubarak's rule. 
Nasir's Welfare State 
When Nasir assumed power after the coup d'etat of 1952, he lacked a base of 
support for his rule. He, therefore, introduced some welfare measures to redistribute 
income in the name of social justice. These measures were identified as the rights of 
Egyptian citizens. Nasir's policies were successful in gaining the support of middle 
and lower income groups. 
The functions of the state were expanded beyond the 'traditional' domain of 
'maintaining order, collecting taxes, and delivering essential services'. The state 
was promoted by the regime as the advocator of national development. Not only did 
the state intervene to stimulate the economy and launch projects that were beyond 
385 
the capabilities of the private sector, but it was also the sponsor of social justice.7 
This, however, did not translate into legitimacy for the state. Egyptians looked at 
Nasir as their patriarch and leader who promoted their interests and welfare. Nasir's 
regime was, therefore, unable to generate 'widespread respect for procedures and 
institutions' of the state. 
As Nasir's legitimacy was not grounded in the institutions of the state, and was only 
based on his charisma and achievements, support was conditioned by his ability to 
deliver the promised independence and/or welfare products. Once Nasir failed to 
meet the promises, because of the defeat of 1967, the fragility of the social contract 
based on material gain was exposed. The military, political and economic hardships 
of 1967 made it more difficult for the regime to provide the promised social welfare 
to which it had committed itself. 
Sadat's Welfare State 
Sadat maintained the welfare state instituted by Nasir, until the economic crisis of 
1976. Following the recommendations of the IMF, the regime tried to retrench the 
welfare state by cutting down subsidies. Middle and lower income groups expected 
an improvement in their conditions because of infitah, as the regime has promised. 
Instead, the regime announced the curtailment of subsidy. 8 The attempt of the 
7 Jreisat, J., "Managing National Development in the Arab States", Arab Studies Quanerly, vol. 14, 
nos. 2 & 3, spring/summer 1992, pp. 6-7. 
8 Brumberg, D., "Survival Strategies vs. Democratic Bargains: The Politics of Economic Reform in 
Contemporary Egypt", The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East, in H. Barkey (ed.), 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 84-85. 
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regime to reduce food subsidies was, therefore, met by fierce opposition of the 
population in the food riots of 18 and 19 January 1977. 
Sadat's response to the 1977 riots was a combination of coercion and yielding to 
popular demands. The former included the arrest of as many as 1500, and passing a 
law that declared damage of public property, strikes, demonstrations, and 
association with an underground or an unrecognised political organisation illegal 
and punishable by life imprisonment. The second means involved rescinding the cut 
in subsidies, an exemption of taxes to peasants who owned less than three feddans 
and income groups with annual income less than E£500, and extension of 
subsidies. 9 
Following the riots, Sadat realised the significance of the subsidies for middle and 
lower income groups; therefore, their share in social welfare spending soared, and 
the number of subsidised food items increased. Subsidies were expanded to include 
other foodstuffs that had not been subsidised previously, not even under the 
'socialist' state of Nasir or under the harsh conditions that followed the defeat of 
1967 War. Sadat tried to appease the majority of the population by indulging them 
in the consumption of goods that they could not afford. Fish and meat were 
imported and sold at very cheap prices at the co-operatives. 
In the late 1970s, the state could afford to fmance the expansion of the welfare state. 
This was feasible because of the aid that flowed from the US and rise in oil 
9 Ansari, H., Egypt, the Stalled Society, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), pp. 
187-189. 
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revenues (especially with the return of oil fields in the Sinai), proceeds from the 
Suez Canal, which was reopened in 1975, and remittances from Egyptians working 
in the rich Gulf Arab states. However, this only bought the regime some time, as 
eventually other aspects of the social contract proved unsatisfactory, and resentment 
continued until the assassination of Sadat in 1981. 
Mubarak's Welfare State 
In the early 1980s, the reg1me tried to maintain the welfare state inherited from 
Nasir and Sadat. However, as economic problems escalated, the regime found it 
difficult to sustain high state expenditure. Egypt had a debt crisis in 1986, when it 
could not service its debt any more or even afford to buy its imports of foodstuffs 
for one month. Until then, the regime had been reluctant to adopt economic reforms. 
With the fall in oil prices, and revenues from tourism, the government could no 
longer afford to pay for subsidies. It tried to control its imports and encourage 
exports. In 1987, as it could not service its debt, Egypt asked for the rescheduling of 
its debt. Finally, in 1991, the Egyptian government, having no other alternative. was 
forced to adopt the long avoided painful structural adjustment programme. This 
coincided with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, an event that brought windfalls to 
the Egyptian economy. Here again, Egyptian foreign policy proved to be driven by 
Egypt's economic ailments. As Sadat had made a decision to sign Camp David 
Accords to stop the drain of defence expenditures on the budget and to secure aid 
from the US, Mubarak made the decic;;ion to join the US coalition, after a promise to 
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write off US$ 7 billion of Egypt's military debl. Other nations followed suit and 
forgave Egypt most of its debt. 
This gave the economy some momentum. Egypt was able to enhance its 
performance without suffering the same burden of a hangover debt that many Latin 
American countries were suffering from. The picture started to brighten up at the 
macro level. The balance of payments improved, the budget deticit shrank, and the 
government managed aptly to reduce int1ation. Upon the requirements of the IMF, 
Egypt reluctantly initiated a privatisation programme. 
The structural adjustment and the economic reform programme encompassed a 
curtailment of the welfare state. The fiscal crisis of the state, in the absence of 
sources to finance welfare expenditure, dictated the retrenchment of the state. Under 
pressure from the IMF, the regime has rationalised the welfare state. The regime has 
managed to curtail the role of the state in welfare provision, while avoiding mass 
riots because of employing several techniques. These techniques included 
obfuscation of 'winners and losers' of the privatisation process, or not announcing 
austerity measures undertaken, as was the case with food subsidies. As a 
consequence, food subsidies were reduced, and by the mid 1990s the subsidy 
covered only four commodities. Moreover, education remains only nominally free, 
as the cost of education for households has increased under Mubarak. 
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Conclusion 
This research has shown that Egyptian regimes have concluded a social contract 
with the population. The terms of the contract has entailed patronage for those who 
can he co-opted into the system, such as the opposition. 10 Successive Egyptian 
regimes have fostered a corporatist system, where the state has tried to control 
different interest groups in society through networks of patronage. However, large 
segments of society, who are employed in the informal sector (as was confirmed 
through the fieldwork), are inaccessible to the state. To reach these groups, in the 
absence of a sound process of political participation, the regime has had to employ 
other mechanisms, mainly welfare provi~ion. 
Although the state has attempted to provide education, food subsidies, health 
services, employment, housing and transportation for Egyptian 'citizens', many of 
these goods/services have not been adequate or of good quality, as was shown 
through the fieldwork in this research. These welfare products have been described 
by Rugh as serving 'more as a hope than a remedy'. 11 
The government has allocated more resources to health and education, yet a large 
proportion of these resources has been swallowed by disproportionate salaries. This 
has meant that the quality of services has deteriorated as fewer funds have been 
---~~-------
10 Jreisat, J., Politics without Process: Administering Development in the Arab World, (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 1997), pp. 96. 
11 Rugh, A., Coping with Poverty in a Cairo Community, (Cairo: American University in Cairo 
Press, The Cairo Papers in Social Science, vol. 2, monograph 1, January 1979), pp. 91. 
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allocated to the purchase of educational materials in the case of education, or drugs 
in the case of health care, or building facilities in both cases. 
This research has shown that welfare provi'lion cannot serve as a durable source of 
legitimacy. Expansion in welfare provision is constrained hy the limited resources 
of the state, which prevents it from fulfilling the demands of the rising population. 
Economic difficulties necessitate a cut down in its expenditure on welfare 
programmes. Nevertheless, it cannot retreat from its role due to the resistance of 
beneficiaries and fear of upheaval. 
The two alternative providers in thi'l case are the private sector and the voluntary 
sector; both alternatives pose problems for the state. Encouraging private 
investment m the education and health sectors will most likely lead to the 
introduction of an expensive modem service that will be beyond the financial 
capabilities of lower income groups and will not cater for their needs. 12 The 
voluntary sector, on the other hand, can cater efficiently for the needs of lower 
income groups. However, in a situation where state and/or regime legitimacy is 
weak, the success of the voluntary sector to provide for lower income groups will 
compromise the legitimacy of the state and the regime even further as the deprived 
segments of the population become more alienated from the state and their leaders. 
Thus, if the state retreats from all the aforementioned areas, it will lose the already 
weak supp011 that it enjoys. The formula of the social contract of substituting 
12 lligazf, 1., al-Faqr ji misr [Poverty in Egypt], (Cairo: The National Centre for Social and Criminal 
Research, 1996), pp. 126. 
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welfare for politics, which has heen in place since the revolution. is not functional 
anymore due to the economic difticulties of the state. The state has overstretched 
itseu· by trying to expand in welfare provision for a rising population. However, 
with the contemporary economic dilemmas, the state can no longer afford to 
provide these goods and/or services. Thus, the state has tried to cut down its welfare 
expenditure, for example through food subsidy cuts and raising the costs of 
education. As a consequence, the population, especially middle and lower income 
groups that have been promised equality, social mobility and prosperity, feel 
betrayed as what they have been offered has been eroded. 
Thus, the regime needs to provide a new formula for the social contract that 
promotes social cohesion in order to act as a durable source of legitimacy. This is 
because citizens need to feel their interests arc taken into consideration to support 
the political system not out of fear or for material gains. Mubarak has been obliged 
to redefme the social contract, by allowing more freedom of expression, allowing 
more political parties to operate, and giving civil society more space to grow, due to 
the tinancial constraints imposed on the state that dictated retrenchment. 
Retrenchment of the state will, therefore, mean that the regime will have to look for 
alternative sources of legitimacy. The remedy lies within civil society and more 
political participation. The regime should reform the political system and allow civil 
society to take on some of the obligations of the state, even if this leads to 
destabilisation of the regime. 
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The implication for the state could possibly be a stronger state through building 
stronger state institutions. In the short run, though, it will result in a loss of 
autonomy vis-a-vis society, as civil society associations arc allowed more autonomy 
in running their operations. In the long run, however. it will probably generate a 
durable legitimacy for the state, and accordingly the regime. For the current regime, 
such an option would be suicidal, but it will secure a stable source of legitimacy for 
successive regimes. 
In this formula, welfare provision by the state should be limited and not exploited as 
a means for generating legitimacy, as it has already proved to be hazardous. 
Although the state 'cannot (and should not) be the provider to every member of the 
community', it is important that the state guarantees a minimum standard of living 
for its citizens when market solutions fail and in areas where the voluntary sector 
cannot meet their needs. The regime should be able to demonstrate to its citizens, 
especially those at the lower end of the social strata that their interests are taken into 
consideration so that they do not feel socially and politically excluded from the 
system. This exclusion is inimical to the interests of the regime as it can lead to 
alienation and the loss of the support of these groups. 
The regime should realise that stability is generated through the promotion of 
liberties and inclusion, rather than exclusion, of all members of society in the socio-
political process. By affording the associations of civil society more autonomy, the 
regime encourages the contribution of members of civil society to socio-economic 
life, as the public recognises an interest in the maintenance of the system. The 
populace will come to identify an interest in the continuity of the socio-political 
393 
system. In addition, a strong, dynamic civil society can mediate between the state 
and individuals; more importantly, it can mitigate 'violence' and reduce 'the appeal 
of the violent groups that have chosen to operate outside the hounds of civil 
. ' 13 SOClety . 
The regime is aware that it can wm more support hy openrng channel<; of 
participation; yet, it fears losing control over the political system, which might not 
only mean giving up the pro-Western policies of economic liheralisation and peace 
with Israel, but even the survival of the regime itself. 14 
Ironically, by opting for limited participation, Egyptian reg1mes have denied 
themselves legitimacy, as they have failed to establish inclusive democratic 
institutions that are capable of generating genuine support. 15 
13 D. Sullivan, and S. Abed-Kotob, Islam in Contemporarv Egvpt: Civil Society vs. the State, 
(London: Lynne Rienner, 1999), pp. 92. 
14 Weinbaum, M., Egypt and the Politics of U.S. Economic Aid, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 
pp. 151-152. 
15 Zaki, M., Civil Society and Democratization in Egypt, 1981-19W, (Cairo: Konrad-Adenauer-
Stiftung, 1995), pp. 102. 
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Appendix 
Questionnaire 
A. BACKGROUND INFORMATION: 
Code Names of members Relation to Sex Age Marital Educational Members who left Reasons for Occupation Means 
of the household informant status qualification education without leaving of 
completing diploma! education income 
higher education 
' 
-··-----
DEFINITION OF THE HOUSEHOLD: One or more Individuals, related or not, living together permanently, eating, drinking and spending 
together 
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B. FOOD SUBSIDY & HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE: 
1. Does the household possess a ration card? (If no answer why, then go to question 8, 
otherwise go to question 2) 
Dyes D no 
Why? (Tick as many answers as apply) 
D the household does not need a ration card 
D items provided by the ration card are not useful 
D never applied to obtain a ration card 
D other (please specify ________ _ 
____________________________ ) 
2. Is the ration card green or red? 
Dgreen D red 
3. Does the ration card include all members of household? (If yes go to question 4, 
otherwise continue) 
Dyes D no 
I How many members does it include? 
4. Does the household use the ration card? (If never used answer why then go to question 
8, otherwise go to question 5) 
D Have not used the ration card in the D Have never used the ration card 
past 3 months 
D Have used the ration card in the past 3 
months 
Why has the household never used ration cards? (Tick as many 
answers as apply) 
D goods sold on ration cards are of poor quality 
D lot of trouble to purchase 
D other (please specify _____________ __ 
_____________________ ) 
5. Which items do you usually buy with the ration card? 
D oil D sugar 
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6. Do you consume all the rationed items? (If yes go to question 7, otherwise continue) 
0 yes 0 no 
What do you do with the items that you do not consume? (Tick as many 
answers as apply) 
0 sell them 0 give them to family/neighbours/friends 
other (please specify _________________ __ 
______________________________________________ ) 
7. Which kind of subsidy would you prefer? (If I do not know go to question 8, ·otherwise 
continue) 
0 money subsidy 
0 ration cards 
0 a mix of both 
0 I do not know 
Why do you prefer this kind of subsidy? 
0 indifferent 
8. How much does the household consume of each of the following items on average: 
D loaves of subsidised baladi bread per day D grams of tea per month 
D kilos of oil per month D kilos of beef per month 
D kilos of sugar per month D kilos of pasta per month 
D kilos of rice per month D kilos of milk per week 
D kilos of ghee per month 0 chickens per month 
D kilos of fish per month 0 kilos of cheese per month 
D kilos of fruit per month D eggs per month 
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C. EDUCATION: 
These questions should be only addressed to people who have children who are in 
education, if there is none go to section D 
9. Do any of your children go to private/experimental schools or private institutes or 
universities? (If no go to question 10, otherwise continue) 
D es Dno 
Who? Please specify the names and their number in the table of the household 
Why? (Tick as many answers as apply) 
D they have better teachers 
D to learn languages 
D classes are not overcrowded 
D the only school in the area 
D other (please specify __________________ _ 
_______________________________________________ ) 
10. Do you think the tuition fees are: 
D too much 
D reasonable 
D little 
D does not apply 
11. Do your children receive require help with their studies? (If no go to question 12, 
otherwise continue) 
D es 
They take: (Tick as many answers as apply) 
D additional group studies at school 
D help from relatives/neighbours/friends 
D lessons at MOs/COs 
D no 
D private lessons 
D nothing 
D other (please specify __ _ 
___________________ ) 
How much does it cost you on average per month? ______ E£ 
12. What stage/level of education do you want your children to attain? 
Primary Preparatory Secondary Higher education 
Boys 
Girls 
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13. Do any of your children (boys/girls) attend vocational secondary education? (If none 
write zero then go to question 16, otherwise continue) 
D boys D girls 
14. Why have these children chosen to attend vocational secondary education? 
0 it is easier than general secondary 0 the grade scored in preparatory 
education certificate was too low 
0 it is more useful than general 0 other (please specify ____ _ 
secondary education 
_______________________ ) 
15. Have they benefited from their vocational studies? (lfyes go to question 16, otherwise 
continue) 
0 yes 0 no 
I 
Why have they not benefited from their vocational education? 
(Tick as many answers as apply) 
0 studies are too theoretical 
0 lack of proper equipment/ material to work with 
0 teachers are not qualified 
0 other (please specify _______________ __ 
______________________________________ ) 
16. What do you think secures a better life for your children? (If education only then go to 
question 17, otherwise continue) 
0 learning a craft 0 education only 
0 both 
Why? Because learning a craft allows him to (Tick as many answers as apply) 
0 provides the child with more 0 provides additional income for the 
opportunity to get a job family at an early age 
0 provides the child with an 0 other (please specify _____ _ 
opportunity to earn higher income ) 
17. Why do you send your children to school? (Tick as many answers as apply) 
0 to keep the children off the street 0 education gives the children a better 
0 education enables the children to have 
more job opportunities in life 
0 education provides more opportunity for 
the children to earn higher income in the 
future 
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understanding of life 
0 education provides social status for 
the children in the future 
0 other (please specify _____ _ 
______________________ ) 
D. IlEAL TH-CARE: 
18. In the last month, has anyone in the household suffered from any illness other than 
cold? (If no or cannot remember then go to question 19, otherwise continue) 
Dyes D chronic illness D no D cannot re 
Did all those who needed treatment go for medical advice? (1fnone of them had 
treatment answer why then go to question 19, if all of them had treatment answer 
where then go to question 19, otherwise continue) 
D no one had treatment 0 all of them had treatment 
D some of them had treatment 
Why? (Tick as many answers as apply) 
D there is no clinic/hospital near you 0 financial reasons 
D other (please specify ) 
Where did they go for medical advice: (Tick as many answers as apply) 
D public hospital D clinic/polyclinic affiliated with an 
MO 
D private clinic/polyclinic/hospital D repeated medication 
D clinic/polyclinic affiliated with a D other (please specify 
co 
Instructions for the researcher: 
These questions directed to those who have children less than 16 years old, if there is 
none go to question 21 
19. In which type of illness would you take a CHILD in your household to seek medical 
advice from the doctor? 
D Everything D serious illness 
20. Where would you take a CHILD in your household to receive medical treatment (Tick 
as many answers as apply). 
) 
member 
D school clinic 
D nearest public hospital 
D clinic/polyclinic affiliated with a CO 
0 clinic/polyclinic affiliated with a MO 
D private clinic/polyclinic/hospital D other (please specify ___ _ 
___________________ ) 
401 
21. In which type of illness would any ADULT member in your household seek medical 
advice from the doctor? (If everything go to question 22, otherwise continue) 
0 everything 0 serious illness 
Why? (Tick as many answers as apply) 
0 medical treatment is very expensive 
0 do not trust doctors 
0 fear of doctors and medicine 
0 other (please specify 
_______ ) 
22. Where would you would any ADULT member in your household go to receive 
medical treatment (Tick as many answers as apply). 
0 health insurance for workers and employees 0 clinic/polyclinic affiliated with a CO 
0 nearest public hospital 0 clinic/polyclinic affiliated with a MO 
0 private clinic/polyclinic/hospital 0 other (please specify ______ _ 
_____________ ) 
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23. To what extent do you dis/agree with the following statements about each type of medical centre. 
agree, neutral, disagree, not applicable 
doctors/nurses are doctors/nurses are caring proper equipment is available 
knowled2eable 
public hospital 
clinic affiliated with a 
co 
private clinic/polyclinic/ 
hosoital 
health insurance for 
workers and emolovees 
school clinic 
clinic affiliated with an 
MO 
other (please specify 
) 
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service is affordable 
24. Do you have problems obtaining medicine? (If no or does not apply then go to question 
25, otherwise continue) 
D does not apply 
--~~---------------.----------------------
D es D no 
What are these problems? (Tick as many answers as apply) 
D too expensive D not available 
D other (please specify ------------------------------
_______________________________________ ) 
E. INCOME: 
25. What is the total gross income of the household? 
D less than £E100 D £E251- £E350 
D £E101- £E150 D £E351- £E500 
D £E151 - £E250 D £E501 - £E700 
D £E70 1 - £E900 
D £E901 - £E1000 
D more than £El 000 
26. What are the sources of income in your household? 
Source yes does not apply occasional 
work 
assistance from the state 
(please specify 
) 
assistance from MOs 
assistance from COs 
assistance from individuals 
assistance from relatives 
pension 
inheritance 
other (please specify 
) 
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